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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 1. The Changing Contours of International Law: Inside/outside upside 
down! 
 
Since the end of the Cold War or so we have witnessed an increasing use and 
relevance of international legal and law-like concepts and vocabularies in world 
politics. From the field of development economics1 to the regulation of global 
financial markets2 to the control of climate change3 or the use of force and the 
application of violence4, it seems that today everything has to be framed with a 
touch of (international) law. At the turn of the century, this development has been 
famously described as the “legalization of world politics”, namely that “the world is 
witnessing a move to law” in more and more issue areas.5 Related processes such 
as, for example, a rapid expansion of the international judiciary (also coined: 
‘judicialization’), which in turn is manifested in the proliferation and increasing 
relevance of permanent and non-permanent international courts and dispute 
mechanisms, have also been highlighted.6 In short, as one observer noted recently: 
“The big debates in world politics today are inseparable from international law”.7 
This growth of international legal activity is widely identified with progress as it is 
                                                      
1 See David Kennedy, ‘Law and Development Economics: Toward a New Alliance?’, in Law and 
Economics with Chinese Characteristics: Institutions for Promoting Development in the Twenty-First 
Century, ed. David Kennedy and Joseph E. Stieglitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 19–70. 
As Tor Krever observes, ‘since the early 1990s, and especially in the new century, law has taken 
centre stage in development thinking’, Tor Krever, ‘Quantifying Law: Legal Indicator Projects and 
the Reproduction of Neoliberal Common Sense’, Third World Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2013): 131. 
2 See Annelise Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
3 See Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 4. 
4 See David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
5 Judith Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics’, International Organization 
54, no. 3 (2000): 385. 
6 See, for example, Karen J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights, 
2013; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and 
Bernhard Zangl, ‘Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of Dispute Settlement under GATT and the 
WTO’, International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 4 (2008): 825–54. 
7 Ian Hurd, How to Do Things with International Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 
1. 
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seen as an important ‘building block’ for global governance and a possibility to 
finally ‘tame’ international politics by ‘speaking law to power’.8 
 
 Simultaneously to this more general turn towards international legal and 
law-like vocabularies, we can notice a shift within the vocabulary of international 
law itself. For this thesis three structural changes are of particular significance. 
First, the phenomenological growth and extension of legality, i.e. the spread of legal 
and law-like vocabularies, goes hand-in-hand with an increasing relevance of 
international legal experts and expertise. To speak of international legal expertise 
indicates that international law itself has become a field of expertise. On the one 
hand, this is facilitated by the growing complexity and technicality of the 
international legal discourse – something that touches also recent debates on the 
deformalization, bureaucratization and constitutionalisation of international law 
and is said to manifest itself, e.g., in the emergence of a global administrative law9; 
on the other hand, the international legal discourse has developed into various 
specialised discourses (such as, e.g., international humanitarian law, international 
human rights law and international criminal law) with distinct forms of expertise 
and distinct groups of experts – something that is addressed in the literatures on 
the pluralisation, compartmentalisation and fragmentation of  international law.10 
 
 Second, as many observers notice, we are also witnessing a shift in the 
temporal structure of the international legal argument, i.e. in the temporality of 
international law. Prominent examples in this context encompass the question of 
anticipatory self-defence, such as in the Bush administration pre-emption doctrine, 
or the precautionary politics in the so-called ‘war on terror’. What is common in 
these examples is a shift from the ‘past-oriented’ logic of traditional international 
law (and law in general) towards more ‘future-oriented’ logics in international law. 
International law has increasingly to deal with questions of what might happen in 
                                                      
8 See, for example, Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn, eds., Verrechtlichung - Baustein für Global 
Governance? (Bonn: Dietz, 2004). On attempts to ‘speak law to power’ see David Kennedy, ‘Speaking 
Law to Power’, Wisconsin International Law Journal 23, no. 1 (2004): 173–81. 
9 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law’, Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (2005): 15. 
10 I will address the literatures on the constitutionalisation, bureaucratization, fragmentation, 
pluralisation, etc. of international law in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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the future and is not limited to the evaluation of possible past and current 
wrongdoings anymore. 
 
 Third, and most important for this thesis, it is the rise of what Ruti Teitel has 
described as a “paradigm shift” towards “humanity’s law” (or “humanity law”).11 
Namely, where international law was for a long time characterized in the language 
of a voluntarist inter-state law, i.e. as a law “that governs the relationship between 
independent states”12 – and nothing else –, it is now increasingly conceived in 
other terms: states, sovereign and with exclusive jurisdiction over their territory, 
are not seen – as it was the case with the ‘Westphalian order’ – as the ‘solution’ to 
international violence, imperial vision and alien rule anymore. It seems that we 
witness an opposing trend, as today states are increasingly portrayed as the 
‘problem’ and, consequently, as something that needs to be ‘tamed’. 
Insight/outside upside down! As the new solution to this new problem a new 
international law is presented – a law where not states but human beings as 
persons and peoples are the main addresses, the ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of law.13 
The new subjects of international law are, as Teitel notes, often “organized along 
affiliate ties (such as race, religion, and ethnicity) that extend beyond the state and 
even beyond nationality”.14 For Teitel, the rise of ‘humanity’s law’ reveals that the 
“normative foundations of the international legal order have shifted from an 
emphasis on state security – that is, security defined by borders, statehood, 
territory, and so on – to a focus on human security; the security of persons and 
peoples”.15 Moreover, as Teitel writes, “[h]umanity law is universalizing enough to 
offer a new legal and political subjectivity. This subjectivity is defined and shaped 
                                                      
11 Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 8 (emphasis added). 
Throughout this thesis I refer mainly to ‘humanity’ and ‘humanity’s law’. For a discussion of the 
similarities and differences of the concept of humanity vis-a-vis the neighbouring concepts 
mankind and human dignity see: Britta van Beers, Luigi Corrias, and Wouter Werner, ‘Introduction: 
Probing the Boundaries of Humanity’, in Humanity across International Law and Biolaw, ed. Britta 
van Beers, Luigi Corrias, and Wouter Werner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5–9. 
12 This is, of course, the classic formulation of the Lotus case: Permanent Court of International 
Justice, ‘The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”’, in Publications of the Permanent Court of Justice: Collection of 
Judgments, Series A, No. 10, 1927, 18. 
13 This runs, of course, against traditional formulations a la Lassa Oppenheim’s: ‘Since the Law of 
Nations is based on the common consent of individual States, and not of individual human beings, 
States solely and exclusively are the subjects of International Law’. As a consequence, for 
Oppenheim, ‘individuals are never subjects but always objects of the Law of Nations’ Lassa 
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. I: Peace (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905), 
18, 345. 
14 Teitel, Humanity’s Law, 15. 
15 Teitel, 4. 
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by the humanity concept itself, and is articulated and achieved through the 
multiplication of claims in diverse actors’ struggles over access to courts and other 
institutions of global law”.16 This shift towards ‘humanity’s law’ materializes, 
according to Teitel, in particular in the rise of three – for a long time irrelevant – 
strands of international law, namely international human rights law, international 
criminal law and a restructuring of the law of wars (or international humanitarian 
law).17 In this regard, international criminal law, for instance, has developed its 
own international judiciary, encompassing ad-hoc tribunals, hybrid courts and the 
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague; ‘rights’ as ‘human 
rights’ have become, in the words of Duncan Kennedy, “universal legal linguistic 
units”;18 and, in the context of international humanitarian law the discourse of 
international interventions has fundamentally changed as the for and against of 
interventions is not discussed in a vocabulary of ‘order’, ‘national interest’, 
‘balance of power’, ‘Realpolitik’ or ‘security imperatives’ anymore but increasingly 
of ‘legality’, ‘justice’ or through new – at least on the international level new – legal 
and law-like terms such as ‘rule of law’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘self-determination’, 
‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and ‘responsibility’. 
 
 2. The Politics of International Law 
 
Yet, as it was already the case with the literature on regimes in the 1980s or on 
global governance in the 1990s, the diagnosis of critical scholars at the intersection 
of International Relations (IR) and International Law (IL) still stands:19 even if the 
observation of the legalization literature that the ‘world is witnessing a move to 
law’ and that this also changes the structure of the international legal argument 
and the constitutive rules of world politics, a scientific positivist epistemology is 
                                                      
16 Teitel, 216. 
17 Teitel, 4–5. 
18 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000’, in The New Law 
and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal, ed. David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 66. 
19 As a matter of convenience, I follow Nicholas Onuf’s suggestion that disciplines and fields of study 
will always be designated by Upper Case, their subject of study by lower case, Nicholas Onuf, World 
of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1989), 1. Nevertheless, it is important to note, and this applies more to IL 
than to IR, that the separation between academic fields and disciplines and their subject is never a 
sharp one. The relationship between both should rather be seen as co-constitutive. 
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poorly equipped to grasp the intersubjective ontology of its object(s) of study – 
and that as a consequence we should turn to interpretive methodologies instead if 
we want to understand and study the role and rule of and through law on a global 
level in a more promising way.20 This thesis is located at the intersection of critical 
approaches in IR (mainly the more ‘radical’ strand of constructivism) and IL 
(mainly what developed from the critical legal studies movement). These 
literatures are sometimes also assembled under the term ‘politics of international 
law’.21 
 
 Broadly speaking, critical approaches in IR and IL point to the fact that law 
and politics are not isolated realms but that law and politics constitute each other. 
As, for example, Martti Koskenniemi states, it is wrong to assume that the ‘politics 
of international law’ would be “about international law and politics. The 
                                                      
20 This was in particular the core argument by Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerad Ruggie in the 
midst of the regime debate: Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International 
Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, International Organization 40, no. 4 (1986): 
753–75. For a rearticulation of this critique with regard to the literature on ‘legalization’ see 
Kratochwil in Shirley Scott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Legalization: 
Interpreting the Empirical Evidence’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 96 (2002): 291–98; and, for global governance, see, for example, Ole Jacob 
Sending and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and 
Power’, International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2006): 651–72. 
21 This thesis aims to contribute to discussions among critical scholars in both disciplines. 
Nevertheless, the point of departure of some discussions lies rather in the confines of IR than IL (in 
particular in Chapter 2). More generally: The term ‘politics of international law’ goes back to Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, European Journal of International Law 1, no. 1 
(1990): 4–32. For a discussion of different ways to conceptualise the ‘politics of international law’ 
see, for example, Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Philip Liste, ‘Völkerrechtspolitik. Zu Trennung und 
Verknüpfung von Politik und Recht der Weltgesellschaft’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 
2005, 209–49. There have been various attempts to substitute the ‘international’ in ‘international 
law’ through notions such as ‘transnational law’: cf. Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1956); ‘transnational legal process’: cf. Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law?’, Yale Law Journal 106 (1997): 2599–2659; ‘transnational legal 
pluralism’: cf. Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Legal Pluralism’, Transnational Legal Theory 1, no. 2 
(2010): 141–89; ‘legal pluralism’: cf. John Griffiths, ‘What Is Legal Pluralism?’, Journal of Legal 
Pluralism 24 (1986): 1–55; and Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’, Law & Society Review 22, no. 5 
(1988): 869–96; ‘postmodern law’: cf. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. 
Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law’, Journal of Law and Society 14, no. 3 (1987): 279–302; 
‘global law’ Gunther Teubner, Global Law Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997); or ‘law 
and globalization’ Paul Schiff Berman, ‘From International Law to Law and Globalization’, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 43 (2005): 485–556. Although I am sympathetic with many of these 
approaches as they point to the limits of the concept of ‘the international’ (as it, e.g., reifies the 
inside/outside distinction and focuses mainly on what happens between states), I will stick to this 
concept and follow attempts of ‘generalising the international’: Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss, 
‘Generalising the International’, Review of International Studies 31, no. 3 (2005): 451–72. In 
particular, to speak of ‘the international’ in terms of ‘world society’ (in a Luhmannian sense) seems 
to be a promising avenue, see Oliver Kessler, ‘World Society’, in Routledge Handbook of 
International Political Sociology, ed. Xavier Guillaume and Pinar Bilgin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 
101–10. 
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conjunctive form would suggest a meeting of two separately identifiable entities 
whose action upon each other would then be the subject of analysis”.22 For 
Koskenneimi, law and politics are instead only two sides of the same coin. As 
Koskenniemi explains, on the one hand, it is “impossible to make substantive 
decisions within the law which would imply no political choice”,23 while, on the 
other hand, international politics is always embedded in international legal 
language as international law provides “the conditions of possibility for the 
existence of the ‘international’ […]. If international law did not exist, political 
actors would need to invent it”. 24 This latter point mirrors also Fleur Johns 
formulation of studying international law as “the continual making and remaking 
of global political possibilities”.25 Moreover, critical scholars in both fields leave 
behind the idea that it is possible and desirable to define ex ante, i.e. by a 
stipulative (working) definition, what (international) law ‘is’; instead, they 
understand (international) legality as a certain practice, which has to be 
reconstructed.26 If one pursues this avenue, law becomes part of processes of 
sense and world making.27 However, these processes of sense and world making 
do not come without rule, authority and power. This calls attention, on the one 
hand, to the “constitutive functions of law: the way in which law produces reality, 
symbolic orders, and power” and, on the other hand, it emphasises that “legal 
arguments are embedded in and reproduce deeper-lying social and symbolic 
structures that make certain argumentative moves look more acceptable than 
others”.28 To study the ‘politics of international law’ in such a way requires, in the 
end, an inquiry of the “productive power of legal arguments” as well as to examine 
                                                      
22 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Preface’, in The Politics of International Law, ed. Martti Koskenniemi 
(Oxford: Hart, 2011), v (emphasis in the original). 
23 Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, 31. 
24 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 
reissue with a new epilogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), xiii (emphasis in the 
original). 
25 Fleur Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 1. 
26 Cf. Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja E. Aalberts, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Introduction: 
Legality, Interdisciplinarity and the Study of Practices’, in The Power of Legality: Practices of 
International Law and Their Politics, ed. Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja E. Aalberts, and Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1–25. Additionally, by 
concentrating on practices of legality, the perennial question whether international law is really 
‘law’ becomes irrelevant. 
27 For the classic formulation see Onuf, World of Our Making. 
28 Wouter Werner, ‘The Use of Law in International Political Sociology’, International Political 
Sociology 4, no. 3 (2010): 305. 
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the blind spots, biases, tensions, contradictions, paradoxes and mechanisms of 
exclusion being part of it.29 
 
 To study the ‘productive power of legal arguments’, implies also mean to 
reformulate the concept of ‘legalization’ as the “process whereby things, problems, 
issues, and facts are made ‘legal’” 30  – of how the ‘international’ is 
“jurimorphised”.31 Such an understanding of ‘legalisation’ deals also with the 
“formation and transformation of boundaries”.32 Firstly, it draws attention on the 
shifting boundaries between ‘legality’, its oppositional concepts – being them ‘a-
legality’33 or different forms of ‘non-legality’34 – as well as neighbouring concepts 
such as ‘legitimacy’.35 To speak of ‘a-legality’, ‘non-legality’ and ‘legitimacy’ helps 
here also to overcome the simple dichotomy of legal/illegal. Secondly, it highlights 
the ordering dynamics and boundary conflicts between different vocabularies and 
strands of international law: classical public international law foreground the role 
of states as main subjects of international law and conceptualise the international 
as divided into national territories; international economic lawyers emphasise the 
role of central banks, multinational enterprises or currency flows and segregate 
the global between these entities; international criminal law (as other forms of 
‘Humanity’s law’) highlights  individuals (as victims, perpetrators or prosecutors) 
and is often accompanied by discussions over the notion of universal jurisdiction. 
These different strands of international law identify different ‘global’ problems and 
                                                      
29 Werner, 305; see also Filipe dos Reis and Oliver Kessler, ‘Constructivism and the Politics of 
International Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, ed. Anne Orford and 
Florian Hoffmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 344–64. 
30 Oliver Kessler, ‘The Same as It Never Was? Uncertainty and the Changing Contours of 
International Law’, Review of International Studies 37, no. 5 (2011): 2166; see also Kessler, ‘World 
Society’, 108. 
31 The term ‘jurimorphised’ goes back to Kyle McGee’s discussion of the way Bruno Latour 
conceptualises the ‘passage of law’. It describes the way the ‘various entities and agents at stake are 
semiotically re-figured’ when turned into law, Kyle McGee, ‘On Devices and Logics of Legal Sense: 
Towards Socio-Technical Legal Analysis’, in Latour and the Passage of Law, ed. Kyle McGee 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 64. See also my discussion of Latour’s approach to 
law in Chapter 4. 
32 Werner, ‘The Use of Law in International Political Sociology’, 307. 
33 Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013); and Hans Lindahl, ‘A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of 
Legal Boundaries’, The Modern Law Review 73, no. 1 (2010): 30–56. 
34 Fleur Johns identifies various forms of non-legalities: illegality, extra-legality, pre. and post-
legality, supra-legality and infra-legality. See Johns, Non-Legality in International Law, 1. 
35 Cf. Filipe dos Reis and Oliver Kessler, ‘The Power of Legality, Legitimacy and the (im)possibility of 
Interdisciplinary Research’, in The Power of Legality: Practices of International Law and Their 
Politics, ed. Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja Aalberts, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 99–124. 
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translate them into certain solutions as they encapsulate also different causal, 
agentic, temporal or spatial understandings of the ‘international’. Importantly, they 
do not only coexist in isolation of each other but intersect and often struggle with 
each other. 
 
 Finally, this has important repercussions for the three structural changes of 
international law to which I pointed at the outset of this chapter. First, with regard 
to the proliferation and increasing relevance of international legal experts and 
expertise, critical approaches call attention to the fact that legal experts and 
expertise are part of sense and world making dynamics. Expertise is not conceived 
as something technical (in the sense of being neutral and a-political) anymore. For 
example, David Kennedy argues that international legal experts ‘translate’ 
problems into their vocabularies and offer, then, solutions on the basis of these 
vocabularies. Obviously these translations are never neutral or mere 
transpositions from one context into another – translations serve as sites of open 
mediation, rewriting and negotiation of boundaries. What we see is then the 
boundary work or management of boundaries of and through law. Hence, Kennedy 
conceptualises international legal experts as ‘people with projects’ or ‘people 
pursuing projects’ – and these people pursue different projects.36 Here, the co-
constitutive or  “performative dimension of expert practice” comes to the fore: 
“expert work constituting the space of its own expertise”. 37  Second, the 
temporalisation of international law can then be understood as a struggle between 
different expert vocabularies and their related temporalities (often between legal 
norms and vocabularies of risk) – it is a struggle at international law’s temporal 
border about “how international law imagines, and helps to imagine, the future”.38 
These “legal imaginaries of the future” have in turn “serious consequences for the 
present”39 – as they are a struggle between different “present futures”.40 The 
                                                      
36 David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, Ohio Northern University Law Review 34 
(2008): 827–60. 
37 David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 4. 
38 Mónika Ambrus, Rosemary Rayfuse, and Wouter Werner, ‘Risk and International Law’, in Risk 
and the Regulation of Uncertainty in International Law, ed. Mónika Ambrus, Rosemary Rayfuse, and 
Wouter Werner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5. 
39 Ambrus, Rayfuse, and Werner, 5–6. 
40 See Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern Society’, Social 
Research 43, no. 1 (1976): 130–52. I will take up this discussion in Chapter 7. 
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‘politics of international law’ can then be understood as a “politics of framing”.41 
Moreover, this struggle transforms and blurs existing legal categories, creates new 
categories and makes new practices possible such as targeted killings in the 
context of the so-called ‘war on terror’ or practices of intervention for the sake of 
‘humanity’. Third, critical approaches shed light to the ‘darker’ sides of global 
governance in general and ‘humanity’s law’ in particular.42 To remind us of the 
‘darker’ sides of ‘humanity’s law’ means that often well-intended schemes to 
improve the human condition come with non-intended side effects, blind spots, 
power dynamics and exclusionary mechanism. For instance, critical voices remind 
us that the notion of ‘justice’ in recent debates about international criminal justice 
is rooted in longstanding Western traditions of thought – thereby becomes a 
“universalization of western particularities”43 – and can thus have problematic 
effects when applied in an non-Western context;44 others call attention to the 
biopolitical effects of the recent inversion of the inside/outside dichotomy.45 
 
 In general terms, the core argument of this thesis is that ‘humanity’s law’ 
does not only introduce new forms of subjectivity to the international legal 
discourse but also redescribes the politics of space and the politics of time in 
international law. It redescribes the politics of space, as ‘humanity’ does not work 
through a spatial logic of an already extended territory but rather through a notion 
of extending space. It redescribes the politics of time as ‘humanity’ challenges the 
traditional past-oriented temporality of international law and sets up the 
conditions of possibility to introduce a future-oriented temporality of a ‘humanity 
to come’. Importantly, we should not conceptualise the politics of space and the 
politics of time as independent of each other.  
 
                                                      
41 Ambrus, Rayfuse, and Werner, ‘Risk and International Law’, 5. 
42 See Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Legalism and the “Dark” Sides of Global Governance’, in International 
Law-Making: Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers, ed. Rain Liivoja and Jarna Petman (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2014), 39–56; and David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
43 Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Multiple Modernities or Global Interconnections: Understanding the 
Global Post the Colonial’, in Varieties of World-Making: Beyond Globalization, ed. Nathalie 
Karagiannis and Peter Wagner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 59. 
44 For further discussion, see, for example, Sarah M. H. Nouwen, ‘Justifying Justice’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law, ed. James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 327–51. 
45 Cf. Jens Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 
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 The broader aim of this thesis is thus to reconstruct shifts in the structure of 
the international legal argument and world politics connected to the emerging 
‘humanity’s law’, in particular with regard to international criminal law (and to 
some extend the intervention discourse): how do traditional legal and political 
categories change? how are, for instance, images of spatiality, temporality and 
subjectivity shifting? how do different forms of international legal expertise 
struggle over discursive hegemony? how is then global authority, power and order 
redescribed?  
 
 3. Of Reconstruction, Projects and Jurisdiction 
 
In order to boil these rather broad questions down and make the whole endeavour 
more feasible, I will rely on the logic of reconstruction as underlying logic of 
inquiry and use two guiding concepts: projects and jurisdiction. This will provide 
the methodological bedrock of this thesis. Let me briefly illustrate what I mean by 
reconstruction, projects and jurisdiction. 
 
3.1 Reconstruction 
 
This thesis follows the logic of reconstruction as its underlying logic of inquiry. As 
for example Benjamin Herborth has pointed out, the logic of reconstruction is 
usually contrasted to the logic of subsumption.46 On the one hand, the logic of 
subsumption follows primarily the outline of a (scientific positivist) course in 
research design. These courses often start with establishing stipulative (working) 
                                                      
46 Benjamin Herborth, ‘Rekonstruktive Forschungslogik’, in Handbuch der internationalen Politik, 
ed. Carlo Masala, Frank Sauer, and Andreas Wilhelm (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2010), 265–84; see 
also Oliver Kessler, ‘Keynote: Reconstructive Methods and the Politics of International Law’ (EISA 
Young Researcher’s Workshop: (Re)Constructing Violence: Norms, Knowledge, and International 
Legal Discourse, Catania, 22 September 2015). The concept of reconstruction is part of the 
vocabulary of constructivism since its inception in IR. Indeed, the first paragraph of Nicholas Onuf’s 
World of Our Making, where the term ‘constructivism’ is introduced to IR, reads: ‘The point of this 
book is to reconstruct a self-consciously organized field of study, or discipline, called International 
Relations. To do so necessarily involves reconsideration of international relations as something to 
study.t I use the term “reconstruct” deliberately, both because my goal is ambitious and because I 
am committed to a philosophical position [...], which I call “constructivism.” In my view, people 
always construct, or constitute, social reality, even as their being, which can only be social, is 
constructed for them’, Onuf, World of Our Making, 1. 
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definitions of core concepts and categories47, operationalize these definitions then 
in order to make them measurable and then test different theories, variables and 
hypotheses against the empirical material (data).48 This scheme serves as a pre-
given ideal of how to conduct research. Moreover, it is connected with a 
progressive imaginary of science, i.e. as an enterprise of discovering more and 
more (hidden) scientific laws of the world and generating thus cumulative 
knowledge: the more we test and measure, the more we know. As this logic of 
inquiry is mainly concerned with the measurement of empirical phenomena (in 
order to make them suitable for theory testing), it becomes essentially method-
driven. Method is hierarchically superior to theory, which in turn stands over 
empirics.49 What becomes visible here is that theory and its object of study 
(understood in terms of the ‘empirical’) are clearly separated and the latter 
subsumed under the former; what also becomes visible is that, for example, the 
work on concepts and categories is limited to establishing (working) definitions at 
the outset of the research process – once this is done, it is assumed that the 
meaning of concepts and categories is fixed (no ambiguity, no indeterminacy) and 
empirical phenomena can be subsumed under them. 
  
Yet, on the other hand, the reconstructive logic of inquiry does not start 
with the fixation of concepts and categories but rather start with asking what kind 
of concepts and categories are relevant in a given field. In other words, these 
concepts do not derive from abstract theorising in advance but through an 
engagement and problematization of the object of study at hand. In other words, 
this logic of inquiry is mainly problem-oriented. Moreover, the research process is a 
constant back and forth between theories, methodologies, methods and concepts. 
Here, in particular, methodology is important as it connects and translates 
                                                      
47 See already Gottlob Frege: ‘A Definition of a concept (of a possible predicate) must be complete; it 
must unambiguously determine, as regards any object, whether or not it falls under the concept’: 
Gottlob Frege, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and 
Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), 159. 
48 This kind of research design is introduced to students of IR mainly through the textbooks of Gary 
King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Stephen Van Evera, Guide 
to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
49 This goes hand-in-hand with a certain centre-periphery dynamic with regard to research 
practice. While method and theory is developed in the (Western) centre, the (non-Western) 
periphery is not seen as place of method and theory development but, at best, of data generation. 
For further discussion see Pinar Bilgin, The International in Security, Security in the International 
(London: Routledge, 2017), chap. 1. 
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between the various elements of research.50 This does not mean that “deep 
theorising” 51  is not possible; but it means that ‘absolute knowing’ is not 
attainable.52 Theories, methodologies, methods and concepts are part of the social 
fabric – science is a social activity – as there is no Archimedian point from where to 
derive them in a ‘neutral’ way – there is no incontestable ‘view from nowhere’.53 As 
a result, theory and object of study are not perfectly separable. This implies also, as 
Jörg Friedrich and Friedrich Kratochwil remind us, that we must recognise in the 
end that “neither lofty theory nor clueless research activism can provide secure 
foundations for our knowledge” and that we should “instead seek knowledge that 
will enable us to deal with relevant problems and, ultimately, to find our way 
through the complexities of the social world”.54 Scientific practice helps thus ‘to go 
on’ or in ‘muddling through’ the world and provides thus orientation in our daily 
lives.55 
 
Importantly, the work on concepts and categories is not done when they are 
‘fixed’ as it is the case with the logic of subsumption. When following the logic of 
reconstruction, the work on concepts and categories can move into the centre of 
analysis. However, here the aim is not to ‘fix’ a concept and establish (or find) clear 
boundaries vis-à-vis other concepts. Instead, the goal is to ‘reconstruct’ how a 
concept is ‘used’ and what it ‘does’ in a specific context.56 When we take the 
example of the concept of (international) law, the aim is not to ‘fix’ the meaning of 
(international) law – of what (international) law ‘is’ – but to inquire into the use 
and performative effects of (international) law. This implies also that concepts do 
not have pre-given meaning and clear boundaries but that their boundaries are 
                                                      
50 Herborth, ‘Rekonstruktive Forschungslogik’, 262. 
51  Felix Berenskötter, ‘Deep Theorizing in International Relations’, European Journal of 
International Relations, forthcoming. 
52 Cf. Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, Leiden Journal of International Law 25, no. 3 (2012): 
621. 
53 See, for example, Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Of False Promises and Good Bets: A Plea for a Pragmatic 
Approach to Theory Building (the Tartu Lecture)’, Journal of International Relations and 
Development 10, no. 1 (2007): 1–15. 
54 Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance 
International Relations Research and Methodology’, International Organization 63, no. 4 (2009): 
726. 
55 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, trans. 
Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969). 
56 This goes, of course, back to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953); and John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1962). 
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always ‘fuzzy’ or “blurred”57 and that the boundary work of concepts serves as 
place for political contestation.58 To analyse concepts in such a way means also to 
reconstruct the use and performative effects of concepts over time, i.e. historically. 
 
Such an understanding of reconstruction as logic of inquiry goes also hand-
in-hand with what Anne Orford recently advocated as “praise of description”.59 
Following mainly Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work and Michel Foucault, Orford 
argues that we should start our research process with reconstructing and 
problematizing (international legal) practices.60 Citing Wittgenstein – “We must do 
away with explanation, and description alone must take its place”61 –, Orford 
points out that we should not look for the deep structures of language and search 
for underlying absolute truths. For Orford, such an account continuous to be 
‘critical’ as it is still possible to ask questions with regard to rule, authority, power 
and mechanisms of exclusion. It does also not mean that we should abandon 
theorization and pursue instead a naked empiricism but it means that theorization 
works always in dialogue with a problem at stake. Instead of analysing deep 
                                                      
57 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 71. The question of whether the boundaries of 
concepts are fixed or fuzzy goes back to the controversy between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gottlob 
Frege. Frege remarked, that ‘the concept must have a sharp boundary. If we represent concepts in 
extension by areas on a plane, this is admittedly a picture that may be used only with caution, but 
here it can do us good service. To a concept without sharp boundary there would correspond an 
area that had not a sharp boundary-line all round, but in places just vaguely faded away into the 
background. This would not really be an area at all; and likewise a concept that is not sharply 
defined is wrongly termed a concept. Such quasi-conceptual constructions cannot be recognized as 
concepts by logic; it is impossible to lay down precise laws for them. The law of excluded middle is 
really just another form of the requirement that the concept should have a sharp boundary. Any 
object Δ that you choose to take either falls under the concept Φ or does not fall under it; tertium 
non datur’: Frege, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 159. Wittgenstein 
answers: ‘Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot 
be called an area at all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything with it.—But is it 
senseless to say: “Stand roughly there”? Suppose that I were standing with someone in a city square 
and said that. As I say it I do not draw any kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my hand—as if 
I were indicating a particular spot. And this is just how one might explain to someone what a game 
is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way.—I do not, however, mean 
by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I—for some reason—
was unable to express; but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving 
examples is not an indirect means of explaining—in default of a better. For any general definition 
can be misunderstood too. The point is that this is how we play the game. (I mean the language-
game with the word “game”.)’: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 71. 
58 This is the idea of treating concepts as ‘essentially contested’, William E. Connolly, The Terms of 
Political Discourse, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 
59 Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’. 
60 Orford uses the concept of practice rather in the way the more radical constructivists do. For a 
discussion of the limitations of the ‘practice turn’ within the more conventional constructivist camp 
in IR see also Oliver Kessler, ‘Practices and the Problem of World Society’, Millennium 44, no. 2 
(2016): 269–77. 
61 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 109 (emphasis in the original). 
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structures, Orford suggests to follow Foucault and Wittgenstein and “‘to make 
visible precisely what is visible’ – and arrange ‘what we have always known’”.62 In 
concrete terms, for example, the mapping of discourses and language games can 
provide valuable insights as a map never perfectly mirrors a ‘world out there’ but 
represents always an act of abstraction as it orders the world in a specific way.63 
Additionally, if we understand mapping in a way as Orford does, it comes very 
close to what Wittgenstein once called ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’.64 There have 
been difficulties to translate this term into English – it was either translated as 
“surveyable representation” or, better, “perspicuous representation”. 65  The 
concept of ‘perspicuous representation’ (übersichtliche Darstellung) is central in 
the Philosophical Investigations as it describes the aim of Wittgenstein’s 
grammatical investigations. The idea is to give a ‘clearer (over)view of the use of 
the words’ by ‘seeing connections’ (in the way Wittgenstein uses the term ‘family 
resemblances’) but without providing a systematic account of some deep structure 
of the grammar.66 Put differently, it is a way of ordering our descriptions – of 
making them clearer and providing orientation in order ‘to find our way through 
the complexities of the social world’. 
 
                                                      
62 Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, 618. The quote ‘to make visible what is visible’ is Foucault’s. For 
Foucault’s original statement (and a discussion of ordinary language philosophy) see Michel 
Foucault, ‘La Philosophie Analytique de La Politique’, in Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988, ed. Daniel Defert 
and François Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 534–51. The quote ‘what we have always known’ is 
from Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 47. I will discuss the question of 
‘depth’ and ‘surface’ with regard to the ‘linguistic turn’ and how it has informed critical scholars in 
IR and IL in more detail towards the end of Chapter 3. 
63 Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, 618, 625. Similarly, Friedrichs and Kratochwil, ‘On Acting and 
Knowing’, 716. On the question of mapping legal discourse see also William Twining, Globalisation 
and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000), chap. 6; and in international law see Kennedy, A 
World of Struggle, chap. 2. 
64 It is introduced Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 122. 
65 For further discussions on the translation of this concept see Marie McGinn, The Routledge 
Guidebook to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (London: Routledge, 2013), 28–29. For an 
‘application’ of it see Sybille Krämer, Sprache, Sprechakt, Kommunikation: Sprachtheoretische 
Positionen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001). 
66 The whole paragraph is the following (in G.E.M. Anscombe’s translation): ‘A main source of our 
failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our 
grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that 
understanding which consists in “seeing connexions”. Hence the importance of finding and 
inventing intermediate cases. The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental 
significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 
“Weltanschauung”?)’ Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 122. 
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 Orford’s ‘praise of description’ resonates also to some degree with Bruno 
Latour’s research strategy of ‘opening the black box’. 67  As Latour explains 
“blackboxing […] refers to the way scientific work is made invisible by its own 
success”.68 To ‘open the black box’ means then to make the ‘invisible visible’, i.e. 
the invisible that is at the surface already, ‘visible visible’.69 In this thesis I use the 
strategy of ‘opening the black box’ various times in order to problematize and 
theorize concepts and practices, which are usually taken for granted (as they are 
perceived as ‘neutral’ and/or ‘technical’), such as interdisciplinarity, expertise, law, 
international crimes, and, most importantly, jurisdiction. 
 
3.2 Projects 
 
I will do so by reconstructing projects. The concept of ‘project’ is around for some 
time and widely used among critical scholars in IR, IL and beyond. Examples 
abound: Friedrich Kratochwil describes processes, which are related to what has 
been described as ‘legalization’ at the outset of this chapter, by referring to the 
observation that “law has become one of the languages, if not already the most 
frequently used language, to name and tackle our political projects”.70 Somewhere 
else Kratochwil speaks of “the liberal political project”, “the cosmopolitan project” 
or “the governance project”.71 Or, anthropologist and globalization scholar Anna 
Tsing argues that “[g]lobalization is a set of projects”.72 For international law, 
Martti Koskenniemi states: 
                                                      
67 See already Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 1. 
68 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 304. To ‘open the black box’ does not mean for Latour to go ‘behind the 
things’ but is (semiotically speaking) an operation at the surface. In this regard, it also resembles 
Gilles Deleuze concept of ‘unfolding’. See Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. 
Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). For a discussion of how Latourian 
scholarship uses the strategy of ‘unfolding’ in the analysis of law see François Cooren, ‘In the Name 
of the Law: Ventriloquism and Juridical Matters’, in Latour and the Passage of Law, ed. Kyle McGee 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 238. 
69 The main difference between Orford and Latour is that Latour is less interested in using this 
strategy for a ‘critical’ project and does not discuss questions of power and authority. In this regard, 
this thesis is more interested in the questions Orford tackles. 
70 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘A Guide for the Perplexed? Critical Reflections on Doing Inter-Disciplinary 
Legal Research’, Transnational Legal Theory 5, no. 4 (2014): 542 (emphasis added). 
71 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Global Governance and the Emergence of a “World Society”’, in Varieties of 
World-Making: Beyond Globalization, ed. Nathalie Karagiannis and Peter Wagner (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2007), 266, 268, 275 (emphasis added). 
72 Anna Tsing, ‘The Global Situation’, Cultural Anthropology 15, no. 3 (2000): 351. 
 16 
 
“From Grotius to the International Criminal Court, international law has 
been a project carried out by international lawyers. It has been 
sometimes a religious, sometimes a secular humanitarian project, a 
project for order, civilization, peace, security, development, rule of law 
and so on. Most of the time it has been a project by which European and 
European-originated lawyers or intellectuals have advanced their 
universalist ideals so as to substitute new rules and institutions for the 
present political and diplomatic world”.73 
 
However, Koskenniemi points out that this observation is increasingly inadequate: 
where the discourse of international law seemed to encompass for a long time only 
one common project – namely international law itself –, the image of unity has 
been under pressure more recently. As Koskenniemi continues: 
 
“In the last three decades, the profession has been marked by functional 
specialisation and political controversy. The emergence of new 
institutional regimes reflecting new priorities has been accompanied by 
the consolidation of distinct forms of expertise in ‘human rights law’ 
international trade law’, ‘international environmental law’, 
‘international criminal law’, and so on. International law has developed 
through diffusion into distinct and contradictory projects”.74 
 
The idea that international law as a discipline is composed of various projects is 
echoed by David Kennedy as well. According to Kennedy disciplines are in general 
composed of  
 
“people in concrete situations. In my image of the discipline, individuals 
have projects – which they pursue in, around and through the 
argumentative, doctrinal, and institutional materials the discipline 
offers. Sometimes these materials thwart or facilitate or redefine a 
project, sometimes the reverse, sometimes both. As a result, it is 
                                                      
73 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Lawyers’, 2007. 
74 Koskenniemi, 4 (emphasis added). 
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surprising how often one can describe a disciplinary sensibility in a way 
which explores its elisions and contradictions, even its blind spots and 
biases, but which still somehow seems sympathetic to the projects, 
ambitions, and personalities who have constructed it, and may even be 
embraced by participants in the discipline itself as a helpful account of 
their sensibility”.75 
 
This dynamic is for Kennedy also generated as these people “pursue the projects of 
theirs hearts and heads”.76 Moreover, Kennedy extends this conceptualisation. For 
Kennedy, not only disciplines but also international legal expertise on a more 
general level is constituted of, as he writes, “people with projects”77 and “people 
pursuing projects”.78 
 
Although the language of projects is omnipresent in the writings of more 
critically inclined scholars, it is remarkable that it is rarely contextualised and 
problematized. Its ‘black box’ remains closed. A notable exception is Duncan 
Kennedy, who defines ‘project’ as follows: 
 
“I use the word ‘project’ here as a term of art, a term of art that is also a 
fudge. A project is a continuous goal-oriented practice activity based on 
an analysis of some kind (with a textual and oral tradition), but the 
goals and the analysis are not necessary internally coherent or 
consistent over time. It is a collective effort, but all the players change 
over time, and people at any given moment can be part of it without 
subscribing to or even being interested in anything like all its precepts 
and practical activities. […] It isn’t a project unless people see it as such, 
but the way they see it doesn’t exhaust what outsiders can say about it. 
Liberalism and conservatism are ‘projects of ideological intelligentsias,’ 
                                                      
75 David Kennedy, ‘The Disciplines of International Law and Policy’, Leiden Journal of International 
Law 12, no. 1 (1999): 14 (emphasis added). 
76 Kennedy, 13 (emphasis added). 
77 Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, 847. 
78 David Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and Warfare’, in The Cambridge Companion to International Law, ed. 
James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 172 
(emphasis added). 
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and so are modernism/postmodernism, leftism, and critical social 
theory”.79 
 
In other words, the concept of project has the advantage that it does not force us to 
search for coherence, where no coherence may exist. Projects are never fully 
constructed yet construct our world.80 Projects might constantly slip between the 
normative and descriptive – but this is not a problem.81 Projects are ‘fuzzy’ – and it 
might be that they are successful not despite of their fuzziness but rather because 
of it. As such they work as “social imaginaries”.82 What we get when we study the 
‘politics of international law’ by concentrating on projects is a more dynamic and 
less static conceptualisation of politics: we become aware of the construction 
process of projects but also the way different projects struggle with each other. To 
inquire into the ‘politics of international law’ by reconstructing projects has two 
additional benefits.  
 
 First, projects can be studied in different contexts (globalisation, 
international law, expertise, etc.) and at different scales (e.g., globalisation can be 
studied as a project, but also different projects of globalisation; an academic 
discipline as such can be studied as a project, but we can also inquire how ‘people 
pursue projects’ within that disciplines). ‘Context’ or ‘scale’ is then nothing pre-
given but part of a permanent negotiation process itself, which has to be 
reconstructed. This means also that I am less concerned with engaging in exercises 
of comparison but rather with questions of what happens if different scales and 
different contexts intersect, overlap, clash and hybridize.  
                                                      
79 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siècle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1998), 6. 
80 Thus they resemble what Nicholas Onuf recently described as ‘moderate-sized dry goods’: 
Nicholas Onuf, ‘Constructivism at the Crossroads; Or, the Problem of Moderate-Sized Dry Goods’, 
International Political Sociology 10, no. 2 (2016): 115–32. 
81 This is emphasised by Kratochwil when he writes: "Since politics is always about projects which 
are never complete and which constantly move between the is and the ought, its analysis cannot be 
reduced to the logic of law, to the structural constraints of the international system, to the economy 
of force, or to a historical trend“, Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Politics, Norms and Peaceful Change’, 
Review of International Studies 24, no. 5 (1998): 216. 
82 The concept of ‘social imaginary’ goes back to Charles Taylor who defines it as follows: ‘By social 
imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may 
entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the 
ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
hetween them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative 
notions and images that underlie these expectations’, Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 23. 
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Second, to reconstruct projects tackles also the agent-structure 
problematique. Here, the following longer quotation of David Kennedy is 
indicative: 
 
“I am convinced that were we to understand the mutually constitutive 
relationship between professional practice and knowledge we would 
have displaced the agent/structure debate which has paralyzed so 
much of the social sciences when thinking about international affairs. 
Rather than agents in structures, we might come to see people with 
projects, projects of affiliation and disaffiliation, commitment and 
aversion, and with wills to power or to submission. We would find 
these people organized in disciplines, speaking with another in the 
vernacular perhaps of public international law or international 
economic law or constitutionalism. Their disciplines would have a 
history, an intellectual history, and an institutional and political history. 
Their knowledge would be less recipe than rhetoric. Their practice 
would often be best understood as assertion and argument, the 
vernacular of those arguments structured like any other language. Were 
we to pursue this approach, we would focus less on procedures or 
institutions, or even substantive norms and values. The constitution, if 
we could call it that, for global governance would be written in the 
disciplinary habits, including the habits of mind and patterns of 
argument, of people with projects operating with expertise”.83 
 
For Kennedy, to start with ‘people with projects’ is an elegant way to identify the 
agent-structure debate as being concerned with a pseudo problem 
(Scheinproblem). Yet, like nature/culture, mind/body, normative/empirical the 
question of agent/structure has been a constitutive problematique of (Western) 
modernity.84 Reconstructing projects – and Kennedy explicitly relies on the 
                                                      
83 Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, 847. 
84 The framing of these problematiques in terms of binaries is of course already part of the project 
of modernity as it is based on one of the guiding principles of modern logics, namely the law of the 
excluded third (tertium non datur). 
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methodology of mapping projects85 – helps to leave the ‘paralyzing’ agent-
structure debate behind as it makes it possible to stop questioning whether agents 
determine structures or structures agents – or whether both are co-constitutive.86 
We simply do not have to ask whether projects are the product of some deep 
structure or the intention of agents. Instead, it becomes now the central task to 
reconstruct how causality, space, time, agency or subjectivity are imagined and 
conceptualised within a certain project. In the end, we have to ‘open the black box’ 
of projects and can thereby provide ‘perspicuous representations’ (übersichtliche 
Darstellungen). 
 
3.3 Jurisdiction 
 
Finally, this thesis is mainly concerned with a specific type of projects, namely 
projects of jurisdiction or as I also call them: jurisdictional projects. As this thesis 
has an entire chapter on the concept of jurisdiction (Chapter 5), I can be brief, here. 
The concept of jurisdiction is one of the fundamental concepts of every 
(international) legal discourse. However, it is hardly problematized, 
conceptualized and theorized; even ‘critical’ scholars started only recently and in a 
still very sporadic way to investigate the use, performative effects and history of 
jurisdiction. Reason for this could be that, on the one hand, the term is usually 
conceived as neutral, a-political and technical – a technicality of law par 
excellence;87 and that, on the other hand, most attention is derived to its adjacent 
or complementary concept of sovereignty – jurisdiction seems to stand in the 
shadow of sovereignty. Yet, to ‘open the black box’ of jurisdiction is, as I hope to 
show in this thesis, a promising endeavour. It is promising as jurisdiction is, in the 
words of Asha Kaushal, the “labourer of law” and “threshold between law and non-
law”.88 In other words, jurisdiction is a boundary-drawing device. This means that 
to concentrate on jurisdiction, its struggles and disputes, helps us then to better 
capture the politics of boundary-drawing in (international) law. As a corollary, we 
                                                      
85 See Kennedy, A World of Struggle, chap. 2. 
86 Kennedy locates the agent-structure problematique mainly in traditional systems theory. See 
Kennedy, 75–78. Yet another way out would be the modern systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. 
87 Indeed, Annelise Riles uses the example of jurisdiction when she introduces the studying of 
(lega)l’ technicalities’ as a ‘new agenda’ to students of law. See Annelise Riles, ‘A New Agenda for 
the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities’, Buffalo Law Review 53 (2005): 973–1033. 
88 Asha Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’, The Modern Law Review 78, no. 5 (2015): 759, 783. 
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should understand jurisdiction as a political and social concept.89 Jurisdiction then 
concerns questions of rule, authority, power, order and governance. 
 
In the discourse of international law jurisdiction has usually been equated 
with exclusive territorial jurisdiction. In mainstream accounts the politics of 
jurisdiction in international law is then formulated as partitioning and 
compartmentalisation of an already existing, i.e. already extended (in the sense of 
Cartesian res extensa), (territorial) space into jurisdictional realms. This thesis 
challenges this view. It does so by, for example, reconstructing the history of the 
project of exclusive territorial jurisdiction and thereby showing that this project is 
a rather new phenomenon and that, even in high modernity, we can detect 
loopholes in the architecture of exclusive territorial jurisdiction: exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction was never as exclusive nor as territorial as imagined; it can 
thus be conceived as an example of a ‘social imaginary’. Moreover, it seems that the 
project of exclusive territorial jurisdiction has been contested more recently 
through the emergence of the discourse of ‘humanity’s law’, particularly when it 
turns into discussions about universal forms of jurisdiction. What is important 
here is not the fact that ‘humanity’ might represent a new totality, but that it is 
extending.  In other words, I will propose a post-Cartesian concept of jurisdiction 
and argue that we should understand different projects of jurisdiction as extending – 
as something that spreads and only thereby creates its own conditions of possibility.90 
This means that there is no pre-fabricated jurisdictional space but every 
jurisdictional project fabricates its own space.  
 
To conceptualise jurisdiction in this way helps me to redescribe the concept 
in four ways. Firstly, it moves beyond the idea that jurisdiction is territorial, which 
was the underlying logic of modern statehood. Rather, we can grasp jurisdictional 
projects of humanity as extending by a non-territorial logic of space. Secondly, I 
will argue that we should leave a notion of jurisdiction behind, which is based on a 
Cartesian concept of space (i.e., space as something already extended) and, instead, 
understand jurisdictional projects as extending in space – and thereby extending 
                                                      
89 This is the main argument of Richard T. Ford’s seminal article: Richard T. Ford, ‘Law’s Territory 
(A History of Jurisdiction)’, Michigan Law Review 97, no. 4 (1999): 843–930. 
90 That jurisdiction is extending could subsequently be understood as its performative effect. 
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space itself. Thirdly, the extension of jurisdictional projects is not restricted to 
space only but works also by extension of time and other modalities. For instance, 
conventional international criminal lawyers list four different principles (or 
dimensions) of jurisdiction ratione loci, jurisdiction ratione tempore, jurisdiction 
ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione materiae. Jurisdictional projects in 
international criminal law can use these different forms of jurisdiction as tools to 
regulate their extend. For instance, in Chapter 6, I will reconstruct how 
jurisdictional projects of international criminal law attempt to extend by means of 
international crimes (i.e., jurisdiction ratione materiae). We can even go further 
and broaden the use of the concept of jurisdiction into new areas and, in particular, 
‘borrow’ it to analyse boundary conflicts. For example, I will follow Andrew 
Abbott’s suggestion to reconstruct conflicts between academic disciplines (Chapter 
2) and between different groups of experts (Chapter 4) as struggles about 
jurisdiction.91 Fourthly, jurisdiction is not exclusive. Of course, this is hardly new 
for legal pluralists. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that jurisdictions do not 
only consist of spatial overlaps but also, for example, of temporal ones.  
 
To sum up, methodologically this thesis follows reconstruction as its 
underlying logic of reconstruction. More precisely, it uses strategies such as 
‘opening black boxes’ or to map and provide a ‘perspicuous representation’ 
(übersichtliche Darstellung) of discourses and language games in order to examine 
the politics of international law as a struggle of various jurisdictional projects in 
the context of ‘humanity’s law’.92 Such a methodologically take, helps me also to 
ask the following, more concrete, questions: how do different jurisdictional 
projects of ‘humanity’s law’ transform traditional legal and political categories? 
how do they change underlying imaginaries of spatiality, temporality and 
subjectivity? how do different experts, as ‘people with projects’, pursue their 
projects of ‘humanity’s law’? how do these projects intersect, overlap, hybridize  
and struggle with other projects of ‘humanity’s law’? how do these jurisdictional 
projects in the end rearticulate global authority, power and order? 
                                                      
91 See, in particular, Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert 
Labor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
92 To do so, this thesis relies mainly on library and Internet materials. It follows in this regard: 
Andrew Abbott, Digital Paper: A Manual for Research and Writing with Library and Internet 
Materials (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
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 4. Content and Overview 
 
In order to approach these kinds of questions and reconstruct the politics of 
jurisdiction in international law and, here, in particular in what has been coined 
‘humanity’s law’, this thesis unfolds into two larger parts. The next two chapters, 
Chapters 2 and Chapter 3, are mainly concerned with disciplinary dimension of 
studying the ‘politics of international law’. They focus on ‘Projects of 
(Inter)Disciplinarity’ (Part I). The remaining substantial chapters, Chapter 4 to 
Chapter 7, turn then to ‘Projects of International Law and Politics’ (Part II), which 
are rather located outside of academia. However, as we will see in various 
discussions, one should not draw the line between academic disciplines and their 
field of study as too sharp. Each of the chapters is presented here. 
 
 The next two chapters situate the thesis within academic debates in the 
intersection of IL and IR (Part I). Chapter 2 reconstructs different interdisciplinary 
projects between IR and IL and investigates thereby the politics of 
interdisciplinarity involved. The idea is not to give a stipulative definition of what 
interdisciplinarity means or should mean but to ‘open the black box’ of 
interdisciplinarity and to provide (by means of mapping) a ‘perspicuous 
representation’ (übersichtliche Darstellung) of the structure of the interdisciplinary 
argument between IR and IL. I identify four projects of interdisciplinarity with 
each of these projects being based on a different logic of interdisciplinarity but also 
(and this is of course connected) with different ways of, for example, relating law 
and politics.93 Moreover, different interdisciplinary projects come with different 
hierarchies, biases, contradictions and exclusionary mechanism. In other words, 
interdisciplinary projects are also very much about jurisdictional struggles 
between (and within) academic disciplines. The first project of interdisciplinarity 
concerns the work of the scholars Frederick Shuman, Harold Lasswell and Quincy 
Wright at the University of Chicago during the interwar years. These authored 
contributed to both academic fields. However, in particular Lasswell and Wright 
referred permanently to an external third – the emerging behaviourist ‘social 
                                                      
93 Annelise Riles has done so, yet in a to some extent different way, with regard to interdisciplinary 
scholarship of law and anthropology: Annelise Riles, ‘Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, 
and the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity’, University of Illinois Review 3 (1994): 597–650. 
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sciences’ and ‘policy science –, which should be the blueprint for research in both 
disciplines. As a second project, I reconstruct the ‘hidden’ interdisciplinary 
dialogue or ‘strange symbiosis’ between political realism (IR) and legal positivism 
(IL), which should dominate the relationship between the two disciplines form the 
1940s until the end of the Cold War. Although political realism and legal positivism 
seem at first sight incompatible with each other, as the possibility of their very 
existence is the denial of the ‘other’ and, therefore, seem antagonistic to 
interdisciplinary research; yet, a closer look reveals that they created a ‘strange 
symbiosis’ as they engage in a (hidden) division of labour exactly because their 
own condition of possibility is the denial of the other. The third project is provided 
by the more recnet IR/IL literature, which is usually captured by terms such as 
‘institutionalism’, ‘liberalism’ and ‘liberal institutionalism’ as well as by moderate 
constructivist research. Although emphasising ‘dual agendas’ and ‘two optics’ this 
projects links the two disciplines in a hierarchical relationship where, e.g., IR offers 
method and theory while IL should provide enough cases to test them. Finally, I 
highlight how critical scholars in IR and IL address interdisciplinarity and in 
particular how critical IL scholars such as Jan Klabbers and Martti Koskenniemi 
started the project of ‘counterdisciplinarity’. Yet, I will not leave it here and argue 
that the concept of translation could provide an interesting way for disciplinary 
linking as, if understood in a specific way, translation will not provide us with a 
tool to solve paradoxes, to eliminate power relations and to shed light into the 
blind spots of interdisciplinarity but it will enhance our vocabulary to make 
paradoxes, power relations and blind spots visible, analysable and criticisable; 
moreover, it points to the necessity to begin common investigations not by starting 
with a certain theory or method but rather by reconstructing a substantive puzzle 
or problem. 
 
 In order to further substantiate this last point, Chapter 3 provides an in-
depth reconstruction of four critical projects at the intersection of IR and IL. These 
are the scholarly projects of Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil, David Kennedy 
and Martti Koskenniemi. In particular, I focus on their earlier writings and, in the 
case of Onuf and Kratochwil, on their legal writings. As I point out, all four projects 
have a strong interdisciplinary basis, which can be found mainly in the different 
guises of the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy and the social sciences. As a 
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consequence, the projects of Onuf, Kratochwil, Kennedy and Koskenniemi highlight 
legal ‘argumentation’, speak of the ‘rhetoric’, ‘grammar’ and ‘practice’ of 
international law and study law as ‘language’. Yet, although they share these 
similarities – similarities that make translation possible –, they nevertheless differ 
in the way they have taken the linguistic turn. Here, I draw on the idea to 
distinguish between a ‘performance model’ and a ‘two worlds model’ of language.94 
While, on the one hand, the ‘two worlds model’ ontologically divides speech 
(speaking) and language, where language ‘lies’ behind speech – and where speech 
becomes an articulation of a ‘deep grammar’ or of underlying ‘rules’ –, the 
‘performance model’ rejects the idea that there is an ontological difference 
between speech and language and foregrounds instead ‘use’ and ‘performativity’. 
As I reconstruct, Koskenniemi and Onuf can rather be related to the ‘two worlds 
model’, while the positions of Kennedy and Kratochwil resemble rather the 
‘performance model’. By mapping the similarities and differences between these 
important critical projects, I do not aim to elaborate a ‘joint discipline’ of critical 
scholars but rather develop a vocabulary that draws on different sources and is 
able to grasp recent developments of the ‘politics of international law’ and thereby 
provides a theoretical basis for discussions in the remaining chapters. 
 
 Chapter 4, the first chapter that is mainly concerned with projects outside of 
academia (Part II), inquires into the social preconditions of international legal 
argumentation by connecting the thesis to the recent interest in critical 
scholarship in the ‘politics of expertise’ in international law and beyond. In order 
to substantiate this, the chapter opens with a reconstruction of traditional 
accounts of expertise in both fields. Although taking different avenues, these 
accounts separate in the end between politics (power) and expertise (knowledge). 
However, such a separation between politics and expertise has been left behind by 
several authors in general social theory and also by more critical scholars in IR and 
IL. Moreover, international law has been conceptualised as a specific form of 
expertise. The chapter addresses then how different streams of critical scholarship 
in the intersection of IR and IL conceptualise international legal expertise. This 
links also to my earlier discussion of a ‘performance model’ and a ‘two worlds 
                                                      
94 See Krämer, Sprache, Sprechakt, Kommunikation. 
 26 
model’ of language, as depending on the respective image of language critical 
authors either foreground such notions as ‘competence’, ‘performativity’ or ‘form 
of life’ when it comes to conceptualise international legal expertise. The chapter 
concludes with the suggestion that a focus on ‘legal technicalities’ – with 
jurisdiction being such a ‘technicality’ – might be a promising avenue to pursue in 
order to better grasp the ‘politics of expertise’ in international law and beyond.  
 
 I am now able to further reconstruct, problematize and theorize the specific 
‘legal technicality’ of jurisdiction. In order to do so, Chapter 5 in two steps. First, I 
reconstruct the emerging critical scholarship on jurisdiction in various disciplines. 
Here, authors point to the fact that jurisdiction constitutes a social practice and has 
political implications, as it draws the boundary between law and its others; other 
voices highlight the spatio-temporal fixes of jurisdiction and link it to debates in 
legal pluralism. Second, I historicise the project of modern territorial and exclusive 
jurisdiction, which is one of the bedrocks of the modern nation state and hence the 
modern international. Here, I reconstruct how jurisdiction became territorial and 
exclusive and how its terroriality and exclusivity were always contested. More 
recently, it has been contested by the various streams of ‘humanity’s law’. In order 
to study the recent transformations associated with the emergence of ‘humanity’s 
law’, I conclude this chapter by advancing a notion of jurisdiction that is non-
territorial, post-Cartesian, multidimensional and non-exclusive. It is non-territorial 
as it acknowledges that jurisdictional projects of humanity extend by a non-
territorial logic of space; it is post-Cartesian as it conceptualises jurisdictional 
space not as pre-given but jurisdictional projects as extending – and only thereby 
creating their jurisdictional space; it is multidimensional as jurisdictional projects 
often extend in non-spatial ways; and, it is non-exclusive as jurisdictional projects 
interact, intersect, overlap, clash and hybridize. 
 
 The remaining two substantial chapters illustrate by drawing on two 
exemplary case studies what it means to study jurisdictional projects of 
‘humanity’s law’ in such a way. Chapter 6 focuses on international criminal law, 
one of the main streams of ‘humanity’s law’, and reconstructs how jurisdictional 
projects expand here by means of international crimes (concerning jurisdiction 
ratione materiae). Concretely, I study jurisdictional projects of two of the most 
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influential scholars in this field: Hersch Lauterpacht’s successful project to make 
‘crimes against humanity’ an international crime and Antonio Cassese’s more 
recent, yet still not fully successful, project to make ‘international terrorism’ an 
international crime. To draw attention on the work of these projects helps to 
highlight how international legal expertise actually works, as both Lauterpacht and 
Cassese often ‘changed hats’ between academia and different roles outside the 
university sectors, in particular as judges and legal advisers. Moreover, the chapter 
foregrounds the relevance to look at more technical legal discourses (legal 
technicalities) and to ‘open these black boxes’ as the inclusion and exclusion of 
certain crimes has fundamental repercussions on questions of global authority and 
what ‘belongs’ to the international. 
 
 Chapter 7 moves then to the politics of jurisdiction in another stream of 
‘humanity’s law’, namely the broader discourse of intervention for humanitarian 
purposes (i.e., questions belonging to humanitarian international law). In 
particular, I explore the question of how jurisdictional projects in the context of the 
intervention discourse developed a future-oriented logic and how this logic is part 
of a number of episodes, which challenge the temporality of international legal 
argumentation. In order to study this, I reconstruct a ‘chain of translation’ from 
NATO’s Kosovo campaign in 1999 until the proliferation of risk indicator projects 
in the context of ‘implementation’ strategies of the responsibility to protect within 
the United Nations – indicators to assesses the risk that responsibility to protect 
situations might occur in the future. I interweave this reconstruction with a 
discussion of the production of uncertainty and ambiguity in international law and 
argue that attempts to ‘fix’ uncertainty and ambiguity by law, expertise and 
managerial tools produce new forms of uncertainty and ambiguity. In particular, I 
discuss the production of uncertainty, first, in the aftermath of the Kosovo 
bombings and, second, the adoption of the formula ‘illegal but legitimate’ 
(semantic uncertainty) and the intersecting temporalities of a rather past-oriented 
international law with future-oriented risk assessment tools in the context of the 
implementation of the responsibility to protect within the United Nations 
(temporal uncertainty). The chapter ends with a short discussion of the 
consequences for global ordering and the questions of who represents the 
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international and who humanity in a world of ‘competing legitimacies’ and 
‘competing temporalities’ 
 
The thesis ends with a brief Conclusion, which summarizes the thesis’ main 
findings, brings its main threads together and provides some pointers for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2: The Boundaries of Disciplines and the Disciplines of Boundaries: 
International Relations, International Law and the Politics of 
Interdisciplinarity 
 
“No topic has been the subject of more confusion in contemporary thought about 
international problems than the relationship between law and politics”95 
 
“Stories about fields emerge from within fields, they take weight but not density. 
Without them scholars would be less certain of their field’s distinctive character and 
its place in the world of learning. This is the reason we hear simple stories, easy to 
learn and marked by a relative high degree of consensus. We might even expect such 
stories to take mythical propositions”96 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
It seems, that since its institutional inception in the immediate aftermath of the 
Great War the academic discipline or field of IR is in a permanent crisis of identity. 
This goes so far as it is even unclear whether IR itself is a discipline at all, ‘just’ a 
sub-discipline of a larger political science or a loose field of inquiry.97 Throughout 
its history one can identify a number of attempts to give IR its own disciplinary 
‘status, identity and project. In this context, the story of the ‘great debates’ is 
probably the most familiar one. According to this narrative, a first debate taking 
                                                      
95 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 170. 
96 Nicholas Onuf, ‘“Tainted by Contingency”: Retelling the Story of International Law’, in Reframing 
the International: Law, Culture, Politics, ed. Richard Falk, Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, and R.B.J. Walker 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 27. 
97 Cf. Ole Waever, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European 
Developments in International Relations’, International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727; 
and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of 
Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011), chap. 1; see 
also the recent forum in the journal International Relations on the disciplinary status of IR 
introduced by Félix Grenier, Helen Louise Turton, and Philipp Beaulieu-Brossard, ‘The Struggle 
over the Identity of IR: What Is at Stake in the Disciplinary Debate within and beyond Academia?’, 
International Relations 29, no. 2 (2015): 242–44. For an argument that IR should not be conceived 
as a discipline but ‘just’ a field of inquiry, see Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in 
Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 14–
27. For a similar and more recent statement, see Justin Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the  
Prison of Political Science’, International Relations 30, no. 2 (2016): 127–53; and the forum on this 
article introduced by Ken Booth and Milja Kurki, ‘Rethinking International Relations - Again’, 
International Relations 31, no. 1 (2017): 68–70. 
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place in the 1940s between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ was decided in favour of the 
realists, liberated the field from the idealists’ daydreams of the inter-war years and 
provided IR with a view of the ‘reality’ of international politics as a permanent 
struggle for power; the second debate between ‘traditionalism’ and ‘behaviourism’ 
(some call the latter also ‘scientism’), which took place during the 1950s and 
1960s, was ‘won’ by the ‘behaviourists’, made IR the vanguard of ‘American social 
science’ and helped to cut of its ties to Europe and  ‘unscientific’ academic 
enterprises such as IL, philosophy, political theory or historiography; the inter-
paradigm debate, starting in the 1970s, is sometimes mentioned as a third debate, 
which recovered liberal themes and attempted to fuse them with realism – the 
result was a debate without winners but, in the end, with a ‘(neo-neo) synthesis’ in 
the robe of a ‘rationalist’ vernacular, which became the new standard of science 
and thereby helped to get rid of Marxism (representing the third competing 
‘paradigm’ at that time); and finally, mainstream IR scholars claim that a fourth 
debate between ‘scientific positivism’ and ‘post-positivism’ – or as some called it, 
between ‘rationalist’ and ‘reflective’ accounts (the latter used as a garbage can to 
assemble critical theory, feminism, post-structuralism and constructivism) – 
accounts was won by the ‘positivist’ side as it showed that ‘rationalists’ are able to 
engage with radical criticism and that ‘reflective’ scholars are incompetent, unable 
and unwilling to develop their own robust ‘research programme’. 
 
 Even though this picture of a cascade of successive great debates is, as the 
currently growing body of disciplinary historiography convincingly shows 
historically at least exaggerated if not even false, it nevertheless presents a 
powerful narrative to construct the discipline’s own identity and project.  98 It 
                                                      
98 It is not possible to capture the literature on the historiography of IR in one footnote. However, 
see, for example, Miles Kahler, ‘Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory 
After 1945’, in New Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. Michael W. Doyle and G. John 
Ikenberry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 20–53; Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the “First Great 
Debate”’, Review of International Studies 24, no. 05 (1998): 1–16; Cameron G. Thies, ‘Progress, 
History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate’, 
European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 2 (2002): 147–85; Ole Waever, ‘Still a Discipline 
After All These Debates?’, in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim 
Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 306–27; Ole 
Waever, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate’, in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 149–85; Ole Waever, ‘The Speech Act of Realism: The Move That Made IR’, in The Invention 
of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on 
Theory, ed. Nicolas Guilhot (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 97–127; Joel Quirk and 
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shows also that writing history is never a ‘innocent’ endeavour: it never excavates 
and describes historical ‘facts’ in a neutral way (i.e., history as the sequence of 
facts), but rather writing history means ‘producing’ and ‘doing’ history, i.e. 
‘making’ and ‘performing’ historical facts.99  
 
This means also that writing history is usually connected to a ‘presentist’ 
purpose – a ‘present past’ instead of a ‘past past’100 – and that to reconstruct how 
history is written often tells us more about our current societies as it does about 
past ones (e.g., in the context of IR the narrative of the ‘great debates’ helps to 
present and therefore legitimize one’s own project as the ‘winner’ or the ‘silenced 
victim’ of several successive debates).101 Although often forgotten, ‘presentism’ 
(i.e. the tendency to write history backwards) resembles exactly what the historian 
Herbert Butterfield, who was also one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the English 
school tradition in IR, convincingly described more than fifty years ago in his 
classic polemic as The Whig Interpretation of History: 
 
“It is part and parcel of the whig interpretation of history that it studies 
the past with reference to the present […]. Through this system of 
immediate reference to the present-day, historical personages can 
easily and irresistibly be classed into the men who furthered progress 
and the men who tried to hinder it […]. On this system the historian is 
bound to construe his function as demanding him to be vigilant for 
likeliness between the past and present, instead of being vigilant for 
unlikeness; so that he will find it easy to say that he has seen the 
present in the past, he will imagine that he has discovered a ‘root’ or an 
                                                                                                                                                            
Darshan Vigneswaran, ‘The Construction of an Edifice: The Story of a First Great Debate’, Review of 
International Studies 31, no. 1 (2005): 89–107; Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: 
A Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); 
Brian C. Schmidt, ‘On the History and Historiography of International Relations’, in Handbook of 
International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 2nd ed. (London: 
Sage, 2013), 3–28. 
99 Cf. Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth 
and Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
100 Cf. Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern Society’, Social 
Research 43, no. 1 (1976): 130–52. 
101 It was this insight that every description carries always a performative dimension that led 
already John L. Austin to abandon his earlier distinction between ‘constitutive’ (i.e. descriptive) and 
‘performative’ utterances in favour of the latter, John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), chap. 6. 
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‘anticipation’ of the 20th century, when in reality he is in a world of 
different connotations altogether, and he has merely tumbled upon 
what could be shown to be a misleading analogy […]. The total result of 
this method is to impose a certain form upon the whole historical story, 
and to produce a scheme of general history which is bound to converge 
beautifully with the present – all demonstrating throughout the ages 
the working of an obvious principle of progress, of which the 
Protestants and whigs have been the perennial allies while Catholics 
and tories have perpetually formed obstruction”.102 
 
The narrative of the great debates reveals also that IR is since its beginning as 
an academic discipline obsessed with the ‘science question’, namely to present its 
own endeavour as scientific and to delimit itself, on the one hand, from the 
‘unscientific’ work of practitioners and journalists as well as, on the other hand, to 
survive among other neighbouring social science disciplines that, on their part, 
claim to be the ‘standard of science’ (economics in particular and, to some extent, 
psychology, sociology as well as – if conceived as different discipline than IR – 
political science).103 This focus on conflicts between disciplines as institutional 
struggles resembles also, as I pointed out in the introductory chapter, what the 
sociologist Andrew Abbott called “jurisdictional conflicts” between different fields 
of expertise (professions, academic disciplines, etc.). These conflicts arise when 
different professions or disciplines start to “claim jurisdiction—that is, legitimate 
control—of a problem”.104 According to Abbott, in order to capture these dynamics 
a sociological account of interdisciplinarity is indispensable.105 
 
                                                      
102 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York: Norton, 1965), 11–12. 
103 On the ‘science question’ see, for example, Gerard van der Ree, ‘The Politics of Scientific 
Representation in International Relations’, Millennium 42, no. 1 (2013): 24–44; and Jackson, The 
Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 3–10. For a discussion of the relationship of IR and 
Political Science, see Rosenberg, ‘International Relations in the Prison of Political Science’. 
104 Andrew Abbott, ‘Jurisdictional Conflicts: A New Approach to the Development of the Legal 
Professions’, American Bar Foundation Research Journal 11, no. 2 (1986): 191; see also Andrew 
Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1988). 
105 For similar statements, see also Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002), and 
Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft Der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1990). For a 
discussion whether the professional development of IR can be better understood by focusing on the 
institutional or external (i.e. exogenous events in world politics) context, see Schmidt, ‘On the 
History and Historiography of International Relations’. 
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 Simultaneously to this turf building exercise, however, IR’s identity was 
always tied to the idea that it is better equipped than other disciplines to conduct 
interdisciplinary research. 106Thus, IR often saw itself often as an ‘orchestrator’ or 
‘meta-discipline’, which collects and assembles bits and pieces from other 
disciplines whenever these bits and pieces seem to be relevant to conduct the 
study of international relations and world politics.107 And, as ‘real world problems’ 
do not care about the boundaries of academic disciplines, ‘interdisciplinarity’ 
always seemed to be intrinsically valuable and, hence, presented and still presents 
until today a powerful symbolic capital for IR to promote itself, claim and extend 
its own jurisdiction in vis-à-vis its competitors. 
 
 Yet, the attempt to be disciplinary and interdisciplinary at the same time, 
leads us to a paradoxical situation, which is captured well (in the context of the 
field of economy and society) by the following quote of Andrew Barry, Georgina 
Born and Gisa Weszkalnys:  
 
“The idea of discipline opens up a nexus of meaning. Disciplines 
discipline disciples. A commitment to a discipline is a way of ensuring 
that certain disciplinary methods and concepts are used rigorously and 
that undisciplined and undisciplinary objects, methods and concepts 
are ruled out. By contrast, ideas of interdisciplinarity and 
transdisciplinarity imply a variety of boundary transgressions, in which 
the disciplinary and disciplining rules, trainings and subjectivities given 
by existing knowledge corpuses are put aside or superseded”.108 
 
 With these preliminary remarks in mind the purpose of this chapter is to 
inquire into the paradoxes, possibilities and politics of interdisciplinary research in 
IR. However, I do not try to ‘solve’ the paradoxes and ‘eliminate’ the politics of 
interdisciplinarity by defining what ‘interdisciplinary’ means or should mean. As 
pointed out in the introductory chapter, to (re)define and hence anchor our 
                                                      
106 This is probably due to the fact that, historically speaking, IR is a relative latecomer and that in 
its self-perception most of the turfs were already occupied by other disciplines. 
107 Of course, this image neglects the co-constitutive relationship between academic disciplines and 
‘their’ object of study. 
108 Andrew Barry, Georgina Born, and Gisa Weszkalnys, ‘Logics of Interdisciplinarity’, Economy and 
Society 37, no. 1 (2008): 20–21. 
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concepts as if they were transhistorically and crossculturally valid is the way 
‘positivist’ accounts of science conduct their inquiry. Instead, I follow a different 
path as I reconstruct different interdisciplinary projects as jurisdictional projects, 
which stand in competition with other projects. I show thereby how each of these 
projects produces different hierarchies and power relations between disciplines as 
well as different strategies to claim what the field of IR is or should be. In order to 
examine this, I use the relationship of IR to international law and the academic 
discipline of IL as a prism. Thus, to put it in another way, I will ‘follow the law in 
IR’. This approach reveals also that different projects of interdisciplinarity are 
intertwined with different images of law as well as different ways to relate law and 
politics. To do so, I am guided by a number of interlinking research questions: How 
does the discipline of IR ‘look’ at IL, often perceived as its ‘sibling discipline’ or 
‘constitutive other’? How do different ‘theories’, ‘schools’, ‘frameworks’, 
‘approaches’ and ‘narratives’ relate and link ‘law’ and ‘politics’? Do they address 
the problematique of interdisciplinary research? If so, do they support or decline 
interdisciplinarity? How do they understand ‘interdisciplinarity’?  
 
 To develop my argument, the chapter unfolds into four parts. The first part 
traces back interwar attempt of the three University of Chicago-based scholars 
Frederick Schuman, Harold Lasswell and Quincy Wright to study both disciplines 
IR and IL as a ‘social science’. In the second part I will show how political realism in 
IR and legal positivism in IL were occupying several blind spots of the other and 
how this established a hidden and often overseen interdisciplinary project. The 
third part will introduce two rather recent interdisciplinary projects between IL 
and IR, which turn out to establish an imbalance between the disciplines in favour 
of the latter: on the one hand, the work of self-proclaimed institutionalist, liberal or 
liberal institutionalist scholars in both fields cumulating in joint projects such as 
the ‘legalization of world politics’ and attempts to produce blueprints for 
‘legitimate global governance institutions’ for the future; and, on the other hand, 
the moderate constructivist literature on the ‘power of human rights’ and the idea 
that ‘legitimacy’ could serve as a distinct logic of action (beyond coercion and self-
interest), which could also bridge the abyss between the two disciplines. In the 
fourth part I turn finally to contributions of critical scholars in IL and IR – and 
reconstruct how these scholars conduct the critique of the work of 
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liberal/institutionalist and moderate constructivist approaches as well as how 
they address the resulting asymmetry between IR and IL (in its most extreme form 
represented in the claim of some critical international legal scholars to foster the 
project of ‘counterdisciplinarity’ instead of interdisciplinarity). Yet, I will not leave 
it there and argue that intellectual cooperation can work on the basis of a shared 
problematique and, in particular, if we leave the narrow disciplinary confines 
behind and frame the exchange between different bodies of knowledge (which can 
be organised as disciplines) as ‘translation’, where ‘translation’ is understood as an 
open process that reflects upon its own power relations and silences: we are then 
able to move from an interdisciplinarity as subsumption to interdisciplinarity in 
terms of a reconstruction of shared problematiques. This discussion serves as a 
preparation to begin in the following chapter to outline how common research 
between critical scholars from IR and IL could look like. 
 
 2. Chicago and the Interwar Years: IL and IR as ‘Social Science’ 
 
A good starting point to study different interdisciplinary projects between IR and 
IL are several systematic attempts, which occurred at the University of Chicago 
from the 1930s onwards and had the aim order to make IR more scientific.109 
                                                      
109  Of course, I could have chosen another starting point. However, I do not attempt to write an all-
encompassing history of all possible projects of interdisciplinarity between IR and IL. I actually do 
not belief that there could be one ‘natural’ starting point as different approaches and schools of 
thought highlight different origins. As Foucault reminds us: History is always a history of the 
present. Thus, the four interdisciplinary projects, which I discuss in this chapter, represent only a 
selection of interdisciplinary encounters between both disciplines (nevertheless, I claim that they 
represent important projects in the histories of both IL and IR; projects that repercuss until the 
present day). Another ‘natural’ stating point would have been the work of Alfred Zimmern, the 
holder of the first chair explicitly dedicated to IR, the Woodrow Wilson Chair for International 
Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919 (and thus the beginning of IR as an 
academic profession). Zimmern conceptualised IR as an ‘orchestrator’ between other, already more 
developed, disciplines such as international law and diplomatic history. A good example of 
Zimmern’s concept of interdisciplinarity – or as it was called at his time, ‘intellectual cooperation’ – 
is his inaugural lecture at the University of Oxford, where he was appointed Montague Burton 
professor in 1931. Here, Zimmern demarcates the scope of IR as follows: ‘But, to pick up once more 
the thread of our argument, if the teacher of international relations is concerned with the study of 
Modern Society, what exactly is his place in that field, and how is his subject to be related to those 
of his colleagues in kindred disciplines? Amid the group of studies devoted to the interpretation of 
modern society International Relations is only one, and a late-comer in the field. It is indeed 
legitimate whether, in the academic sense, it is a subject at all. Certainly, if the paradox may be 
excused, International Relations is not the only subject concerned with international relations. 
International judicial relations are already cared for by the international lawyers and international 
economic relations by the economists,’ Alfred Zimmern, The Study of International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), 9. And he continues ny stating that a scholar of IR cannot ‘hope to 
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Indeed, it was at the University of Chicago where in 1931 the first IR program in 
the United States was established.110 Among the most prominent early figures at 
Chicago were Charles E. Merriam (1974-1932), Frederick L. Schumann (1904-
1981), Quincy Wright (1890-1970) and Harold D. Lasswell (1902-1978).111The 
common aim of these scholars was to establish political science – with IR as one of 
its branches – as a ‘social science’ or ‘policy science’. While Merriam should 
become famous as one of the initiators of the behavioural revolution in political 
science and through his attempt to turn political science into a ‘genuine science’ 
(meaning that it should discard historicism and orientate itself stronger towards 
the natural sciences), the latter three became in particular important for the 
‘scientific’ development of international thought in the United States. 112 
Throughout their careers Schuman, Wright and Lasswell contributed to both 
disciplines, IR and IL. Immediately after the Second World War, it was then the 
work of these Chicago-based authors, which should be among the primary targets 
of Hans Morgenthau’s polemic essay Scientific Man vs. Power Politics.113In the 
remainder of this section I will reconstruct briefly important topics in the work of 
Schuman, Wright and Lasswell. In this section I will limit myself to present their 
work of the Interbellum as it reveals a specific understanding of interdisciplinarity, 
which could be described as an attempt to turn both IR and IL into a social science. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
cover all territories assigned to him: but neither can the historian or the economist or even the 
international lawyer. His [the IR scholar’s] title may seem to be more comprehensive than theirs", 
Zimmern, 12. What I do also not taken into account, and what has only recently been revealed, are 
the ‘racial origins’ of both disciplines. See for IR the excellent study by Robert Vitalis, White Order, 
Black Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (Cornell University Press, 2015); and 
for IL, see, for example, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Race, Hierarchy and International Law: Lorimer’s 
Legal Science’, European Journal of International Law 27, no. 2 (2016): 415–29. 
110 An interesting overview of the status of the field in the 1920s is provided by Parker Thomas 
Moon in his Syllabus on International Relations, published in 1925 on commission of the New York-
based Institute of International Education. According to Moon, who focuses mostly on the US, the 
field was heavily fragmented as there is ‘a purely diplomatic approach to the subject; there is an 
“economic interpretation”; there is also a legal, and a political, and a psychological, and a 
sociological, and a geographical, and an historical interpretation’. However, as valuable as these 
interpretations may seem on a first view, for Moon, ‘international relations must be viewed as a 
whole’. It is the task of Moon’s Syllabus to bring together and integrate the different interpretation 
of the subject matter. The existence of ‘conflicting viewpoints’ notwithstanding, Moon argues that 
the ‘relevant facts should be presented impartially’. To do so, Moon lists more than 1200 
publications contributing to the different strands of the literature on international relations 
(including also numerous references to the most important publications in IL). See Parker Thomas 
Moon, Syllabus on International Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1925), v, vii. 
111 Cf. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy, 212. 
112 As I am concerned in this chapter with IR, I will not deal to a greater extent with the writings of 
Merriam. 
113 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (London: Latimer House Limited, 1947). 
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2.1 Frederick L. Schuman 
 
In 1933, Schuman’s textbook International Politics: An Introduction to the Western 
State System was published for the first time.114The book went for seven printings 
and was the leading textbook in the field until the publication of Morgenthau’s 
Politics Among Nations.115In the words of Jack Donnelly, International Politics was 
“arguable the first realist international relations text”.116And according to Steven 
Bucklin, Schuman was together with Quincy Wright and Denna Flemming an 
exponent of Wilsonian internationalism – something that also showed how flawed 
the realist critique of the ‘idealist’ Wilsonians actually was as these authors 
incorporated several ‘realist’ themes in their writings.117 
 
 Schuman claims in International Politics that the “study of international 
relations has traditionally been monopolized by historians and lawyers” where the 
historians were occupied in collecting historical data and where the lawyers were 
concentrated on the “formal and legalistic dissections of the contemporary fabric 
of international organization—or ‘international government’, as some prefer to call 
it”. However, according to Schuman there is a necessity to “escape from the 
limitations of the traditional approaches” that are trapped “by barren legal and 
historical concepts” and that are following the “blind alley of legalism” (in the case 
of law) or “fact gathering” (in the case of historiography) without “any unified 
scheme of interpretation”. Instead, the study of IR should find a new home in the 
“new Political Science” that “as one of the social sciences, is concerned with the 
description and analysis of power in society—i.e., with those patterns of social 
contacts which are suggested by such words as rulers and ruled, command and 
obedience, domination and subordination, authority and allegiance”.118Based on 
this interest on the analysis of power in society, Schuman admits that his 
                                                      
114 Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1933). 
115 Oliver Jütersonke, Morgenthau, Law and Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 10. 
116 Jack Donnelly, ‘Realism and the Academic Study of International Relations’, in Political Science in 
History: Research Programs and Political Traditions, ed. James Farr, John S. Dryzek, and Stephen T. 
Leonard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 179. 
117 Steven J. Bucklin, Realism and American Foreign Policy: Wilsonians and the Kennan-Morgenthau 
Thesis (Westport: Praeger, 2001). 
118 Schuman, International Politics, xi–xii (emphasis in the original). 
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“approach is rather that of Realpolitik, characterized by Machiavellian 
detachment”.119Although Schuman claims that he leaves the analysis of history and 
international law behind, both still play a prominent role in his more than 900 
pages long textbook.120Schuman devotes for instance the entire first part of the 
book to the history (he speaks of “origins”) of the “Western State System” and later 
a chapter to international law (chapter IV).  
 
For the purpose of this chapter, it is of particular interest to see how 
Schuman conceptualises international politics. For Schuman “international politics 
resolve about the competitive struggle for power and prestige between the units of 
the System”. And he continues by pointing out that two “habits and patterns” exist 
in international politics, which may be classified into “forms” and “forces”: 
 
“Forms are structural and static. Forces are functional and dynamic. 
The study of Forms is the anatomy of international politics. The study of 
Forces is its psychology. Forms are laws, procedures, and institutions—
the rules and tools of the game of international politics. Forces are the 
purposes, motives, and objectives which move the players to action. 
Forms shape the relations between States. Forces arise within States 
and determine the content of the policies behind the Forms. The two 
obviously interact upon each one another, and any sharp distinction 
between them must be somewhat artificial”.121 
 
Hence, the relationship of international law and politics resembles the interaction 
of forms and forces. Schuman elaborates this further in his discussion of 
international disputes. Although international law may be able to solve legal 
disputes, it cannot solve political disputes: “International Law cannot itself supply 
solutions. Law is static and politics is dynamic. Political disputes can be settled 
only by readjustments of relationships of power”. Furthermore, on the 
                                                      
119 Schuman, viii. 
120 Recently, Schmidt however questioned the innovative character of Schuman’s work as it 
‘advanced many of the same ideas that scholars in the field had been discussing for decades’, 
Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy, 213. 
121 Schuman, International Politics, 120. That international politics constitutes a game is a topos, 
which runs through the entire textbook. This is already visible in the book cover, which is designed 
as a chess board. 
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international level the question whether something is “a political or legal 
controversy […] is of necessity answered politically”.122 As we will see below in 
this chapter, Morgenthau takes a similar position with regard to the nature of 
disputes and the dynamics of international politics. 123 
 
The asymmetric relationship between law and politics becomes also visible 
in Schuman’s image of international law. Even though Schuman rejects John 
Austin’s classic legal positivist statement that international law is not ‘law’ as it 
lacks an effective sanctioning mechanism, he argues that international law is what 
states – “sovereign, independent, and equal” – find “useful and expedient”.124 In 
addition, as international law has “no […] coercive power” it is not a “substitute for 
force in the relations between States, however much enthusiastic jurists would like 
to give it this function”. International law may help, however, to supply “a set of 
concepts of the legal definition of the subject matter” and to specify “what 
procedures are permissible, both in pacific and non-pacific settlements”.125 
Consequently, he defines international law in a (what we would today call) 
voluntarist way as “the body of rules and principles of conduct generally observed 
within the society of civilized States for the violation of which States are habitually 
held responsible”.126 Hence, international law is law in a very specific way. 
 
Schuman’s image of international law resembles also his rather sceptical 
view whether a reduction of violence in world politics is possible at all. For 
Schuman – and this should become one of the characteristic concepts of the 
Chicago scholars – “world unity”, i.e. the lack of “chaos” and “international 
anarchy” is, although highly desirable, nearly impossible to achieve. And here he 
has little hope that the League of Nations could help in this regard. For Schuman a 
modicum of hope lies only in a fundamental non-institutionalised shift of the 
mentality of the relevant actors of international politics, a shift conducted through 
                                                      
122 Schuman, 796. As we will see below, this resembles the line of argumentation of Morgenthau’s 
doctoral thesis. 
123 Something that also repercussed more recently in Koskenniemi’s mapping of IR as being based 
on a ‘culture of dynamism’ while IL should elaborate a ‘culture of formalism’, Martti Koskenniemi, 
The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 494–508. 
124 Schuman, International Politics, 60–61. 
125 Schuman, 64. 
126 Schuman, 61. 
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a radical transformation of the underlying “myths” and “symbols”.127 As we will 
see, it was Lasswell who further developed the ideas of “myths” and “symbols”; 
while it was Wright who was far more optimistic in the peace-creating force of the 
League of Nations. I will first turn to Lasswell. 
 
2.2 Harold D. Lasswell 
 
Harold Lasswell was probably the most creative proponent of the Chicago school 
during the interwar years. Lasswell studied political science under his mentor 
Merriam in the 1920s and obtained his PhD in 1926. He left Chicago in 1938 for an 
appointment at Yale Law School where he should become well known, alongside 
with Myres McDougal, as co-founder and central figure of the so-called ‘New Haven 
School’ of IL. This policy-oriented perspective on international law should become 
one of the most important streams of American IL after World War II.128However, 
it is interesting to see that Lasswell did not conduct comprehensive research on 
international law until he left for Yale. This may also anticipate the division of 
labour he should later obtain with McDougal, as Lasswell was the one responsible 
for the theoretical, methodological and conceptual foundations of the approach 
whereas McDougal, due to his in-depth knowledge of the subject matter, ‘applied’ 
it to international law.129 
 
Yet, it was during his time at the University of Chicago that Lasswell 
developed and sharpened his theoretical framework. In this context, Lasswell 
understood the project of the ‘New Political Science’ at the University of Chicago as 
an opportunity to integrate it with approaches and concepts from other emerging 
disciplines, in particular psychology. It was also during his time at the University of 
Chicago where Lasswell developed in the mid-1930s his famous definition of 
politics – something which occurred alongside with his first engagement with the 
                                                      
127 Schuman, 828–830. 
128 For an introduction to the approach - co-authored by Michael Reisman, one of the leading 
figures of the later New Haven School – see: W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner, and Andrew 
R. Willard, ‘The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction’, Yale Journal of International Law 32, no. 2 
(2007): 575–82. For a more critical examination see Sandra Voos, Die Schule von New Haven: 
Darstellung und KritikeEiner amerikanischen Völkerrechtslehre (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000). 
129 Voos, Die Schule von New Haven, 28. 
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subject matter of international relations.130 At this time Lasswell was interested in 
how war propaganda was shaped by elites and experts and how these elites and 
experts could help to change public debates in order to make international politics 
less violent. Such an interest in experts and elites was not uncommon at this time 
as we can see, e.g., in the writings of Walter Lippmann and Alfred Zimmern.131 
Lasswell assembles these different aspects in the opening paragraph of his World 
Politics and Personal Insecurity, where his famous definition of politics is 
presented: 
 
“Political analysis is the study of changes in the shape and composition 
of the value patterns of society. Representative values are safety, 
income, and deference. Since a few members of any community at a 
given time have the most of each value, a diagram of the pattern of 
distribution of any value are the élite; the rest are the rank and file. As 
élite preserves its ascendancy by manipulating symbols, controlling 
supplies, and applying violence. Less formally expressed, politics is the 
study of who gets what, when, and how”.132 
 
As a result, the “analysis of world politics […] implies the consideration of the 
shape and composition of the value patterns of mankind as a whole”.133 In other 
words, Lasswell (and later the New Haven School) should use a very broad, almost 
all-inclusive, notion of politics.  
 
 Moreover, Lasswell turns to the idea of “world unity”, which I introduced in 
my discussion of Schuman already. For Lasswell the “stable world order” of ‘world 
unity’ is possible only if a “universal body of symbols and practices [is] sustaining 
an élite”. However, the “consensus on which order is based is necessarily 
nonrational”. It is important that the elites create a “world myth” – and this myth, 
in turn, “must be taken for granted by most of the population”. The analysis of 
                                                      
130 On Lasswell’s contribution to IR in general, see Derek McDougall, Harold D. Lasswell and the 
Study of International Relations (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984). For an impressive 
reconstruction of Lasswell’s behavioralism from a constructivist angle, see Onuf, World of Our 
Making, chap. 7. 
131 I will return to this early literature on experts and expertise at the outset of Chapter 4. 
132 Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York: Whittlesey House, 1935), 3 
(emphasis in the original). 
133 Lasswell, 3. 
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myth-making should become then the main task of the social science as it should 
“seek for the processes by which nonrational consensus can be most expeditiously 
achieved”.134 
 
Lasswell connects during the 1930s the idea of world unity only vaguely to 
international law. In World Politics and Personal Insecurity, for example, less than a 
page is devoted to the analysis of international law – the subject matter, which 
should become his central occupation later in his career. At this point of his career, 
however, Lasswell limits the discussion of international law to the idea that terms 
such as “law” and “World Legal Community”, as it was put forward by advocates of 
natural law (with regard to this literature, he cites inter alia the Austrian 
international lawyer Alfred Verdross), can work as a powerful “world symbol” in 
order to create a “world myth” and, subsequently, facilitate “world unity” and, 
finally, peace.135 More generally speaking, the idea to connect international law 
and politics through ‘process’ will become later the core assumption of the New 
Haven School. 
 
2.3 Quincy Wright 
 
In contrast to Lasswell, who started to write on topics related to international law 
only after he had left Chicago, Quincy Wright worked on it throughout his whole 
academic career. Although Wright was one of the most influential figures in the 
history of IR (and IL), he is often forgotten today. Wright came to Chicago in 1923 
where he was appointed a professor of political science at the age of only twenty-
three and where he stayed for his whole career.136 His permanent engagement 
with the two fields of international law and politics is well reflected by the fact that 
Wright served after the end of the Second World War as president of the American 
Political Science Association (APSA, 1948-49) and the American Society of 
International Law (ASIL, 1955-56) as well as inaugural president of the 
                                                      
134 Lasswell, 237; see also his earlier discussion in Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Problem of World-Unity: 
In Quest of a Myth’, International Journal of Ethics 44, no. 1 (1933): 68–93. 
135 Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, 245–246. 
136 For a detailed analysis of Wright’s role in the international law during the interwar years, see 
Hatsue Shinohara, US International Lawyers in the Interwar Years: A Forgotten Crusade (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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International Political Science Association (IPSA, 1950-52). Wright has also been an 
editor of the American Journal of International Law and published an enormous 
oeuvre of approximately 1155 titles – including 99 articles and 55 book reviews 
alone in the American Journal of International Law.137 According to Morton Kaplan, 
Wright was the “foremost theorist of international relations in the United states”138 
and Inis L. Claude claimed that “[i]f the academic field of international relations has 
a founding father, this man is surely Quincy Wright”.139 More recently Bucklin 
called Wright “a dean among twentieth-century internationalists” and described 
him as “dedicated to what he called the Anglo-Saxon legal heritage of evolutionary 
change. His prescription declared that an enforceable international law was a self-
correcting system.”140  
 
 Although it is not so clear, as it is the case with the whole generation of 
interwar scholarship, whether the anachronistic and presentist label of ‘idealism’ 
really fits to his approach, he was definitely a defendant of a scientific approach to 
international affairs.141 What makes Wright so interesting for our discussion is the 
fact that he worked in IR as well as in IL and that he attempted to make both fields 
                                                      
137 One of the few larger engagements with Wright in recent times is an article by Robert J. Beck. 
Here, Beck counts ‘21 books, 141 chapters in introductions to books of others, 392 journal articles, 
123 encyclopaedia articles, 423 book reviews, and 55 published radio broadcasts’, Robert J. Beck, ‘A 
Study of War and An Agenda for Peace: Reflections on the Contemporary Relevance of Quincy 
Wright’s Plan for a “New International Order”’, Review of International Studies 22, no. 02 (1996): 
122. 
138 Morton A. Kaplan, ‘Toward a Theory of International Politics: Quincy Wright’s Study of 
International Relations and Some Recent Developments’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 2, no. 4 
(1958): 335. 
139 Inis L. Claude Jr, ‘The Heritage of Quincy Wright’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 14, no. 4 (1970): 
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140 Bucklin, Realism and American Foreign Policy, 2–3. 
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‘Realism and the Academic Study of International Relations’, 179. For Emily Hill Griggs, on the other 
and, he was a realist avant la lettre, see Emily Hill Griggs, ‘A Realist before “realism”: Quincy Wright 
and the Study of International Politics between Two World Wars’, Journal of Strategic Studies 24, 
no. 1 (2001): 71–103; and for Trygve Throntveit neither realism nor idealism fit as categories, as he 
describes Wright as a policy-oriented ‘pragmatist’, see Trygve Throntveit, ‘A Strange Fate: Quincy 
Wright and the Trans-War Trajectory of Wilsonian Internationalism’, White House Studies 10, no. 4 
(2011): 361–77. The problem to find an adequate label for scholars such as Wrigt may, again, be 
rooted in the ‘presentist’ way to write disciplinary history. Categories such as ‘liberalism’ or 
‘realism’ were not used in the (self-)descriptions of IR scholars before the beginning of the Second 
World War. On the anachronistic use of the label ‘idealism’, its absence in the interwar discourse 
and its ‘invention’ by early ‘realist’ scholars in the 1940s, see Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Where Are the 
Idealists in Interwar International Relations?’, Review of International Studies 32, no. 02 (2006): 
291–308. 
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more scientific. Put differently, Wright observed from the legal angel IR (political 
science/social science) as he observed from IR (political science/social science) 
the analysis of law.  
 
 A good example for Wright’s attempt to make IL more ‘scientific’ is a short 
report, which he filed in 1930 for the Social Science Research Council with the 
financial support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In this 
report Wright’s task was to review, as already the title points out, the Research of 
International Law since the War.142 According to the report we can obsereve a 
general growth of the field of IL (assessing different areas of research such as the 
League of Nations as well as foundations, university degrees, publications, etc.) and 
it is suggested that the field should evolve in the future more towards applicability, 
which in turn is strongly identified with the social sciences. The report argues 
argues that applicability is important as the League of Nations and other 
international organisations, the foreign policy of many countries as well as ‘the 
public’ in general demand more technical assistance to solve the problems of 
international war and violence.  
 
For Wright international law should be seen as a technique to solve these 
problems. As Wright puts it “[i]nternational law is a technique for dealing precisely 
with problems soluble only by action of more than one state, and consequently if 
the public is interested in such problem the role of international law necessarily 
enlarges”.143 Wright qualifies this statement a little bit when writing that the  
 
“international lawyer, however, is not only a technician to assist the 
diplomat and statesman in the task of accomplishing results and 
making institutions run smoothly, important as that work is, his art and 
philosophy also give him a particular kind of insight into the tendencies 
and possibilities of social development. This may make him a useful 
political adviser, particularly when advance is guided relatively more 
                                                      
142 Quincy Wright, Research in International Law since the World War: A Report to the International 
Relations Committee of the Social Science Research Council (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1930). 
143 Wright, 4–5. 
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by permanent international institutions and relatively less by accident 
of war and conquest”.144 
 
Wright’s description of the role of international lawyers, which is strongly 
oriented on the output of their work, is also resembled in his conceptualisation of 
international law. He describes international law as a “method, a philosophy, and a 
process” and substantiates this as follows:  
 
“As a method it seeks to formulate current international relations as 
precisely as possibly, as a philosophy it seeks to formulate them as 
useful as possible, as a process it seeks to eliminate occurrences 
contrary to the most precise and useful formulations it can make.”145 
 
 To accomplish the task of being ‘as precise as possible’, IL scholarship should 
become more scientific as “[r]esearch excludes vagueness, irrationality, and 
copying. Its essence is precision, logic, and originality”.146 And, in order to make IL 
more scientific, it should stick more to the social sciences “not merely by utilizing 
their data, but also by employing their methods and philosophy”.147 The idea, that 
IL should draw more on the social sciences (IR as part of political science 
constituted for Wright a social science), was popular among IL scholars in the 
interwar context (particular in the US) and it was probably articulated most openly 
and prominently by Manley O. Hudson, a professor at Harvard Law School, who 
claimed that IL itself should become an “international social science”.148 Even if 
Wright did not go so far as he concedes to IL a degree of ‘relative autonomy’, the 
report concludes with the suggestion  
 
“that international law can advance best by first giving efficient 
constructive aid to international institutions so that they can 
satisfactorily fulfil their functions of codification, legislation, and 
                                                      
144 Wright, 6. 
145 Wright, 23. 
146 Wright, 23. 
147 Wright, 30. 
148  Quoted after Katharina Rietzler, ‘Fortunes of a Profession: American Foundations and 
International Law, 1910–1939’, Global Society 28, no. 1 (2014): 15; for a portrait of the 
contributions of Hudson and Wright during the interwar years, cf. Shinohara, US International 
Lawyers in the Interwar Years. 
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adjudication. This will mean careful analysis of the practical problems 
as they arise, both of procedure and substance. As a background for this 
the social sciences and contemporary politics should be more liberally 
drawn on than heretofore. They should determine the problems which 
are presently important, and should yield categories useful to the jurist 
when more precisely defined. The jurist should not stop there, however. 
He should seek constantly to formulate the concepts and systems. The 
law cannot live on philosophy alone, but it cannot live without 
philosophy. By envisaging the broadest tendencies of the times and 
moulding his systems toward them, the jurist may gradually shape the 
course of society itself.”149 
 
As I pointed out above, Wright was both, an IL scholar dealing with 
international relations and an IR scholar dealing with law. The latter orientation 
becomes visible for example in Wright’s leading role in a project dealing with the 
‘causes of war’, which was initiated in 1927 by the Social Science Research 
Committee based at the University of Chicago and funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation. The idea behind this project was to assemble insights with regard to 
the causes of war from different disciplines such as history, anthropology, 
psychology, sociology, economics, political science and international law. 150 
Wright’s research in this project should culminate in the publication of his 
magnum opus, the two-volume A Study of War, which was published in its first 
edition in 1942 (with a second edition coming out in 1965).151 Yet, Wright had 
published some preliminary results already during the interwar years, in 
particular, in a smaller monograph, which carries the title The Causes of War and 
the Conditions of Peace.152  
 
The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace is an important study as 
Wright explains here his framework and addresses the relationship of 
international politics and law. Let’s have a closer look at the line of the argument of 
                                                      
149 Wright, Research in International Law since the World War, 36. 
150 Wright, 12. 
151 Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942). 
152 Quincy Wright, The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1935). 
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The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. For him peace and war are only two 
sides of the same coin as the identification of the conditions of peace is the flip side 
of the identification of the causes of war. Again, as it was the case for international 
lawyers, applicability is important. For “social scientists” it is not important to 
examine all elements involved in war and peace: ”We want to know elements in 
the situation of either predictive or control value. Thus the conditions of peace 
which we actually wish to identify are those elements of the total situation during 
peace which we can effectively manipulate and which, if properly manipulated, will 
preserve the peace”.153 For Wright the social sciences are perfectly suitable for 
such an endeavour of social engineering, as the social scientist occupies the perfect 
middle-ground between the journalist and the diplomat – both being too practical 
and too ‘close’ to the object of study which hinders them to elaborate 
generalisations –, on the one hand, and the philosopher and historian – both 
working only theoretical and lacking applicability –, on the other: “The social 
scientist seeking to retain contact with both the practical and theoretical workers, 
centers attention upon the isolation of measurable or at least recognizable factors, 
useful for predicting, or capable of manipulating for controlling the future”.154 
Wright’s method is in particular informed by comprehensive historical inquiries, 
which he subjects to further statistical analyses from time to time. 
 
But, what are exactly the ‘conditions’ and ‘causes’, according to Wright? 
Wright identifies four conditions of peace (and their absence or inadequacy are 
equated with the four causes of war). The conditions are (1) “a desire for peace in 
the human population superior to all hatreds”; (2) “an organization of world 
community adequate to restrain conflicts”, (3) “the realization in international 
relations of a system of law intolerant of violence except as a legally controlled 
instrument of exclusion”; (4) “the continuous application of peaceful techniques 
for presenting extreme departures from equilibrium among the material forces in 
the state system”.155 Similarly one can look at these conditions from other angels: 
(1) is about “public opinion and propaganda” (the psychological and public opinion  
point of view); (2) deals with “international organization and procedures” (the 
                                                      
153 Wright, 1–2 (emphasises in the original). 
154 Wright, 19. 
155 Wright, 3–6. 
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sociological and organizational point of view); (3) centres around “international 
and constitutional law” (the legal point of view); (4) is concerned with “armaments 
and the balance of power” (the technical and military point of view).156 For Wright 
all four conditions of peace are linked to each other. This signifies that, for 
instance, the field of international law cannot be studied in isolation. As he puts it, 
especially law 
 
“and organization are clearly related […]. Law and organization may 
indeed be looked upon as but objective and subjective aspects of the 
same thing. Law is the society’s policy as recorded, classified, pigeon-
holed, and susceptible of study. It is the analysis by which a society 
systematizes its interests. Organization is the society’s policy as effected 
in the day to day functioning of institutions, the formulating, giving and 
carrying out of orders. It is the coordination by which society realizes 
its interests. Law is then a society’s intellect and organization is its 
will”.157 
 
Moreover, according to Wright,  “law must be hostile to violence” and it must 
be an instrument to abolish the violent behaviour of states.158 Wright argues that 
there have been two important developments since the Great War, which are the 
League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact; and he suggest that the 
organizational structure of the international level should be that of a ‘world 
federation’: “The federation is something of a compromise between the balance of 
power and the empire […]. It seeks to organize authority in international matters, 
not in all matters, in a central representative body”.159 For Wright the League of 
Nations can become this body.160 However, Wright points out that the League of 
Nations had to struggle in recent time (he is writing in 1935), as it has become the 
arena for a conflict between law and politics – between supporters of a conception 
of the League arguing that it should be more legalistic in order to guarantee a 
                                                      
156 Wright, 21. 
157 Wright, 73 (emphasis added). 
158 Wright, 86. 
159 Wright, 95. 
160 In other words, Wright can certainly be seen within the broader pragmatic ‘move to institutions’ 
in the first half of the twentieth century. On the ‘move to institutions’, see David Kennedy, ‘The 
Move to Institutions’, Cardozo Law Review 8, no. 5 (1987): 841–988. 
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higher degree of independence of its member state (the position of, e.g., the United 
States) and supporters of an antagonistic conception, who demanded a higher 
degree of political flexibility in order to give more power to the League (the 
position of, e.g., Japan).161 Wright is in support of this second position and argues 
that the League “must become universal” in order to transcend the struggle 
between law and politics. This kind of universality should not only be achieved by 
means of making all states a member of the League but also by means of 
propaganda and education.162  
 
2.4 Interim Conclusion 
 
So far, the discussion of Schuman, Lasswell and Wright revealed a specific 
understanding of interdisciplinarity. For the three Chicago-based authors 
interdisciplinarity – or ‘intellectual cooperation’ (as it was often called during the 
interwar period) – is tied to the idea(l) to make both disciplines – IL and IR – more 
scientific, which means to turn them into a ‘social science’ (or a ‘new Policy 
Science’) merely understood as an impartial and neutral technique to conduct 
research. In other words, an external third is invoked and established in order to 
provide a new orientation for both disciplines.163 To become an interdisciplinary 
scholar signifies then to become a generalist – a scholar “whose skills allowed 
acquisition of all other disciplines without formal training”.164 And with this turn 
to ‘science’, comes also the promise that IR and IL are able not only to explain and 
predict international politics but also to deliver technical solutions in order to 
eliminate international violence and war. What becomes visible here is the fact 
that this understanding of interdisciplinarity comes also with a certain image of 
law as an important tool to create ‘world unity’ and establish peace.  
                                                      
161 For a recent study of the role of international law in US foreign policy during the first part of the 
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Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
162 Wright, The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace, 98. 
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As Duncan Kennedy has noted recently, it was the legislator along with the 
administrator who became the “hero figures” of international thought during the 
interwar years.165Both administrator and legislator were designed as social and 
legal engineers, respectively. While in this context the task of the legislator was to 
draft the “multiplicity of that constituted the new order”, the administrator was 
portrayed as producing and enforcing “the detailed regulations that put legislative 
regimes into effect”.166 Moreover, the area of activity of social and legal engineers 
was imagined to be within and around the newly established international 
organisations, with the League of Nations being the most important one.  
 
This development is, of course, also connected to the more general ‘move to 
institutions’ on the international level. 167  In other words, the international 
imagined as international organization was the condition of possibility for this 
literature to emerge and it was during this period of time when it began that the 
international was imagined and “problematized in terms of international 
organization”.168 All of the three authors shared these basic views.  
 
But Schuman, Lasswell and Wright also differed – and these differences should 
lay the foundations for a number of new projects in both disciplines. While 
Schuman was certainly the less optimistic of the Chicago authors, his style of 
reasoning and his main assumptions should be shared by the main figures of 
political realism after the Second World War; Lasswell, on the other hand, should 
intensify his interest in the relevance of elite rule and apply this – then together 
with McDougal – to the legal field;169 and finally, in particular Wright, who was the 
most explicit in developing IR (and IL) into a ‘social science’ should remain one of 
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168 Oliver Kessler, ‘World Society’, in Routledge Handbook of International Political Sociology, ed. 
Xavier Guillaume and Pinar Bilgin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 102 (emphasis in the original). 
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to the topic of legal education, namely to the question of how to make legal education a tool to 
produce the US foreign policy elites for the future, see Harold D. Lasswell and Myres McDougal, 
‘Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest’, Yale Law Journal 
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the central references and one of the driving forces of what Stanley Hoffmann later 
described as the development of IR into an “American Social Science”.170 
 
 3. International Law and the Mirror of Politics: On Realism, Positivism and 
the Production of Blind Spots 
 
Let us turn now to a second interdisciplinary project between IR and IL: the 
‘strange’ relationship between classical legal positivism and political realism. This 
relationship is ‘strange’ in the first place as it has been usually neglected that there 
existed such a relationship between both at all. For instance, Martti Koskenniemi 
reconstructs in his well-received history of international legal thought The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations the rise and fall of the European ties of IL. According to 
Koskenniemi, the European tradition of the field emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century with a strong link to the idea ‘to provide the legal conscience of 
the civilised world’ and started to fade out after the interwar years. Koskenniemi 
claims that merely two developments led this tradition to come to an end – and 
what he also seems to regret: it was, on the one hand, the emergence of policy-
oriented approaches in IL exemplified in Lasswell and McDougal’s New Haven 
school and, on the other hand, the growing relevance of the discipline of IR in the 
form of its prevailing paradigm of political realism and in the person of its main 
representative Morgenthau. Put differently, these projects were more successful in 
terms of jurisdictional struggles in academia. 
 
Morgenthau in turn is portrayed by Koskenniemi as a (hidden) translator of 
the central positions of Carl Schmitt into international affairs and into American 
academia.171 Koskenniemi justifies this claim by pointing out that, while both 
Schmitt and Morgenthau being lawyers by education, they relate law and politics 
in an asymmetric way by emphasising the primacy of the political over the legal 
and, hence, downgrading law to an epiphenomenon of political struggle (we have 
                                                      
170 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus 106, no. 3 
(1977): 41–60. 
171 Here, Koskenniemi makes a rather strong claim: ‘international lawyers have been compelled to 
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Schmittian insights as parts of its professional identity’, Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations, 424. 
 53 
already seen something similar in Schuman’s International Politics). But if law is 
understood only as an epiphenomenon of political struggle, we have not to include 
it in our analysis of international politics. This is, according to Koskenniemi, the 
reason why IR and IL separated their ways in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. As a reaction IL itself turned to the formalistic analyses of legal positivism.172 
 
However, in this section I attempt to challenge the view that legal 
positivism and political realism did not share an interdisciplinary project. Instead, 
I will argue that they engaged in a hidden dialogue as the condition of possibility of 
both was the existence of the ‘other’. To do so, I will briefly reconstruct 
Morgenthau’s take on the relationship of law and politics by scrutinizing three of 
his interventions: his doctoral dissertation, his famous 1940 article in the 
American Journal of International Law and his early American work in IR.173 I turn 
then (though very briefly) to legal positivism in order to argue finally that both, 
realism and positivism constitute a hidden interdisciplinary project as both, while 
not only sharing many epistemological and ontological commitments, construct 
their respective projects in the blind spot of each other. 
 
3.1 Morgenthau, Political Realism – and the Irrelevance of International Law? 
 
It is interesting to see that Morgenthau developed his main assumptions with 
regard to his image of the relationship of law and politics already in his doctoral 
dissertation, which he completed in 1927 at the University of Frankfurt and 
published as revised version two years later as Die international Rechtspflege, ihr 
Wesen und ihre Grenzen [The International Juridicary, its Nature and its Limits].174 
                                                      
172 Koskenniemi, chap. 6; recently, Oliver Jütersonke has pointed out that Koskenniemi’s claim 
about the close intellectual alliance between Schmitt and Morgenthau is exaggerated as both had 
hardly met and – more importantly – as both were involved in more general debates of their time. 
Consequently, Jüttersonke argues that we should situate Morgenthau more broadly in the 
discussions of law and politics (in particular, the German tradition of the Staatswissenschaften) of 
the 1930s and ‘40s as he was in permanent exchange with legal scholars such as, for instance, 
Hersch Lauterpacht and Hans Kelsen. See Jütersonke, Morgenthau, Law and Realism. As my main 
focus in this chapter concerns logics of interidisciplinarity, I will not go into historical details in the 
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173 Thus, I do not include the work of all the main advocates of political realism in IR to this section. 
In particular, the work of E.H. Carr is missing. 
174 Hans J. Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen (Leipzig: 
Universitätsverlag von Robert Noske, 1929). 
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The thesis examines the question of whether states feel obliged to subordinate 
their conflicts to organs of international judiciary (meaning bodies of arbitration 
or courts) and, if they do so, to what extent this is the case. The thesis topic, as 
Koskenniemi notes, was “a rather standard object of scholarly interest in the 
1920s”.175 Morgenthau is in thesis puzzled in his thesis by the fact that, on the one 
hand, the scope of the international judiciary is – in ‘objective’ terms – unlimited as 
every international conflict can be subsumed under general norms while, on the 
other hand, this does – in reality – not mean that all international conflicts are 
addressed before the international judiciary.176 Morgenthau explains this gap by 
arguing that the ‘subjective’ limits of the political determine how law and politics 
are related. As Morgenthau famously remarks: 
 
“The concept of the ‘legal’ and the ‘political’ do not constitute an 
adequate pair of concepts that could enter into a contradictory 
distinction. The conceptual distinction of the concept of political 
questions is formed by the concept of non-political questions and 
not by the concept of legal questions which, for its part, can be just 
as much of political as of non-political nature”.177 
 
As law and politics are not conceptualised as directly opposed (kontradiktorischer 
Gegensatz) we can identify two types of conflicts: firstly, political conflicts or, as 
Morgenthau calls them, tensions (Spannungen); secondly, non-political conflicts, 
which are in Morgenthau’s words disputes (Streitigkeiten). While disputes can be 
tamed by delegating them to the different mechanisms of the international 
judiciary, tensions have to remain unsolved here. Tensions, which are a 
“particularity of international relations” [“Eigentümlichkeit der 
zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen”], have to be addressed in political terms – if 
                                                      
175 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 440. 
176 Morgenthau, Die internationale Rechtspflege, 42. 
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they can be addressed at all and do not constitute the result of deeper underlying 
and in general untameable psychological forces.178 
 
Consequently, conflict settlement in international relations is in principle a 
political and less a juridical question. Morgenthau’s position resembles here the 
one of Schuman as discussed above. Tensions appear usually when questions of 
states’ vital interests and, in particular, national honour, which both find their 
expression in international law through clauses of vital interest and honour 
(Interessen- und Ehrenklauseln), are at stake.179However, it is not possible to decide 
a priori whether a conflict is political or not. There are no objective criteria, which 
would allow us to subsume [“auf Grund einer reinen Subsumtionstätigkeit”] a 
conflict either under the label of the political or consider it as non-
political.180Rather, the question whether something is political or not depends on 
the subjective perception of states and the international community. And, 
moreover, whether an issue or conflict becomes political is a question of 
“intensity”.181This observation has far-reaching consequences when we take the 
following paragraph into account: 
 
“We have to remark that the distinction between political and non-
political questions with regard to certain purposes is impossible as the 
concept of the political is not tied with conceptual necessity to certain 
purposes, as well as it is not excluded from certain purposes. The scope 
of political conflict cannot be determined by some material content; no 
question must be of political character due its material content, 
however, every question can have political character due to 
circumstances, which lie outside its own realm. The concept of the 
political has no substance, which is once and for all fixed, as it is rather 
a feature, a quality, a colouring, which can be attached to any kind of 
substance, but is not attached necessary to a certain substance. There 
are certain purposes, which attach the colour of the political 
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particularly easy and often, but it is not by nature the property of a 
certain purpose. A question that is of political character today can be 
deprived of its political meaning by tomorrow and a question of low 
significance can become a political question of first order only by 
night”.182 
 
According to Morgenthau these insights about the “indeterminate, through judicio-
technical fixation untameable concept of the political” should help those who are in 
charge to create a more effective international legal order.183 Such an order should 
consist of two features: firstly, it should be aware of its own (subjective) limits and, 
secondly, it should be dynamic rather than static (as, e.g., in legal formalism) in 
order to be able to adapt quick enough to the untameable nature of politics.184To 
sum up, Morgenthau conceptualises international law and politics in an 
asymmetric fashion where the political dominates the legal. 
 
Morgenthau’s elaborations on the relationship of law and politics should 
culminate in his famous 1940 article Positivism, Functionalism, and International 
Law, which was published in the American Journal of International Law.185 At the 
time of publishing this article Morgenthau had already been forced to immigrate to 
the United States and was working as an Assistant Professor for Law and Political 
Science at the University of Kansas City. It is worth to have a closer look at this 
article, which has been referred to as Morgenthau’s “legal swan song” as it 
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represents not only a break in Morgenthau’s own biography but as it also stands 
for a broader movement and transition from European IL to American IR, i.e. a 
period where IR as late-coming discipline started to dominate the study of 
international affairs on the disadvantage of other disciplines such as diplomatic 
history and IL.186 
 
 Morgenthau asserts in the article that traditional forms of positivism 
represent the mainstream of legal reasoning of this period as they lay the legal and 
intellectual foundation of the League of Nations and of what he refers more 
generally to as ‘Geneva’. Here, traditional legal positivism (or as Morgenthau calls 
it, ‘juridic positivism’) is the main reason for the “collapse of the international law 
of Geneva” as the ”failure of the post-World War science of international law is not 
due to personal or accidental circumstances; it grows out of the very assumptions 
and methods which have led juridic positivism to defeat in the domestic context” 
already.187 However, juridic positivism was not able in the international context to 
learn from its prior domestic errors and to adapt to the new realities of 
international affairs. This is so as juridic positivism as it “blame[s] the facts for 
failure. When the facts behave otherwise than we have predicted, they seem to say, 
too bad for the facts. […] As the League of Nations was a failure, let us have another 
League”.188 
 
But what is, according to Morgenthau, juridic positivism exactly and why 
did it fail? For Morgenthau, juridic positivism emerged out of the more general 
turn to positivism in philosophy in the nineteenth century – a move that claimed to 
exclude metaphysical speculation form science and attempted, instead, to ground 
scientific knowledge only on direct observation. In the sphere of law the turn to 
positivism produced four consequences which are according to Morgenthau: (1) 
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“legalism” as juridic positivism devotes itself strictly to the legal sphere and 
demarcates itself “from ethics and mores as well as psychology and sociology”; (2) 
“étatist monism” – i.e., a restriction on “legal rules enacted by states, and excludes 
all law whose existence cannot be traced to the statute books or the decisions of 
courts”; (3) moral “agnosticism” as legal positivism has no preference vis-à-vis the 
value system represented by the rules it is constituted of; and (4) “dogmatic 
conceptualism” as it advocates the idea that “a logically coherent system of law” 
can be constructed in which the system of law, particular rules and cases are tied 
together through “logical deduction”.189 
 
On the basis of these tenets Morgenthau identifies a couple of 
misconceptions of juridic positivism, which result from the “assumption that law, 
as it really is, can be understood without the normative and social context in which 
it actually stands”.190 This means for Morgenthau that it is, first, impossible to 
blend law’s normative sphere out as “[l]aw, ethics, and mores support each other 
[…]. Legal rules refer to ethics and mores for the determination of their meaning 
and vice versa”.191 In international law this becomes visible when we look at 
certain principles or ideas of civilization, which had become predominant for 
certain periods of time and were translated into legal rules. This line of argument 
is for Morgenthau, however, just an attempt to eliminate one metaphysics with 
another as the idea that it is possible to get rid of metaphysical presuppositions is 
by itself a “metaphysical attitude, a kind of negative metaphysics”.192 Second 
almost the same holds true for the sociological context as “economic interests, 
social tensions, and aspirations for power […] are the motivating forces in the 
international field”. 193  It is impossible to understand the conclusion of 
international treaties or the different (and sometimes conflicting) interpretations 
of a specific legal text without studying transformations of the sociological 
situatedness. And finally, one can witness how the firm boundaries of the 
assumptions of ‘étatist monism’ and legalism (written statues, etc.) are cracked 
open through the doctrine of customary law “which has become a veritable 
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panacea for its [i.e., international law’s] theoretical troubles“ as it is mobilised 
whenever formal rules are lacking.194 
 
It is due to these misconceptions that this stream of legal positivism has 
become the subject of several attacks from different directions: the renaissance of 
moderate natural law as represented by Hersch Lauterpacht’s writings; 195 a 
radicalisation and ‘scientification’ of positivism in Hans Kelsen’s neo-positivism;196 
and a realist (also known as ‘sociological’ or ‘functional’) jurisprudence advanced, 
for example, by Morgenthau himself. Morgenthau claims that his own approach is 
realist as a “truly scientific theory of international law” must deal with 
international law “as it really is”; in order to do so, it has to be aware of the 
sociological background which is represented by the “psychological, social, 
political and economics forces”; and, it has to identify the dual “functionalist 
relationship between those forces and legal rules” as, on the one hand, 
international law is the “function of the civilization in which it originates” (in 
particular: “ethics and mores”) and, on the other hand, international law itself 
shapes as a “social mechanism working towards certain ends” the civilization of 
which it is part of.197 
 
Moreover, Morgenthau argues that, if one is aware of the social forces in the 
background of the international legal order,  
 
“[i]nternational law owes its existence to identical or complementary 
interests of states, naked by power as a last resort, or, where such 
identical interests do not exist, to a mere balance of power which 
prevents a state from breaking these rules of international law. Where 
there is neither community of interests nor balance of power there is no 
international law”.198 
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As a consequence, Morgenthau links this observation to the main argument of his 
doctoral dissertation as it is essential for a ‘functional’ theory of international law 
to understand that there exists a “political” and a “non-political” international law 
in the form of tensions and disputes.199 Furthermore, Morgenthau extends this 
discussion to the issue of the validity of international law as for him rules of 
international law are only valid if their violation is sanctioned whereas if this is not 
the case they “never become valid law” (his examples are the Treaty of Versailles 
and the Covenant of the League of Nations).200 
 
 The 1940 article was Morgenthau’s last text, which was explicitly addressed 
to an international legal audience. In the years that followed Morgenthau started to 
play an essential role in establishing IR as a discipline in the US (especially after he 
moved from the University of Kansas to the University of Chicago in 1944). As 
recently Robbie Shilliam, Oliver Jütersonke and others convincingly argued, 
Morgenthau’s transformation into an IR scholar was more a process of transition 
from European IL to American IR than an immediate rupture with the former; it 
was less a start from nowhere than the translation of previous work into three new 
contexts:201 American academia with its specific projects, institutions, rules, 
discourses, cognitive interests and objects of study; a second ‘birth’ of the 
discipline of IR, now in the US (after the first was located more in post-First World 
War Europe and the almost mythical place of origin of Aberystwyth), which should 
culminate in the idea that IR is representing a genuine ‘American social science’; 
and finally, the changing architecture of the international sphere moving from the 
interwar years and the Second World War context towards the bipolar order of the 
rising Cold War era.202In this regard one can read Morgenthau’s three first 
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American books, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Politics Among Nations and In 
Defense of the National Interest , which have been published within a short period 
of time (1946-1951), as speaking to these three contexts: Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics is addressing the first context; while Politics Among Nations the second; 
and In Defense of the National Interest the third one. However, this is not the place 
to trace back and discuss Morgenthau’s three ‘American books’ in full detail. Suffice 
is to say that I will concentrate on a few, however pivotal, developments of these 
books. What is common to all three books is that while their main focus seems 
gradually shifting away from international law they still operate within the 
confines of examining the limits of international law.203  
 
For instance, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, which was published in 1946 
but was based on a series of lectures that Morgenthau had provided in 1940 in 
New York, presents a polemic essay, on the one hand, against the liberal ‘scientific’ 
approach regarding the social sciences in general and IR more specifically that had 
been developed inter alia one decade earlier at the University of Chicago;204 on the 
other hand, Morgenthau attacks what he calls the “legalistic spirit” of the interwar 
years.205 As Morgenthau puts it, both the reliance on science as well as on 
‘legalism’, come with the idea that, e.g., war is the result of brute power politics and 
that it has been untameable for a long time as the political and legal sciences were 
in a rather primitive stage of their development. Yet, according to Morgenthau, 
during the first decades of the twentieth century the figure of the ‘scientific man’ 
emerged and with it the belief that peace could be established by juridico-technical 
means. As Morgenthau portrays it, this strand of thought includes also that social 
and natural sciences share the same ‘logic of inquiry’ and that the social sciences 
could – and should – catch up the earlier success of the natural sciences (in order 
tame the social as the natural sciences tamed nature). As Morgenthau summarizes, 
the approach of the ‘scientific man’ claims that “politics should be ‘reformed’ and 
‘rationalized’. Political manœvering should be replaced by the scientific ‘plan,’ the 
political decision by the scienfitic ‘solution,’ the politician by the ‘expert,’ the 
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chapter. 
205 Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 98. 
 62 
statesmen by the ‘braintruster,’ the legislator by the ‘legal engineer.’”206 In a 
striking paragraph, Morgenthau describes what this move towards the ‘legal 
engineer’ might signify for the relationship of law and politics. It is worth to quote 
the whole paragraph:  
 
“The rule of law has come to be regarded as a kind of miraculous 
panacea which, wherever applied, would heal, by virtue of its intrinsic 
reasonableness and justice, the ills of the body politic, transform 
insecurity and disorder into the calculability of a well-ordered society, 
and put in the place of violence and bloodshed the peaceful and 
reasonable settlement of social conflicts. The rule of law had 
accomplished this in the domestic field, and the rule of law would 
accomplish it again in the international sphere, provided it was given a 
chance. Transfer the rule of law to international affairs and ‘order 
under law’ will reign supreme there, too. How to effect this transfer 
remains, then, the only problem to be solved. Persuasion, propaganda, 
education, scientific proof, and democratization of foreign affairs are 
the means by which governments and people shall be induced to put 
international relations under the dominance of the rule of law”.207  
 
Morgenthau uses – or better: invents – the figure of the ‘Scientific Man’ as a typical 
straw man. By contrasting the project of the ‘Scientific Man’, Morgenthau argues in 
line with his previous work that international tensions and war cannot be 
eliminated through the scientific and legalistic tools of the ‘Scientific Man’ as such 
an approach overlooks the “contingent character of social reality”208 and oversees 
that struggels on an international level are the result of deeper, often 
uncontrollable, psychological and social forces in the struggle for power. This 
brings Morgenthau to the conclusion that politics “is an art and not a science, and 
what is required for its mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom 
and moral strength of the statesman”.209 As we will see below, the idea that politics 
is only – to a very limited extend – tameable through what is often referred to as 
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the ‘prudence’ of the statesman should become one of the central claims of 
Morgenthau’s work as well as in classical realist approaches more generally. 
 
 In a similar vein as with Scientific Man vs. Power Politics and, Oliver 
Jütersonke persuasively suggested, contrary to many of today’s “mainstream 
conceptions, Politics Among Nations was not a book on what today would be called 
International Relations theory, constituted in the vein of Political Science” but it 
was rather “a book on the practical limitations to the use of law in the international 
realm, written at a time when peaceful change seemed an increasingly futile 
endeavour and the bipolar stalemate that was to become the Cold War an ominous 
reality”.210 As we can read in the first sentence of the first edition of Morgenthau’s 
seminal textbook Politics Among Nations (published in 1948), “[i]nternational 
politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”.211 This general statement is 
further sub-divided and plays out in three different policies: the “policy of the 
status quo” (“to keep power”), the “policy of the imperialism” (“to increase 
power”) and the “policy of prestige” (“to demonstrate power”). International law is 
only important in the context of the first kind of ‘policy’ as it “is a favourite device 
of status quo nations” in order to perpetuate the existing order (and strengthen an 
existing balance of power), while “[i]mperialistic nations are inevitably opposed to 
the existing status quo and its legal order and will not think of submitting the 
controversy to the authoritative decision of an international court”.212 This is also 
because, as we learned in a similar way already from Schuman, “[l]aw in general 
and, especially, international law is primary a static social force”213 and that 
“disputes which are most likely to lead to war cannot be settled by judicial 
means”.214 However, this does not mean that international law does not exist 
(according to Morgenthau, an argument exemplified and popularized in the 
nineteenth century by the jurisprudence of John Austin) as “to deny that 
international law exists at all as a system of binding rules flies in the face of all 
evidence. This misconception as to the existence of international law is at least in 
part the result of the disproportionate attention which public opinion has paid in 
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recent times to a small fraction of international law, while neglecting the main 
body of it”.215 
 
Yet, that international law exist does not mean that the role of law in 
international affairs is identical to the one law plays on the domestic level. In this 
respect Morgenthau puts forward that “[i]nternational law is a primitive type of law 
resembling the kind of law which prevails certain preliterate societies”.216 As 
international law works only in limited cases, Morgenthau puts his hopes, as he did 
in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics already, in the role of the statesman and the 
relatd institution of diplomacy. However, diplomacy can only be successful if it 
abandons the errors of the “new parliamentary diplomacy”, which Morgenthau 
identifies with the diplomatic practices of the interwar years.217 If diplomacy is 
controlled by parliaments, it looses its grip as, for example, international politics 
become the subject of day-to-day party politics. Contrary to this, diplomacy should 
rely, according to Morgenthau, on the practical wisdom of foreign policy elites, the 
statesmen and diplomats. “The continuing success of diplomacy in preserving peace 
depends”, as Morgenthau summarizes, “upon the extraordinary moral and 
intellectual qualities which all the leading participants must posses”.218 
 
 To emphasise the significant role of diplomacy and the prudent statesman is 
the general theme which Morgenthau, but also other important realist figures such 
as George F. Kennan and Henry Kissinger, should pursue in the following years. 
Morgenthau’s third American book In Defense of the National Interest is a striking 
example of this turn. While Morgenthau’s earlier assessment of diplomacy such as 
in Politics Among Nations was still limited to its role in international politics, the 
focus shifts with In Defense of the National Interest to foreign policy analysis (or a 
theory of foreign policy). With regard to international law, the question is now 
what role international law could play in the context of foreign policy. This shift of 
the ‘referent object’ from the achievement of international peace and security 
towards the maintenance of US-foreign-affairs-focused peace and security becomes 
also visible by the fact that we can observe an increasing policy relevance of IR 
                                                      
215 Morgenthau, 211. 
216 Morgenthau, 211 (emphasis added). 
217 Morgenthau, 431. 
218 Morgenthau, 444. 
 65 
scholars as the revolving door between academia, emerging think tanks and the US 
State Department began to spin faster: in this regard Kennan and Kissinger are, of 
course, two of the most famous examples but also Morgenthau worked between 
1949 and 1951 as a consultant for Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff at the State 
Department.219 This shift becomes also visible in In Defense of the National Interest 
where Morgenthau traces back the recent history of US foreign policy as well as he 
attempts to identify its main flaws.  
 
In this book Morgenthau listed “legalism” among the main flaws (or as he 
puts it: “intellectual errors”) of American foreign policy during the interwar 
years.220 Morgenthau portrays the, what he calls, “legalistic approach to foreign 
policy” as a “logical development” of a “utopian, non-political conception” of 
foreign policy where it is assumed that international politics is “an undertaking by 
peace-loving nations”.221 Yet, the legalistic approach dramatically underestimates 
for Morgenthau that “[f]oreign policy like all politics, is in its essence a struggle for 
power, waged by sovereign nations for national advantage”.222  Importantly, 
legalism is often not only irrelevant but can even make things worse if it is 
combined with ‘utopianism’ as this leads, for example, to the criminalization of 
war. When war is criminalized, Morgenthau explains, a conflict between two 
states, “instead of seen in terms of relative power, is conceived in absolute terms of 
power, law, and order vs. aggression, crime, and anarchy”.223 In accordance with 
his earlier work, Morgenthau claims now that US foreign policy should avoid anly 
legalistic and utopian reasoning and, instead, concentrate mainly on diplomacy 
and statesmanship and rely on international law only to consolidate an already 
existing and favourable balance of power. International law is again 
conceptualised as a static technique to pursue status quo policies. 
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 As I noted already, we can find similar position in the work of Kennan and 
Kissinger. While Kennan scrutinizes in his American Diplomacy the history of US 
foreign policy during the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, Kissinger 
concentrates in A World Restored on the European context in the aftermath of the 
Congress of Vienna and the resulting balance of power of the nineteenth century 
‘Concert of Europe’. Here, Kennan’s central claim is that US diplomacy relied too 
much on, what he famously coined, “a legalistic-moralistic approach to 
international politics”.224 This approach is characterized by the belief “that it 
should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of 
governments in the international field by the acceptance of some systems of legal 
rules and restraints”.225 For Kennan, however, this is bound to fail as the “legalistic 
approach to international affairs ignores in general the international significance 
of political problems and the deeper sources of international instability”, in 
particular as many states will not accept to subordinate their political aspiration 
under an international judiciary.226 In addition, international law is not dynamic 
enough to adapt to the rapidly changing contours of international politics:  
 
“The function of a system of international relations is not to inhibit this 
process of change by imposing a legal strait jacket upon it but rather to 
facilitate it: to ease its transitions, to temper the asperities to which it 
often leads, to isolate and moderate the conflicts to which it gives rise, 
and to see that these conflicts do not assume forms too unsettling for 
international life in general. But this is the task of diplomacy, in the 
most old-fashioned sense of the term. For this, law is too abstract, too 
inflexible, too hard to adjust to the demands of the unpredictable and 
the unexpected”.227  
 
However, these are more or less juridico-technichal shortcomings ‘only’ while the 
main deficiency lies in the intersection of law and morality, namely it 
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“is the inevitable association of legalistic ideas with moralistic ones: the 
carrying-over into the affairs of states of the concept of right and 
wrong, the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral 
judgment. Whoever says there is law must of course be indignant 
against the lawbreaker to the point of complete submissiveness—
namely, unconditional surrender. It is a curious thing, but it is true, that 
the legalistic approach to world affairs, rooted as it is unquestionably is 
in a desire to do away with war and violence, makes violence more 
enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to political stability than 
did the older motives of national interest. A war fought in the name of 
high moral principle finds no easy end short of some form of total 
domination”.228 
 
This position is of course identical with Morgenthau’s earlier criticism of a foreign 
poicy, which integrates utopianism and legalism. Likewise Kennan claims that 
instead of pursuing the politics of the ‘legalistic-moralistic approach’ of the 
international, the United States should stick to the less ambitious politics of 
diplomacy and start to follow its own national interest.229 
 
 In terms of the architecture of the international order – and thisis where 
Kissinger’s contribution was important – ‘stability’ should become the central – 
and only feasible – goal. As Kissinger argues, stability is possible only within a 
“legitimate international order” – something that was created in the aftermath of 
the Napoleonic Wars by the drafters of the Treaty of Vienna.230 This kind of 
stability was, however, lost during the late nineteenth century and in the first half 
of the twentieth century as diplomats and politicians attempted to establish a just 
international order. Thus the search for legitimacy should not be confused with the 
quest for a just international order as imagined by (the straw man of) interwar 
idealism. ”Stability”, Kissinger writes,  
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“has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally 
accepted legitimacy. ‘Legitimacy’ as here used should not be confused 
with justice. It means no more than an international agreement about 
the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims 
and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the 
framework of international order by all major powers […]. A legitimate 
order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. Wars 
may occur but they will be fought in the name of the existing structure 
and the peace which follows will be justified as a better expression of 
the ‘legitimate’, general consensus. Diplomacy in the classic sense, the 
adjustment of differences through negotiation, is possible only in 
‘legitimate’ international orders”.231 
 
I will revisit the notion of ‘legitimacy’, which Kissinger does not further 
develop (he uses it almost synonymously with stability and order), below. At this 
point ‘legitimacy’ has not to concern further. Rather, it is important to stress that 
Morgenthau’s three US-American books together with the writings of Kennan and 
Kissinger constitute in a way the golden age of classical realism in IR. What we see 
in the realist tradition is that the earlier imaginary of international law, as 
something that can regulate politics and help to secure peace, comes increasingly 
into defence. Already soon, however, classical realism itself should become the 
target of several attacks, particularly in form of the emerging behaviourist 
revolution (which arrived in IR compared to other social sciences quite late), and 
start to fade out slowly. However, this has not to concern us here.  232 
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3.2 Oppenheim, Legal Positivism – and the Elimination of Politics? 
 
In this subsection I will shortly reconstruct a number of central assumptions of 
legal positivism in IL. This will help me to compare legal positivism and political 
realism – and to point to interdisciplinary connection points – in the conclusion 
(3.3) of this section. The reconstruction of legal positivism will be considerably 
shorter than the one of political realism in the previous subsection (3.1). I will this 
only provide a spotlight on the project of legal positivism in IL – a spotlight that 
cannot capture this rich tradition of international legal theory. 233 I justify this for 
two reasons: first, this chapter is mainly interested in the role of law, the 
relationship between law and politics as well as images of interdisciplinarity 
within IR (i.e., ‘to follow the law in IR’) although this runs the risk to reify 
disciplinary boundaries (though, I think, section 5 will help to reflect on this 
sufficiently); second, as I will come back to legal positivism later in this study 
(when I inquire into the use of jurisdiction in legal positivism), this helps me to 
avoid redundancies. This said, I reconstruct some tenets of legal positivism in IL by 
introducing Lassa Oppenheim’s seminal 1908-article on The Science of 
International Law.234 The article is particularly interesting for our purpose as it 
attempts, in a similar way with Morgenthau’s 1940-article, to outline and 
popularize a specific approach to an American IL audience (as Oppenheim was 
coming from an European and here, first and foremost, British 
tradition).235Moreover, Morgenthau praises in the textbook Politics among Nations 
from the second edition (published in 1954) onwards Oppenheim’s view on the 
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relationship of law and politics and, especially, his use of balance of power 
thinking.236  
 
 Writing in 1908, Oppenheim claims that international law is “still in the 
beginning of its development” as it is mainly composed of customary 
rules.237Among the tasks of the ‘science’, i.e. academic discipline, of IL Oppenheim 
identifies to state the already existing codified international law as well as to 
identify and evaluate the extent and history of international customary law.238 
However, by referring to – and in order to oppose – the project of natural law 
international law, Oppenheim claims that the “international jurist must not walk in 
clouds; he must remain on the ground of what is realizable and tangible”.239 We 
can see what this means, for instance, in Oppenheim’s discussion of the role of the 
‘science of international law’ in the process of preparing the codification of already 
existing customary rules. For Oppenheim international law’s codification neither 
can nor should “revolutionize the present international order and put the whole 
system of international law on a new basis”.240Instead, international law should 
mirror international politics. Moreover, he stresses also that usage and custom 
should be distinguished sharply as usage alone does not constitute customary 
law.241 In addition, ‘the science of international law’ should not “fill in the gaps in 
the existing rules of international law unless a conclusion per analogiam suggests 
itself with such force that its acceptance is obvious and absolutely necessary”.242 In 
other words, the task of the international legal academic is quite a restrained one 
                                                      
236 See Jütersonke, Morgenthau, Law and Realism, 72. See already Morgenthau’s rather positive 
evaluation of Oppenheim’s use of the balance of power in Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘International 
Affairs’, The Review of Politics 10, no. 4 (1948): 494. 
237 Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law’, 317. 
238 It is interesting to note at this point how sharp Oppenheim distinguishes between science and 
international law as a field of practice. One can find a similar separation also in the work of Hans 
Kelsen and other international legal positivists. The separation between observer and observed is 
of course typical for positivism (and its roots in scientific positivism) more generally and its many 
other neo-Kantian dichotomies (e.g. normative/descriptive). 
239 Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law’, 318. Connected to this Oppenheim argues that 
the role of the authority of international legal scholars as a source of international law is overrated 
whereas the role of black and letter law in the form of treaties is underrated. Similarly, he claims 
that the ‘future of law belongs to conventional and not to customary law’, Oppenheim, 348–349. 
240 Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law’, 319. 
241 Oppenheim, 334. 
242 Oppenheim, 335. 
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as s/he should describe the already existing international legal order and not 
invent a revolutionary new order.243  
 
The reason why this so can be found in Oppenheim’s image of international 
law and in his conceptualisation of the relationship between law and politics. 
According to Oppenheim international law cannot go beyond the practices of 
states when “independence, honor, or vital interests” are at stake (we have seen a 
similar position in Morgenthau’s discussion of tensions and disputes above).244 As 
a consequence, for Oppenheim, there exists no “universal international law”, i.e. a 
law that goes beyond the interaction of states, at the moment (and he does not 
expect that there will exist one in the future). 245 Thus, states are the only subjects 
of international law.246 Accordingly, international law operates in a horizontal and 
not in a vertical way, as “international law is a law not above but between 
states”.247In the end, the existence of international law depends on the existence of 
a balance of power as such a balance is the only setting where vital interests 
remain uncontested.248  
 
 
                                                      
243 This holds also for international judges, which ‘are tools in the hands of custom and legislation’ 
and ‘are law-shapers, law-developers, law-finders, and law-excavators, but not real law-makers and 
law-givers’, Oppenheim, 337. 
244 Oppenheim, 322. 
245 Oppenheim, 321. 
246 As Oppenheim writes in his textbook: ‘Since the Law of Nations is based on the common consent 
of individual States, and not of individual human beings, States solely and exclusively are the 
subjects of International Law’, Oppenheim, International Law, I: Peace:18. Oppenheim 
conceptualises the individual within the international legal order as follows: ‘If, as stated, 
individuals are never subjects but always objects of the Law of Nations, then nationality is the link 
between this law and individuals’, Oppenheim, I: Peace:345. 
247 Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law’, 322; For Oppenheim, international law is thus 
‘law’ and not, like for the ‘deniers of international law’ (as, for example John Austin) nothing more 
as a ‘positive morality’, Oppenheim, 330–333. 
248 As Oppenheim argued elsewhere, the ‘Law of Nations can exist only if there is an equilibrium, a 
balance of power, between the members of the Family of Nations. If the Powers cannot keep each 
one anther in check, no rules of law will have any force, since an over-powerful State will naturally 
try to act according to discretion and disobey the law. As there is not and never can be a central 
political authority above the Sovereign States that could enforce the rules of the Law of Nations, a 
balance of power must prevent any member of the Family of Nations from becoming omnipotent’, 
Oppenheim, International Law, I: Peace:73–74. For further discussion see also the discussion in 
Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of 
Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law’, European Journal of International Law 
13, no. 2 (2002): 416–421. 
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3.3 Interim conclusion 
 
In this section, I have discussed so far different projects in IR’s political realism 
(mainly Morgenthau; but also Kennan and Kissinger) and in IL’s legal positivism 
(Oppenheim) and mapped how these projects address the relationship of law and 
politics. In particular the work of Morgenthau is characteristic for early IR 
scholars, especially from the late 1930s onwards, as it has also an important 
‘disciplinary’ dimension. As Friedrich Kratochwil reflects, realists started to pursue 
at this period a strong anti-legalist project as the “development of the new 
discipline of ‘international relations’ […] required an independence from the legal 
discourse and its concerns”.249 We can find such an attempt to delineate IR as an 
autonomous field of study, for instance, in Kennan’s critique of the ‘legalistic 
approach to international relations’, in Morgenthau’s work from the 1940s 
onwards or in the publications of E.H. Carr.250  
 
But, according to Kratochwil, this is only one part of the story. The other – 
and often missing – part is that international legal positivism, represented 
particularly in the projects of Hans Kelsen and Lassa Oppenheim, attempted to 
become more ‘scientific’ (in different ways, though), too – something of which 
Morgenthau was fully aware of as he excluded in his 1940 article this kind of 
positivism from his overall critique of traditional or ‘juridic’ positivism. 251 What is 
important to note in this regard, is that to become more scientific means for 
international legal positivists the exact opposite as for Morgenthau, Kennan or 
Carr, namely it means to get rid of politics and the social and normative 
underpinning of law. The aim for the legal positivists was accordingly to develop a 
pure, objective, formal and apolitical theory of law.252 
  
                                                      
249 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘How Do Norms Matter?’, in The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays 
in International Relations and International Law, ed. Michael Byers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 37; see also Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary 
Study’, in Constructing International Relations: The next Generation, ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud 
Erik Jørgensen (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 21–24; as well as Simpson, ‘Duelling Agendas’; and 
Tanja Aalberts and Ingo Venzke, ‘Moving Beyond Interdisciplinary Turf Wars: Towards an 
Understanding of International Law as Practice’, in International Law as a Profession, ed. Jean 
d’Aspremont et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 287–310. 
250 I have not introduced Carr’s work in this section. Yet, see Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, chap. 10. 
251 See, for instance, Morgenthau, ‘Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law’, 263, 266. 
252 See García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law. 
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 This forms a specific constellation as realist accounts in IR and the positivist 
framework in IL constitute what has been labelled an “analytic synthesis”253 or 
even a “strange symbiosis”.254 This observation mirrors also what Judith Shklar 
had suggested earlier in her seminal study of ‘legalism’. As Shklar notes, the 
“realistic picture of politics is […] that of legalism gone sour”.255 For Shklar, this is 
the case as a closer look reveals that realist scholars are using the same method as 
international legal positivist, their “professed opponents”, as they “have simply 
applied the same type of arguments that legal theorists have used in separating 
law from morality to the task of preserving politics from both law and morality”.256 
One consequence of this development consists for Shklar in an impoverished 
picture of both the concept of politics as well as the concept of law as ‘politics’ gets 
reduced to a permanent war-like struggle for power while ‘law’ is boiled down to 
an image of extreme formalistic legalism.257  
 
Another consequence of this constellation was that realist IR and positivist IL 
could start to engage in a kind of division of labour as both disciplines attempt to 
become more scientific through an exclusion of the main object of study of the 
other: politics is excluded in the case of IL; and law is excluded in the case of IR.258 
However, the result of this development, exceptions notwithstanding,259 was an 
                                                      
253 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, European Journal of 
International Law 6 (1995): 537. 
254 Kratochwil, ‘How Do Norms Matter?’, 37; similarly: ‘Consequently, there exists a paradox in that 
attempts to separate these two disciplines as much as possible leads not only to similar conceptual 
difficulties but also uncovers a certain symbiotic relationship between these two foundationalist 
attempts. In other words, legalism (of which the theory of ’pure law‘ is only the most recent and 
best articulated version) needs realism not only as an opponent in regard to concrete issues, but 
also for its own self-understanding’, Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Politics, Norms and Peaceful Change’, 
Review of International Studies 24, no. 5 (1998): 200. As well as: "Realists and legalists, then, share a 
particular orthodoxy about law drawn from a model of legality that no longer commands much 
support among those who have studied the varieties of law at the domestic, regional and 
international level. In other words, the standoff between IR and PIL [Public International Law] 
occurred because the dominant camp in each group shared a view of the law”, Simpson, ‘Duelling 
Agendas’, 72. Or: Onuf, World of Our Making, 242. 
255 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1986), 126. 
256 Shklar, 126. 
257 See Shklar, 122–123. 
258  Resembling somehow also the German nineteenth century distinction between 
Begriffsjuriprudenz (‘conceptualism‘ or conceptual jurisprudence) and Interessenjurisprudenz 
(‘interests’ or sociological jurisprudence). 
259 For example, in the United States Quincy Wright continued writing extensively on issues of 
international law and attempted to integrate both academic fields until his death in 1970; scholars 
such as Stanley Hoffmann, who was also a lawyer by education, and Karl W. Deutsch (and many 
other regional integrationists) were leading figures in IR and published also on international law; 
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increasing estrangement or “schism” between IR and IL on an institutional level. As 
both stopped speaking with each other and rather started to speak of each other, 
their differences were usually overstated.260 
 
Though as a closer look reveals, both projects share fundamental assumptions 
as both rely, for instance, on a rather state-centric conception of the international – 
realism imagines world politics as a struggle for power between states; and 
Oppenheim’s legal positivism frames international law as the result of the practice 
of states.261In other words, international law is a mirror of international politics: as 
both accounts conceptualise international law in a formalist and voluntarist way 
where law operates mainly vertically and is only important when the international 
is dominated and tamed by a balance of power.  
 
In comparison with the first context, i.e. the work of Schuman, Lasswell and 
Wright in the interwar period, there is not only a fundamental shifts with regard to 
the way interdisciplinarity is conceptualised, but also with regard of how the 
‘international’ is portrayed. While this second context of the ‘strange symbiosis’ of 
legal positivism and political realism still operates within the horizon of 
international organization, the meaning of international organization has changed: 
where the interwar generation conceptualised international organization as a 
move to (formal) inter-state institutions relying on a top-down perspective (i.e. 
international institutions guarantee peace, stability and even justice), the post-
Second World War generation imagines international organization through the 
figure of the (informal institution of the) balance of power and works thus through 
                                                                                                                                                            
Richard Falk’s and Saul Mendlovitz’ World Order Models Project (often referred to with the acronym 
WOMP) was situated at the intersection of IL and IR and produced, inter alia, a couple of important 
collections of essays; on the other side of the Atlantic, the main figures of the English school such as 
Martin Wight or Hedley Bull devoted in-depth chapters in their central monographs to the study of 
(the Grotian tradition of) international law and emphasised the relevance of international law as an 
institution to maintain international order; and, in IL the two in the United States prevailing 
process-oriented schools, the New Haven school (around McDougal and Lasswell) and the 
Manhattan school (represented, for example, by Louis Henkin, Oscar Schachter and, later, Thomas 
Franck), as well as functionalist (William Coplin, Gidon Gottlieb, Francis Boyle) and sociological 
frameworks (Julius Stone) attempted to push the analysis of international law more towards 
politics and the social sciences, respectively. 
260 The notion of ‘shism’ is taken from: Francis Anthony Boyle, World Politics and International Law 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), chap. 1. 
261 On the differences and similarities between political realism and legal positivism see also J. D. 
Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Hélène Lambert, International Law and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 78–83. 
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a bottom-up approach (i.e., create peace, stability and legitimacy when they pursue 
their national interest).262 As a consequence, the ‘heroic figures’ of this period is 
not the social and legal engineer located in Geneva anymore, but it is now the 
prudent statesman, the diplomat (maybe as lawyer-diplomat) or the foreign policy 
officer working in Washington, London or Moscow. 
 
 4. Liberalism and Moderate Constructivism: Interdisciplinarity as 
Colonialization 
 
Although these early projects of interdisciplinarity between IR and IL have 
important repercussions until the present day on the relationship between both 
disciplines and how each of these disciplines imagines the other, I will turn now to 
more recent interdisciplinary projects. These projects differ from earlier accounts 
as they explicitly work with the concept of interdisciplinarity. In other words, the 
period of ‘proto’-interdisciplinarity is over. This explicit treatment of 
interdisciplinarity does however not result, as we will see in this section in a less 
‘political’ relationship between both disciplines. The difference is only, that in 
these explicit interdisciplinarity the ‘politics of interdisciplinarity’ seems to be 
better hidden. And maybe it is even worse, as I will outline, we are moving from 
interdisciplinarity as ‘strange symbiosis’ towards interdisciplinarity as 
‘colonization’. In particular, I will focus on the different guises of liberalism and of 
moderate constructivism. 
 
4.1 A Starting Point: Regimes 
 
It were only the late 1970s and the early 1980s, which saw a revival of 
international law within IR. Here, in particular the literature on complex 
interdependence and, developing from it, the debate about international regimes 
began to change the disciplinary confines of IR significantly and provided an 
                                                      
262 It should be the ‘neo-realist’ critique of the ‘levels of analysis’, which re-establishes a top-down 
perspective of the international. Yet, for neo-realists not international organizations but the logic of 
anarchy is the driving force of the international. For a summary of the neo-realist critique, see, for 
example, Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, Journal of International Affairs 
44, no. 1 (1990): 21–37. 
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important starting point for a couple of interdisciplinary research projects 
between scholars from IR and IL. In this context, the concept of ‘complex 
interdependence’ presents, on the one hand, an attempt to move beyond the neo-
realist mainstream with its emphases on ‘national interest’ and security issues but 
relied, on the other hand, on scientific positivism as underlying theory of science as 
well as on the assumption that the international system is in its basic structure 
anarchical and mainly composed of states.263 The same holds true for the literature 
on regimes. The notion of regimes was for the first time introduced to IR in the 
context of a research project conducted by Ernst B. Haas and John Gerard Ruggie, 
which examined the consequences and ‘collective responses’ of states towards the 
transboundary impacts of scientific and technical developments.264Yet, it was only 
a special issue published in 1982 in International Organization, which established 
the concept firmly in the discipline (though, varying to some degree from the 
previous work of Haas and Ruggie). One of the reasons for the success of ‘regimes’ 
was surely Stephen Krasner’s seminal definition of the concept, which should 
become perhaps the most famous definition of a concept in IR’s history at all. 
According to this definition, regimes are  
 
“sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of facts, 
causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in 
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions of 
                                                      
263 The most important elaboration of this strand of literature is still Robert O. Keohane and Joseph 
S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2004). The first edition came out 
in 1977. 
264 Interestingly, the notion of international regimes was introduced together with ‘epistemic 
communities’, another concept, which should become highly popular in IR and which was, 
originally, derived from Michel Foucault. Ruggie, for instance, defines these concepts as follows: ‘In 
depicting the ’collective response‘ of states to collective situations occasioned by science and 
technology, I will differentiate among three levels of institutionalization: (1) the purely cognitive, 
which I will call ’epistemic communities;‘ (2) that consisting of sets of mutual expectations, 
generally agreed-to rules, regulations and plans, in accordance with which organizational energies 
and financial commitments are allocated, and which we are calling ’international regimes;‘ and (3) 
international organizations. Most of our case studies focus on the second of these, the construction 
and transformation of international regimes. I also touch upon the other two, so as to demonstrate 
their interrelationships’, John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and 
Trends’, International Organization 29, no. 3 (1975): 557–83. The concept plays also an important 
role in Keohane and Nye’s influetntial 1977 monograph, see in particular Keohane and Nye, Power 
and Interdependence, chap. 3. 
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action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making 
and implementing collective choice”.265 
 
Using this definition as a vantage point, the main concern among students of 
international regimes was now whether regimes matter – and this issue was 
pursued in the vocabulary of empirical social sciences driven by the question 
whether regimes should be conceived as intervening, independent or dependent 
variables; 266  whether one should analyse the ‘supply’ or ‘demand’ side of 
regimes;267 whether game theory could add something in order to better explain 
the effectiveness of regimes and cooperation;268 and so on: the turn to regimes 
established a large playground to develop theories and hypotheses on 
international regimes and cooperation as well as a largely welcomed opportunity 
to test those theories and hypotheses empirically. 
 
However, one point is striking in this context: although the language of 
procedures, principles, rules (just remember Krasner’s specification of rules as 
‘specific prescriptions of action’) and norms (these are, according to Krasner, 
‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’) heavily 
resembled key terms of the international legal discourse, “much of the work on 
‘regimes’”, as Nicholas Onuf and James Taulbee point out, “has consciously avoided 
the traditional language of international law while borrowing extensively from its 
conceptual base”.269 This is even more perplexing as the “concept of regimes was 
borrowed from international law” where we can trace back its trajectory for at 
least 150 years.270 Yet, for some authors such as Anne-Marie Slaughter the 
avoidance of linking law and regimes more explicitly was not considered as a 
                                                      
265 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables’, International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 186. 
266 Cf. Krasner, 189–194. 
267 Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, International Organization 36, no. 2 
(1982): 325–55; and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
268 See the special issue on ‘Cooperation under Anarchy’ introduced by Kenneth A. Oye, ‘Explaining 
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies’, World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 1–24. 
269 Nicholas Onuf and James Larry Taulbee, ‘Brining Law to Bear on International Relations Theory 
Courses’, PS: Political Science and Politics 26, no. 2 (1993): 250. 
270 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism’, World Politics 40, no. 2 (1988): 240. On the 
history of the concept of regimes in international legal discourse which can be traced back at least 
until the first part of the 19th century, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-
Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 18–19. 
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research gap but as a “brilliant tactical move” in the game of scientific practice as 
in the light of “the existing schism between international lawyers and international 
political scientists, any attempt to study international institutions from outside the 
reigning paradigm would have been ignored from the outset”.271 From this point of 
view the regimes literature provided a valuable starting point for many 
interdisciplinary projects, not only between IR and IL, but also between other 
fields, as it helped, according to Oran Young, “to identify constructive opportunities 
for reintegrating the subfields of international politics, economics, law, and 
organization”.272 In the remainder of this section, I will scrutinize two strands of 
research which emerged from the regimes literature and which constitute today 
the most successful ‘mainstream’ accounts when it comes in IR to discuss topics 
linked to the field of international law and the question of fruitful interdisciplinary 
research between IR and IL. I will start with the (neo)liberal “IL/IR”273 literature 
(4.2 and 4.3) and then turn to moderate constructivist approaches (4.4). 
 
4.2 Of Agendas, Optics and Compliance: Imagining Interdisciplinarity 
 
Although the notion of regimes played, as noted, an important role in debates 
within IR from the early 1980s onwards, only by the end of that decade and 
throughout the early 1990s discussions between IR and IL turned into more 
explicit interdisciplinary projects. In this subsection, I will concentrate on projects 
among liberal and/or institutionalist scholars from both disciplines.274 In the 
broader context of regimes and institutionalism it was Kenneth W. Abbott, with a 
journal article that is today often referred to as the ‘prospectus’ (the whole title of 
the piece was Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
                                                      
271 Anne-Marie Slaughter-Burley, ‘Law and the Liberal Paradigm in International Relations Theory’, 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 86 (1992): 182. 
272 Oran R. Young, ‘International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions’, World Politics 39, 
no. 1 (1986): 105. 
273 I take the label ‘IL/IR’ from Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, ‘International Law and 
International Relations: Introducing an Interdisciplinary Dialogue’, in Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark 
A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3–32. 
274 I come back later in this chapter to early cooperative projects among representatives of 
‘moderate‘ constructivism as well as proponents of different process-oriented schools and address, 
then, potential interdisciplinary projects between ‘radical‘ constructivism and ‘critical‘ legal 
scholars (which I extend to the next chapter). 
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Lawyers) and a number of subsequent publications, who was the first to welcome 
interdisciplinary scholarship between IR and IL in a more explicit way.275 
Throughout these publications Abbott aimed, on the one hand, to introduce 
“modern International Relations theory” to IL in order to overcome the 
“international lawyers’”, as he calls it, “narrow positivism”.276 In this regard, Abbott 
argues here that particularly the regimes literature “offers a long-overdue 
opportunity to reintegrate IL and IR”.277 But, on the other hand, IR would also 
benefit from such a ‘collaboration’ as IL could provide IR with, as Abbott writes, 
“an immense reservoir of information about legal rules and institutions, the raw 
material for the growth and application of theory”.278 This kind of division of 
labour between both disciplines becomes also clear in the following quote:  
 
“At its present stage of development, IR is heavy on theory, but 
relatively light on empirical application and testing. IL can bring to the 
table a wealth of data, on legal practices and procedures, primary rules 
of conduct, secondary rules of law formation, interpretation and 
application, and so on”.279 
 
In particular, regime theory’s offspring neoliberal institutionalism seems for Abbott 
promising in order to bring both disciplines together (again).280 According to 
Abbott such a collaboration could make both disciplines in the end “part of a larger 
interdisciplinary ’rationality project’” based on insights from rational choice theory, 
which in turn draws heavily on economics and game theory.281 Subsequently, the 
literature on ‘law and economics’ is for Abbott the role model to follow when it 
                                                      
275 Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers’, Yale Journal of International Law 14 (1989): 335–411; Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘Elements of a 
Joint Discipline’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 86 
(1992): 167–72; and Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘International Relations Theory, International Law, and 
the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts’, The American Journal of International Law 
93, no. 2 (1999): 361–79. 
276 Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus’, 340. 
277 Abbott, 238. 
278 Abbott, 338. 
279 Abbott, ‘Elements of a Joint Discipline’, 169. 
280 And here it is Robert Keohane’s work or as Abbott admits, ‘Bob Keohane has been my guru’, 
Abbott, 170. 
281 Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus’, 340; see also: ‘Modern IR theory 
would supplement that approach [i.e., IL] with a broader scholarly perspective based on a rational 
choice model of state interaction’, Abbott, 340–341. 
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comes to the overall structure of interdisciplinary collaboration.282 Such an 
endeavour could even be the cornerstone of a “joint discipline” between IL and IR, 
a discipline that “might be called the study of organized international 
cooperation”.283 During the 1990s Abbott should further develop this approach 
into a, as he coins it, “international governance theory”284 where he focused for 
example on the question of the institutional design of international 
organizations.285  
 
Other scholars, such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and Robert Keohane, should 
soon join this early claim of pursuing explicit interdisciplinary project between IR 
and IL. For example, Slaughter famously observed that “[i]nternational law and 
international politics cohabit the same conceptual space” and should thus engage in 
interdisciplinary research as it becomes increasingly visible that “it makes little 
sense to study one without the other”.286 To advance this argument, Slaughter even 
rewrites the history of both disciplines since the 1950s: according to Slaughter’s 
historical sketch, IL was since the end of the Second World War mainly reacting to 
IR’s “realist challenge”.287 Yet, it is striking here that Slaughter constrains the list of 
historical IL approaches opposing the ‘realist challenge’ to American approaches 
that study law already as a social science: the New Haven school around McDougal 
and Lasswell, Falk’s World Order Models Projects as well as the process approach 
of Chayes and Chayes, Henkin and others.288 European or more positivist inclined 
accounts are not mentioned by Slaughter at all. 
 
                                                      
282 Cf. Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus’, 376; Abbott, ‘Elements of a 
Joint Discipline’, 169; Abbott, ‘International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime 
Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts’, 365–366. 
283 Abbott, ‘Elements of a Joint Discipline’, 168. 
284 Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stepan Wood, ‘International Law and 
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’, The American 
Journal of International Law 92, no. 3 (1998): 384. 
285 The latter often in collaboration with Duncan Snidal. See, for example, Kenneth W. Abbott and 
Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act through Formal International Organizations’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3–32. 
286 Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 503 (emphasis added); see also: ‘IR 
and IL scholars seem increasingly to see the same world outside their office windows’, Slaughter, 
Tulumello, and Wood, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory’, 370. 
287 Anne-Marie Slaughter-Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda’, 
The American Journal of International Law 87 (1993): 207. 
288 Slaughter-Burley, 207–220; see also Slaughter-Burley, ‘Law and the Liberal Paradigm in 
International Relations Theory’, 181; and Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 
503. 
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Moreover in order to overcome the historically grown tensions between IR 
and IL, two recent developments or ‘agendas’ in IR are promising according to 
Slaughter: institutionalism and liberalism. Institutionalism is here represented by 
the regimes literature and in Abbott’s rationality project. According to Slaughter, 
institutionalism is promising as 
 
 “[i]nstitutionalists and international lawyers subscribe to a common 
ontology of the international system: the actors, the structure within 
these actors act, and the process of interaction. Both groups, separately 
and together, are describing a common agenda focused on the study of 
improved institutional design for maximally effective international 
organizations, compliance with international obligations, and 
international ethics”.289 
 
As Slaughter explains, this theoretical development was important in order to rid 
of the ‘realist challenge’: “Reinventing international law in rational-choice 
language stopped the traditional ‘Realist-Idealist’ debate cold. ‘Efficiency and 
transparency’ are hardly legalist-moralist sentiments”.290 
 
However, for Slaughter institutionalism comes also with a number of 
problems as it is not capable to explain the emergence and change of regimes, 
neglects the role of individuals in international affairs and does not crack open the 
black box of states in order to study the role and impact of domestic policy beyond 
the state. In this context, as Slaughter remarks, the literature on ‘democratic peace’ 
has pioneered international thought as it has shown that the domestic level plays 
an important role in international relations.291  
 
                                                      
289 Slaughter-Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda’, 207; see also: 
‘Considerable common ground exists already; many remaining obstacles are matters as much of 
semantics as of convictions’, Slaughter-Burley, 226. 
290 Slaughter-Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda’, 220. See also 
Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 507. 
291 Cf. Slaughter-Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda’, 225–226; 
and Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 509–511. 
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It is here, where liberalism – the ‘agenda’ Slaughter herself prefers – comes 
in.292Importantly, liberalism and institutionalism do not exclude each other and 
constitute together a dual agenda where “the Liberal agenda complements the 
Institutionalist […]. In sum, the dual agenda is a unified agenda”. 293  In 
interdisciplinary terms liberalism could help to further “forge a new 
interdisciplinary bridge” between IR and IL. 294 Yet, for Slaughter, it is important to 
stress that she understands the new liberal agenda not as a renaissance of an old-
fashioned “‘Wilsonian ‘liberal internationalism’” of the interwar period, which 
according to her represents the normative strand of liberal thinking, but instead as 
a positive theory, which is based on the tradition of scientific positivism.  
 
As Slaughter continues, the new liberal agenda should now focus on the 
causes and effects of “how States do behave rather than how they should 
behave”.295 Slaughter explains the behaviour of states by referring mainly to 
domestic factors as “the most distinct aspect of Liberal international relations 
theory is that it permits, indeed mandates, a distinction among different types of 
States based on their domestic political structure and ideology”.296 Slaughter 
follows here Andrew Moravcsik’s outline of liberalism as a distinct approach in IR 
that centres around three basic assumptions: first, that “society is analytically 
prior to the state” and, consequently, that states are not unitary actors; second, 
that “society consists of functionally differentiated private individuals and groups 
who act to promote their interests”, which means that individuals and groups can 
build transnational ties (important in this regard is the emphasis of the 
disaggregation of the state); finally, that the “behavior of states […] reflects the 
nature and configuration of state preferences as shaped by domestic and 
transnational forces”.297 
                                                      
292 The approach is later coined ‘liberal agency theory’, see Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood, 
‘International Law and International Relations Theory’, 384. 
293 Slaughter-Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda’, 206 (emphasis 
in the original). 
294 Slaughter-Burley, 227; see also Slaughter-Burley, ‘Law and the Liberal Paradigm in International 
Relations Theory’. 
295 Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 508; for a critical reflection of the use 
of ‘liberalism’ in IL see Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’, European Journal of International Law 12, 
no. 3 (2001): 537–71. 
296 Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 504. 
297 Slaughter-Burley, ‘Law and the Liberal Paradigm in International Relations Theory’, 183; see 
also Slaughter-Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda’; and 
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This shift in perspective – in particular, the invocation of liberal IR theory 
with its rejection of state-centrism and the state-as-unitary-actor model – has also 
strong repercussions on Slaughter’s concept of law.  As Slaughter explains,  
international law  
 
“comprises all the law that regulates activity across and between 
territorial boundaries. It can include the law of peoples and the law of 
nations, the jus gentium and jus inter gentes. Existing categories and 
distinctions such as public and private, domestic, transnational and 
international are immaterial. The identifying element that qualifies a 
rule or set of rules for inclusion in this category is the potential for 
contributing to international order, whether by constraining domestic 
forces that might otherwise escalate international disputes into military 
or severe economic conflict, by strengthening or regulating transactions 
in transnational society, or by directly regulating inter-State relations. 
The resulting body of ‘law’ is defined not according to subject or source, 
but rather in terms of purpose and effect, in conformity with a 
particular body of international relations theory”.298 
 
By following such a concept of international law, Slaughter investigates, for more 
than twenty years by now, the empirical consequences (‘purpose and effect’) of the 
liberal agenda. As I am interested in this section only in Slaughter’s notion of 
interdisciplinarity, suffice is to say here Slaughter’s research agenda is mainly 
centred around two general themes: first, the role of decentralized 
“transgovernmental networks” consisting of regulators, legislators and judges in 
processes of global governance and, second, the role of judges in the “constitutional 
cross-fertilization” of international law through domestic courts. According to 
                                                                                                                                                            
Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 508; Moravcsik presented his approach 
most comprehensively in Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics’, International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53. 
298 Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 516. 
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Slaughter judges have become pivotal in the development and the constitution of a 
“global community of courts”.299 
 
Let me turn now briefly to a third important project of liberal 
institutionalism in the intersection of ‘IL/IR’, namely Robert Keohane’s ‘two 
optics’. Where Slaughter speaks of a ‘dual agenda’, Keohane introduces the idea of 
“two optics”.300 The talk of the ‘two optics’, however, works slightly different as the 
one of the ‘dual agenda’. For Keohane, the starting point and main concern for 
students in the intersection of IL and IR should be the issue of compliance, i.e. “why 
governments do or do not keep commitments”. 301 In this context, Keohane 
attempts to sharpen our understanding of compliance by introducing a ‘scientific’ 
vernacular which treats compliance as a “dependent variable” and tries to explain 
why states comply (or do not comply) with international agreements. 302 The 
literature on compliance as Keohane maps it can be differentiated into two camps 
or, as he calls it, ‘optics’ which try to explain compliance and to outline its “causal 
pathway”.303 On the one hand, there is an “instrumentalist optic” which is shared 
by most political scientists (IR scholars constituting a subfield of it) and which 
“focuses on interests and argues that rules and norms will matter only if they affect 
the calculations of interests by agents”;304 on the other side, however stands a 
“normative optic”, which is the prevailing position in IL (together with a few IR 
scholars such as in particular Friedrich Kratochwil) and where compliance is 
understood as an outcome of discourse (producing persuasion and legitimacy) and 
                                                      
299 Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’, Harvard International Law Journal 44, no. 1 
(2003): 191–219. 
300 Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Relations and International Law: Two Optics’, in Power and 
Governance in a Partially Globalized World, ed. Robert O. Keohane (London: Routledge, 1996), 117–
30. 
301 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Compliance with International Commitments: Politics within a Framework 
of Law’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 86 (1992): 176. 
For an in-depth discussion of compliance, which is addressed more to an IL audience, see the 
special issue introduced by Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Why Nations Behave’, Michigan Journal of International 
Law 19, no. 2 (1998): 303–17. Yet, as Benedict Kingsbury suggests ‘’[c]ompliance with law is an 
important but elusive concept’ because it has different meanings in different theoretical contexts, 
Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of 
International Law’, Michigan Journal of International Law 19, no. 2 (1998): 368. Kingsbury is able to 
show this by discussing different concepts of law and different theoretical streams in international 
legal scholarship. 
302 Keohane, ‘Compliance with International Commitments’, 176. 
303 Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, 123. 
304 Keohane, 119. 
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where “norms have causal impact”.305 Put differently, Keohane is in the end 
puzzled by the question whether interests or discourse shapes our behaviour and 
causes compliance with international commitments and international (legal) 
norms.306  
 
Yet, for Keohane, both approaches come with their genuine shortcomings. 
In a “crude version of instrumentalism”307 every action can be rationalised ex post 
because both compliance and non-compliance can be explained in terms of states’ 
interests. Such a concept of rationality is problematic for two reasons: first, “if all 
behavior is by definition rational, the concept of ‘rationality’ becomes 
meaningless”;308 second – and more importantly –, it makes empirical testing 
impossible as rationality cannot be conceptualised in a clear and unambiguous 
way. 309  However, the ’normative optic’ is according to Keoahne far more 
problematic as it is unclear whether discourse works in a different way than 
reputation, which constituted one of the key terms of rational choice approaches in 
the early regimes debate.310 Yet, the central flaw of the ‘normative optic’ is that it 
conceptualises norms as counterfactually valid. But if we move from compliance to 
validity as litmus test whether something is legal or not, we loose the possibility of 
empirical testing exercises. 
 
 In this aspect Keohane’s ‘two optics’ resemble, of course, his earlier 
distinction between “rationalist” and “reflective” approaches, which he developed 
in light of the meta-theoretical debate between positivism and post-positivism in 
the late 1980s and where “reflective” approaches should be assessed on the basis 
of criteria established by an empirically-driven version of the “rationalist” 
tradition – the latter, for Keohane, best represented in a ‘research program’ (of 
                                                      
305 Keohane, 120. 
306 For an attempt that attempts to integrate both within its concept of compliance see: Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993): 
175–205; and Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), chap. 1. 
307 Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, 119. 
308 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations’, 
The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. S1 (2002): 308. 
309 Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, 120. 
310 On ‘reputation’ see, for instance, Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation 
under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226–54. 
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what he understands) in the Lakatosian fashion.311 With the ‘two optics’ it seems to 
be the same, as the ‘normative optic’ (represented by IL and ‘reflective’ IR 
approaches) should help to answers a research question, which is only relevant for 
the larger project of an empirical social science (constituted mainly by the 
instrumentalist optic). Nevertheless, the apparent imbalance and hierarchy 
between the two optics does not prevent Keohane from claiming that 
“instrumental and normative incentives work in tandem with each other” and that 
both of the ‘two optics’ should provide the ground for a “productive synthesis”.312 
 
4.3 Legalization, Legitimacy and the Design of Institutions 
 
The most prominent results of these attempts to practice interdisciplinarity under 
the auspices of liberalism, institutionalism and liberal institutionalism were 
certainly the research projects on the ‘legalization of world politics’, on which I 
touched at the outset of the introductory chapter already, and on legitimacy from a 
liberal institutionalist perspective. This means also that it would be wrong to 
perceive approaches that run under such labels as ‘liberalism’, ‘institutionalism’ 
and ‘liberal institutionalism’ as fundamentally different – something Slaughter in 
her attempt to break IR into three approaches (institutionalism, realism and 
liberalism) seems to indicate.313 Rather, the boundary between the liberal and 
institutionalist camps are blurred – if it even makes sense to speak of different 
camps. The project of ‘legalization’ is a good example in this regard as it assembles 
inter alia Abbott and Slaughter (both holding formal degrees in law) as well as 
political scientists such as Keohane, Moravcsik and Snidal. In a similar vein as it did 
already almost 20 years earlier with the lietature ‘international regimes’, 
                                                      
311 Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly 
32, no. 4 (1988): 379–96; Keohane’s standard(ization) of science was outlined most 
comprehensively in Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
312 Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, 128. 
313 It is interesting to pay attention on how Slaughter introduces these approaches: she addresses in 
her writings institutionalism first, than realism and finally liberalism. The textual practice of 
separating institutionalism and liberalism by putting realism in the middle generates the 
impression that both approaches – institutionalism and liberalism – constitute the opposing poles 
of a spectrum of IR theories addressing legal issues. And, as three seems by academic conventions 
to be a sufficient number of approaches, is seems not to be necessary to include or even mention 
other schools and approaches. 
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International Organization, the flagship journal of American IR, devoted a special 
issue to the “legalization of world politics”.314 
 
In this special issue the proponents of ‘legalization’ observe that “in many 
issue areas the world is witnessing a move to law” and that this transformation is 
heavily affecting international institutions.315 International institutions are defined 
almost identically as ‘international regimes’ before, namely as “enduring sets of 
rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that shape the expectations, 
interests, and behaviour of states”.316 The concept of legalization itself is then 
indirectly defined by the introduction of three “criteria”, “components”, “elements”, 
“levels” or “dimensions” (read: variables) which are “obligation”, “precision” and 
“delegation”.317 Moreover, obligation, precision and delegation should not be 
understood as binaries but in terms of gradation: the higher these variables are, 
the more issue-areas and institutions are ‘legalized’ and, the more they are 
‘legalized’, the higher their rate of compliance becomes.318 Furthermore it is noted 
that if we understand legalization not as a binary it becomes also possible to 
capture the “variety of international legalization” on a global level.319  
 
According to this literature, the ‘legalization’ framework implies as well that 
one should not separate law and politics as “[l]aw and politics are intertwined at 
all levels of legalization”:320  
 
“We view law as deeply embedded in politics: affected by political 
interests, power, and institutions. As generations of international 
                                                      
314 See the introduction by Judith Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics’, 
International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 385–99; see also the various contributions in Bernhard 
Zangl and Michael Zürn, eds., Verrechtlichung - Baustein für Global Governance? (Bonn: Dietz, 2004). 
315 Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction’, 385. 
316 Goldstein et al., 387. 
317 ‘Obligation means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of 
rules or commitments. Specifically, it means that they are legally bound by a rule or commitment in 
the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, 
and discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well. Precision means that rules 
unambiguously defined the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means that 
third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve 
disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules’, Kenneth W. Abbott et al., ‘The Concept of 
Legalization’, International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 401, (as we will see below the definition 
of those ‘criteria’ heavily resembles Thomas Franck’s criteria of ‘legitimacy’). 
318 Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction’, 387. 
319 Abbott et al., ‘The Concept of Legalization’, 405. 
320 Abbott et al., 419. 
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lawyers and political scientists have observed, international law cannot 
be understood in isolation from politics. Conversely, law and 
legalization affect political processes and political outcomes. The 
relationship between law and politics is reciprocal”.321 
 
Consequently – and this is different to the special issue on ‘international regimes’ –
‘legalization’ is introduced as an explicit interdisciplinary project as it “creates 
common ground for political scientists and lawyers by moving away from a narrow 
view of law”. 322  In other words, ‘legalization’ seems to be “able to unite 
perspectives developed by political scientists and international legal scholars and 
engage in a genuinely collaborative venture”.323 Yet, at this point the question has 
to be asked whether the project of legalization represents really a ‘genuine 
collaborative venture’.  I will come back to this issue in the conclusion of this 
section. 
 
We can find a similar line of argumentation in the literature on legitimacy 
and global governance. For example, in a number of interdisciplinary collaboration 
Keohane and the philosopher of international law Allen Buchanan, attempted to 
develop a “complex standard of legitimacy” in order to design the “global 
governance institutions” of the future – with international law being part of these 
institutional arrangements or even being conceptualised as an institution in its 
own regard.324 What is new in this particular project is that Keohane and 
Buchanan limit their interest not only to an ‘empirical’ test of the legitimacy of 
these institutions where legitimacy is conceptualised as compliance with the rules 
of the institution(s) in case (which then translates, e.g., into the question of how we 
can measure the legitimacy of an institution or a legal rule). But Buchanan and 
                                                      
321 Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction’, 387. 
322 Abbott et al., ‘The Concept of Legalization’, 402 (emphasis added). 
323 Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction’, 387. 
324 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, 
Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 405–37. On the idea that international law should be 
understood as an institution, see Allen E. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: 
Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2. See also Robert 
O. Keohane, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy’, Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 1 
(2011): 99–109. For a longer discussion of the role of legitimacy in debates about global 
governance see Filipe dos Reis and Oliver Kessler, ‘The Power of Legality, Legitimacy and the 
(im)possibility of Interdisciplinary Research’, in The Power of Legality: Practices of International 
Law and Their Politics, ed. Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja Aalberts, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 99–124. 
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Keohane are rather interested in ‘normative’ research in order to provide a better 
design (by means of ‘standard of legitimacy’) for ‘global governance institutions’ as 
well as the institutionalisation of international law – now enhanced with more 
‘legitimacy’.  
 
Here, Buchanan and Keohane’s ‘complex standard of legitimacy’ is 
presented as an attempt to refuse, in a first step, three predominant views on the 
legitimacy of international law and institutions.325 Firstly, it turns against the idea 
that the consent of states alone, as it is the case for modern international law, 
creates legitimacy (this was, e.g., Henry Kissinger’s position). If we would follow 
this idea, legitimacy is simply equated with legality. According to Buchanan and 
Keohane this is however problematic as “many states are non-democratic and 
systematically violate the human rights of their citizens and are for that reason 
themselves illegitimate”.326 Secondly, they refuse the idea that the consent of 
democratic states enhances legitimacy to global governance institutions. In this 
case the chain of delegation (and therefore authorization) could become too long. 
In addition, democratic states are only accountable to their own citizens and not to 
all individuals affected by their decisions on a global scale – not to speak of some 
form of an emerging global demos.327 Such a limited scope of institutions composed 
of democratic states only would have as a consequence that most individuals, as 
they live in non-democratic states, would not be represented in those institutions. 
Thirdly, Buchanan and Keohane reject the view that a global democracy should be 
seen as the basis of a standard of legitimacy as it is difficult to imagine that there 
will be a global democracy in the near future, as there is at the moment no global 
public, no consensus (i.e. there is disagreement and uncertainty) about the 
normative framework of global common interest and – if liberal democratic 
principles should be the basis – there are no institutions (like free press and 
media), no active civil society and no mechanisms to check possible abuses of 
power of public institutions.328   
 
                                                      
325 cf. also Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, chap. 7. 
326 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, 413. 
327 A further discussion of the question of accountability is provided in Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. 
Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’, American Political Science Review 
99, no. 01 (2005): 29–43. 
328 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, 417. 
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In order to overcome these difficulties Buchanan and Keohane articulate 
then, as a second step, their own standard by introducing “three substantive 
criteria” for legitimate global governance institutions.329 Firstly, in order to 
become legitimate global governance institutions should carry at least some kind 
of minimal moral acceptability. This means that – on a general level – global 
governance institutions should actively promote basic human rights (understood 
as physical security, liberty and the right to subsistence) and, if this is not the case 
already, they should at least not violate these basic human rights.330 Secondly, as 
the purpose of institutions is to provide benefits, which would not be generated 
without the institution, global governance institutions have to prove, in order to 
maintain their legitimacy, that their existence produces a comparative. Thirdly, all 
global governance institutions should carry, what Buchanan and Keohane coin, 
‘institutional integrity’. For Buchnan and Keohane, ‘institutional integrity’ means 
that an institution will loose its legitimacy if “an institution exhibits a pattern of 
egregious disparity between its actual performance, on the one hand, and its self-
proclaimed procedures or major goals, on the other”.331In order to guarantee these 
three criteria so-called epistemic virtues, understood primarily as transparency (to 
all parties involved) and accountability (also towards transnational civil society), 
should also be maintained.332 
 
In a subsequent step, these rather general remarks on the legitimacy of 
global governance institutions are further specified and ‘applied’ – now mostly by 
Buchanan alone – to the field of international law.333 Here, Buchanan’s work on 
legitimacy is also part of a larger project on, as he terms it, “moral foundations of 
international law” or a, as he puts it somewhere else, “systematic moral view”.334 
According to Buchanan, constitutes such a ‘systematic moral view’ a middle 
ground between natural law approaches, legal positivism and political realism. It 
                                                      
329 Buchanan and Keohane, 419. 
330 Buchanan and Keohane, 420. 
331 Buchanan and Keohane, 422. 
332 Buchanan and Keohane, 424–429. 
333 See in particular Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination; see also Allen Buchanan, 
‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson 
and John Tasioulas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 79–96; and the collection of essays in 
Allen E. Buchanan, Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
334 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 15. 
 91 
draws mainly on the tradition of analytic ethics. Buchanan illustrates the ‘moral 
foundations of international law’ by analysing, on the one hand, traditional topics 
of public international law such as the use of force or self-determination and 
secession but also, on the other hand, emerging topics such as demorcratization by 
force or the discourse on human rights.  
 
As Buchanan further argues, every moral theory of international law has to 
be grounded on justice and is hence holistic. By following mainly John Rawls, 
Buchanan distinguishes between ideal from non-ideal theories of justice. On the 
international level the “moral ideal should be a right’s protecting world state, a 
system of genuine global governance, not an improved multi-state system”.335 Such 
a ‘system of genuine global governance’ would not only guarantee human rights 
but also requires mechanisms of distributive justice and a democracy on a global 
scale. Yet, Buchanan is aware – as in his collaboration with Keohane – that such a 
system is not feasible at the moment and argues instead that a non-ideal system 
with a ‘justice-based conception of legitimacy’ at its core should be implemented. 
By referring to a ‘justice-based conception of legitimacy’, Buchanan stresses that 
he is concerned with “legitimacy in the normative sense, not with the conditions 
under which an entity is believed to be legitimate”.336 Thus, legitimacy is ‘justice-
based’ or ‘normative’ when it is deducted from objective criteria. On the 
international level these criteria encompass those of the ‘complex standard of 
legitimacy’, which he had developed with Keohane. Buchanan emphasis in 
particular the importance of the compliance with human rights and the fact that a 
legitimate international system can be implemented in the best way through 
legitimate institutions and institutional reasoning – thus, for Buchanan: 
“[i]nstitutions matter”.337 
 
 What becomes also apparent in this discussion is that two things are 
fundamental in this attempt of a ‘normative’ underpinning of international law and 
global governance. First, Buchanan uses the notion of legitimacy in order to close 
(or create?) a gap between an ideal theory of international law (what he 
                                                      
335 Buchanan, 54 (emphasis added). 
336 Buchanan, 235 (emphasis in the original). I will address ‘empirical’ notions of legitimacy (based, 
e.g., on a believe in legitimacy) below. 
337 Buchanan, 23; see also Buchanan, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’, 79–80. 
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pigeonholes as natural law approach) on the one hand and a view of the 
international legal order based on the mere consent of states on the other 
(equalled with political realism and legal positivism).338In other words, the power 
of the notion of ‘legitimacy’ is based on its flexibility and ability to oscillate 
between is (consent) and ought (justice). Second, this stream of the global 
governance literature fits perfectly into the wider project of ‘humanity’s law’ as for 
Buchanan the main threshold – the problem that needs to be fixed – in order to 
achieve a just (i.e. ideal) system of international law is the state and, consequently, 
a state-oriented conception of international law that has to be overcome. This 
means also that situations might arise where international law might be formally 
valid and, at the same time, unjust. This is in particular the case when international 
law ‘protects’ human rights abuses of non-democratic states. Buchanan argues that 
in such circumstances what he calls “illegal legal reform” might be necessary in 
order to create a just international system of the future. ‘Illegal legal reform’ means 
that a conscious act of law-breaking might be morally demanded if the existing 
positive international law is unjust. Put differently, breaking the law might help to 
develop the law.339  
 
4.4 Logics of Action, the Power of Human Rights and Moderate Constructivism 
 
However, not only different streams of (neo)liberal institutionalism began to 
develop interdisciplinary projects in the intersection of international law and 
politics recently. Other important interdisciplinary projects are in particular linked 
to the different guises of constructivism in IR. Usually the relevant literature 
distinguishes between two versions of constructivism: between a ‘thick’ and a 
‘thin’,340 a ‘conventional’ and a ‘critical’,341 a ‘soft’ and a ‘rule-oriented’,342 a ‘soft’ 
                                                      
338 Cf. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, chap. 6. 
339 Buchanan, 456–459. One of the cases Buchanan has in mind is NATO’s 1999 Kosovo air 
operation. I will explore this case in more detail in chapter 7. 
340 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
341 Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International 
Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200. 
342 Vendulka Kubálková, ‘The Tale of Two Constructivisms at the Cold War’s End’, REGIS Working 
Paper, 2001. 
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and a ‘radical’343 or a ‘moderate’ and a ‘radical’ version.344 As it was the case with 
the (neo)liberal ‘IL/IR’ literature the emergence of IR’s constructivism is closely 
tied to the regimes debate. Yet, while the ‘moderate’ version started mainly to 
problematize in the aftermath of the Cold War era the core assumptions of 
neorliberalism on the level of substantial theorizing (‘anarchy is what states makes 
of it’), the more radical version added to this critique of first-order theorizing a 
more fundamental critique also on the level of meta-theory. This move opened for 
the radical constructivist camp new avenues for an engagement with topics from 
general social theory and the philosophy of science by which it made radical 
constructivism an important part in IR’s fourth debate.345 While I will not dwell 
more on the differences between both versions of constructivism this point, I hope 
that the differences between them (in particular in their treatment of international 
law) become clear in the next chapter where I discuss the contours of the more 
radical version of constructivism more comprehensively.346 
 
But let us have a look at the use of international law in moderate 
constructivism first. When it comes to the study of the role of international law, 
moderate constructivists attempt “to make visible the force of law through states’ 
compliance and, subsequently, the politics of law involved in their reasons for 
doing so/not doing so”.347 This kind of cognitive interest is strongly connected to 
the study of the evolution, spread, diffusion of and, particularly, compliance with 
norms.348 I will illustrate what this means by introducing two important research 
                                                      
343 Ronen Palan, ‘A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in 
International Relations’, Review of International Studies 26, no. 4 (2000): 575–98. 
344 Oliver Kessler, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy? On Hayek, Constructivist Thought, and the Current 
Economic Crisis’, Review of International Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 275–99. 
345 Cf. Kubálková, ‘The Tale of Two Constructivisms at the Cold War’s End’, 9. 
346 Together with Oliver Kessler I have discussed this to a greater extent elsewhere: Filipe dos Reis 
and Oliver Kessler, ‘Constructivism and the Politics of International Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
the Theory of International Law, ed. Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 344–64. For a different take to relate constructivism and international law, see also 
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, ‘Constructivism and International Law’, in Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 119–45. 
347 dos Reis and Kessler, ‘Constructivism and the Politics of International Law’, 345–346. 
348 The claim that constructivism is the study of norms has been put forward, for example, by Jutta 
Brunnée and Stephen Toope: ‘norm-interested IR thinkers have been labelled “constructivist”’, 
Brunnée and Toope, ‘Constructivism and International Law’, 119; similarly, Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 
52, no. 4 (1998): 889–894. Moderate constructivists usually follow Peter Katzenstein’s suggestion 
to ‘use the concept of norms to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors 
[...]. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having 
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projects of moderate constructivism: the literature on the ‘power of human rights’ 
and attempts to identifying ‘legitimacy’ as a distinct logics of action. Here, the use 
of ‘legitimacy’ differs, as we will see, from the one in the context of neoliberal 
institutionalism. 
 
The questions of when, why and how norms ‘matter’ and why states comply 
with international law constitute the basis for moderate constructivist inquiries of 
international law. Moreover, the whole enterprise was conducted in the language 
of empirical social sciences as these approaches attempt to ‘bridge’ the divide 
between rationalist and reflective approaches in IR by establishing a ‘middle 
ground’, which means in turn to share a philosophy of science with the scientific 
positivist mainstream.349 A good starting point in order to better grasp the 
moderate constructivist take on international law is Margaret Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink research on “transnational advocacy networks” and the role of these 
networks in the global politics of human rights. 350  In Keck and Sikkink’s 
conceptualisation, transnational advocacy networks are mainly composed of 
actors of the ‘global civil society’ and are “organized to promote causes, principled 
ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes 
that cannot be easily linked to rationalist understanding of their ‘interest’”.351 In 
other words, Keck and Sikkink identify lacunae or blind spots in the rationalist 
literature, namely that rationalism is not able to explain change and that it treats 
the interests of actors as black boxes.  
 
In order to overcome these shortcomings of rationalism, Keck and Sikkink 
introduce the so-called “boomerang pattern”: if civil society actors in a country A 
                                                                                                                                                            
“constitutive effects” that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize  a particular 
identity. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an 
already defined identity. In such instances norms have “regulative” effects that specify standards of 
proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) 
behavior, or they do both’, Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives of National 
Security’, in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. 
Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5. 
349 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001): 
391–416; see also Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, 
European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63; and Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The 
Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–48. 
350  Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 3. 
351 Keck and Sikkink, 8–9. 
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are not able to gain direct influence on policy outcomes like the implementation of 
human rights they may start to form a network in country B; after the 
establishment of such a network civil society actors in country B might increase 
the pressure on the policy elites of country B and, if necessary, on international 
organisations in order to intervene into the policy of state A. This intervention 
might then change the policy of state A.352 
 
The work on transnational advocacy networks was further developed by 
Sikkink (now together with Martha Finnemore) into the “norm life cycle model” 
and the idea that norms are created, framed and promoted by “norm 
entrepreneurs”.353 For Finnemore and Sikkink norm entrepreneurs do not act out 
of egoistic self-interests as “it is very difficult to explain the motivation of norm 
entrepreneurs without reference to empathy, altruism, and ideational 
commitment”. 354  Accordingly norm entrepreneurs are important for the 
emergence, spread and implementation of norms. This is illustrated by the ‘norm 
life cycle model’, where norms pass through three stages. During the first stage 
norms origin or emerge. At this stage the role of norm entrepreneurs is 
particularly relevant as norms “do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built 
by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their 
community”.355After getting enough support and trespassing a “threshold or 
tipping point” norms enter the second stage and, as Finnemore and Sikkink put it, 
“cascade” as more and more countries and organisations begin to support those 
norm. This stage can also described as the phase of the “socialization” of 
norms.356The ‘norm life cycle model’ enters its final stage when norms get 
“internalized”, i.e. when they “may become so widely accepted that they are 
internalized by actors and achieve a ’taken-for-granted’ quality that makes 
                                                      
352 Keck and Sikkink, 12–13. 
353 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 894–909. For a 
recent example in IL explicitely refering to the literature on ‘norm entrepreneurs’, see Frédéric 
Mégret, ‘ICC, R2P, and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist Toolkit’, Finish 
Yearbook of International Law 21 (2010): 21–53. Instead of ‘norm entrepreneur’, in IL the term 
‘normative intermediary’ is used in a similar way, cf. Steven R. Ratner, ‘Does International Law 
Matter in Preventing International Conflict?’, New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 32 (2000): 591–698. 
354 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 898. 
355 Finnemore and Sikkink, 896. 
356 Finnemore and Sikkink, 902. 
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conformance with then norm almost automatic”.357 
 
Both mechanics, Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang pattern’ as well as 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s three-stage ‘norm life cycle model’, were finally extended 
into a five-phase “spiral model”, which was introduced in the well-received edited 
volume on The Power of Human Rights.358In the introductory chapter Thomas Risse 
and Kathryn Sikkink develop the theoretical framework of the volume, which is 
then applied without greater changes to several case studies in the remaining 
chapters (including studies of Sub-Sahara African, Arab, Latin American, South 
East Asian and East European cases). Risse and Sikkink are interested in the 
“impact of ideas and norms in international politics” and, here, particularly in the 
global impact of human rights ideas and norms.359  
 
According to Risse and Sikkink human rights norms, if they are successfully 
implemented, undergo five phases: first, human rights norms are violated 
(“repression”) by a state (the “target state”) and this violation triggers the work of 
transnational advocacy networks (gathering information); second, while, on the 
one hand, the transnational advocacy networks start to disseminate information 
on the international level and to lobby, the target state, on the other hand, denies 
its involvement in the violation of human rights norms; third, if “international 
pressures continue and escalate” the ‘target states’ sees itself forced to make 
tactical concessions which, in turn, mobilize also domestic opposition;360fourth, 
human rights norms achieve “prescriptive status”, i.e. the target state starts to 
ratify international protocols and to institutionalize human rights norms 
domestically; fifth and finally, human rights norms are completely internalized and 
we can observe fully “rule consistent behavior” by the target state.361 
 
Summing up, these three models – the ‘boomerang pattern’, the ‘norm life 
cycle model’ as well as the ‘spiral model’ – emphasise agency, where norm 
                                                      
357 Finnemore and Sikkink, 904. 
358 Thomas Risse, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
359 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in The Power of Human Rights, ed. Thomas Risse, Steve C. Ropp, 
and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 6 (emphasis added). 
360 Risse and Sikkink, 25. 
361 Risse and Sikkink, 17–34. 
 97 
entrepreneurs exist and where even norms themselves are ascribed – by 
introducing certain metaphors – with agentic quality (as they spread, diffuse, 
cascade, etc.); norms even ‘live’.362Moreover, these models rely on a rather 
mechanical, uni-directional and teleological understanding of how norms work, as 
norms seem to follow a simple causal arrow.363 Yet, such a conception of norms 
neglects that norms are socially embedded and that the implementation of norms 
is part of a larger process of contestation between various, often adversial 
projects.364 
 
 Beside the interest in the ‘life of norms’ and the ‘power of human rights’, 
moderate constructivists are extensively dedicated to further investigating agency 
and focus here on the underlying motives, i.e. the intensions, of international 
actors (mainly states). This research on logics or rationalities of action is orientated 
on the by now classic question of the research on compliance, namely the question 
of “why do powerful states obey powerless rules?”.365 By asking this, moderate 
constructivist are able to build bridges into two directions: on the one hand, to 
legal process scholars in IL and their interest in the compliance question; and, on 
the other hand, to other ‘mainstream’ accounts in IR as the moderate constructivist 
logic of actions literature claims to only complement the already existing 
explanations of states’ behaviour (traditionally either coercion or interest) by 
adding a genuine constructivist logic. For instance, where Keohane explains 
compliance in terms of states’ self-interest, moderate constructivist scholars 
suggest that – at least in some cases – states also follow another logic – might it be 
called ‘logic of appropriateness’, a ‘logic of persuasion’, a ‘logic of arguing’ – or 
                                                      
362 Cf. Bernd Bucher, ‘Acting Abstractions: Metaphors, Narrative Structures, and the Eclipse of 
Agency’, European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 3 (2014): 742–65. 
363 Adriana Sinclair presents a comprehensive critique of the idea that norms work like an uni-
directional causal arrow. Sinclair points, in particular, to the possibility of ‘normative backsliding’, 
see Adriana Sinclair, International Relations Theory and International Law: A Critical Approach  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 6. 
364 See the important criticism in: Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation (Heidelberg: Springer, 
2014). 
365 The classic formulation is from Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). For more recent restatements in IL see Thomas 
M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and 
Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’, Yale Law Journal 106 (1997): 2599–
2659. For IR see Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International 
Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 379–408. 
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because they perceive a norm as ‘legitimate’.366 In this context particularly the 
concept of ‘legitimacy’ was warmly welcomed as an opportunity to conduct 
common research in IL and IR.367  
 
Interestingly, in contrast to the legal and political discourse of the nation 
state, the notion of legitimacy was for a long time almost absent from both IL and 
IR. Although there were some exceptions, such as Kissinger’s rather loose use of 
legitimacy (see above), the concept was substantially introduced to IR only in 1999 
by an influential article by Ian Hurd published in International Organization.368 
Hurd asks at the outset of the article, “[w]hat motivates states to follow 
international norms, rules, and commitments?”.369 This puzzles Hurd as the fact 
that states ‘comply’ with ‘norms, rules and commitments’ – and in later 
publications he should increasingly focus on legal norms, rules and commitments 
(‘the rule of law’)370 – runs fundamentally against the assumption that states 
operate (or ‘dwell’) under the condition of international anarchy, i.e. without a 
central mechanism that could sanction non-compliance. To shed light to the 
compliance question, Hurd uses as his main example the “institution of 
sovereignty”. Sovereignty is understood here as non-intervention and mutual 
recognition; and, according to Hurd, virtually all states comply with this 
foundational ‘institution’ of the international system.371  
 
Traditional approaches, which either rely on coercion (e.g., classical 
realism) or interest (e.g., neorealism or neoliberalism) as rationale of action, are 
according to Hurd not able to explain such a high rate of compliance with the 
                                                      
366 Cf. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in  
Political Life’, The American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 734–49; Nicole Deitelhoff and 
Harald Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise – Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas’, Review of 
International Studies 31, no. 1 (2005); and Thomas Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in 
World Politics’, International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1–39. 
367 For a longer discussion of ‘legitimacy’ in IR and IL see: dos Reis and Kessler, ‘Power of Legality, 
Legitimacy and the (im)possibility of Interdisciplinary Research’; as well as dos Reis and Kessler, 
‘Constructivism and the Politics of International Law’, 351–354. For a discussion, which focuses 
mainly on IL see: Filipe dos Reis and Oliver Kessler, ‘Legitimacy’, in Fundamental Concepts of 
International Law: The Construction of a Discipline, ed. Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcoming). 
368 Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’. 
369 Hurd, 379. 
370 Cf. Ian Hurd, How to Do Things with International Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2017). 
371 Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, 393–399. 
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institutions of sovereignty. Only a distinct constructivist logic of action is able to 
grasp this and Hurd identifies this logic with ‘legitimacy’. Hence, legitimacy is 
presented as the missing link to answer the compliance puzzle. As Hurd argues 
legitimacy is linked to the 
 
“the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be 
obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and 
institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the institution. The 
actor’s perception may come from the substance of the rule or from the 
procedure or source by which it was constituted. Such a perception 
affects behavior because it is internalized by the actor and helps to 
define how the actor sees its interests.”372 
 
Thus, Hurd’s concept of legitimacy works differently than the one of Buchanan and 
Keohane, as Hurd employs an ‘empirical’ concept of legitimacy. This means that 
not predefined ‘objective’ criteria but the ‘subjective’ perception – the Weberian 
legitimacy believe (Legitimitätsglaube) – determine whether a rule or institution is 
legitimate. Moreover, legitimacy has an intimate relationship with authority as the 
believe in the legitimacy of a rule or institution provides the rule or institution 
with authority.373  
 
According to Hurd, it has important implications if it is possible to show 
that the compliance with rules and institutions on the international level is – at 
                                                      
372 Hurd, 381 (emphasis in the original). 
373 For a still strong critique of the idea to perfectly distinguish between the ‘empirical’ (or 
‘descriptive’) and the ‘theoretical’, see Charles Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Science of Man’, 
Review of Metaphysics 25, no. 1 (1971): 3–51. As Taylor nicely demonstrates, empirical research is 
always based on normative assumption; similarly, normative research rests always on empirical 
observations. See also the slightly different argument by William E. Connolly: ‘To describe a 
situation is not to name something, but to characterize it. [...] A description does not refer to data or 
elements that are bound together merely on the basis of similarities adhering in them, but to 
describe is to characterize a situation from the vantage point of certain interests, purposes, or 
standards. To describe is to characterize from one or more possible points of view, and the 
concepts with which we so characterize have the contours they do in part because of the point of 
view from which they are formed’, William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 22–23. As a result, as Connolly famously called it, all concepts are 
‘essentially contested’ and, as a corollary of the contested nature of concepts, our neo-Kantian 
dichotomies - and Max Weber was certainly the ‘master’ of these dichotomies - ‘break down’. 
Connolly’s examples are synthetic/analytical, operational/non-operational, scientific 
language/ordinary language or normative/empirical; one could, of course, also add 
process/substance, see, in particular, Connolly, chap. 1. 
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least to some extent – evoked by their legitimacy. As Hurd explains, this would 
make the assumption, that the international system is anarchical, obsolete: “If we 
accept that some authoritative international institutions exist, by virtue of being 
accepted by states as legitimate, then the international system is not an 
anarchy”.374It would then also soften the sharp separation between the domestic 
and the international as two completely different spheres or levels as the 
international would then be, like the domestic, governed “by structures that rely 
on normative pull to enforce their edicts”.375 Yet, this does not mean that the 
international and the domestic work completely identical. While the domestic is 
governed by centralised authority, the international could better be described as a 
“system of decentralised authority”.376 
 
Hurd’s concept of legitimacy is ‘empirical’ in another sense as well, namely 
as he actually tests whether the ‘institution of sovereignty’ is perceived as 
legitimate by states. Yet as a direct access to the motivations of states and their 
representatives is not possible – “as it is impossible to enter into an actor’s 
head”377 –, Hurd suggests to prove the underlying rationale of states’ actions 
indirectly. Hurd asks here whether it is possible to fully explain the persistence of 
sovereignty (understood as non-intervention) by just focussing on self-interest or 
coercion as possible explanations. In particular, he asks why should such a 
powerful hegemon as the United States respect the sovereignty of its neighbour 
Canada? According to Hurd explanatory models based on self-interest or coercion 
are not able to explain this and he concludes consequently that the United States 
do not interfere into Canada’s sovereignty as they have a general believe in the 
legitimacy of the ‘institution of sovereignty’.378 
 
When we turn to IL, it was the work of Thomas M. Franck that introduced 
the concept of legitimacy in the late 1980s and early 1990s to the 
discipline.379Franck was one of the most significant figures of the so-called 
                                                      
374 Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, 401. 
375 Hurd, 401. 
376 Hurd, 401. 
377 Hurd, 382. 
378 See Hurd, 383–399. 
379 It was particularly his monograph, Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations; for earlier 
studies see Thomas M. Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’, The American Journal of 
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Manhattan School, a school that pursued the agenda of bringing the US process 
tradition together with a liberal world-view.380As it was the case for Hurd, Franck 
is interested in the compliance question.381And as for Hurd, Franck answers this 
question with reference to ‘legitimacy’: “legitimacy is assigned the role of an 
independent variable” to explain why states follow the rules of international law. 
The competing variable is mainly ‘coercion’.382 Where Franck differs from Hurd is 
the definition of legitimacy as Franck argues that legitimacy “is a property of a rule 
or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance”, he 
continuous by addressing the role of community, “on those addressed normatively 
because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being 
and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process”.383 
 
Moreover Franck distinguishes sharply between legality and legitimacy and 
keeps in this regard one of the core assumptions of legal positivism alive, namely 
that legality operates through a binary logic where something is either legal or not 
– tertium non datur.384 The legitimacy of a rule is, in contrast, always a “matter of 
degree”.385In order to grasp legitimacy and to make it observable, Franck develops 
four indicators (also functioning as variables), which are determinacy (semantic 
clarity), symbolic validation (pedigree and rituals), coherence (consistency with 
other rues) and adherence (validation of a rule in accordance with secondary 
rules). As legitimacy is a ‘matter of degree’ one can evaluate now the ‘legitimacy’ of 
a rule or rule-making institution vis-à-vis the degree of the fulfilment of the four 
indicators.386What is noteworthy in this context is the circularity of Franck’s 
argument and the interplay between subjective believes and objective criteria as 
subjective believes produce objective criteria, which in turn produce subjective 
believes. 
                                                                                                                                                            
International Law 82, no. 4 (1988): 705–59; and Thomas M. Franck, ‘Why a Quest for Legitimacy?’, 
UC Davis Law Review 21 (1988): 535–47. 
380 For an excellent introduction to the work of Franck and the framework of the Manhattan School, 
see David Kennedy, ‘Tom Franck and the Manhattan School’, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 35, no. 2 (2003): 397–435. 
381 “What if the evolution of a system of rules ordinarily obeyed by states were possible without a 
coercive infrastructure?", Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 22. 
382 Franck, 25. 
383 Franck, 24; see also: ‘Legitimacy [...] is about right process and about community’, Franck, 38. 
384 Franck also distinguishes (as Buchanan) legitimacy from justice, see Franck, The Power of 
Legitimacy Among Nations, chap. 13. 
385 Franck, 37, 43. 
386 Such an approach resembles of course the one of the legalization literature. 
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Although both, Hurd (standing for IR) and Franck (standing for IL) address 
similar puzzles, it was only the work of Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, which 
started to bring both disciplines explicitly together and repeatedly used the 
language of ‘interdisciplinarity’. Brunnée and Toope’s project is to develop an 
“interactional account of international law”, which is interdisciplinary as it is an 
attempt to marry IL with IR’s moderate constructivism and Lon Fuller’s neo-
naturalist legal theory.387The authors are in particular interested in the concept of 
“international legal obligation” as they “believe that the key to understanding the 
role that law plays in international society lies in understanding the nature and 
operation in practice of legal obligation”.388 
 
International legal obligation is created when three things come together. 
Firstly, Brunnée and Toope borrow from the moderate constructivist literature on 
norms the idea of ‘shared understanding’. Here, they engage with Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s ‘norm life cycle model’ (which I discussed above), the literature on 
‘epistemic communities’ and Emanuel Adler’s take on ‘communities of 
practices’.389These different strands of constructivist literature point out that 
“[s]ocial norms can only emerge when they are rooted in an underlying set of 
shared understandings”.390 Shared understandings create also social legitimacy. 
Secondly, although all ‘legal norms’ are ‘social norms’, not all ‘social norms’ are 
‘legal norms’. In order to distinguish ‘legal norms’ from non-legal norms, Brunnée 
and Toope introduce Fuller’s work to international legal theory. Fuller, whose 
approach was published in the context of domestic debates in US legal theory 
taking place mainly during the 1950s, identified a number of criteria, which (if 
                                                      
387 See Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an 
Interactional Theory of International Law’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 39 (2000): 19–
74; Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Jutta Brunnée and 
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Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization 46, no. 1 
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and Legality in International Law, chap. 2. 
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fulfilled) would create fidelity to law.391 If law fulfils these criteria it would also 
help to create specific legal legitimacy.392 To connect legality to a number of 
criteria helps Fuller to overcome a hierarchical conception of law. It is exactly this 
non-hierarchical conception, which Brunnée and Toope identify empirically on the 
international level. Thirdly, only the permanent practice of legality in the 
interaction of the various actors of the international scenery – Brunnée and Toope 
explicitly leave the state-centrism of traditional international law behind and 
include non-state actors – can make legal norms legitimate and hence sustainable. 
 
4.5 Interim Conclusion 
 
In order to conclude the reconstruction of various recent interdisciplinary 
research projects between ‘mainstream’ accounts in both disciplines – either in the 
context of liberal ‘IL/IR’ or the moderate constructivism – let me point to three 
implications.393 
 
First, interdisciplinarity is easier said than done. In this regard my discussion of 
the concept of legitimacy should be indicative. This means that simply the 
“reference to the same concept does not constitute an interdisciplinary research 
agenda”.394 As we have seen, a concept like legitimacy conveys different meaning 
in different contexts (as it oscillates, e.g., between objective criteria and subjective 
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feelings or between substance and procedures) and, hence, works differently: 
while Franck was mainly interested in how rules and rule-making institutions 
create compliance and thereby to answer a perennial question of US policy 
approaches in IL, namely the question of ‘why do powerful states obey powerless 
rules?’; although Hurd took up a similar question his main concern was to show 
that the international system is rather a ‘system of decentralised authority’ than of 
anarchy, which in turn also helped him in disciplinary terms to bridge between 
rationalistic and constructivist approaches in IR; for Keohane and Buchanan 
‘legitimacy’ helped to design more effective institutions of global governance as 
well as they saw it as a promising device to trespass disciplinary boundaries 
between normative and empirical research; and for Brunnée and Toope examining 
the concept of legitimacy was useful in order to create an account of ‘international 
legal obligation’ which should fuse insights from legal theory with IR’s moderate 
constructivism. Importantly as we can also see, all of these projects have certain 
disciplinary dimensions.  
 
Second, all of these projects are attempts to move beyond the traditional image 
of the international, which was so persistent in both IR and IL. Instead of 
conceptualizing and problematizing the international in terms of international 
organization these new interdisciplinary projects turned to an image of the 
international as global governance.395 As we have seen – for example, in the 
literature on regimes or the ‘empirical’ research with regard to legitimacy – 
projects of global governance are not an entire renunciation of the traditional 
image of the international but, rather, challenge a few – yet important – 
assumptions. Although the international is often still recognized as anarchical, the 
emergence of regimes or the diagnosis that legitimacy and law might matter 
somehow ‘softens’ the hopeless nature of the international. Connected to this 
observation, states are not conceived as main actors of international politics 
anymore as global governance directs our attention to the role of ‘transnational 
advocacy networks’, courts, multinational enterprises and the whole plethora of 
international institutions. Consequently, the ‘heroic figures’ are not the statesmen, 
diplomats or foreign affairs officers of the Cold War era anymore but for example 
                                                      
395 The first part of this paragraph draws mainly on Kessler, ‘World Society’, 102–103. 
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the human rights activist, the judge or even the bureaucrat. In disciplinary terms 
this created a demand for ‘empirical’ research evaluating the compliance with 
international rules and commitments – with international legal rules and 
international legal commitments as prime examples – as it created at the same 
time a demand for an engagement with ‘normative’ analyses in order to create the 
most effective, efficient and democratic – in short, legitimate – institutions for the 
future. 
 
However, there is still another disciplinary dimension to all of this. This brings 
me to my third and probably most important point. In all the different 
’mainstream’ projects, which I traced back, we can observe a certain imbalance 
between the disciplines of IR and IL – mostly to the disadvantage of the lawyers. As 
we will see in the next section, the imbalance led critical IL scholars to articulate 
the claim that IR ‘conquers’ IL and that IL, in order to maintain its own disciplinary 
core (whatever this might be), should start to engage in the project of 
‘counterdisciplinarity’. The claim that interdisciplinary projects are often projects 
of “colonialization” is, however, nothing new when we look at the history of 
various ‘law and …’ endeavours, which often started promising but later turned 
into ‘law as…’ misunderstandings. 396  But how does interdisciplinary 
‘colonialization’ exactly work here? Before I pursue this question in light of the 
work of critical scholars from both IR and IL in the next section and in the 
chapter’s conclusion, I think it is a good starting point to look first at the language, 
which is often mobilised in interdisciplinary projects. As James Boyd White has 
observed on a more general level, interdisciplinary projects between law and other 
fields are usually framed in territorial and/or mechanical metaphors – and these 
metaphors create in the end disciplinary hierarchies.397 
 
The ‘hierachisation’ of disciplines through these metaphors works in different 
forms: Firstly, many interdisciplinary projects reify disciplinary boundaries instead 
of overcoming these boundaries (i.e. ‘breaking down boundaries’). This is the case 
as disciplines are not conceptualised as social practices with contested and blurred 
                                                      
396 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, ‘Interdisciplinarity as Colonization’, Washington and Lee Law Review 53 
(1996): 949–70. 
397 James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 12–17. 
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boundaries but as pre-given and naturalized containers or “‘fields’—as though 
there were entities out there in the world, perhaps like a patchwork quilt of 
agricultural fields seen from an airplane, among with connections”.398Secondly, 
interdisciplinary work is often captured in the language of findings. We have seen 
various attempts to bring findings – mainly IR’s findings – to IL (e.g. the findings of 
‘modern IR theory’, ‘liberalism’ or ‘moderate constructivism’). This image does not 
only reify disciplines but it also reifies the findings itself as it seems that one could 
transfer findings from one disiplines to another as one could “pass a plate with the 
truth on it over to the law, which would then in some unspecific way put it to use 
(or vice versa)”.399 Yet, to use the language of findings in this way neglects the fact 
that findings remain already within disciplines never uncontested and are never 
transhistorically valid.400 Contesting findings is actually the way scientific practice 
works. Finally, we have seen how the metaphor of ‘intellectual method’ is 
mobilised, i.e. that “one learns from another discipline not its ‘findings’ but its 
methodology, which can be brought like a machine to problems of one’s own field, 
upon which it will go to work without undergoing any transformation.”401 In the 
present chapter we have witnessed different uses of these metaphors and how 
they, in turn, produce disciplinary hierarchies between IR and IL – often with the 
request that IL should incorporate the methods and theoretical findings of IR or 
that IR should concentrate more on the empirical findings of IL (but hardly, the 
other way around). This is of course the logic of subsumption at its best. Such way 
of relating disciplines was already put forward in the very first publication – the 
foundational document so to say – of the recent ‘IL/IR’ movement as the full title of 
Abbott’s ‘prospectus’ reveals: ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A 
Prospectus for International Lawyers’.402 Moreover, it is important to note that the 
discipline that ‘does the theory’ or ‘exports’ its findings or methods is the one that 
decides what kind of research is relevant (e.g., what constitutes a valid case, 
                                                      
398 White, 13. For accounts to study science as practice see inter alia Bruno Latour, Science in Action: 
How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1987); and Michael Lynch, Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social 
Studies of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a discussion of IR, see 
Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘The Monologue of “Science”’, International Studies Review 5, no. 1 (2003): 
124–28. 
399 White, Justice as Translation, 13. 
400 See Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact. 
401 White, Justice as Translation, 14. 
402 Cf. Tanja E. Aalberts, ‘The Politics of International Law and the Perils and Promises of 
Interdisciplinarity’, Leiden Journal of International Law 26, no. 3 (2013): 505. 
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argument or research questions) and how research should be conducted. Yet, at 
this point one could, of course, ask whether we can overcome disciplinary 
hierarchies at all? To engage with this question, let’s have a look on how critical 
scholars from both disciplines scrutinized the different ‘mainstream’ projects – and 
how the puzzle of interdisciplinarity is approached – and whether a more 
reconstructive mode of disciplinary linking is possible. 
 
 5. From Interdisciplinarity to Counterdisciplinarity – and Back? 
 
To recapitulate, I have introduced and discussed so far three different projects of 
interdisciplinary research between IR and IL. The first one was provided by the 
Chicago-based authors Frederick Schuman, Harold Lasswell and, especially, Quincy 
Wright and their attempt to make both IR and IL more scientific by invoking an 
external ‘third’: ‘social sciences’. As a second project, I discussed the ‘strange 
symbiosis’ between legal positivism and political realism after the beginning of the 
Second World War. Although both approaches seem at first sight incompatible 
with each other, as the possibility of their very existence is the denial of the ‘other’ 
and, therefore, seem antagonistic to interdisciplinary research; yet, a closer look 
reveals that they created a ‘strange symbiosis’ as they engage in a (hidden) 
division of labour exactly because the condition of possibility is the denial of the 
other. The third context brought us to a number of more recent debates. Here the 
division of labour between both disciplines (as in particular the terms ‘dual 
agenda’ or ‘two optics’ imply) seems to be clear and prima facie a project among 
‘equal partners’. However, a second view reveals as we have seen in my discussion 
from ‘regimes’ to ‘legalization’, from the ‘the power of human rights’ to different 
uses of ‘legitimacy’ among liberal and soft constructivist scholars that these 
projects are rather to understand as hegemonic projects in disguise as they impose 
the perspective – the theory and method – of IR on the empirical field of 
international law (rather than discussing on equal footing with the cognate field of 
IL). 
  
 From a methodological point of view, what I have done so far was not to ‘fix’ 
the meaning of the term ‘interdisciplinarity’ by providing a once or for all 
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definition and by establishing at least a preliminary working definition. As I 
understand science as a social practice (and, thus, its guiding concepts as 
contingent, socially embedded and permanently contested), I rather reconstructed 
the practice of interdisciplinary research and the use of the term in various 
contexts.403 In the remainder of this section, I will focus on some prominent 
criticisms of the recent wave of interdisciplinary mainstream scholarship between 
IR and IL. However, I will not leave it there as I will argue that interdisciplinary 
research can actually work – not framed as collaboration between different 
‘disciplines’ but rather as an engagement between scholars with similar 
‘metatheoretical’ (in particular, epistemological and methodological) orientations. 
On a side note, this is not only the case between but also within disciplines. To 
advance my argument I will focus in particular on the debate on ‘counter-
disciplinarity’ and make use of the notion of ‘translation’.  
 
The recent wave of interdisciplinary projects in the mainstream(s) of IR and 
IL was the object of harsh assessments by critical scholars from both disciplines. 
For instance, critical IL scholars began to fear a ‘colonialization’, ‘conquest’ and 
‘instrumentalization’ of their field through IR.404 Particularly Martti Koskenniemi 
has been among the most ardent critics of these interdisciplinary projects during 
the past fifteen years. Koskenniemi’s (and to some extent also Jan Klabber’s) 
critique went so far that it culminated in the claim that IL scholars should start to 
engage in ‘counterdisciplinarity’ rather than in interdisciplinary projects with their 
colleagues from IR.405To understand Koskenniemi’s position it is important to 
                                                      
403 For a similar but less developed argument, see Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘A Guide for the Perplexed? 
Critical Reflections on Doing Inter-Disciplinary Legal Research’, Transnational Legal Theory 5, no. 4 
(2014): 541–56. See also: ‘Rather than focusing on the “inside” of disciplinary understandings - 
which of course are surrounded by other “islands of knowledge” - or by examining “bridges” that 
connect these islands, I focus on the processes by which these boundaries of “sense” are drawn and 
redrawn so that different elements can be included, reconfigured, or excluded’, Friedrich 
Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 29 (emphasis in the original). See also Aalberts and Venzke, 
‘Moving Beyond Interdisciplinary Turf Wars’. 
404 On the vocabulary of ‘colonialization’ see my discussion in the conclusion of the previous section 
and: Balkin, ‘Interdisciplinarity as Colonization’; Koskenniemi speaks of ‘conquest’, see Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law’, European 
Journal of International Relations 15, no. 3 (2009): 410; and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology 
and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity’, International Relations 26, no. 1 
(2012): 16; on ‘instrumentalization’, see Jan Klabbers, ‘Counter-Disciplinarity’, International 
Political Sociology 4, no. 3 (2010): 309–310. 
405 Cf. Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations’. 
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understand how he frames the (inter)disciplinary history of IL and IR.406 I have 
touched upon it already above when I introduced Morgenthau’s work in the 
intersection of international law and politics and I will come back to it now.  
 
According to Koskenniemi, the establishment of realism as the main 
paradigm and the role of Hans Morgenthau, as a European international lawyer 
leaving for US-American IR, was the moment when not just the positive 
relationship between IR and IL came to an end but – and this is for Koskenniemi 
certainly the bigger problem – when traditional IL, i.e. the European project of the 
‘gentle civilizer’, began to fade out. While the European tradition of international 
legal thought was mainly interested in the formal validity of law, IR – and this is 
also true for US policy approaches in IL – increasingly started to follow a dynamic 
conception of law, where law is reduced to an outcome of policy and an 
epiphenomenon of the struggle for power. The result of this development is for 
Koskenniemi a two culture problem: while a “culture of dynamism” started to 
dominate IR (and IL’s policy approaches), a “culture of formalism” was assigned on 
the other hand to the remains of the European tradition (particularly, legal 
positivism).407 And even recent liberal development in IR, which seem to be so 
distant on a substantial theoretical level (first-order theory) from the different 
forms of realism (as the ‘liberal agenda’ claims to oppose the ‘realist challenge’), 
seem to share on a deeper theoretical level (second-order theory or metatheory) a 
dynamic image of international law.408  
 
In this regard two developments even intensified the problem. First, the 
recent ‘IL/IR’ literature (as well as moderate constructivism) turned the “debate 
about the ends of action to the means of action, from normative praxis to 
instrumental techne”.409 We shouldn’t forget, however, that it was Morgenthau’s 
critique in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics that was directed exactly against this 
kind of ‘legal engineering’. Yet, for Koskenniemi this seems to be of less relevance. 
Second, the problem is not only of ‘theoretical’ nature. For Koskenniemi it is 
                                                      
406 See in particular Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, chap. 6. 
407 Koskenniemi, 494–509. 
408 For a valuable discussion of first-order and second-order theory - and their relationship, see 
Fred Chernoff, Theory and Metatheory in International Relations: Concepts and Contending Accounts 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
409 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 486 (emphasis in the original). 
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important to note that the dynamic conception of law became closely connected to 
hegemonic projects in US academia and, moreover, of US foreign policy. In other 
words, for Koskenniemi, claims about interdisciplinarity turn easily into 
hegemonic projects, as he suggests in the following paragraph: 
 
“Today, many lawyers in the United States persist in calling an 
integration of international law and international relations theory 
under a ‘common agenda’. This is an American crusade. By this, I do not 
mean only that some of the crusaders have chosen to argue for an 
increasing recourse to US principles of domestic legitimacy in the 
justification of its external behavior, nor that nearly all of the relevant 
literature comes from North America. […] Nor am I relying on the fact 
that the concepts of ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy’ refer back to an 
American understanding that links them with determined (Western) 
liberal institutions. What I want to say, instead, is that the 
interdisciplinary agenda itself, together with a deformalized concept of 
law, and enthusiasm about the spread of ‘liberalism’, constitutes an 
academic project that cannot but buttress the justification of American 
empire […]. This is not because of bad faith or conspiracy on anybody’s 
part. It is the logic of an argument […] that hopes to salvage the law by 
making it an instrument for the values (or, better, decisions) of the 
powerful that compels the conclusion”.410 
 
These developments find their expression also in a turn in the international 
legal discourse towards a ‘managerialist’ vocabulary. One of the outcomes of 
managerialism is the growing relevance of experts and expert vocabularies on a 
global scale. I shall return to this later. Yet, Koskenniemi is also afraid of another 
consequence, namely that ‘managerialism’ leads to a re-definition and hence 
transformation of a number of key legal concepts into pure technical instruments – 
instruments helping to manage international affairs. Koskenniemi observes in this 
regard a couple of semantic drifts such as, e.g., from ‘institutions’ to ‘regimes’, from 
‘rules’ to ‘regulation’, from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, from ‘responsibility’ to 
                                                      
410 Koskenniemi, 483–483. 
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‘compliance’, from ‘law’ to ‘legitimacy’ and, in the end even, ‘lawyers’ become 
‘international relations experts’.411  
 
As for Koskenniemi these problems are so closely linked to the culture of IR, 
he consequently suggests a radical break from IL’s ‘sibling discipline’: instead of 
establishing interdisciplinary ‘IL/IR’ projects, IL should foster 
“counterdisciplinarity” as a project of critique.412This project, in turn, should be 
tied to a wider ‘culture of formalism’. For Koskenniemi it is important to note that 
a ‘culture of formalism’ works differently than a simple return to formalism as it 
would present a “culture of resistance to power, a social practice of accountability, 
openness, and equality whose status cannot be reduced to the political positions of 
any one of the parties whose claims are treated within it. As such, it makes a claim 
for universality that may be able to resist the pull towards imperialism”.413 
 
Although other critical international legal scholars point into the same 
direction as Koskenniemi, they seem to be more moderate in the formulation of the 
consequences. For instance, Jan Klabbers speaks as well of ‘counter-
disciplinarity’.414 And, Klabbers starts with a similar diagnosis when he discusses 
for example Slaughter’s contribution to interdisciplinarity, which makes visible 
that “interdisciplinary scholarship, in a word, is about power, and when it comes to 
links between international legal scholarship and international relations, the 
power balance tilts strongly in favour of the latter”.415 However, Klabbers does not 
go as far as Koskenniemi and does not completely deny that interdisciplinary 
scholarship between IR and IL might produce valuable results for both sides. For 
him, and I will argue the same towards the end of this section, collaborations 
between scholars from both disciplines are possible under certain 
                                                      
411 Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters’, 405–411. 
412 Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations’. 
413 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 500; for further discussion, cf. Jan Klabbers, 
‘Towards a Culture of Formalism? Martti Koskenniemi and the Virtues’, Temple International and 
Comparative Law Journal 27, no. 2 (2013): 417–35. 
414 Cf. Klabbers, ‘Counter-Disciplinarity’. 
415 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Bridge Crack’d: A Critical Look at Interdisciplinary Relations’, International 
Relations 23, no. 1 (2009): 120; and Jan Klabbers, ‘The Relative Autonomy of International Law or 
the Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinary’, Journal of International Law & International Relations 1, 
no. 1–2 (2005): 35–48. 
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circumstances.416 They are possible if we frame disciplines not as monolithic 
blocks anymore but rather as internally fragmented knowledge orders, which 
provide a centre stages for epistemic struggles between various (people with) 
projects. This means, for instance, that IR scholars inspired by Foucault can hardly 
cooperate with proponents of rational choice approaches in their own discipline – 
and the same might be true for IL as well. However, cooperation between 
Foucauldians or rational choicers beyond disciplinary boundaries should be on the 
first view easier as they share the same metatheoretical assumptions and a 
common world-view.  
 
In a similar vein, the recent wave of liberal and soft constructivist 
interdisciplinary projects has been the object of repeated criticism within IR. From 
early onwards it were particularly radical constructivists who pointed to the flaws, 
biases and blind spots in the literature on ‘international regimes’.  417  As I pointed 
out at the outset of this thesis already, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard 
Ruggie famously observed in the heydays of the regimes debate that in the 
prevailing approach to regimes “epistemology fundamentally contradicts 
ontology”.418 Epistemology contradicts ontology as, on the one hand, regimes are 
defined in terms of rules, norms, principles and procedures, which all bear a 
intersubjective dimensions (in other words they are framed as having an 
intersubjective ontology), while, on the other hand, the mainstream protagonists of 
the regimes literature adheres to an image of science, which is heavily indebted to 
scientific positivism and its rather mechanical epistemology of thinking in arrows. 
As Kratochwil and Ruggie note, a positivist theory of science is ‘blind’ for the study 
                                                      
416  Klabbers, ‘The Bridge Crack’d’, 123–124; similarly, Aalberts, ‘Perils and Promises of 
Interdisciplinarity’, 505–506; and Kratochwil, ‘A Guide for the Perplexed?’ 
417 In my reconstruction of radical constructivism’s critique of mainstream interdisciplinary 
projects between IR and IL, I will mainly focus in the work of Kratochwil (and, by far, I cannot 
discuss all of his points). Kratochwil published repeatedly on this issue. See, for instance: 
Kratochwil, ‘How Do Norms Matter?’; Shirley Scott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Friedrich 
Kratochwil, ‘Legalization: Interpreting the Empirical Evidence’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law) 96 (2002): 291–98; Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘The 
“Legalization” of World Politics?’, Leiden Journal of International Law 16, no. 4 (2003): 878–84; 
Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘International Law and International Sociology’, International Political 
Sociology 4, no. 3 (2010): 311–15; Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘How (Il)liberal Is the Liberal Theory of 
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45; Kratochwil, ‘A Guide for the Perplexed?’; and Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 
chap. 1; for a discussion see Tanja E. Aalberts, ‘Interdisciplinarity on the Move: Reading Kratochwil 
as Counter-Disciplinarity Proper’, Millennium 44, no. 2 (2016): 242–49. 
418 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Organization: A State of the Art on 
an Art of the State’, International Organization 40, no. 4 (1986): 764. 
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of meaning and validity (and hence unable to grasp an intersubjective ontology of 
regimes adequately) as it infers explanations from the observation of behaviour. 
This is even worsened as the position of the observer is not reflected and the 
observer and the observed remain sharply divided. In particular the trend to treat 
norms as explanatory variables (in the tradition of causa efficiens causality) brings 
the positivist agenda into an unsustainable position as “unlike the initial conditions 
in positivist explanations, norms even can be thought of only with great difficulty 
as ‘causing’ occurrences”.419 According to Kratochwil and Ruggie, we should thus 
abandon this mechanistic image of norms as norms  
 
“may ‘guide’ behavior, they may ‘inspire’ behavior, they may 
‘rationalize’ or ‘justify’ behavior, they may express mutual 
‘expectations’ about behavior, or they may be ignored. But they do not 
effect cause in the sense that a bullet through the heart causes death or 
an uncontrolled surge in the money supply causes price inflation”. 420 
 
Moreover – and this is even more important – “norms are counterfactually 
valid”.421 This means that non-compliance with norms does not invalidate a norm – 
even if non-compliance occurs repeatedly. As Kratochwil and Ruggie point out, this 
has far-reaching consequences for a model that treats “norms as ‘variables’—be 
they independent, dependent, intervening or otherwise—” as we cannot grasp the 
validity of a norm by focussing on its effectiveness (i.e., behavioural effects), which 
is logically deduced from game theoretical models and/or empirically measured 
through rates of compliance. Instead Kratochwil and Ruggie suggest that we 
should turn our focus to the rationalization of behaviour within a specific context, 
namely the way the protagonists involved give reasons:  
 
“Precisely because state behavior within regimes is interpreted by 
other states, the rationales and justifications for behavior which are 
proffered, together with pleas for understanding or admissions of guilt, 
as well as the responsiveness to such reasoning on the part of other 
                                                      
419 Kratochwil and Ruggie, 767. 
420 Kratochwil and Ruggie, 767 (emphasis added). 
421 Kratochwil and Ruggie, 767. 
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states, all are absolutely critical component parts of any explanation 
involving the efficacy of norms. Indeed, the communicative dynamics 
may tell us far more about how robust a regime is than overt behavior 
alone”.422 
 
As a logical consequence of this assessment, IR should abandon the positivist 
tradition of science and rather follow an “interpretive epistemology”.423 This kind 
of epistemology should become later a cornerstone of the more radical strand of 
‘constructivism’.424 It is also an important example of the logic of reconstruction in 
IR. The main reason why IR has failed to overcome these blind spots and 
shortcomings of scientific positivism is a lack of knowledge about and engagement 
with central debates in other disciplines. Kratochwil, for instance, notes that “the 
subject of custom seems highly relevant to the regime discussion, but one cannot 
think that busy social scientists are about to rediscover the wheel. Worse still, 
there are justifiable suspicions that the wheel will not be discovered unless 
fundamental changes are made in the research program”.425 
 
More than fifteen years later, Kratochwil diagnoses a similar maladjustment 
in the context of the literature on ‘legalization’: Even if the ‘empirical’ observation 
that there are “phenomena of legalization” (i.e., that ‘the world is witnessing a 
move to law’) is correct, the way of studying it, which was advanced by the authors 
of the special issue on the ‘legalization of world politics’, may be flawed.426 For 
Kratochwil, the legalization literature represents “a nearly autistic attempt to 
theorize about law and politics” as it lacks any engagement with the broad 
literature on law and legalization in social and legal theory (in particular, a 
discussion of the work of Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann is missing). In the 
                                                      
422 Kratochwil and Ruggie, 767–768 (emphasis in the original). 
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end, ‘legalization’ scholars postulate interdisciplinarity but they are unable to 
practice it, as they do not know what happens outside their own disciplinary 
turf.427  
 
The failure to consider these essential literatures leads Kratochwil to the 
observation that the discussion has not moved on since the debate about regimes 
as norms are still “reduced […] simply to ‘hooks’ – obviously a mechanical 
metaphor has then to carry all the weight in an ‘explanation’ – or they are treated 
as ‘signals’ for a commitment”. 428 In this context Kratochwil further elaborates on 
the radical constructivist critique of the mainstream model of norms. Kratochwil 
points out that, on the one hand, the proponents of legalization limit their analysis 
of legal obligation “to manifestations of legal behaviour”, which is measurable in 
empirically driven research designs. This, however, “excludes precisely the ‘pull’ 
that results from the ‘internal’ point of view of law (Hart) that is constitutive of the 
legal enterprise”. On the other hand, Kratochwil notes “the total neglect of 
language and narratives that frames ‘law’”. Both points produce also repercussions 
for interdisciplinary research as by “neglecting the problem of context, 
interpretation, and the peculiarities of the normative world, one cuts oneself off 
from some of the most interesting puzzles in an interdisciplinary dialogue”.429  
 
But, such a genuine interdisciplinary dialogue is easier said than done as it 
involves the willingness to move from an understanding of disciplines as 
monolithic blocks to ‘epistemes’ or ‘communities of discourse’.430 And, as we have 
seen the two camps of IR and IL seem still to be “so close yet so far” in this 
regard.431 This has primarily to do with the way critical scholars frame their own 
discipline but also ‘the other’.432 As Tanja Aalberts observes, critical scholars from 
both disciplines are mainly concerned with scrutinizing the mainstream in their 
                                                      
427 Kratochwil, ‘The “Legalization” of World Politics?’, 879. 
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own or the other discipline instead of actually searching for intellectual 
cooperation partners among disciplines. Here, the example of Koskenniemi stands 
out as he seems to trap back into some kind of “hyper-disciplinarity” through his 
claim for ‘counterdisciplinarity’ – a claim, which is in the end, as Aalberts puts it, 
rather “a counter-IR-disciplinarity. Or more specifically, a counter-IR-as-an-
American-social-science-disciplinarity”.433  
 
Anna Leander and Wouter Werner rightly noticed in this regard that the call 
for ‘counter-disciplinarity’ is a “paradoxical return to law […] in critical legal 
studies”.434On the one hand, it is paradoxical, as it was critical scholarship in IL, 
which for so long not only acknowledged but actively promoted the importance of 
interdisciplinary work. In the case of Koskenniemi this is particularly perplexing as 
his own work has always been interdisciplinary: From Apology to Utopia, was “not 
only a book on international law” but also, as we can read in its second sentence, 
“an exercise in social theory and political philosophy”;435 and the Gentle Civilizer is 
heavily indebted to the literature on ‘the history of political thought’.436 What is 
also problematic here, is Koskenniemi’s representation of IR as it is, in the words 
of Mark A. Pollock, “at best an anachronism describing early Cold War IR of our 
grandfathers rather than the contemporary field, and at worst a distortion of IR 
scholars’ attitudes, aims, and influence on the legal profession”.437 
 
Yet, Koskenniemi’s move is ‘paradoxical’ also for a second reason as it is 
Koskenniemi, who was always so closely linked to the project of the ‘politics of 
international law’, starting now to advocate a rather non-political concept of 
international law, which is grounded in a ‘culture of formalism’.438 But, such a non-
political concept of (international ) law hardly exists and formalism – even as a 
culture –  will not protect international law from possible ‘pulls towards 
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437 Mark A. Pollack, ‘Is International Relations Corrosive of International Law: A Reply to Martti 
Koskenniemi’, Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 27, no. 2 (2013): 340. 
438 Cf. Leander and Werner, ‘Tainted with Love’, 87–96. 
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imperialism’. As Duncan Kennedy has noted in his discussion of the first 
globalization of law and legal thought, formalism is always socially and politically 
embedded as the language of formalism was part of (and enabled) left liberal as 
well as conservative political projects.439Moreover, the turn to formalism helps 
also to reify disciplinary boundaries and to conceptualise disciplines as being 
homogeneous and having a clear core. In this context, Aalberts claim for reflexive 
interdisciplinarity, meaning that critical scholars should engage with critical 
projects in other disciplines, should be more than welcomed as it helps to move 
discussions onwards instead of again and again beating dead horses.440 
 
An interesting hint, how interdisciplinary collaboration understood in 
terms of reflexive interdisciplinarity could work, has been given by Kratochwil. 
Throughout his work Kratochwil makes repeatedly, without further specifying it, 
use of the metaphor of translation when he points to the promises, problems and 
pitfalls of interdisciplinary research. Kratochwil writes, for instance: 
“interdisciplinary work will require considerable knowledge in at least two fields 
and the capacity to ‘translate’”.441In the remainder of this section, I argue that the 
notion of translation could open a promising avenue to overcome the ‘mainstream’ 
conception of interdisciplinarity. As suggested in the conclusion of the previous 
section, mainstream interdisciplinary projects – and, in particular the liberal 
exchange on regimes, legalization and legitimacy – resembles often more an one-
way transportation or transplantation from one discipline to another: the findings 
or the method of one discipline is without greater ‘adjustments’ transplanted into 
another discipline.442 
 
However, ‘interdisciplinarity as translation’ works differently. Of course, the 
meaning of the term ‘translation’ differs from context to context – and in 
                                                      
439 Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought’, 25–37. 
440 Aalberts, ‘Perils and Promises of Interdisciplinarity’. 
441 Kratochwil, ‘International Law and International Sociology’, 313; see also Kratochwil, The Status 
of Law in World Society, 30; Kratochwil, ‘A Guide for the Perplexed?’, 550. Onuf uses in this context 
‘traffiking’ in a similar way: Nicholas Onuf, ‘The Politics of Constructivism’, in Constructing 
International Relations: The next Generation, ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen (Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 239. 
442 Mainstream accounts do not only rely on this view when they discuss the relationship between 
disciplines but also as we have seen in the literature on the ‘power of human rights’ when it comes 
to conceptualise norms – and even their image of language and communication is based on this 
view. 
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particular, the ‘norm diffusion’ literature might stick to an understanding of 
translation, which basically resembles translation as transportation – but, a thicker 
or more “radical”443 notion of translation, which we can find in different (social) 
theoretical literatures (ranging from semiotics to ANT, from post-analytical 
philosophy to hermeneutics, from feminist to postcolonial approaches, etc.) would 
instead highlight the productive, transformative and also contested nature of 
translations. To focus on translation, means then to concentrate on the ‘inter’ and 
thereby ‘open the black box’ of inter-disciplinarity. As Doris Bachman-Medick 
convincingly argues, translation 
 
“can become a model for disciplinary linking, where the individual 
disciplines make themselves as susceptible as possible to connection 
with other areas of knowledge and explore their ‘contact zone’. In 
contrast to the ‘smoother’ category of interdisciplinarity, the translation 
category has the advantage of explicitly addressing the differences, 
tensions and antagonisms between disciplines or schools of thought”.444  
 
Translation helps us, in other words, to focus on and recognize the politics of 
interdisciplinarity. It does so, as a ‘thicker’ notion of translation does not 
presuppose that there exists only the one and true translation (i.e. that translation 
is determinate and stable) but that translations are always ‘indeterminate’, fluid 
and unfinished.445 Translation is then a productive way to deal with indeterminacy 
and the politics of interdisciplinarity – it is productive as it does neither deny 
indeterminacy nor the political nature of interdisciplanrity. Put differently, 
translation will not provide us with a tool to solve paradoxes, to eliminate power 
relations and to shed light into blind spots but it will enhance our vocabulary to 
                                                      
443 William Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), 23. 
444 Doris Bachmann-Medick, ‘Introduction: The Translational Turn’, Translation Studies 2, no. 1 
(2009): 12. 
445 The formulation that translation is ‘indeterminate’ is W. V. O. Quine’s. For Quine, the 
‘indeterminacy of translation’ is a corollary of the ‘inscrutability of reference’, see Quine, Word and 
Object, chap. 2. Quine’s work on translation could be seen as the starting point of ‘post-analytical’ 
philosophy. For further discussion see also Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 192–209. To link translation and the work of critical 
scholars in IR and IL through such a notion of translation is also promising, as the ‘indeterminacy’ 
of international law provided the most important vantage point for radical constructivist research 
in IR as it did for critical legal studies in IL. I will discuss this more comprehensively in the next 
chapter. 
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make paradoxes, power relations and blind spots visible, analysable and criticisable – 
and thus helps us to ‘move on’. 
 
 To rely on the notion of translation has further consequences. First, to read 
interdisciplinarity through the lens of translation ‘weakens’ to some extent the 
claim that IR (or ‘law and…’ endeavours in general) ‘conquer’, ‘colonize’ and 
‘instrumentalize’ IL (or the legal profession in general). If we take translation 
seriously, we cannot communicate without translation. Interdisciplinary 
communication is thus always part of processes of translation(s). At least a 
‘colonial semiosis’ is happening.446 Or, if we go one step further: As Gunther 
Teubner persuasively argues in a general assessment of the ‘law and …’ research, 
this kind of research does not present a ‘colonization’ of law by the humanities or 
by social sciences such as economics, sociology or political science. Rather, 
Teubner suggests that it should be understood as an attempt to translate ideas, 
concepts, theories and methods of these disciplines into legal language. As such, 
the various forms of ‘law and …’ research should be understood as “legal 
reconstructions” of the humanities or social sciences – something that resembles 
the way lawyers reconstruct, describe and explain a ‘world out there’ when 
analysing a case.447 
 
 Second, the starting point of a project of ‘interdisciplinarity as translation’ 
should not be a theory or method but rather a shared substantive problem or 
puzzle. As Kratochwil notes, when “we ask ourselves why certain types of 
interdisciplinary investigation seem to have been successful, we notice that none 
of them was based on some form of disciplinary imperialism, be it methodological 
or substantive. Rather, these investigations started with a substantive problem 
that did not fit the standard disciplinary accounts”. 448  For Kratochwil, the 
constructivist observation that the “human world is not simply given and/or 
natural but that, on the contrary the human world is one of artifice” could be one 
                                                      
446 I take the term ‘colonial semiosis’ from Mignolo. See, for example, Walter D. Mignolo, ‘Afterword: 
From Colonial Discourse to Colonial Semiosis’, Dispositio 14, no. 36/38 (1989): 333–37. 
447 Gunther Teubner, ‘How the Law Thinks: Towards a Constructivist Epistemology of Law’, Law & 
Society Review 23, no. 5 (1989): 746–750 (emphasis added). 
448 Kratochwil, ‘Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study’, 14. 
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starting point.449 Similarly, Nicholas Onuf argues that “constructivism can do the 
job of we think of it as a comprehensive framework of social theory and covering 
social relations of every sort”.450 This does not mean that we should create a new 
mode of subsumption. But rather the opposite is the case as constructivism 
understood in this way is a reconstructive logic of inquiry. Applied to the 
relationship of IR and IL this would shift our focus to the world making capacities 
of legal language. 
 
Finally, this goes also hand in hand with James Boyd Whites suggestion that 
the notion of translation helps us to leave both the ‘culture of dynamism’ (as we 
have found it in many streams of IR theorizing) and the ‘culture of formalism’ 
(Koskenniemi’s romanticism) behind and that we should instead focus on a 
“culture of argument” when it comes to collective investigations of legal scholars 
with other disciplines.451As Wight explains one should think of law as a 
 
 “culture – as a ‘culture of argument’ – or, what is much the same thing, 
as a language, as a set of ways of making sense of things and acting in 
the world. So regarded, it is far more complex than the ‘law as rules’ (or 
‘law as rules plus principles’) theory can begin to allow and far more 
substantial in its effects, actual and potential, than the ‘law as facade’ 
theory would have it. The law is a set of ways of thinking and talking, 
which means, as Wittgenstein would tell us, a set of ways of acting in 
the world (and with each other) that has its own configurations and 
qualities, its own consequences. Its life is a life or art. This is, after all, 
how we learn law, not as a set of rules nor as the art of unmasking […] 
but by participation in a culture, learning its language and how to live 
within it; and this is how we practice law, too”.452 
 
As I will suggest in the next chapter, both critical international legal scholars such 
as Kennedy and Koskenniemi as well as radical constructivists such as Kratochwil 
                                                      
449 Kratochwil, 17. 
450 Onuf, ‘The Politics of Constructivism’, 239. 
451 White, Justice as Translation. Yet, White speaks instead of a ‘culture of dynamism’ of a ‘culture of 
instrumentalism’. Nevertheless, White’s use of a ‘culture of instrumentalism’ resembles 
Koskenniemi’s use of a ‘culture of dynamism’. 
452 White, xiii. 
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and Onuf can be read with all their differences as treating law as a ‘culture of 
argument’: this is the case in particular in their earlier publications as they 
attempted to reconstruct here how international legal argumentation works as 
well as in their more recent investigations where they focus, among other topics, 
on the world making capacities and politics of international legal experts and 
expertise. The focus on the politics of expertise might then also open up for a re-
description of the ‘international’ in terms of  ‘world society’.453 
 
 6. Conclusion: Jurisdiction and the Politics of Interdisciplinarity 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to reconstruct interdisciplinary projects between 
IR and IL as jurisdictional struggles between disciplines and fields of knowledge. 
Instead of fixing the concept of interdisciplinarity a priori and providing a 
stipulative definition of what interdisciplinarity is and/or should be – something 
that would encompass a logic of subsumption –, I suggested that a reconstruction of 
the grammar of interdisciplinarity projects might be more promising if we want to 
understand the dynamics and politics of interdisciplinarity – and the sometimes 
problematic relationship between the ‘sibling’ disciplines of IR and IL. 
Furthermore, by relying on this methodological approach I was able to 
demonstrate that different interdisciplinary projects between IR and IL come with 
different images of (international) law, are embedded in different 
conceptualisations of how the ‘international’ is structured, foreground different 
‘heroic figures’, connect law and politics in different ways and support different 
visions of interdisciplinarity (as disciplinary linking) itself.  
 
Rather then providing a reconstruction of every interdisciplinary project 
that occurred in the context of IR and IL, I focussed on a number of, in my view, 
important and emblematic moments and points of crystallisation of 
interdisciplinarity between both disciplines – sometimes uttered explicitly, 
sometimes conducted implicitely. As first project, I discussed a number of attempts 
                                                      
453 Kessler, ‘World Society’, 107. This resembles also Kratochwil’s suggestion that ‘sociology could 
perhaps provide a ’‘neutral’‘ meeting place for the interdisciplinary dialogue’, Kratochwil, 
‘International Law and International Sociology’, 314. For a similar point, i.e. to start 
interdisciplinarity from the idea that law is a certain form of argumentation (or practice), see 
Aalberts and Venzke, ‘Moving Beyond Interdisciplinary Turf Wars’. 
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by the University-of-Chicago-based scholars Frederick Schumann, Harold Lasswell 
and Quincy Wright during the Interbellum and how they tried to link IL and the 
(emerging) field of IR by invoking an external ‘third’, namely ‘social sciences’ or a 
‘New policy science’. This external third should then provide the point of 
orientation for more scientific endeavours within both disciplines. Moreover, the 
international was theorized in terms of ‘international organization’ where 
international law was seen as an important technical device to eliminate war. The 
heroic figure of this project was consequently the social and legal engineer 
working in and around the international institutions of Geneva. 
 
The second project revealed the (hidden) interdisciplinary dialogue, which 
started in the 1940s, between political realism in IR and legal positivism in IL. We 
can speak of an interdisciplinary dialogue as both streams were situated in the 
‘blind spot’ of the other: where IR’s realism began increasingly – mostly in order to 
create its own disciplinary turf – to eliminate its ties to the discipline of IL and 
topics related to international law (for example, by mobilising against ‘legalism’), 
the legal positivism IL, on the other hand, started to eliminate political 
considerations from the sphere of law in order to gain some ‘relative autonomy’. 
Yet, despite all their differences, these attempts share a common image of 
international law where international law is rather formalistic (‘law as rules’) and 
where international law is the outcome or epiphenomenon of politics – the 
struggle for power. This project remained – with regard of picturing the 
‘international’ – within the broader image of ‘international organization’. However, 
‘international organization’ is portrayed differently: it is not the ‘international 
organization’ of the interwar ‘move to (formal) institutions’ and its hope in the 
universal rationality of mankind (by means of education) but it is now the idea to 
rely on the institution of the balance of power and the prudence of those being in 
charge. As a consequence (at least for IR), the ‘heroic figure’ became the prudent 
statesman, the diplomat or the foreign policy officer of the great powers.  
 
 As a third project I turned to the recent wave of interdisciplinary 
scholarship – scholarship that explicitly uses the term ‘interdisciplinary’ – between 
mainstream scholars from IR and IL. Here, I focussed, on the one hand, on the 
liberal institutionalist ‘IL/IR’ research that emerged in the regimes debate and had 
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its peak in the literatures on the ‘legalization of world politics’ and the ‘legitimacy 
of global governance institutions’ as well as, on the other hand, on the moderate 
constructivist work on the ‘power of human rights’ and attempts to identify 
‘legitimacy’ as a distinctive, almost law-like, rationale of action. Although these 
mainstream projects claim to practice interdisciplinarity among equal partners, a 
second view revealed that these projects also carry a ‘hegemonic’ dimension. 
Furthermore, these projects foster a rather mechanistic logic of interdisciplinarity 
– as if it is possible to directly transfer or transplant the theory or findings from 
one discipline to another; interestingly, this mechanical understanding of 
interdisciplinarity is accompanied by a rather mechanistic logic of law (as well as 
norms and language) where rates of ‘compliance’ reveal whether something is 
legal or not. In this context the conceptualisation of the ‘international’ shifted from 
‘international organization’ to ‘global governance’. Although global governance 
scholars still recognize that the international is anarchic and mainly composed of 
states, the emergence of regimes and the diagnosis that legitimacy and law might 
matter, makes the international ‘tameable’ and introduces new actors and logics of 
‘governing beyond the state’. Here, our attention is directed to the role of 
‘transnational advocacy networks’, processes of ‘cross-fertilization’ between 
international and domestic courts, the power and authority of private actors such 
as multinational enterprises and rating agencies or the vast number of minor and 
major formal international organisations. As a consequence, the ‘heroic figures’ of 
this strand of research are, for example, the human rights activist, the judge or the 
bureaucrat in international organizations. 
 
Fourth, I reconstructed the way how critical legal scholars and radical 
constructivists challenge this recent wave of interdisciplinary ‘mainstream’ 
scholarship. While critical legal scholars pointed to the hierarchies, power 
relations, silences and blind spots of these projects by highlighting moments of 
‘colonization’, ‘conquer’ and ‘instrumentalisation’, radical constructivists mainly 
stressed the methodological, epistemological and ontological shortcomings of the 
‘mainstream’, e.g., how it treats ‘regimes’, ‘legalization’ or ‘norms’. Yet, this focus on 
‘mainstream’ projects of interdisciplinarity produced its own blind spots and 
created by introducing, for example, a ‘culture of formalism’ new forms of ‘hyper-
disciplinarity’ reifying even more existing disciplinary boundaries. In order to 
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crack these boundaries open, I suggested towards the end of the chapter that 
treating ‘interdisciplinarity as translation’ might be a promising avenue in order to 
start common research among more critical scholars in both disciplines and to 
engage in more reflexive forms of interdisciplinarity. As a caveat:  as promising 
treating interdisciplinarity as translation is, it will not provide us with a tool to 
solve paradoxes, to eliminate power relations and to shed light into blind spots but 
it will enhance our vocabulary to make paradoxes, power relations and blind spots 
visible, analysable and criticisable; moreover, it points to the necessity to begin 
common investigations not by starting with a certain theory or method but rather 
by reconstructing a substantive puzzle or problem. In line with this, the next 
chapter reconstructs how critical scholars from both disciplines started in the 
1980s to problematize the ‘presumption of anarchy’ – the foundation of images of 
the ‘international’ at that time – and how they turned to the ‘indeterminacy of 
international law’ by mobilizing different strands of the linguistic turn. I move 
then, towards the end of that chapter, to different avenues of advancing from the 
focus on the linguistic turn(s) to the social and historical precondition of 
(international) legal argumentation. 
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Figure 1 attempts to summarize by means of perspicuous representation 
the points I have made so far with regard to interdisciplinarity. As such it provides 
a map of the structure of the interdisciplinary argument between IR and IL.454 
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Figure 1. The structure of the interdisciplinary argument between IR and IL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
454 This kind of mapping is, of course, mainly influenced by David Kennedy. See in particular the 
map in Kennedy, ‘Tom Franck and the Manhattan School’, 402. 
 126 
Chapter 3: Constructivism, Critical Legal Studies and the Changing Contours 
of the Politics of International Law 
 
“Constructivism without international law is really unthinkable”455 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
More than three decades ago, in its spring volume of 1985, the Harvard 
International Law Journal published an article on the relationship of legal theory 
and ordinary language philosophy (the latter understood mainly as speech-act 
theory).456 The piece was written by Nicholas Onuf and had the rather long title ‘Do 
Rules Say What They Do? From Ordinary Language to International Law’. It was 
since then republished twice: as a key chapter (‘Law and Language’) in Onuf’s 
ground-breaking 1989-monograph World of Our Making and (sticking to its 
original title) in a collection of essays on International Legal Theory, which was 
published in 2006.457 I will come back, in more detail, to the content of the article 
later in this chapter. However, to look at the career of Onuf’s article is already 
interesting as it reveals at least three things. First, it shows how intimate the 
connection of constructivism and international law is. As it is widely known, Onuf 
introduced in World of Our Making the term ‘constructivism’ to the field of IR. 
However, it is less known that Onuf devoted most of his research in the first 
twenty years of his career to international legal theory.458 Second, although the 
paper remained in length, form, structure and content in principle without 
alteration, Onuf kept changing the headings of the section. While, for instance, in 
1985 the first section had the title ‘The Positivist Legal Tradition and International 
Law’, it was named ‘Positivism’ in 1989 and ‘Legal Positivism’ in 2006; the second 
section changed over time form ‘The Success and Failures of the Contemporary 
                                                      
455 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Bridge Crack’d: A Critical Look at Interdisciplinary Relations’, International 
Relations 23, no. 1 (2009): 121. 
456 Nicholas Onuf, ‘Do Rules Say What They Do? From Ordinary Language to International Law’, 
Harvard International Law Journal 26, no. 2 (1985): 385–410 (the volume included also 
contributions by Günter Frankenberg, David Kennedy, James Boyle - and Kenneth Abbott - all 
intending to pursue new path in international legal theory). 
457 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations  
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), chap. 2; Nicholas Onuf, International Legal 
Theory: Essays and Engagements, 1966-2006 (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), chap. 14. 
458 Onuf, International Legal Theory, xvi–xxiii. 
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Critique of Positivism’ (1985) to ‘The Limits of Legal Theory’ to ‘Indeterminacy’ 
(2006); and so on.459 In particular, the changes in the second section (which 
remained in length and content nearly unchanged) are telling as they reveal the 
shifting fashions of ‘critical’ scholars: from the critique of positivism to the project 
of indeterminacy. This brings me to the third point. Onuf does not only introduce a 
critique of the legal positivist mainstream in international legal theory but also 
introduces and connects the critique with the work of two authors: David Kennedy 
and Friedrich Kratochwil. As Onuf puts it in World of Our Making, both share a 
“postpositivist” position and “challenge positivist premises, as I [Nicholas Onuf] do 
here”.460 And, if Onuf would have published the piece only a couple of years later 
he would certainly have included Martti Koskenniemi as another key figure in the 
‘postpositivist’ movement.461 
 
 All of these authors – Onuf, Kratochwil, Kennedy and Koskenniemi – have in 
common that they attempted from early onwards to transform their respective 
disciplines in a rather self-conscious and ambitious way. We can see this already in 
the opening sentences of three, now seminal, monographs of this generation of 
scholarship, namely Onuf’s World of Our Making, Kratochwil’s Rules, Norms, and 
Decisions and Koskennemi’s From Apology to Utopia. All three books were 
published in 1989 (and some may say that these books were hardly read; never 
engaged with; yet often cited).462 For instance, Onuf writes in the very first 
paragraph of World of Our Making:  
                                                      
459 The remainder of the paper is structured into one (‘Performative Language’, 1989), two (‘Social 
Rules’ and ‘Speech acts, rules, and international law’, 2006) and three (‘From Philosophy of 
Language to Rules’, ‘Establishing a Speech Act Basis for Rules’ and ‘Speech Acts, Rules, and 
International Law’) sections. However, this is only on the first view a substantive change as a 
second view reveals that the text of the different versions is nearly identical. 
460 Onuf, World of Our Making, 76 However, it remains unclear whether he refers to ‘philosophical’, 
‘scientific’ or ‘legal’ positivism – or all together. 
461 See, for example, Onuf’s early review essay of From Apology to Utopia where he lists inter alia 
Kennedy, Kratochwil and Koskenniemi as representatives of the ‘postpositivist’ movement, 
Nicholas Onuf, ‘Review: From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument. By 
Martti Koskkenniemi’, American Journal of International Law 84, no. 3 (1990): 771; see also 
Nicholas Onuf, ‘The Constitution of International Society’, European Journal of International Law 5, 
no. 1 (1994): n. 5 and 10. For another early attempt to bring critical IL scholars (among others 
Kennedy and Koskenniemi) and radical IR constructivists (Kratochwil) together, see Anthony Carty, 
‘Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law’, European Journal of 
International Law 2, no. 1 (1991): 66–96. 
462 In my discussion below I will demonstrate that Kennedy shares the same commitment and 
similar tools to renew his discipline as Onuf, Kratochwil and Koskenniemi do. Yet in contrast to 
Onuf, Kratochwil and Koskenniemi, Kennedy had published his first ground-breaking book already 
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“The point of this book is to reconstruct a self-consciously organised 
field of study, or discipline, called International Relations. To do so 
necessarily involves reconsideration of international relations as 
something to study. I use the term ‘reconstruct’ deliberately, both 
because my goal is ambitious and because I am committed to a 
philosophical position […], which I call ‘constructivism’”.463 
 
Kratochwil pursues a similar avenue and defines the scope and aim of Rules, 
Norms, and Decisions in a highly ambitious way: 
 
“This book examines the role of norms in international life. To the 
extent that the focus is on interactions in the international arena, it is a 
book about international relations. To the extent that the investigation 
is interested in legal norms it is a book on legal theory. Insofar as issues 
of ‘interpretations,’ ‘precedent,’ and ‘sources of law’ will be discussed, it 
is in a way a treatise on jurisprudence. To the extent that rules and 
norms are viewed as means to maintain social order it is a book on 
social theory. Finally, to the extent that the analysis is occasioned by the 
re-reading of some of the classics of international law and political 
theory, it is – at least indirectly and without wanting to claim 
comprehensiveness or completeness – a study of political thought”.464 
 
And, finally, Koskenniemi exposes his endeavour at the beginning of his treatise 
From Apology to Utopia as follows: 
 
“This is not only a book in international law. It is also an exercise in 
social theory and in political philosophy. […] This does not mean that 
lawyers should become social theorists or political visionaries. But it 
does mean that without a better grasp of social theory and political 
                                                                                                                                                            
two years earlier, in 1987, David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
1987). 
463 Onuf, World of Our Making, 1. 
464 Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 1. 
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principles lawyers will continue to be trapped in the prison-house of 
irrelevance. They will continue to have one foot in crude pragmatism 
and the other in indeterminate theorizing without understanding the 
relations between the two and why taking a position in either will 
immediately seem vulnerable to apparent justifiable criticisms”.465 
 
These opening statements are not just, as I already noted, ambitious and self-
conscious. These opening statements identify also the need to incorporate the 
knowledge of other academic disciplines. In other words, all three authors (and the 
same holds true for Kennedy) point to the advantages of interdisciplinary research 
as it could help to escape the narrow confines of their own fields of study. In 
addition, they understand the need to cross disciplines in a similar way as all refer 
to the same set of disciplines from which they seek inspiration. These sources of 
inspiration are the various forms and repercussions of the linguistic turn in 
philosophy and social and political theory, namely its analytical as well as its 
hermeneutical version.466 This genuine interdisciplinary perspective was however 
never translated into larger common research projects between radical 
constructivists in IR and critical approaches in IL.467 As we have seen in the 
previous chapter both camps were mainly occupied with criticising the 
mainstream of their ‘own’ disciplines – and if they engaged with the ‘other’ 
discipline they turned again towards a critique of the mainstream of that discipline 
– a constellation that resulted sometimes even in calls for ‘counterdisciplinarity’.  
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to continue what I started in the last section 
of the previous chapter, i.e. to discuss the promises and possibilities but also the 
problems and perils of research on the ‘politics of international law’ that draws on 
both radical constructivism and critical international legal scholarship. In order to 
do so, the next two sections (2. and 3.) reconstruct roughly a number of key 
aspects of the projects of Onuf, Kratochwil, Kennedy and Koskenniemi. I will mainly 
                                                      
465 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument , 
reissue with a new epilogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1, 4. 
466 On the origins and different versions of the linguistic turn, see, for example, Jürgen Habermas, 
‘Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy. Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn?’, Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44 (1999): 413–41. 
467 For an exception see Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja Aalberts, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, eds., 
The Power of Legality: Practices of International Law and Their Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
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focus on their earlier writings and, in the case of Onuf and Kratochwil, on their 
legal writings. Moreover, and this is the core argument of this chapter, I will show 
that all four scholars took the ‘linguistic turn’, but they did so in different ways. 
This will help me to outline the basic characteristics and structure of critical work 
in both disciplines. However, I neither want to remain in 1985 nor in 1989 nor in 
2006 – the years of the (re)publication of Onuf’s essay. In order to move on, I will 
discuss in the conclusion of this chapter (4.) how different ways the ‘linguistic turn’ 
was taken opens up different social theoretical avenues to study the ‘politics of 
international law’. The aim of this chapter is thus not to elaborate a ‘joint 
discipline’ but rather, by highlighting similarities and differences, to develop a 
vocabulary that draws on different sources and is able to grasp recent 
developments of the ‘politics of international law’ and thereby prepare the 
discussion of the next chapter, which will be on the ‘politics of expertise’ in 
international law. 
 
 2. Radical Constructivism and International Law 
 
In my discussion of mainstream accounts of IR and global governance in the 
previous chapter, I introduced efforts of moderate constructivists to engage with 
international law and highlighted how these efforts are connected to various 
projects of IL scholarship. I turn now to the second camp of constructivism, namely 
its more radical version, and reconstruct how this type of constructivist research 
studies international law. The more radical version of constructivism is mainly 
represented by its ‘first generation’. Onuf and Kratochwil certainly stand out as 
main representatives of this generation. Only later, during the 1990s, 
constructivism developed its more moderate version (also known as ‘second 
generation constructivism’) – under the heavy pressure to become ‘scientific’ in a 
way the rationalist mainstream had defined it.468 In a nutshell, as outlined above 
moderate constructivism is, when it comes to international law, mainly interested 
in the study of norms and, here, in the question of compliance with norms (i.e., 
                                                      
468 On the ‘generations’ of constructivism and the promise of a ‘third generation’ taking up a similar 
postpositivist stance as the ‘first generation’ see the recent forum introduced by Oliver Kessler and 
Brent J. Steele, ‘Introduction: “Constructing IR: The Third Generation”’, European Review of 
International Studies 3, no. 3 (2016): 7–13. 
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norm diffusion, logics of actions, etc.). Yet, on the other hand, the more radical 
version argues that norms are counterfactually valid and – as a consequence – 
enterprises to measure the validity of norms by focussing on rates of compliance 
are about to fail. Instead, radical constructivists are concerned with the question of 
how law is used and how behaviour is justified through legal and law-like 
argumentation.469 In order to show what this exactly means I will reconstruct in 
the next two sub-sections the role of law in the work of constructivist’s ‘founding 
fathers’ and still prevailing representatives of the more radical version of 
constructivism, Onuf and Kratochwil.470 
 
2.1 Onuf 
 
We have already seen in the opening sentences of World of Our Making, which I 
quoted at the outset of this chapter, that Onuf connects his project of 
reconstructing IR with the analytical stance of constructivism. For Onuf, 
constructivism is the appropriate take for this endeavour as it offers, firstly, a 
vocabulary to challenge (disciplinary) foundations because for constructivism “the 
ground itself is the rubble of construction”.471 Yet, for Onuf this does not mean that 
constructivism does not claim that it presents an approach without foundations 
but it delivers a way to debunk foundations and reflect upon its own foundations. 
Secondly, constructivism is not restricted to IR and the study of its subject matter 
international relations as it “applies to all fields of social inquiry”.472 For Onuf 
constructivism is, in other words, “a way of studying social relations—any kind of 
                                                      
469 Filipe dos Reis and Oliver Kessler, ‘Constructivism and the Politics of International Law’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, ed. Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 345–346. More generally, the moderate and radical version of 
constructivism are usually delimitated by the question of whether they take the linguistic turn or 
not. While moderate constructivists stick to the idea that language objectively represents an 
accessible ‘world out there’, moderate constructivists believe that language is part of the social 
construction of our world and that our world is always accessed from somewhere, see Nicholas 
Onuf, ‘The Politics of Constructivism’, in Constructing International Relations: The next Generation, 
ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 246. See also Maja 
Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
470 Together with Oliver Kessler, I have done so in a slightly different way in dos Reis and Kessler, 
‘Constructivism and the Politics of International Law’, 354–359; see also Adriana Sinclair, 
International Relations Theory and International Law: A Critical Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), chap. 1. 
471 Onuf, World of Our Making, 35. 
472 Nicholas Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, in International Relations in a Constructed 
World, ed. Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 58. 
 132 
social relations”.473 However, it is “not a theory as such” as it “does not offer 
general explanations for what people do, why societies differ, how the world 
changes”.474 As constructivism is, in other words, not a first-order theory, it can be 
conceived as a meta-theory, which “makes it feasible to theorize about matters that 
seem to be unrelated because the concepts and propositions normally used to talk 
about such matters are also unrelated”. 475  As such, constructivism can be 
combined with a variety of substantive (i.e., first-order) theories. While Onuf 
admits that his own substantive position can be located in the tradition of a 
Kantian version of republicanism or, more recently, in Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
other constructivists labelled themselves, for instance, as ‘realist 
constructivists’.476 
 
To conduct the study of international relations as the study of social 
relations has far-reaching consequences as it directly challenges the ‘identity’ of IR 
– at least the ‘identity’ back in the times when constructivism emerged. It 
challenges the ‘identity’ of IR as it shows, according to Onuf, that international 
relations are composed of a plethora of rules. And if there  
 
“are rules—many rules, constituting and regulating the relations of 
states—then there must be a condition of rule. Or, to say the same 
thing, there can be no anarchy. To say this is to challenge IR’s very 
identity as the study of the dark side of politics”.477 
 
                                                      
473 Onuf, 58. 
474 Onuf, 58. 
475 Onuf, 58; The reason why Onuf elaborates constructivism in the context of IR, is for him a 
practical one as ‘international relations are the subject of this book only because I have thought 
more about them’, Onuf, World of Our Making, 27. 
476 On Onuf’s ‘Kantian sympathies’, see Onuf, ‘The Constitution of International Society’, 2; and on 
his ‘republicanism’, see Nicholas Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); and on Aristotelian virtue ethics, see Nicholas Onuf, ‘Thinking 
About Ethics, Thinking Across Fields’, E-International Relations (blog), 22 June 2016. For an 
example of ‘realist constructivism’ see: J. Samuel Barkin, ‘Realist Constructivism’, International 
Studies Review 5, no. 3 (2003): 325–42. Conceptualising constructivism as a meta-theory which can 
be linked to different more substantive theories has, of course, the consequence that the popular 
structure of literature reviews, which haunted so many journal articles and book reviews over the 
years, by introducing three IR theories (realism, liberalism, constructivism) turns into a category 
mistake. To avoid this, constructivism should rather be contrasted with, e.g., scientific positivism or 
critical realism. 
477 Nicholas Onuf, ‘Rule and Rules in International Relations’ (talk presented at the Erik Castrén 
Institute of International Law and Human Rights University of Helsinki, 24 April 2014). 
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Constructivism is, thus, a way of getting rid of IR’s foundation and its constituting 
puzzle, namely the ‘presumption of anarchy’:478 ”The incidence of anarchy is not 
the same as a condition of anarchy, that is, an absence of rule”.479 There might be 
no rule, but there are still rules. To get rid of the image of the ‘international’ as an 
anarchical condition without rules means also to get rid of the sharp boundary 
between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ – and the subsequent idea that both 
international and domestic politics constitute distinct modes of politics (on the one 
hand, the sate of nature; and, on the other hand, the state) with only loosely linked 
disciplines (on the one hand, Political Science; and, on the other hand, 
International Relations).480  
 
As we have seen, Onuf attempts to crack open the ‘anarchy presumption’ by 
introducing and theorizing the concept of rules. Indeed, rules are the heart of Onuf’s 
version of constructivism. And rules are also the connection to international legal 
theory.481 The centrality of rules in Onuf’s work becomes tangible when we take 
the following paragraph into account: 
 
“Constructivism holds that people make society, and society makes 
people. That is a continuous, two-way process. In order to study it, we 
must start in the middle, so to speak, because people and society, 
always having made each other are already there and just about to 
change. To make a virtue of necessity, we will start in the middle, 
                                                      
478 On the ‘presumption of anarchy’, see Onuf, World of Our Making, chap. 5; to contest anarchy as 
constitutive idea of international politics and thus as foundation for a distinct form of politics was 
the common theme of the early post-positivist movement in IR. In particular and among many 
others see Richard K. Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique’, Millennium 17, no. 2 (1988): 227–62. 
479 Onuf, World of Our Making, 167. 
480 ‘Current scholarship tends to view domestic societies as having progressively solved the 
problem of order by developing states, while international relations persists in anarchy. I take a 
contrary view, namely, that international relations was never a matter of anarchy, any more than 
domestic societies could have been’, Onuf, 164; The most powerful assessment of the 
domestic/international distinction is until now: R. B. J. Walker, Inside/outside: International 
Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
481 It is interesting to see that almost simultaneously, though independently, Thomas Franck 
developed his account of legitimacy in IL, which focuses exclusively on the rules and rule-based 
institutions of international law. Franck’s main concern was to uncover whether the rules of 
international law are obeyed because they are perceived as legitimate. This connects, of course, 
also to the moderate constructivist literature on legitimacy. See Thomas M. Franck, The Power of 
Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). See also my discussion in 
Chapter 2. 
 134 
between people and society, by introducing a third element, rules, that 
always links the other two elements together. Social rules (the term 
rules includes, but is not restricted to, legal rules) make the process by 
which people and society constitute each other continuous and 
reciprocal”.482 
 
This statement has important implications. As we have read, Onuf uses rules to 
connect people (as agents 483 ) with society (existing of institutions 484  and 
structure485). Onuf defines rules as “statements that tell people what we should 
do”.486 And, it was in the 1985-article, with which I started this chapter, where 
Onuf elaborated for the first time – and through an in-depth assessment of 
positivist (international) legal theory – his framework of rules. Although rules are 
a fundamental concept for legal positivists, the positivists’ treatment of rules is, 
according to Onuf, problematic as legal rules and legal order are linked to 
compliance where we are then confronted with the problem of circularity: that 
rules work make them legal – that rules are legal make them work – and so on. 
Another problem arises through the close connection of legal positivism and 
scientific positivism since the epistemic presupposition of scientific positivism pre-
selects what can be observed as law.487 What counts as fact determines the 
outcome, meaning that legal rules, which are not obeyed, and rules, which are 
obeyed but not traced to any legal authority, are out of sight (most legal theorists 
ignore this problem, although it is in international law particularly relevant as 
international law has no ‘hard core’ of law).488 In order to overcome the “failure of 
scientific positivism to provide itself with an adequate philosophical grounding”, 
                                                      
482 Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A Users Manual’, 59. 
483 ‘People are agents, but only to the extension that society, though its rules, makes it possible for 
us to participate in the many situations for which there are rules. [...] Agency is a social condition’, 
Onuf, 59–60. 
484 ‘Whether by accident or design, rules and related practices frequently form a stable (but never 
fixed) pattern suiting agents’ intentions. These patterns are institutions’, Onuf, 61 (emphasis in the 
original). 
485 ‘Any stable pattern of rules, institutions and unintended consequences gives society a structure, 
recognizable as such to any observer [...]. Agents are always observers’, Onuf, 61 (emphasis in the 
original). 
486 Onuf, 59 (emphases in the original). 
487 As a side note, this does not mean that legal positivism and scientific positivism are always 
linked as, for instance, H.L.A. Hart combined a postpositivist view on science, deeply rooted in 
ordinary language philsophy (in particular, the late Wittgenstein), with legal positivism. For further 
discussion see Horst Eckmann, Rechtspositivismus und sprachanalytische Philosophie: Der Begriff des 
Rechts in der Rechtstheorie H.L.A. Harts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1969), chap. 3. 
488 Onuf, ‘Do Rules Say What They Do?’, 386. 
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Onuf introduces ordinary language philosophy in order to get a better 
grounding.489 However, it is less the late Ludwig Wittgenstein’s version of ordinary 
language philosophy, which is mobilised by Onuf as it is rather speech-act theory 
in the tradition of John Langshaw Austin and, first and foremost, the 
reconstruction of Austin’s work by John Searle.490 As Onuf makes clear: 
 
 “Austin was the first to recognize the performative aspect of language 
for what it is. He and other Philosophers working in the ordinary 
language tradition were attracted to particular cases and not the 
general features of language use. Only with John Searle did 
consideration of speech acts locate itself in a codificatory paradigm. 
Searle’s starting point is both familiar and, for our purpose, 
appropriate. ‘Speaking a language is engaging in a (highly complex) 
rule-governed form of behavior’. Searle brought speech acts to the door 
of social theory”.491 
 
Onuf follows Searle so far as he adopts Searle’s ‘categorization’ or ‘typology’ (Onuf 
uses both terms in a generic way) of speech acts and, in a second step, directly 
links it to legal practices and, more importantly, to different types of rules.492 This 
categorization (and categories are understood in this context as Wittgensteinian 
“family resemblances”493) of rules is, in Onuf’s words: “universal”.494 
 
According to Onuf there are three categories of rules as “all rules are either 
assertives […] or directives […] or commissives. […]. In other words, with 
assertives, commissives, and directives, we have an inclusive typology of all 
rules”.495 Onuf operates with a number of “threes”.496 He distinguishes three 
                                                      
489 Onuf, 390. 
490 For a discussion of the relevance but also the limits of Wittgenstein, see Onuf, World of Our 
Making, 43–51. 
491 Onuf, 82 (references and footnotes omitted). 
492 For Searle’s typology of speech-acts see, in particular, John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning: 
Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
493 Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A Users Manual’, 70. 
494 Onuf, World of Our Making, 97–98. 
495 Onuf, ‘Do Rules Say What They Do?’, 401–402 (emphasis in the original). According to Searle, 
there are five types of speech acts, which are assertives (also known as constatives), directives, 
commissives, expressives and declarations. However, expressives and declarations are no rule 
candidates for Onuf. Expressives transmit a speaker’s attitude and emotions. They are no rule 
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different types of speech-acts. First, assertive (or constative) speech acts state a 
belief, coupled to the  wish or intention of a speaker that the hearer accepts this 
belief. Assertives are typically connected to verbs such as to ‘state’, ‘report’, 
‘characterize’, ‘affirm’, ‘insist’, ‘attribute’ or ‘dissent’. Assertive speech acts are 
translated into the practice of instruction-rules. In the context of directives, the 
second category of speech acts, the hearer is confronted with a speaker’s intention 
to act in a way which the speaker would like to have performed. Typical verbs for 
directives are to ‘ask’, ‘demand’, ‘command’, ‘permit’, forbid’ or ‘caution’.  This type 
of speech acts is visible in directive-rules. And finally, commissives reveal the 
speaker’s intention of being committed to a standard course of action. Here, to 
‘offer’ or ‘promise’ are the most typical verbs. Commitment-rules (also called 
conferrals) are the relevant rule type in this context.497Or, “[s]tated differently, all 
rules are either assertives of the form, I state that X counts as Y, or directives of the 
form, I state that X person (should, must, may) do Y, or commissives of the form, I 
state that I (can, will, should) do Y”.498 
 
 Onuf applies this tripartite categorisation of rules and speech acts to other 
areas as he also identifies three types social activity, three types of rule and three 
types of law (Figure 2).  
 
Rules Instruction-Rules Directive-Rules Commitment-Rules 
Speech-Acts Assertives Directives Commissives 
Social Activities Naming and 
Relating 
Enabling and 
Making Unable 
Having and Using 
Rule Hegemony Hierarchy Heteronomy 
Law Principles Formal Law Regulation 
Figure 2. Nicholas Onuf’s Typology of ‘Threes’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
candidate as they are only related to the speaker and are over when acknowledged by the hearer. 
Declarations, on the other hand, do not even need the acceptance of a hearer in order to be 
completed. 
496 On Onuf’s complex system of ‘threes’ see also the illustrative synoptic table at the end of Onuf, 
World of Our Making, 290–293. 
497 Onuf, ‘Do Rules Say What They Do?’, 400. 
498 Onuf, World of Our Making, 90. 
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While instruction-rules convey the social activity of naming and relating, directive-
rules enable activities or make them unable and, finally, commitment-rules are 
linked to the practices of having and using.499 When w e turn to the three different 
forms of rule this works in a similar way. For Onuf rules and rule are intertwined, 
as rules produce rule and rule produces rules: “By constituting condition of rule. 
Rules always distribute privilege, and always preferentially”.500If instruction-rules 
are dominant in a particular setting the form of rule is hegemony, in the case of 
directive-rules it is hierarchy and commitment-rules constitute heteronomy. 
According to Onuf, in the specific setting context international relations 
heteronomy is the dominant mode of rule. This observation helps Onuf to 
overcome the assumption that the ‘international’ is dominated by anarchic rule.501  
 
When it comes to law and legal theory instruction rules play out as principles 
as they help us to rank and choose between a number of instructions; directives 
are what legal positivists usually call law as they are formally stated and subject to 
enforcement; and we can find commitment-rules in regulation as they help to 
routinize.502 We can find all three types of law in the domestic as well as the 
international context. Consequently, the sharp distinction between international 
and the various forms of domestic law collapses. Where they differ, however, is the 
degree of institutionalization and formalization. As the international legal order is 
still less institutionalized and formalized as the domestic one, legal positivists (by 
focussing only on the directive-rule type of law) cannot grasp international law 
properly. In particular, they miss the role of regulation and principles as “law they 
are, whatever damage this does to the positivist conception of the proper legal 
order”.503 This brings Onuf to the conclusion “that the international legal order, 
although lacking a constitutional template for extrusion of legal rules, is very much 
a legal order”.504 
 
                                                      
499 Cf. Nicholas Onuf and V. Spike Peterson, ‘Human Rights from an International Regimes 
Perspective’, Journal of International Affairs 37, no. 2 (1984): 329–42. 
500 Onuf, World of Our Making, 128. 
501 See Onuf, chap. 6. 
502  Somewhere else, Onuf (together with V. Spike Peterson) links ‘norms’ to insructions, 
‘commands’ to directives as well as ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ to commissives: Onuf and Peterson, ‘Human 
Rights from an International Regimes Perspective’. However, Onuf does not follow this line later on. 
503 Onuf, World of Our Making, 407. 
504 Onuf, 410. 
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Yet, and this will be relevant in our discussion of international legal expertise, 
even if international legal positivists (and others) would be right that international 
law would not qualify as ‘proper law’, it would nevertheless matter. The reason for 
this can neither be found in law’s formal validity nor in rates of compliance but 
rather it is central to reconstruct the way lawyers structure international relations 
and to look hence at their capacity in world-making. As Onuf explains in a 
discussion of Lasswell’s theory of elites and their power in forming world opinion:  
 
“That international law is not properly law by legal positivist criteria is 
no bar to the justificatory role of lawyers in world politics, because the 
point is to identify rules authorizing an organized activity […] and to 
show that these rules are subject to enforcement. Recourse to such 
justifications, like diplomacy, is a peaceful means of – not alternative to 
– ‘attacking’”.505 
 
This means that international lawyers shape world politics as they are getting, 
even without sanctioning mechanisms, what they want “by directing others to act 
in certain ways, explaining the consequences of their failures to do so, and 
justifying the measures that may be taken to effectuate such directives”.506 
Consequently, lawyers and other international legal experts cannot be seen as a-
political actors as they always translate political projects into the vernacular(s) of 
law. In the next chapter I will turn in more detail to the role and relevance of 
international legal expertise (and the international lawyers’ profession), but let us 
first have a look now at the work of Kratochwil – the other ‘founding father’ of 
constructivism in IR. 
 
2.2 Kratochwil 
 
As it was the case for Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil’s points of departure are two 
puzzles directly connected to the ‘strange symbiosis’ between legal positivism and 
political realism. On the one hand, the legal positivist movement brings Kratochwil 
                                                      
505 Onuf, 252–253. 
506 Onuf, 243. 
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to the question whether international law is ‘proper’ law and, on the other hand, 
political realism introduces the question whether the ‘international’ is in its 
structure really anarchical.507 Although Onuf and Kratochwil start with the same 
set of questions, have a strong background in international legal theory and are 
considered of being the two ‘founding fathers’ of constructivism in IR (and the 
main representatives of the more radical strand), both also differ to some extent in 
the way they conceptualise constructivism and approach (international) law – and 
this has, as I will argue towards the end of this chapter, much to do with how they 
take the linguistic turn.508 For instance, where Onuf starts with rules, Kratochwil 
“examines the role of norms in international life”.509 Although this may resembles, 
prima facie, the moderate constructivist obsession in studying the evolution, 
spread, diffusion and, particularly, compliance of and with norms – I have 
discussed this in the preceding chapter in the context of the ‘power of human 
rights’ – Kratochwil approaches this question in a different way. We have seen 
Kratochwil’s scepticism towards such a treatment of norms in the previous 
chapter already, when I introduced his radical constructivist critique on the 
international regimes and legalization literature. The upshot of this critique was 
the rejection of a conceptualisation of norms as explanatory variables. As we have 
seen, one central point was that, as Kratochwil emphasises, norms are 
counterfactually valid. Furthermore norms do not cause behaviour in a causa 
efficience understanding of causality. Norms rather guide behaviour and help to 
                                                      
507 ‘I suspect that it is our reliance on the unquestioned dichotomy between a “domestic order” and 
the “international anarchy” which is to blame for the continuing theoretical embarrassments. By 
making social order dependent upon law and law, in turn, upon the existence of certain institutions 
- be they the exercise of sovereign or central sanctioning mechanisms - we understand the 
international arena largely negatively, i.e., in terms of the “lack” of binding legal norms, of central 
institutions, of sovereign will, etc. As inappropriate the “domestic analogy” may be for 
understanding international relations, the conceptual link between order, law, and special 
institutions remain largely unexamined even for domestic affairs’, Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and 
Decisions, 2 (emphasis in the original); see also Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Is International Law “Proper” 
Law? The Concept of Law in the Light of the “Legal” Nature of Prescriptions in the International 
Arena’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 69, no. 1 (1983): 13–46. 
508 Kratochwil has published extensively on international legal theory. Both of his monographs can 
be located at the intersection of international law and politics. See in particular Kratochwil, Rules, 
Norms, and Decisions, chap. 6, 7 + 8; and Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: 
Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). For an in-
depth discussion of the latter monograph see also the recent forum introduced by Oliver Kessler, 
‘Introduction to the Forum: The Status of Law in World Society’, Millennium 44, no. 2 (2016): 236–
41. 
509 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, 1. 
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justify behaviour. 510  In this context “interdisciplinary works, when guided 
successfully”, can help to overcome IR’s “treatment of norms [which] suffers from 
a variety of epistemology shortcomings”.511 At first sight legal theory seems to be 
the ‘natural’ source of inspiration when it comes to conduct the of study norms. 
However, mainstream approaches in legal theory – from positivism to process and 
policy – share the same shortcomings as the prevailing IR approaches, namely they 
sharply distinguish between the domestic and the international and emphasise 
that we should focus primarily on compliance when we examine the role of 
norms.512 
 
To overcome these shortcomings Kratochwil developed over the years what 
he had labelled in 1986 (together with Ruggie) as ‘interpretative epistemology’ 
into his own take on (radical) constructivism.513 Suffice is to say here that 
Kratochwil sees (similarly to Onuf) constructivism as a “meta-theory” and “neither 
a theory, nor even an approach to politics”. This does not mean, however, that as 
being a meta-theory constructivism is completely detached from substantive 
theories or from methods. Rather, methods, substantive theories and meta-theory 
are always linked and influence each other. They are linked by the core of 
constructivism, namely the assumption that “the things we perceive are rather the 
product of our conceptualisations”.514 Yet, these conceptualisations are not the 
product of the minds of individuals but “social phenomena” and, thus, 
constructivists point out “that social phenomena such as money or authority are 
not natural kinds but utterly conventional”. 515  In order to examine ‘social 
phenomena’ – law being one of them – and conventions properly, we should turn 
to intersubjectivity.516And in order to study intersubjectivity we should turn to 
                                                      
510 See again Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Organization: A State of 
the Art on an Art of the State’, International Organization 40, no. 4 (1986): 767–768. 
511 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, 1. 
512 Cf. Kratochwil, 2; and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘How Do Norms Matter?’, in The Role of Law in 
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law, ed. Michael Byers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 35–68. 
513 Kratochwil and Ruggie, ‘International Organization’, 772. For a comprehensive exposition of 
Kratochwil’s take on constructivism see Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Constructivism: What It Is (not) and 
How It Matters’, in Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, ed. 
Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 80–98. 
514 Kratochwil, ‘Constructivism’, 80–81. 
515 Kratochwil, 81. 
516 See the exposition of his ‘research program’ towards the end of Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and 
Decisions, 256–262. 
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language and the different versions of the linguistic turn.517 Here, Kratochwil’s 
treatment of law us helpful to understand what this means. 
  
As Kratochwil asserts at the outset of Rules, Norms, and Decisions, the 
“concept of law has become increasingly problematic”.518 He explains this later in 
the book when he states that 
 
“attempts at defining a demarcation between legal and other norms is 
bound to fail becauses [sic!] it fundamentally misconstrues the problem 
of arriving at a decision through the utilization of rules and norms. 
Although judges are bound by the ‘law’ it can be shown that not all 
‘legal’ rules are characterized by sanction, or form part of a deductive 
hierarchical system of norms. Consequently, legal rules and norms 
cannot be conceptualized as possessing one common characteristic, or 
by being treated merely as institutional rule”.519 
 
Why is this so? A quick look at different “images of law” reveals that a purely 
referential model of language that tries to fix our concept of law by finding a 
stipulative – trans-historically and cross-culturally valid – definition of some 
proprium of law by introducing a demarcation criterion (or criteria), which clearly 
distinguishes between law and non-law, cannot be successful.520 Rather, ‘law’, as it 
is the case with all of our concepts, is – whatever one prefers – “indeterminate”,  
“essentially contested” or has “blurred edges”.521We have seen already the 
‘untameable’ nature of concepts in our assessment of ‘interdisciplinarity’ in the 
preceding chapter. In order to leave the idea behind that concepts have one 
common characteristic, Kratochwil follows the later Wittgenstein and his notion of 
                                                      
517 Cf. Sinclair, International Relations Theory and International Law, 19–21. While speech-act 
theory (as for Onuf) plays an important role in Kratochwil’s account, it is however the late-
Wittgenstein who had the strongest influence. 
518 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, 2. 
519 Kratochwil, 186. 
520 On different ‘images of law’ see Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 1–7. 
521 For an at-large discussion of (different forms of) indeterminacy see Kratochwil, ‘How Do Norms 
Matter?’, 43–51. The idea of ‘essentially contested concepts’ was developed by W. B. Gallie, 
‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167–98; and was 
introduced to the study of politics by William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). The formulation ‘blurred edges’ is Wittgenstein’s, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), para. 71. 
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‘family resemblances’. Wittgenstein illustrates the meaning of ‘family resemblance’ 
by introducing the notion ‘game’: 
 
“Consider for example the proceeding that we call ‘games’: I mean 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What 
is common to them all?—Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, 
or they  would not be called ‘games’”—but look and see whether there is 
anything common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole 
series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! […] I can think of 
no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family 
resemblances’, for the various resemblances between members of a 
family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. 
overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: ‘games’ form 
a family”.522 
 
To follow the suggestion that the concept of law can better be understood in terms 
of ‘family resemblances’ – and these family resemblances being part of a larger 
‘language game’ – means also that it becomes necessary to reconstruct the use of 
law in different contexts in order to understand its meaning.523 That there is no 
proprium or common category in order to determine what the law is does not 
mean, however, that the notion of law is completely arbitrary as it is still “possible 
to spell out some criteria that in our society are part of the language game of 
law”.524 When we start to follow this methodological route, we would start to 
understand ‘law’ 
 
“neither as a static system of norms nor as a set of rules which share 
some common characteristic such as sanctions; in the same vein as it is 
[…] mistaken to depict law simply as a process in which claims and 
counterclaims are made. Rather law is a choice-process characterized 
by the principled nature of norm-use in arriving at a decision through 
                                                      
522 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 66–67 (emphases in the original). Cf. Kratochwil, 
The Status of Law in World Society, 53–54. 
523 The idea that meaning is use not reference, was of course famously stated by Wittgenstein: ‘the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language’, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 43. 
524 Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 65 (emphasis in the original). 
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reasoning. What the law is cannot therefore be decided by a quick look 
at statutes, treaties, or codes (although their importance is thereby not 
diminished), but can only be ascertained through the performance of 
rule-application to a controversy and the appraisal of reasons offered in 
defense of a decision”.525 
 
Moreover, to reconstruct law as ‘norm-use’ or ‘performance of rule-application’ 
locates law within the realm of “praxis rather than ‘theory’”526 and encourages 
Kratochwil to focus on legal argumentation as a specific form of practical 
reasoning.527 This means that practical reasoning per se is not legal as, for instance, 
rights-based reasoning or reasoning about moral issues also constitute widespread 
forms of practical reasoning. Law is, thus, in other (more Luhmannian) words a 
“system of communication possessing a logic of its own”.528 As such, legal 
communication plays an important role in structuring our society as it gives 
participants information “about the nature of the game”, as Kratochwil writes, “by 
determining the type of actors who can make claims, it sets the range of 
permissible goals the actors can pursue, specifies the steps necessary to insure the 
validity of their acts and assigns priority and weight to different claims”.529 
 
However, to examine what – in ‘our society’ (as a site note: Kratochwil 
never specifies what he means by this term)530 – makes practical reasoning legal, 
i.e. turns it into legal argumentation, requires a couple success conditions. These 
success conditions play a vital part in Kratochwil’s reconstruction of 
(international) law. While Kratochwil focused in Rules, Norms and Decisions 
primarily on classical rhetoric (particularly, in the Aristotelian tradition), he 
further extended his reconstruction of the ‘path of the legal argument’ since then. 
In Rules, Norms and Decisions Kratochwil carves out how law as a specific “‘style’ of 
                                                      
525 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, 18 (emphasis in the original). The second part of the 
quote remained unchanged in Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 65–66. 
526  Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Legal Theory and International Law’, in Routledge Handbook of 
International Law, ed. David Armstrong (London: Routledge, 2009), 56. 
527 Cf. Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 65. 
528  Kratochwil, ‘Legal Theory and International Law’, 65; similarly, Friedrich Kratochwil, 
‘Thrasymachos Revisited: On the Relevance of Norms and the Study of Law for International 
Relations’, Journal of International Affairs 37, no. 2 (1984): 350. 
529 Kratochwil, ‘Thrasymachos Revisited’, 350. 
530 See also the discussion of Kratochwil and the boundary of law, in Wouter Werner, ‘What’s Going 
On? Reflections on Kratochwil’s Concept of Law’, Millennium 44, no. 2 (2016): 258–68. 
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reasoning” works. 531  Three points are important here. First, Kratochwil 
distinguishes legal reasoning from other forms of practical reasoning, in particular, 
moral reasoning. As such legal reasoning works (a) less through principles (as it is 
the case of moral reasoning) but mainly through rules, which provide, for instance, 
strict deadlines for decisions. Legal arguments can rely (b) in different ways on 
intention (ranging from a narrow conception in criminal law in terms of mens rea 
to its neglect in cases of strict liability), while particularly in Kantian ethics 
intention is crucial. (c) Legal ‘truth’ and moral ‘truth’ can differ as it may occur in 
legal settings, for example, that certain proofs are excluded due to procedural 
rules. As such, “[r]eference to legally relevant tests and documents limits the 
search for the factual delineation of a controversy considerably”. As legal 
proceedings are (d) “characterized by the need to come to a final decision”, legal 
decision-makers cannot refuse to take a decision because “each party ‘has a point’”. 
In moral settings, however, certain dilemmas do not need to be decided.532 This 
focus on decision-making is also relevant for the second point, namely that the 
structure of legal decision-making relies usually on third party settlement 
procedures. While in two party settlement procedures the decision in a conflict 
between two parties is taken by the two parties (examples are bargaining and 
diplomacy), third party settlement procedures work by invoking official rule-
handlers (like judges or arbitrators) in order to decide cases between two 
opposing parties. These rule-handlers are authorized to take binding decisions and 
to delimitate what the law is. As law is not the only context where third party 
decision-making is important (other examples include theology and magic but 
would not count as ‘law’), it is the specific structure of legal communication that 
determines on who can be a legal decision maker and who not. Furthermore, legal 
decisions are binding and can be overruled only by decisions of other ‘higher’ legal 
bodies.533 Third, legal reasoning is for Kratochwil closely connected to certain 
rhetorical features.534 In this regard topoi (or commonplaces) stand out as they 
                                                      
531 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, 205. 
532 Kratochwil, 207. 
533 In contrast to third-party settlement, first-party settlement is the prevailing mode of decision-
making through a hegemon in international relations and bargaining is it for second-party 
settlement, Kratochwil, 181–187; see also Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 65–66. 
534 The rhetorical tradition is important for Kratochwil as it is the link to praxis: ‘Rhetoric is 
concerned with the problem of praxis, i.e., with gaining adherence to an alternative in a situation in 
which no logically compelling solution is possible but a choice cannot be avoided’, Kratochwil, 
Rules, Norms, and Decisions, 210. 
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work as “seats of arguments”.535 As such, topoi do “not only establish ‘starting 
points’, but locate the issue of a debate in a substantive set of common 
understandings that provides for the crucial connections within the structure of 
the argument”.536Furthermore, typification, the creation of sub-types (through 
further distinction) and the introduction of analogies are prominent rhetorical 
features of legal reasoning. In particular, analogies are important as they “establish 
similarities among different cases or objects in face of (striking) dissimilarities. 
The similarity established thereby concerns a (partial) equality among the 
compared objects or phenomena in regard to a relevant aspect”.537 
 
Since the publication of Rules, Norms, and Decision, Kratochwil further 
developed his approach of the reconstruction of (international) law. Most notably 
two additions stand out, which are linked to what Wittgenstein described as ‘form 
of life’.538 First, Kratochwil increasingly emphasized the “historical and sociological 
background conditions” of what constitutes law as distinct ‘form of life’.539 This 
does not mean, however, that students of legal reasoning need to know everything 
about law’s history or the entire social background conditions. If we take, for 
instance, law’s history it is not necessary in order to understand how lawyers think 
to know the “past per se […], but it is the past that is ‘present’”.540 In other words, 
students of international legal argumentation have to turn to Butterfield’s ‘Whig 
interpretation’ of the history of (international) law and how lawyers construct 
their own history and tradition.541 Examining legal history in this way brings to the 
fore “that law is always part of a political project that connects the present via the 
past to a future ‘utopia’” and, as Kratochwil continues, ”one of the primary means 
of making sense in individual and collective life”.542 Second, to perceive law as a 
‘form of life’ leads us to the observation that we have to reconstruct how it is ‘to 
                                                      
535 Kratochwil, 214. 
536 Kratochwil, 219. 
537 Kratochwil, 223; For a recent discussion of the relevance of analogies in legal reasoning see also 
Angela Condello, ‘Metaphor as Analogy: Reproduction and Production of Legal Concepts’, Journal of 
Law and Society 43, no. 1 (2016): 8–26. 
538 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 241. 
539 Kratochwil, ‘Legal Theory and International Law’, 56. 
540 Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 68–69. 
541 On Butterfield’s ‘Whig interpretation of history’ see my discussion in the introduction of the 
previous chapter and Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York: Norton, 
1965), chap. 1. 
542 Kratochwil, ‘Legal Theory and International Law’, 56. 
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think as a lawyer’. To ‘think as a lawyer’ resembles the ‘learning of a language’: 
“Learning such a language and speaking about the world in such a way means to 
participate in a practice, a shared form of life, as Wittgenstein has called it”.543 This 
indicates that we have to better understand how the background conditions of law 
and, for instance, study how lawyers are trained as “what goes on is more a 
‘knowing how’ than just a ‘knowing what’ (namely, the rules)”.544In other words, 
what is gaining weight in Kratochwil’s work is an interest in the role of the lawyer 
and other forms of legal expertise. 
 
 3. Critical Legal Studies and International Law 
 
I claimed towards the end of the preceding chapter as well as at the beginning of 
the present one that radical constructivists in IR have much in common – share 
many ‘family resemblances’ – with proponents of critical legal thinking in IL. In 
order to substantiate this point, I will examine in this section some of the basic 
assumptions of, probably, the two most influential critical scholars in the field of 
IL, David Kennedy (3.1) and Martti Koskenniemi (3.2). I will, in particular, focus on 
their earlier writings. 545  Together with the reconstruction of radical 
constructivism and its take on international law, it will help me to lay out the 
foundations for the next section and its discussion of the various forms the 
linguistic turn was taken by critical scholars. 
  
3.1 Kennedy 
 
At least in the United States, David Kennedy is probably the most important 
“founding figure” of critical thinking in IL.546 His approach developed in close 
connection to the broader Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which had his 
                                                      
543 Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 67. 
544 Kratochwil, 67. 
545 For a comprehensive overview, which includes more topics, see B. S. Chimni, International Law 
and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), chap. 5. 
546 Akbar Rasulov lists four ‘founding figures’ to critical approaches in IL: Philip Allott, Anthony 
Carty, Martti Koskenniemi and David Kennedy, see Akbar Rasulov, ‘New Approaches to 
International Law: Images of a Genealogy’, in New Approaches to International Law: The European 
and the American Experiences, ed. José María Beneyto and David Kennedy (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2012), 160. 
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main hub at Harvard Law School.547 While, during the 1970s and 1980s, the CLS 
movement was mainly concerned with strands of domestic law such as 
employment law, law of contract and constitutional law, its focus started to shift 
during the 1980s gradually towards comparative law analysis and, above all, 
international law.548 Since then, critical legal thinking increased rapidly in IL and 
should soon not be limited anymore to Harvard as it disseminated in particular to 
Europe and Australia. In the years that followed critical approaches in IL became 
also known as ‘New Approaches to International Law’ (short: ‘NAIL’) or, in 
opposition to the discipline’s ‘mainstream’, as ‘Newstream’ (sometimes also ‘New 
Stream’).549  Although the NAIL/Newstream was declared dead by its main 
representatives in the meantime, it has been an important starting and focal point 
as well as umbrella term for many critical projects that still play a central role in 
IL.550 In all these twists and turns Kennedy has been a central figure.  
 
At the beginning of his career in the early 1980s, Kennedy attested “that 
international legal scholarship is in crisis” as the field is having more and more 
problems in order to handle the increasing complexities resulting from an “ever 
broader spectrum of players, ideologies and subject matters”. 551 For him, the 
feeling and experience of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘indeterminacy’ seemed to be all 
around. Like Onuf and Kratochwil in the case of IR, Kennedy tries to overcome the 
‘crisis’ of the discipline of IL by incorporating ideas from other disciplines and 
connecting these ideas then to the study of the international legal discourse. 
                                                      
547 As an overview, see for example Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement: Another Time, a Greater Task (London: Verso, 2015); and Günter Frankenberg, 
‘Partisanen Der Rechtskritik: Critical Legal Studies Etc.’, in Neue Theorien Des Rechts, ed. Sonja 
Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2009), 
93–111. 
548 Cf. Frankenberg, ‘Critical Legal Studies Etc.’, 98. 
549 For original statements and overviews from within the movement, see David Kennedy, ‘A New 
Stream of International Law Scholarship’, Wisconsin International Law Journal 7, no. 1 (1988): 1–
49; Carty, ‘Critical International Law’; and David Kennedy and Chris Tennant, ‘New Approaches to 
International Law: A Bibliography’, Harvard International Law Journal 35, no. 2 (1994): 417–60; see 
also the assessments by Deborah Z. Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in 
International Law’, Nordic Journal of International Law 65, no. 3 (1996): 341–83; and Rasulov, ‘New 
Approaches to International Law’. 
550 On the end of NAIL, see David Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box’, New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 32, no. 2 (2000): 489–500; and Thomas 
Skouteris, ‘Fin de NAIL: New Approaches to International Law and Its Impact on Contemporary 
International Legal Scholarship’, Leiden Journal of International Law 10, no. 3 (1997): 415–20. 
551 David Kennedy, ‘Theses about International Law Discourse’, German Yearbook of International 
Law 23 (1980): 356. 
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Furthermore, similar to the two ‘founding fathers’ of constructivism, Kennedy 
conceives international law as a form of argumentation and rhetorics. However, 
while the main (yet not only) source of inspiration for Onuf and Kratochwil was 
the analytic (and in the Anglosphere predominant) strand of the linguistic turn 
(with Searle for Onuf and Wittgenstein for Kratochwil), Kennedy draws more on 
the work of the CLS movement (mainly, Duncan Kennedy) and, when it comes to 
influences from outside of legal scholarship, on Continental thinkers ranging from 
Critical Theory to Semiotics and from Structuralism to Post-Structuralism.552 In 
line with these influences, Kennedy is less interested in ‘solving’ the crisis of the 
discipline of IL in the traditional way, i.e. to present a solution for its renewal, but 
claims that the international legal argument cannot be stabilized, as every attempt 
for renewal was always the site for a new attempt of renewal – and this will not 
change. Projects of renewal are so complicated as “the discipline’s routine efforts 
to renew itself had reinforced rather than eliminated blindness and bias”.553 
Consequently, instead of searching for new techniques to stabilize the 
international legal discourse, scholars following a more critical line of inquiry 
should, according to Kennedy, start to debunk the “characteristic blind spots and 
biases”.554 Such a project should “dislodge” and “displace” the prevailing accounts 
of international law and help “to begin the project of redrawing the discipline”.555 
More generally, Kennedy also termed this project the project of “critical 
performativity”.556Let me illustrate by pointing to three intertwined strategies how 
this project works.  
 
 First, Kennedy devotes a considerable part of his research to the history and 
historiography of international law. “The discipline of public international law has 
a keenly developed sense of history”, Kennedy observes and he continues to state: 
“much of the field’s theoretical and doctrinal debate is conducted as a debate about 
                                                      
552 Kennedy is often quite opaque when it comes to his theoretical sources. However, a 
comprehensive overview of his main influences can be found in David Kennedy, ‘Critical Theory, 
Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship’, New England Law Review 21, no. 2 (1985): 
209–89; see also Kennedy, ‘Theses about International Law Discourse’, n. 4. 
553 Kennedy, ‘Thinking Against the Box’, 459. 
554 David Kennedy, ‘The Disciplines of International Law and Policy’, Leiden Journal of International 
Law 12, no. 1 (1999): 9; see also Kennedy, ‘Thinking Against the Box’, 459. 
555 Kennedy, ‘A New Stream of International Law Scholarship’, 6, 7 and 11. 
556 Kennedy, ‘Thinking Against the Box’, 457. 
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history”.557 However, international legal scholars use history usually for two 
purposes. On the one hand, history helps to develop a narrative of IL as “a single 
story of international law’s progressive development”;558 on the other hand, it 
connects past, present and future in a particular way as it helps “constantly 
remembering a stable origin, foreshadowing a substantive resolution, but living in 
a procedural present”. 559  Kennedy attempts, however, to problematize this 
prevailing use of history in IL. On the one hand, he tries to show that the 
discipline’s stable origin is not as stable as the ‘mainstream’ (makes us to) 
believe(s); on the other hand, he insists that the history of international law is a 
history full of ruptures and, consequently, not as stable and linear as usually 
presented. By studying the history and historiography of IL in this way, Kennedy 
also addresses what Kratochwil demanded (as we have seen in the previous 
discussion) for the history of international law, i.e. to reconstruct the ‘Whig 
history’ of the field and to uncover how lawyers construct their own history and 
tradition. In other words, Kennedy engages here in some kind of second-order or 
postmodern analysis of international law, i.e. he scrutinizes the modern(istic) 
historiography in his own field. 
 
A good illustration of this approach is Kennedy’s lengthy piece on “Primitive 
Legal Scholarship” where he reconstructs the work of and on Francisco Vitoria, 
Francisco Suárez, Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius.560 According to Kennedy the 
era of ‘primitivism’ (pre-1648) precedes the traditional (1648-1900) and modern 
(1900-1980) period of international law. Modern mainstream historians of 
international law usually give little attention to this period and if they pay 
attention they use it for their purpose. For instance, Kennedy shows how both 
James Scott and Arthur Nussbaum make use of the ‘primitive’ period in their 
modern historiographies of international law – Nussbaum for the purpose of his 
legal positivist position while Scott from a naturalist point of view.561 What these 
                                                      
557 Kennedy, ‘A New Stream of International Law Scholarship’, 12. 
558 Kennedy, 13. 
559 Kennedy, 2. 
560 David Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’, Harvard International Law Journal 27, no. 1 
(1986): 1–98; important analysis of different periods of international law are also David Kennedy, 
‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’, Quinnipiac Law Review 17, 
no. 1 (1997): 99–136; and, for the first half of the twentieth century, David Kennedy, ‘The Move to 
Institutions’, Cardozo Law Review 8, no. 5 (1987): 841–988. 
561 Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’, 12. 
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histories have in common, however, is the idea that the work of the  ‘primitives’ 
was “immature and incomplete” (for instance, as they did not distinguish between 
divine and non-divine law or between municipal and international law) and that 
only the events of 1648 and linked to this the Treaty of Westphalia brought the 
‘stable origin’ to international law, which also constituted – as the story goes – the 
beginning of the modern system of states.562Likewise, modern accounts need the 
primitives to construct their history of progress as they can tell, for example, the 
story of the exclusion of religious arguments from (international) life and politics 
and link international law to the emergence of modern statecraft. In short, this 
helps to forge a “continuous discipline of international law”.563 Yet, Kennedy claims 
in opposition to these readings that “primitive international legal scholarship is 
unique, special, coherent and complete”.564 This is the case as writers such as 
Vitoria, Suárez, Gentili and Grotius were concerned with other problems and 
puzzles as traditional or modern international legal scholars, as they addressed, 
e.g., the question of authority in the Age of Discovery or the Reformation Era. To 
reconstruct the work of Vitoria, Suárez, Gentili and Grotius in this way has far-
reaching consequences for today’s self-image of IL as the “coherence of the 
primitive parodies our eclectic confidence, so the diversity of primitive texts 
mocks the pretenses of our progress”.565 
 
 As a second strategy, Kennedy follows a specific style of writing. As 
Kennedy explains, the “strategy is to violate as many stylistic conventions as 
possible” while at the same time not to overstretch and “still in some way to be 
recognizable” as a “legal topic”.566 The aim is thus to scrutinize, stretch and redraw 
the boundaries of the discipline – in the end of what is legal and what not. It is thus 
not a style of rupture. We can find this strategy for instance in publications, in 
which Kennedy reconstruct his work outside of academia as a legal practitioner. 
The main examples are Kennedy’s work on humanitarian as well as military and 
                                                      
562 Kennedy, 2. 
563 Kennedy, 10–13. 
564 Kennedy, 95. 
565 Kennedy, 96. 
566  David Kennedy, ‘Spring Break’, in Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in 
Interdisciplinarity, ed. Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, and David J. Sylvan 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 422. 
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development expertise.567 In this context “[w]riting in the first person, avoiding 
footnotes, describing experiences and discussing sexuality” are ways to confuse 
the audience.568 
 
We witness this strategy also in Kennedy’s reconstructions of post-Second 
World War scholarship in IL. These reconstructions are often written in the first 
person, very personal and avoid lengthy footnotes – with the latter being maybe 
the most confusing, as lengthy footnotes seem to be the main characteristic of the 
style of legal writings in North American academia. These articles are often 
keynote speeches, which remained in their written version nearly unchanged and 
unedited to the spoken word.569To write about international law in this way makes 
international law, as Deborah Cass points out, a “personal quest”.570 Cass further 
describes this as follows: 
 
“The personal quest device allows the writer to evoke a mood of 
disillusionment about international law which repeats a prominent 
substantive theme of work. The personal narrative style and the 
emphasis on the everyday behaviour of people brings the discipline to 
life stressing the human agency involved in its creation. The ironic, 
sometimes aggrandizing and shocking tone of the work highlights the 
melancholic conclusion of the personal voyage, and the objective nature 
of the law-making process is further undermined. Ultimately the 
continual representation of law as driven by two opposing forces 
idealism and realism, heightens the dramatic possibilities of the search 
for a resuscitated international law”.571 
 
                                                      
567 Cf. Kennedy, ‘Spring Break’; David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); David Kennedy, Of War and Law 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, 
Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
568 Kennedy, ‘Spring Break’, 422. 
569 Good examples are Kennedy, ‘Thinking Against the Box’, 457–500; and David Kennedy, ‘Tom 
Franck and the Manhattan School’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 35, 
no. 2 (2003): 397–435. 
570 Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream’, 369. 
571 Cass, 369. 
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To make international law – outside and inside the academic world (as well 
as between the academic and non-academic) – a personal quest links also to 
Kennedy’s concept of international law. For Kennedy, international law is neither a 
process nor a system of rules. Instead, international law is “a series of professional 
performances”. 572  International law consists of “arguments and counter-
arguments, rhetorical performances and counter-performances, deployed by 
people pursuing projects of different kind”.573 
 
Third, Kennedy studies international law as rhetorics and (we will see the 
same below in Koskenniemi’s project) makes ample use of what he calls earlier in 
his career “binaries”  and (in more Marxist terms) “fundamental contradictions”574 
and, later, “structured argumentative oppositions”.575Deborah Cass speaks of 
“doubles”. 576  Kennedy’s vantage point here is the indeterminacy debate 
international law.577 Kennedy argues in this context that every legal question is 
constructed around different ‘doubles’ like sovereignty and international 
community, dualism and monism, autonomous law and law as politics, positivism 
and naturalism, and so on.578 These ‘binaries’ are at each level “two mutually 
exclusive possibilities which never exist without each other”.579 They are exclusive, 
as they seem to cover all possible positions when it comes to argue about a certain 
topic. Every position carries, in other words, its own opposite or contradiction. 
These different positions can be tied up into different projects. However, this does, 
on the one hand, not open the door too full arbitrariness, as it does not mean that 
at a certain period of time everything can be combined with everything. “Skilled 
theorists”, Kennedy assures, “can move easily among these positions” and they 
“are simultaneously those whose arguments seem hardest to challenge and those 
who experience the most comprehensive inclusiveness when speaking with one 
                                                      
572 Kennedy, ‘Thinking Against the Box’, 337. 
573 Kennedy, A World of Struggle, 269; similarly, David Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and Warfare’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law, ed. James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 173. 
574 Kennedy, ‘Theses about International Law Discourse’, 361–367. In this context Kennedy’s main 
source of inspiration is Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries’, Buffalo 
Law Review 28 (1979): 211–222. 
575 Kennedy, ‘Thinking Against the Box’, 457. 
576 Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream’, 362–365. 
577 Kennedy, ‘Theses about International Law Discourse’, 359. 
578 For a list of different ‘doubles’ in different contexts, see Kennedy, ‘Thinking Against the Box’, 
348–365. 
579 Kennedy, ‘Theses about International Law Discourse’, 364. 
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another”.580 On the other hand, this helps Kennedy to describe transformation. 
Although the basic oppositions (like sovereignty/international community or 
naturalism/positivism) remain stable they can move between different levels (e.g., 
sovereignty tied to positivism can move to sovereignty tied to naturalism).581 This 
explains also that international law is fluid, unstable and indeterminate, as it 
cannot serve as a technique to solve ethical and political questions. The 
observation of the binary and transformational nature of the international legal 
argument has fundamental consequences as it shows how “fluid” and 
“interminable” the international legal discourse is. Kennedy describes this 
elegantly in the last paragraph of his first monograph International Legal 
Structures:  
 
“Once […] social difficulties have been transformed into rhetorical 
alternatives, alternatives which invoke social choice in only the most 
hyperbolic fashion. The field of rhetorical maneuver, for all its structure 
and repetition, seems able to extend itself to infinity. To a certain extent 
this results from what seems to be the fluidity and logical 
indeterminacy of the rhetorical frameworks characteristic of each 
discourse. To a certain extent it results from the numerous ways in 
which a set of accommodative balances and temperings of one rhetoric 
by another can produce a feeling of closure and determinacy. To a 
certain extent it results from the patterns of repetition and mutual 
referral which run through the public international law system. And I 
suppose it is also a matter of accident and luck. But the interminability 
of international law seems the subtle secret of its success”.582 
                                                      
580 Kennedy, 363. 
581 Kennedy illustrates it in the following way: ‘Consider argument strictly about the ideals of 
domestic particularism and international solidarity (X/Y). Consider two other ideal oppositions: 
free will/ communal will (A/B), and independence-authority/ equality-mutual respect (C/D). Free 
will seems associated with particularism, as does independence-authority. Communal will seems 
associated with solidarity, as does equality respect. It seems that the same principle separates each 
polarity. Symbolically (X like A like C) opposed to (Y like B like D). Yet sometimes the poles seem 
contradictory and sometimes they seem compatible. Particularism and solidarity, like free will and 
communal will seem opposed. But independence-authority seems compatible with equality-
respect. Without mutual respect there can be no independence. Absolutely independent entities 
must be equal. Independence seems to foreclose a hierarchy. In other words Y opposes Y and A 
opposes B but C is compatible with D. The contradiction of X opposes Y or A opposes B can be 
mediated by moving to C is compatible with D’, Kennedy, 365. 
582 Kennedy, International Legal Structures, 294. 
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Moreover, the fluidity and indeterminacy of the international legal discourse has as 
one important consequence that international law cannot serve as a means or 
technique to solve ethical and political questions – in particular, if ‘solving’ means 
to dissolve them by providing an end to the debate by implementing a stable 
foundation and means of fixation. Rather international law is in itself the site of 
struggles between different ethical and political projects. As we will see below, 
Kennedy connects this approach of studying the structure of the legal argument in 
his more recent research to the social underpinnings of these struggles and here 
particularly to the way legal experts and expertise structure the international.  
 
3.2 Koskenniemi 
 
Even though Martti Koskenniemi’s career is mainly situated in the European 
context, his work shares many similarities with Kennedy’s. As Kennedy describes 
their early projects retrospectively, both were “engaged in a multi-year scholarly 
project on a really crazy scale --- to rewrite the entire history and all the doctrines 
of international law in a new way, in a single unified intellectual framework”.583 
Hence, Koskenniemi shares with Kennedy a strong interest in the history and 
historiography of international law. Yet, while both examine the early history of 
the field in a similar way, they practice some kind of division of labour when it 
comes to more recent developments.  As we have seen, Kennedy main focuses in 
this regard on the transformations of the field in the United States since the Second 
World War. Koskenniemi, on the other hand, reconstructs rather the European 
tradition and – as we have seen in the discussion on interdisciplinarity and 
counterdisciplinarity in the previous chapter – ends with its fading out in the US 
academia.584 Moreover, Koskenniemi shares from time to time Kennedy’s textual 
                                                      
583 David Kennedy, ‘The Last Treatise: Project and Person (Reflections on Martti Koskenniemi’s 
from Apology to Utopia)’, German Law Journal 7, no. 12 (2006): 984. 
584 This is, of course, the topic of his powerful monograph Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer 
of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). Koskenniemi published also on the historiography of international law. These studies 
are conducted as in the case of Kennedy from a second-order perspective (i.e. they scrutinize how 
the discipline’s historians write their histories), see, for example, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘A History of 
International Law Histories’, in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, ed. Bardo 
Fassbender et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 943–71; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Histories 
of International Law: Significance and Problems for a Critical View’, Temple International and 
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strategy of undermining the prevailing writing style of law journals.585 Likewise he 
is mainly concerned with analysing the forms and dynamics of the argumentative 
structure of the international legal discourse. In the remainder of this sub-section I 
will primarily focus on this last aspect of Koskenniemi’s work. By focussing on this, 
i.e. the way Koskenniemi depicts the argumentative structure of IL, I will be able to 
some major differences. 
 
 Koskenniemi’s interest in the structure of international legal argumentation 
is closely connected to his seminal study From Apology to Utopia, first published in 
1989, and the related journal article The Politics of International Law, released one 
year later and being the opening article in the back then newly established 
European Journal of International Law.586  The vantage point in these early 
publications – but it should be a recurring thread running through Koskenniemi’s 
entire work – is an unease with what he calls “the liberal theory of politics”.587 
According to Koskenniemi all modern international lawyers stick to this general 
sensibility at least to some extent. This sensibility is articulated in the legal 
discourse, for instance, in a (formalist) mainstream focusing on the formal 
application of law – something that is leaving political and sociological questions 
aside. Such a concept of law (in its most extreme version in the form of ‘legalism’) 
attempts to eliminate politics from law and to establish a hierarchy where law, if 
used in an appropriate way, trumps politics.588 Koskenniemi contrasts this ‘liberal 
theory of politics’ and argues, instead, that law and politics are inseparable. Yet, 
Koskenniemi does not follow the realist framework here where politics trumps 
law and where politics remains external to law.589 Instead, Koskenniemi uses 
(similarly to Kennedy) an internal perspective and conceptualises politics and law 
                                                                                                                                                            
Comparative Law Journal 27, no. 2 (2013): 215–40; and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Expanding Histories 
of International Law’, American Journal of Legal History 56, no. 1 (2016): 104–12. 
585 The main example is Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the Editors of the Symposium’, American 
Journal of International Law 93, no. 2 (1999): 351–61; see also Koskenniemi’s comment on the use 
of footnotes in Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 15. 
586 The book, originally published in 1989, was re-issued in 2005. The 2005-edition includes a long 
epilogue where Koskenniemi addresses major questions and critiques regarding the first edition, 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, 
European Journal of International Law 1, no. 1 (1990): 4–32. 
587 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 5 (emphasis in the original). 
588 Koskenniemi speaks of ‘the liberal impulse to escape politics’, Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of  
International Law’, 6. 
589 The most prominent example of the external position in international thought is the work of 
Morgenthau. On this, see my discussion in Chapter 2. 
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as intertwined and inseparable when he speaks of the ‘politics of international 
law’: international law operates, on the one hand, “as a (vocabulary for) politics”. 
590 Yet, on the other hand, Koskenniemi emphasises the way international law 
constitutes the international and structures international politics. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, Koskenniemi argues thus to overcome a conceptualisation of 
law and politics as two separated spheres – the way a ‘liberal theory of politics’ 
would do – and, instead, to see them as intertwined.  
 
 As a consequence, Koskenniemi’s work is as an intervention into the 
discipline of IL as it foregrounds the politics involved in international legal 
argumentation (and, thus, argues that lawyers cannot escape politics). It is, among 
other things, in this very explicit treatment of ‘the political’ where Koskenniemi’s 
project differs from the one of Kenned. Yet, the background operation and, thus, 
the reason why international law and politics are intertwined is a similar one. It is 
the idea that the international legal discourse itself is interminable and 
indeterminate. To substantiate this point, Koskenniemi draws as Kennedy on 
Continental philosophical work, yet more in the tradition of French structuralism 
and in this regard mostly on the work of Ferdinand the Saussure.591 These 
influences help Koskenniemi to reconstruct the structure – or as he also calls it: the 
‘grammar’ – of international legal argumentation.592 According to Koskenniemi, 
international legal argumentation does not derive its indeterminacy from the 
indeterminacy of norms and concepts – as if norms and concepts would have a 
stable and determinate core and only indeterminate edges – but is a “structural 
property of the international legal language itself”.593 And, as it constitutes a 
structural property, it is not possible to eliminate indeterminacy from 
international legal discourse. The reason why international law is indeterminate 
                                                      
590 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Preface’, in The Politics of International Law, ed. Martti Koskenniemi 
(Oxford: Hart, 2011), v (emphases in the original). 
591 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 6–14. 
592 It is interesting to note how the notion of ‘grammar’ seems to shift within Koskenniemi’s work. 
While the notion derives in his early attempts from Saussure’s structuralism it seems to be in his 
later self-interpretation stronger related to what the late-Wittgenstein understood as ‘grammar’. 
However, it is a rather structuralist reading of Wittgenstein. See Koskenniemi, 566–573. For a 
recent restatement of structuralism as main influence see: Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What Is Critical 
Research in International Law? Celebrating Structuralism’, Leiden Journal of International Law 29, 
no. 3 (2016): 727–35. 
593 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 62. 
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are the “contradictory assumptions” of international law itself.594 As it was the case 
for Kennedy, Koskenniemi deconstructs international law by focussing on the 
examination of ‘doubles’ or ‘binaries’. However, where Kennedy identified several 
initially unrelated doubles, which can then be assembled in different ways, 
Koskenniemi argues that everything is reducible to one binary – the binary of 
‘normativity’ and ‘concreteness’ – and that all other binaries are only 
manifestations of this fundamental binary. For instance, arguments about 
concreteness usually play out in the language of consent, autonomy, process and as 
apology for state practice; on the other side, arguments about normativity play out 
in the language of justice, community, rule and as utopia beyond state practice.595 
Simultaneously, the binary of normativity and concreteness links also back to the 
liberal theory of politics as – “[a]t a deeper level” – the liberal  theory assumes that, 
on the one hand, “legal standards emerge from the legal subjects themselves” (i.e., 
they are concrete) while, on the other hand, “once created, social order will 
become binding on these same individuals” (i.e., they are normative).596 This helps 
Koskenniemi also to distinguish legal arguments from political or moral 
arguments: while, on the one hand, political argumentation has always to appear 
as concrete and, on the other hand, moral argumentation always as normative, 
legal argumentation in turn has to appear as both, normative and concrete, at the 
same time. Put differently, if we follow Koskenniemi, international law is rooted on 
the paradox that it has to be normative and concrete at the same time. This is 
however not a problem but its condition of possibility.597 And, it is the power of the 
‘liberal theory of politics’ that it is able to make its own roots invisible. The task for 
the critical international lawyer is now to excavate the ‘deep structure’ of 
international legal argumentation.598 
 
 Furthermore, the double normativity/concreteness is not stable and open 
to transformation. As we have seen above, Kennedy argued that it is the ‘jump’ 
from one binary to another, which is responsible for shifts in international legal 
                                                      
594 Koskenniemi, 62. 
595 Cf. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, 8. 
596 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 21. 
597 See on this point also: Oliver Kessler, ‘Toward a Sociology of the International? International 
Relations between Anarchy and World Society’, International Political Sociology 3, no. 1 (2009): 
102. 
598 Koskenniemi, ‘What Is Critical Research in International Law?’, 727. 
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argumentation. Yet, as Koskenniemi conceptualises the structure of the 
international legal argument as consisting of one fundamental and stable binary 
(normativity/concreteness) with different manifestation, he has to introduce the 
dynamics and transformations of international legal argumentation in a slightly 
different way. “The dynamics of international legal argumentation are provided”, 
Koskenniemi explains,  
 
“by the constant effort of lawyers to show that their law is either 
concrete or normative and their becoming thus vulnerable to the 
charge that such law is in fact political because apologist or utopian. 
Different doctrinal and practical controversies turn on transformations 
of this dilemma. […] This provides an argumentative structure which is 
capable of providing valid criticism of each substantive position but 
which itself cannot justify any”.599 
 
It is thus the possibility of permanent critique, which makes international law 
fluid. This observation has in turn at least three important consequences.  
 
First, international law’s “argumentative structure is there only to avoid 
openly political rhetoric. But alone, it leads nowhere but into the constant 
opposition, dissociation and association of points about concreteness and 
normativity of the law. There is no end to this”. This means also, that international 
law is not a “non-political way of dealing with international disputes”. 600Every 
political position can be articulated within the language of international law by 
emphasising either its normativity or concreteness – or both. Put differently, 
international law does not provide us with an algorithm to decide political 
questions. 
 
 Second, Koskenniemi turns the focus of his research increasingly to the 
work and life of international lawyers. According to Koskenniemi, this is necessary 
                                                      
599 Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, 8. 
600 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 68–69. 
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as “[i]nternational Law is what international lawyers do and how they think”.601 In 
this regard, Koskenniemi produced a couple of studies, which reconstructed the 
intellectual biographies of international lawyers. Most notably is probably the 
work on Hersch Lauterpacht.602  Furthermore, the double of normativity and 
concreteness translates, as Koskenniemi observers, in the everyday life and work of 
lawyers into a choice between commitment and cynicism – between utopian 
commitment and apologist cynicism. As Koskenniemi shows, we can find the 
tension between commitment and cynicism in all the working areas and in all the 
roles of international legal experts – ranging from judges to advisers and from 
activists to academics.603 
 
 Third, Koskenniemi is increasingly concerned with the question of what 
makes an international lawyer a good or, how he frames it, “competent” 
international lawyer.604  In this context, the following comprehensive definition of 
international law is indicative as it also includes many themes already discussed 
above. It helps me thus to summarize Koskenniemi’s concept of international law 
and prepare the discussion of expertise in the next chapter: 
 
“International Law is an argumentative practice. It is about persuading 
target audiences such as courts, colleagues, politicians, and readers of 
legal texts about the legal correctness—lawfulness, legitimacy, justice, 
permissibility, validity, etc—of the position one defends. What passes 
for method, in other words, has to do with what counts as persuasive 
arguments in international law. Key to persuasiveness is that the 
argument is recognizable as a good legal argument and not, for 
example, a strong moral point, a plausible political position, or a 
                                                      
601 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline of a Theory of International 
Law as Practice’, in Collection of Essays by Legal Advisers of States, Legal Advisers of International 
Organizations and Practitioners in the Field of International Law (New York: United Nations, 1999), 
523. 
602 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law’, European Journal 
of International Law 8, no. 2 (1997): 215–63; republished with some changes in Koskenniemi, The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations, chap. 5; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht (1897-1960)’, in Jurists 
Uprooted: German-Speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-Century Britain, ed. Jack Beatson and 
Reinhard Zimmermann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 601–62; and Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law’, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 2, no. 3 (2004): 810–25. 
603 See in particular Koskenniemi, ‘Between Commitment and Cynicism’. 
604 On competence see the discussion in Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 567–572. 
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convincing sociological description of something […]. Anyone may, of 
course, operate the binary code of legal/illegal that constitutes the stuff 
of international legal arguments. But it is the consensus in the 
profession—the invisible college of international lawyers—that 
determines, at any moment, whether a particular argument is or is not 
persuasive. This does not mean that it would be impossible to outline 
criteria by which professional audiences typically recognize arguments 
as legally persuasive. The methodology of international law is best seen 
as being about criteria that legal arguments ought typically to fulfil in 
different contexts—including the academic context—in order to seem 
plausible. These criteria may be grouped into two: normativity and 
concreteness. A persuasive argument is one that appears both 
normative and concrete”.605 
 
 4. Conclusion: From the Linguistic Turn(s) to the Historical and Social 
Preconditions of International Legal Argumentation 
 
To recapitulate, the previous discussion of the four projects of Onuf, Kratochwil, 
Kennedy and Koskenniemi revealed that radical constructivism and critical 
approaches to international law share many similarities. Although the vantage 
point may seem different due to the different disciplinary traditions and (resulting 
from this) cognitive interests – as the initial puzzle for Onuf and Kratochwil was 
the presumption of anarchy while for Kennedy and Koskenniemi it was the 
question of indeterminacy – all four authors claim that the crises in their 
respective disciplines were caused by (a certain strand of) liberal political theory. 
Likewise all four authors attempt to overcome these crises by introducing the 
various strands of the linguistic turn – Onuf and Kratochwil more the 
postanalytical, Kennedy and Koskenniemi more the hermeneutical version – to 
their fields: they highlight legal ‘argumentation’, speak of the ‘rhetoric’, ‘grammar’ 
and ‘practice’ of international law and study law as ‘language’. This helps Onuf  and 
                                                      
605 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Methodology of International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) (emphases in the original); the point that the 
success of an argument is not (only) about the speakers intention but is in the end (also) 
determined by the audience is, of course, originally John L. Austin’s, see John L. Austin, How to Do 
Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
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Kratochwil to show that the ‘international’ is structured by rules and norms, which 
in turn are only accessible by relying on an interpretative methodology; and it 
helps Kennedy and Koskenniemi to make a virtue out of necessity as they show 
that, although international law cannot eliminate indeterminacy, to study it as 
language can make one’s own biases and blind spots visible and helps then to 
move on from a critical standpoint. However, if we frame it in this way, the 
disciplinary boundaries between both disciplines are still quite firm: on the one 
hand, was the problem with the presumption of anarchy and the way of tackling it 
was a recourse to postanalytic philosophy (Onuf and Kratochwil); on the other 
hand, stands the puzzle of indeterminacy and the solution (a solution, which does 
not solve but helps to move on) was found in hermeneutics (Kennedy and 
Koskenniemi).  
 
Yet, as I would like to point out in the remainder of this chapter, there is 
another way of dealing with the different ways the linguistic turn was taken by 
Onuf, Kennedy, Koskenniemi and Kratochwil. This is so, as to distinguish between 
a postanalytical and a hermeneutic version is not the only way to map the 
linguistic turn. As philosopher Sybille Krämer convincingly proposes in her 
alternative “‘logical geography’ of 20th century language theory” it is also possible 
to distinguish between a ‘performance model’ and a ‘two worlds model’ of 
language.606 As we will see Kennedy and Kratochwil rather belong to the first 
camp, while Koskenniemi and Onuf to the second one. As Krämer introduces it, the 
‘two worlds model’ of language is characterized by an ontological division of 
speech (speaking) and language. Language is behind speech; speech becomes a 
patter in the actualisation of language.607 This produces a hierarchical relationship 
where language is superior to speech.  Representatives of the ‘two world model’ 
are, according to Krämer, for example, Saussure, Chomsky, Searle and 
Habermas.608 As Krämer continues, typical for these authors is for example that 
they recognise “grammatical or pragmatic universals in which everything that can 
                                                      
606 Sybille Krämer, ‘Is There a Language “Behind” Speaking? How to Look at 20th Century Language 
Theory in an Alternative Way’, in Language and World, Part Two: Signs, Minds and Actions, ed. 
Volker Munz, Klaus Puhl, and Joseph Wang (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2013), 39; for a more comprehensive 
version of her argument: Sybille Krämer, Sprache, Sprechakt, Kommunikation: Sprachtheoretische 
Positionen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001). 
607 This can be read as another form of modernity’s distinction between reason and thought. 
608 Krämer, Sprache, Sprechakt, Kommunikation, 10. 
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be refereed to as ‘language’ or ‘speech’ takes part”; that language is “invisible” 
behind speech as a “deep structure”, which “has to first be made accessible”; that 
proponents of this model refer to rules as to “explain language and communication 
means to describe the rules we obey when we speak”; that in turn these “rules  
specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for linguistic and communicative 
creativity”; and, that therefore the focus lies on the “competence” to speak a 
certain language.609 We have seen such an understanding of the relationship of 
language and speech in the accounts of Onuf and Koskenniemi. For instance, Onuf 
largely followed Searle’s strategy in reconstructing a typology of types of rules 
(instruction-rules, directive-rules, and commitment-rules), which are actualised in 
speech acts, social activities, forms of rule and different types of law; typology is, as 
Onuf claims, ‘universal’.610 Koskenniemi in turn mainly took the Saussurean route 
in order to find the ‘deep structure’ of international legal argumentation, which 
plays out in the underlying root dichotomy of normativity and concreteness. 611  
Other binaries become in Koskenniemi’s take then only actualisations of 
normativity and conreteness. Furthermore, Koskenniemi emphasises that 
someone becomes a lawyer when he or she ‘competent’ in speaking that language, 
i.e., using the underlying ‘grammar’ in the right way.612 
 
The ‘two level model’ of language was, as Krämer explains, criticised and 
rejected by a number of authors such as the later Wittgenstein, Austin, Luhmann, 
Lacan, Davidson, Derrida and Buttler. What these authors have in common is that 
they turn from a ‘two world model’ to a ‘performance model’ of language. This 
means that the ontologically sharp boundary between speech and language 
collapses. There is no ‘behind’ anymore and the focus shifts to the ‘use’ and 
‘performance’ of language.613 Speaking with Derrida, language is not the anchor of 
logos (reason, etc.) anymore. Here, for example, a Wittgensteinan approach, which 
mainly informs Kratochwil’s work, would emphasise that “language games do not 
lie behind or on top of each other, but side by side. There are no universal patterns 
                                                      
609 Krämer, ‘Is There a Language “Behind” Speaking?’, 39–42. 
610 For Searle’s original statement see, for example: Searle, Expression and Meaning. 
611 For Saussure’s original statement see: Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
612 The idea to link ‘language’ to ‘grammar’ and ‘grammar’ to ‘competence’ goes back to Noam 
Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965). 
613 See Krämer, Sprache, Sprechakt, Kommunikation, 12–13. 
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and forms upon which individual cases are based”. 614  Or, Kennedy’s 
poststructuralist understanding of ‘binaries’, in particular the way binaries move 
and transform but where still ‘renewal repeats’, replaces a structuralist argument 
of ‘deep structures’ by foregrounding, if we use a Derridian vernacular, that there 
“is no ‘pure’ signifying system because every actual signifying event is a trace of a 
past signifying event, which it both repeats as transforms”.615 Let me briefly 
illustrate by means of two examples the difference between both models. Firstly, 
for both Saussure and Wittgenstein, as also Koskenniemi and Kratochwil, the term 
‘grammar’ plays a central role. Yet, while, on the one hand, for Saussure grammar 
refers to the underlying structure of language (langue) and where speaking 
(parole) is an actualisation of this grammar, Wittgenstein’s approach is, on the 
other hand, “essentially unsystematic”.616 As a consequence, an analysis of the 
grammar allows for Wittgenstein only for a ‘perspicuous representation’ 
(übersichtliche Darstellung), which is in the end ‘only’ the translation from one 
language game to another. Secondly, to distinguish between the two models has 
also interesting implications for the way we conceptualise ‘practices’ and the 
‘practice turn’, which swapped recently to both IR and IL. The question is here, 
whether there is, for instance, tacit knowledge (in the sense of unformulated 
language) ‘behind’ practices or not. An approach taking the ‘two worlds model’ 
assumes the former. Yet, from a ‘performance model’ point of view “[t]heorizing or 
describing a practice is best conceived as a translation from one social practice to 
another. Thus, formulability can only be comprehended as relationship between 
two practices, not as a general characteristic of a practice”.617 Here, the question of 
whether there is something behind practices resolves into a Scheinproblem. 
 
Though by way of summarizing, what is also interesting to see, when we 
map the way Onuf, Kennedy, Koskenniemi and Kratochwil take the linguistic turn 
along the line of whether they pursue a ‘performance’ or ‘two world model’ of 
language, is that this line does not follow the boundary between the disciplines. 
What I do not claim here is that one of these different ways of dealing with the 
                                                      
614 Krämer, ‘Is There a Language “Behind” Speaking?’, 45. 
615 Krämer, 47 (emphasis in the original). 
616 Marie McGinn, The Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 30. 
617  Mattias Wahlström, ‘Unformulable Practices? Articulating Practical Understanding in 
Sociological Theory’, Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 13 (2006): 121. 
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linguistic turn is better than the other. I also do not claim that these different ways 
of dealing with it are incompatible and mutually exclusive per se. All of them are 
perfect examples of a logic of reconstruction. Yet, by means of mapping them in 
this way it is possible to see where important differences and similarities are and 
by doing so making ‘translation’ between these positions possible – yet, without 
attempting to create some monolithic synthesis of some kind of a ‘joint discipline’ 
of critical approaches. Even though I am following in this thesis rather the 
‘performance model’ of language as exemplified in this chapter by Kratochwil and 
Kennedy,618 I will nevertheless come back repeatedly to arguments, which are 
derived from or come closer to the way Onuf and Koskenniemi conceive the 
linguistic turn. Different problems need different analytical vocabularies. 
 
 While I mapped towards the end of this chapter how the different scholarly 
projects of Onuf, Kratochwil, Kennedy and Koskenniemi study the politics of 
international law from a language point of view, recent scholarship increasingly 
developed two additional themes, namely a focus on the social and historical 
underpinnings of international legal argumentation. This does in turn not mean that 
these new interest abandon the linguistic turn as the way the history or the social 
is always informed by our understanding of language.619 In the next chapter 
(Chapter 4) I will introduce scholarship on the ‘politics of expertise’ in 
international law, which contributes to the question of the social underpinnings of 
the politics of international law. Chapter 5 provides then a comprehensive 
historical reconstruction of the concept of jurisdiction and attempts thereby to 
contribute to the recent ‘turn to history’ among critical scholars in both disciplines. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
618 Kennedy and Kratochwil are, of course, not the only critical scholars in the intersection of IL and 
IR, who follow this model. Anne Orford’s ‘praise of description’, which I introduced in Chapter 1, is 
another example: Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, Leiden Journal of International Law 25, no. 
3 (2012): 609–25. 
619 Yet, it might be more implicit and less explicit as in the, what Koskenniemi recently called, ‘over-
theoretical 1980s’, when Kennedy, Koskenniemi, Kratochwil and Onuf published their ground-
breaking monographs, Koskenniemi, ‘What Is Critical Research in International Law?’, 727. 
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Chapter 4: The Politics of Expertise and Technicalities in International Law 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
The politics of international law, as international politics in general, is increasingly 
a politics of expertise. In order to substantiate this point let me introduce this 
chapter with a couple of examples. Examples abound: 
 
• The marginalization of human rights within the setting of the World Bank can 
be explained as a result of a “clash of expertise” – a clash between human 
rights oriented lawyers and economists that was decided in favour of the latter 
as the lawyers usually had to ‘translate’ their positions into the language(s) of 
economics – and not vice versa. However, and this was the ‘problem’ for the 
human rights oriented lawyers, the structure of the economic argument and 
the “organizational culture” of the World Bank are not designed to give human 
rights claims a very prominent position. At the utmost, rights are ‘translated’ 
into the instrumental-consequentialist language of Law and Economics – being 
more about law through economics than law and economics – where rights 
become ‘economised’ in terms of prices but are surely not ‘legalized’ in terms 
of entitlements.620 
 
• In the context of European integration, we can see how a ‘turn to law’, legal 
managerialism, fragmentation, translation and expertise work hand-in-hand. 
As R. Daniel Kelemen notes in a study of the legal culture of European 
integration, the European Union does have a “special touch of its own, which 
we might call ‘the juris touch.’ It seems that nearly everything the European 
Union touches turns into law”.621 Above all, this becomes visible in a general 
turn to the “language of rights” as more and more policies are framed in terms 
of rights – with economic rights being the driving force of economic 
                                                      
620 Galit A. Sarfaty, ‘Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human 
Rights at the World Bank’, American Journal of International Law 103 (2009): 647–83. 
621 R. Daniel Kelemen, Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European 
Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 19. 
 167 
liberalization.622 The language of rights is particularly effective as “framing 
legal norms as rights has distinct advantages for promoting deeper integration 
and greater legitimacy”.623 At the same time, European integration produces 
vertical – between the EU and its member states – and hierarchical – within the 
bodies of the EU, namely between the Council, the Parliament, the Commission 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – forms of fragmentation.624 Taken 
together these distinct processes generate a deep transformation within the 
‘legal field’ of Europe, which Kelemen assembles under the label 
“Eurolegalism”.625 While the traditional or ‘Old European’ (i.e., Continental 
European) model of law is based on the authority of the legal science – what 
Bourdieu termed ‘law of the professors’ with legal academics at the top of the 
legal pyramid –, ‘Eurolegalism’ rests on the other hand substantially on the 
(Anglo-)American model with its focus on litigation; and where law firms are 
the dominant actors in the legal field.626 The main articulation of the latter 
approach to law is what Robert A. Kagan has dubbed “adversarial legalism” 
and which he describes as 
 
“policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means 
of lawyer-dominated litigation. Adversarial legalism can be distinguished 
from other methods of governance and dispute resolution that rely 
instead on bureaucratic administration, or on discretionary judgment by 
experts or political authorities, or on the judge-dominated style of 
litigation”.627 
 
However, as Kelemen convincingly suggests, we should rather conceptualise 
the relationship between ‘Eurolegalism’ and ‘adversarial legalism’ as 
‘translation’ (my words) than as a direct “transfer, or ‘transplant,’ of legal 
                                                      
622 Kelemen, 45–52. 
623 Kelemen, 51. 
624 Kelemen, 24. 
625 Kelemen, 8. 
626 Cf. David M. Trubek et al., ‘Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization 
of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transitional Arenas’, Case Western Reserve Law Review 44, no. 2 
(1994): 421–426; see also my discussion above on Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a 
Sociology of the Juridical Field’, Hastings Law Journal 38 (1986): 805–53. 
627 Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 3. 
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norms and practices from one country to another” and connect both through 
Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance”.628 In the end, however, it was 
the turn to the specific ‘form of life’ of ‘Eurolegalism’ that facilitated and 
perpetuated many austerity measures within the Eurozone as it helped to 
‘normalize’ the economic ‘state of exception’ of the ‘Eurozone crisis’ by framing 
genuine political questions in the a-political vocabulary of legal 
managerialism.629 
 
• We can also observe fundamental transformations in the context of the law of 
force – and, here, in both the ius ad bellum as well as in the ius in bello. As 
David Kennedy highlights, 
 
“Warfare has become a legal institution. At the same time, as law has 
increasingly become the vocabulary for international politics and 
diplomacy, it has become the rhetoric through which we debate—and 
assert—the boundaries of warfare, and insist upon the distinction 
between war and peace or civilian and combatant”.630 
 
Given this observation, an increasing number of conflicts is today not only 
decided on the battlefield but also conducted between different communities 
of international legal expertise, in particular between humanitarian and 
military professionals. On the one side, as Kennedy describes it, stands a 
“cadre of humanitarian policy experts” which would advocate “the world’s 
general interest in peace” – an interest and desire which would “be designed, 
built, mandated and managed by law” and where the “world of rules, of 
procedures, of wise conflict management would, should, sneak up on war, 
infiltrate the military, overwhelm the evil statesman, and make war a matter of 
the past. We would regulate swords into ploughshares”.631 On the other side, 
                                                      
628 Kelemen, Eurolegalism, 38, 37. 
629 R. Daniel Kelemen, ‘Law, Fiscal Federalism, and Austerity’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
22, no. 2 (2015): 379–400; see also my discussion in Filipe dos Reis, ‘Law, Politics and State(s) of 
Emergency’, New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and 
International Relations 25, no. 2 (2017): 136–41. 
630 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 5. 
631 Kennedy, 30–31. 
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there are the military professionals, which also “have desires for law”; 632 these 
desires for law, are however different and rest in the often-unnoticed “war-
generative functions of law”. Law organises, for instance, the whole logistics of 
war, from the buying and selling of weapons to the recruitment of soldiers; it 
helps to discipline troops and make divisions on the battlefield; it draws a 
boundary between “the military and civilian political and commercial elites in 
war”; and, most importantly, it assures that “killing is authorized and 
legitimate”.633 Soldiers are authorized to kill because there exists law and not 
in spite of it. The conflicts between humanitarian and military legal experts are 
usually staged in the often highly technical legal languages of self-defence, 
proportionality or necessity. 634  In line with this general development, 
observers and participants came to the conclusion that it might be adequate  
to speak in the context of war not only of warfare but also to introduce the 
term ‘lawfare’.635  
 
• Closely linked to the issue of lawfare is the question of how international law 
reacts to new circumstances and developments like, for instance, the 
emergence of new actors (such as international terrorism) or technologies 
(e.g., the rise of autonomous weapon system or the possibility of 
‘cyberwarfare’). More generally, this brings the question to the fore of how 
international law deals with uncertainty. The main issue in this regard is 
whether the existing concepts, procedures, principles and rules of 
international law do apply (e.g. by identifying rules of customary law, by 
subsuming under general principles of international law or by stretching 
existing legal concepts) or whether we need a new body of law. A good 
example in this regard is what has become known as cyberwarfare. In the 
                                                      
632 Kennedy, 32. 
633 Kennedy, 32; See also: ‘Most directly, the classic law established a privilege to kill on the 
battlefield; what would otherwise be murder was now legally privileged and legitimate’ Kennedy, 
102. 
634 Kennedy, Of War and Law, 106. For a recent plea to endow the military with more decision-
making authority when it comes to discriminate the principle of military necessity in armed 
conflicts see, for example, Yishai Beer, ‘Humanity Considerations Cannot Reduce War’s Hazards 
Alone: Revitalizing the Concept of Military Necessity’, European Journal of International Law 26, no. 
4 (2015): 801–28. 
635 Kennedy, Of War and Law, 125; for a conceptual analysis of ‘lawfare’ see also Wouter Werner, 
‘The Curious Career of Lawfare’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 43 (2010): 61–
72. 
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context of cyberwarfare, we can see how different groups of experts, in 
particular experts attached to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and NATO, struggle over the question of how international law should deal 
with this rather new phenomenon. For instance, it is unclear which body of 
(international) law is applicable to cyberwarfare as, for instance, national and 
international criminal law, human rights law, lex digitalis, international 
economic law, international humanitarian law or a newly created international 
cyber law could qualify as relevant bodies.636 Connected to this, the object of 
study – cyberwarfare – is highly ambitious as it is not clear whether a 
cyberwar has ever happened, as there are different definitions of the term. As 
many observers identify cyberwarfare as the war of the future we can see that 
“issues of cyberspace are increasingly discussed in terms of a ‘preventive 
logic’”, i.e. a future-oriented logic which is usually not captured in traditional 
forms of (international) law. 637  An example of how to deal with the 
uncertainties of cyberwarfare is the debate on the Tallin Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.638 The manual was prepared on 
initiative of the NATO and basically elaborated by the US-American 
international lawyer Michael N. Schmitt.639 Here, two points are important to 
note. Firstly, by commissioning Schmitt (an international lawyer) and by 
scrutinizing the international law applicable, the findings of the report are to a 
certain extent predetermined. While, for example, expertise from other (non-
international legal) fields like security studies would imagine cyberwarfare as 
a fundamental revolution of warfare, the manual subsumes it under existing 
categories of international law – and links it, e.g., to Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter and past (and pre-digital) ICJ judgements on the use of force like the 
                                                      
636 Oliver Kessler and Wouter Werner, ‘Expertise, Uncertainty, and International Law: A Study of 
the Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare’, Leiden Journal of International Law 26, no. 4 (2013): 797. 
637 Kessler and Werner, 801;  the main task of international legal experts is thus also to transform 
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638 Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
639 It is interesting to note that Schmitt started recently also to work on the topic of autonomous 
weapon systems, another technical innovation causing serious uncertainty in international law, 
Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, ‘“Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and 
the Law of Armed Conflict’, Harvard National Security Journal 4, no. 2 (2013): 231–81. 
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Nuclear Weapons opinion or the Nicaragua decision.640 This strategy excludes 
not only voices (non-legal but also legal voices from a domestic context) but by 
excluding these voices the problem is framed in a particular idiom with 
particular solutions (relying on state-centrism, solidifying the existing 
private/public distinction, etc.). Secondly, the manual claims the legitimacy 
and authority of its expertise in a specific way. As has been noted those claims 
rely on a specific constellation between the ‘personal’ and the ‘impersonal’ as, 
on the one hand, the personal expertise of a leading scholar like Schmitt is 
important, the manual has to draw, on the other hand, on impersonal legal 
sources in order to maintain the impression of non-arbitrariness.641  
 
What is interesting to note here is that experts and expertise seem not only to be 
all-around in (the various subfields of) contemporary international law but also 
that the concept of expertise is used (slightly) different in these various examples 
and, as a a corollary, the way the ‘politics of expertise’ is problematized and 
theorized differs as well. It is one of the aims of this chapter to reconstruct and 
open up different avenues to study the ‘politics of expertise’ in international law 
(and beyond). Moreover, this chapter aims to link the previous discussions, which 
mainly focussed on scholarly projects in the intersection of IL and IR, to the 
reconstruction of jurisdictional projects outside the confines of academia 
(although, as we will see, for example, in Chapter 6, the boundary between 
academia and non-academia is never fully impermeable).  
 
In order to do so, this chapter unfolds into three substantive sections. The 
next section (2.) provides a historical sketch of the study of experts and expertise 
in IL and IR. By doing so, I am able to show that this topic is not a new one but was 
part of larger academic debates and scholarly projects in the history of the two 
disciplines. Concretely, I will start with a debate on the role of expertise during the 
interwar years in the context of the League of Nations; move then to functionalist 
episodes in IR, namely David Mitrany’s work on technical agencies and the neo-
functionalist literature on ‘epistemic communities’; and, finally, introduce Oscar 
                                                      
640 Lianne Boer and Wouter Werner, ‘“It Could Probably Just as Well Be Otherwise”: Imageries of 
Cyberwar’, in Risk and the Regulation of Uncertainty in International Law, ed. Monika Ambrus, 
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Schachter’s idea of an ‘invisible college of international lawyers’, which still 
continues to be the prevailing IL-mainstream account on expertise. This historical 
sketch is followed (3.) by a reconstruction and comparison of important streams of 
the broader social theoretical literature on expertise. Starting with the Bell-
Lyotard debate on the general consequences of the proliferation of knowledge for 
(post-)modern societies, it examines then how various authors (Abbott, Bourdieu, 
Latour, Jasanoff) frame the relationship of law, knowledge and expertise. This 
discussion aims not to be all-inclusive but rather to augment the conceptual 
apparatus of this thesis and anchor it in a couple of important literatures in social 
theory. The final substantive section (4.) turns then to recent contributions of 
critical scholars in IR and IL and how they problematize, conceptualise and 
theorize (the politics of) experts and expertise. Here, I link the literature on the 
‘politics of expertise’ in international law to the scholarship on legal technicalities. 
I argue that the problematization of legal technicalities might serve to ‘open the 
black box’ of expert work in international law and that in particular the study of 
jurisdiction and jurisdictional projects as a legal technicalities is promising. This 
helps me to prepare my reconstruction of the politics of jurisdiction in 
international law and politics in the context of ‘humanity’s law’ in the final three 
substantive chapters of this thesis. 
 
 2. Expertise in International Politics and Law: A historical sketch 
 
Although we can find, as I will reconstruct later in this chapter, today a burgeoning 
literature on experts and expertise in critical scholarship in both IL and IR, it is 
usually little noticed however that this topic is hardly new for both fields. If we 
take the example of my earlier discussion (Chapter 2) of the contributions of the 
Chicago-based scholars Frederick Schuman, Harold Lasswell and Quincy Wright 
during the interwar years, all of these scholars used a rather instrumental concept 
of international law and (implicitly) advocated a project of interdisciplinarity 
between IR and IL, which invokes an external third as both IR and IL should 
become a ‘social science’ or ‘policy science’. Thus to be ‘scientific’, though 
understood in a specific way, should be the aim of all scholarly work. Closely linked 
to such a desire to become more scientific was, already during the interwar years, 
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the belief in the problem-solving capacities of experts. Indeed, as Jan-Stefan Fritz 
notes, during the interwar years the “terms scientific and expert were taken 
synonymously” as authors of this period believed that ‘scientific expertise’ would 
help to eliminate war and, consequently, establish peace.642 As reconstructed in 
Chapter 2, it was this hope to eliminate war and the idea that IR could provide the 
knowledge to do so, which was the main theme among ‘internationalists’ during 
the Interbellum (most explicitly stated in the work of Quincy Wright).  
 
 Thus, what we see here are early attempts to conceptualise expertise within 
the emerging academic discipline of IR. I will open this historical sketch by 
outlining debates about the role and rule of experts within early IR and embedded 
this discussion in broader social and political debates of this time (2.1); turn then 
different streams of functionalism within IR and how they conceptualise expertise 
(2.2); and finally address Schachter’s ‘invisible college of international lawyers’ 
(2.3). 
 
2.1 ‘Ask Mr. League Expert’: Experts, Democracy and the League of Nations 
 
If we turn first to the emerging academic field of IR, and here particularly to the 
1920s and 1930s, the interest in the capacity of expertise did not emerge out of 
thin air, as IR could connect to an already existing more general discourse on 
expertise. However, this general discourse did not address themes of international 
politics but rather dealt with issues of domestic democratic government (mainly in 
the United States). Nevertheless, it is worth having a quick look at this literature, as 
it should frame debates in IR and in particular offer an important source of 
inspiration for internationalist figures such as Lasswell and Wright. Without doubt, 
Walter Lippmann’s work stands out in this context. Among Lippmann’s numerous 
writings it was the 1922-monograph Public Opinion, which had the biggest impact 
when it comes to address the role of experts and their relevance for democratic 
                                                      
642  Jan-Stefan Fritz, ‘Internationalism and the Promise of Science’, in Imperialism and 
Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations, ed. David Long and Brain C. Schmidt 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 143 (emphases in the original). 
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government.643 Lippmann argues in Public Opinion that political decision makers 
should neither rely on the will of the masses nor follow the press but instead base 
their decisions on the advices of independent experts. For Lippmann it is 
particularly the advice of political scientists that should inform governmental 
decision makers as this kind of expertise would facilitate to understand and govern 
the complexities of modernity as it would guarantee that the best available 
decision is always taken. In addition, experts should not restrict their work to 
deliver practical knowledge to political decision makers only but also help to 
inform and steer public opinion. Typical for Lippmann’s rather conservative-elitist 
and – one could say – Platonic (not by chance, the book begins with a quote from 
the cage allegory of Plato’s Republic) conception of democracy are passages like, 
for example, the following one: 
 
“I argue that representative government, either in what is ordinarily 
called politics, or in industry, cannot be work successfully, no matter 
what the basis of election, unless there is an independent expert 
organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have 
to take the decisions […]. My conclusion is that public opinion must be 
organized for the press if they are to be sound, and not by the press as it 
is the case today. This organization I conceive to be in the first instance 
the task of a political science that has found its proper place as 
formulator, in advance of real decision, instead of apologist, critic, or 
reporter of the decisions have been made. I try to indicate that the 
perplexities of government and industry are conspiring to give political 
science this enormous opportunity to enrich itself and to serve the 
public”.644 
 
Moreover, Lippmann observes – and this should become a recurring pattern 
in since then in various literatures on expertise – that experts do not operate in the 
front row but rather pull strings in the background. As Lippmann describes it, the 
                                                      
643 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922). See also the 
discussion in Craufurd D. Goodwin, ‘The Promise of Expertise: Walter Lippmann and the Policy 
Sciences’, Policy Sciences 28, no. 4 (1995): 317–45. 
644 Lippmann, Public Opinion, 31–32. 
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expert “finds and formulates the facts for the man of action”;645 the expert is the 
“mediator among representatives” and the “mirror and measure of 
administration”;646 and the expert must permanently “translate, simplify [and] 
generalize”. 647 However, things could get difficult, as it is not always clear to 
identify who, as Lippmann formulates, “the most expert” is among those claiming 
expertise in a given case.648 As we will see below, the observation of a struggle 
between different experts over discursive hegemony on a specific topic is one of 
the major themes for contemporary critical approaches to expertise.649  
 
 If we come back to the ‘international’ and the emerging discipline of IR, it 
were not only, as already mentioned, the Chicago-based authors who were 
concerned with the role of experts and expertise during the interwar years.650 A 
prominent example is Raymond B. Fosdick, the long-standing president of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, who enthusiastically welcomed in the mid-1920s the work 
of expert groups and committees within the League of Nations. According to 
Fosdick, the increasing complexities of world politics made the integration of 
expert work in the working processes of the League indispensable. “International 
life has reached a stage where its technical projects can be met only by technical 
scientific study”.651 From security questions to labour rights or from the protection 
and settlement of refugees to health policy, it is the League that provided for 
almost every political project of international scale valuable expertise. Here, 
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experts solve problems as they compile blueprints, coordinate between different 
international bodies and associations or assemble and deliver information – or, as 
Fosdick writes, if you have any question: “Ask Mr. League Expert”.652 Consequently, 
the League operates, as Fosdick puts it, “as a clearing-house for international 
difficulties”.653 Fosdick lists two reasons, which make the work of experts at the 
League so successful. Firstly, the League is able to attract the most qualified 
specialists from all over the world and brings them together in committees where 
knowledge and not nationality counts.654 Secondly, over the years the form of 
problem-solving itself has transformed (and improved) as “political manoeuvring” 
was substituted by “expert advice”.655 Writing in 1924, Fosdick claims that the 
world has with the experts of the League of Nations “at its command the services of 
a high-specialized machinery adapted to an international emergency”.656 
 
In a similar vein, for example, Alfred Zimmern foregrounded in the 1930s 
the benefits of committees and other expert groups in the context of the League of 
Nations.657 As Zimmern frames it, experts deal with “applied science” and form a 
distinct “group which has put its special knowledge to practical use and been 
enabled to profit by experience”.658 For Zimmern it is important to stress that, with 
regard to the work of experts in the context of the League, the “‘glorious invention’ 
here consists in the discovery that Committees of Experts function more 
satisfactorily on an international than on a national basis”.659 Successful examples 
are, as Zimmern lists, the negotiations and drafting of the Dawes and Young Plan 
(settling the open conflict regarding the reparation payments of Germany after the 
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First World War) but also the establishment of the Bank of International 
Settlements or in the work of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations.660 
The reason why the work of experts in the context of the League is so efficient was 
a “common spirit” of all professionals, which are involved.661 Yet, in opposition to 
Lippmann or Fosdick, Zimmern acknowledges that the rule of experts is only the 
second best form of rule, when it is evaluated from the point of view of democracy. 
This is so, as the best option would be a worldwide improvement in the general 
educational level – an improvement, of which the proliferation of experts can be 
interpreted as its spearhead: if the worldwide educational level would improve, 
this would in the end make all citizen experts and would give them thereby the 
necessary competence to take self-conscious decisions in the complex settings of 
an independent world. 
 
2.2 From Functionalism to Epistemic Communities 
 
The various forms of functionalism present a second tradition of scholarship on 
expertise within IR. Until today, the different strands of functionalism are 
prominent when it comes to conceptualise expertise in IR mainstream accounts.662 
The ‘natural’ starting point in this regard is certainly the work of David Mitrany 
and his proposal for a ‘working peace system’. 663  This text initiated the 
functionalist tradition in the discipline. Writing in 1943, for Mitrany the vantage 
point was not – as for Fosdick or Zimmern – a (still) successful League of Nations 
but its failure. Yet, in contrast to the early realists, for Mitrany this did not signify 
to take the rather ‘pessimistic’ route by denying the impact of international 
institutions and reducing them to epiphenomena of the international struggle for 
power. Instead, Mitrany argued that “international activities and agencies” are 
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capable to guarantee the peaceful settlement of conflicts if they are part of a 
‘working peace system’ on a global scale.664 In order to create the institutional 
arrangement of such a ‘working peace system’, it is important, according to 
Mitrany, to understand the reasons for the failure of the League. For Mitrany the 
League failed because it was a “political federation”, which was built – through its 
Covenant – in a top-down manner. Mitrany observes in 1943 that “as things are the 
political way is too ambitious”.665 The political way is too ambitious as the global 
political landscape is at this time too fragmented. For the same reason, larger 
international federations, based on ideology (may it be Democracy, Fascism or 
Communism) or territoriality (like the British Empire), are bound to fail. Instead, 
Mitrany’s proposal builds on the idea of functional activities and agencies. These 
activities and agencies should not be bound by territory or ideology but rather by 
specific issue areas.666 Although these associations might operate on a worldwide 
scale, they might facilitate cooperation as they evolve from ‘bottom up’ and thus in 
a more ‘natural’, ‘organic’ and stable way. Furthermore, these functional 
arrangements should not be dominated by politics and diplomats but by technical 
considerations and technical experts. Mitrany argues that experience from the past 
shows in “many fields arrangements between states have been settled and 
developed directly in conferences attended by technical experts representing their 
respective departments, without passing through the complicating network of 
political and diplomatic censors”.667 In other words, Mitrany (as, e.g., Fosdick and 
Zimmern before) strongly differentiates between expertise and politics. Moreover, 
the former is capable to ‘tame’ the latter. Knowledge and power are thus 
separated. 
 
If we turn now to more recent research, the idea of functional experts has 
been translated into the broader research project on ‘epistemic communities’. The 
concept of epistemic communities marries functionalism with “soft 
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constructivism”,668 has its origins in the regime literature,669 follows Robert 
Keohane’s call for a “reflective research program”670 and, as Mai’a K. Davis Cross 
suggests, can be linked to the more general literature on “transnational global 
governance” through networks.671 Examples of such networks are Anne-Marie 
Slaughter’s ‘transgovernmental networks’ of judges, Margaret Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink’s ‘transnational advocacy networks’ or Emanuel Adler’s ‘communities of 
practice’.672 All of these projects focus on questions of agency and how causal and 
normative ideas spread and guide collective behaviour.  
 
The concept of epistemic communities has been popularized in IR in the 
same way as it has been with ‘regimes’ and ‘legalization’, namely through a special 
issue in the discipline’s leading mainstream journal International Organization. 
The special issue was published in 1992 and Peter M. Haas provided in its framing 
article a general definition of epistemic communities. According to this definition 
an “epistemic community is a network with recognized expertise and competence 
in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area”.673 Haas describes epistemic communities also 
as “knowledge-based networks”.674 In this context Haas advances three important 
arguments. Firstly, Haas introduces a ‘thicker’ notion of community. In order to 
constitute an epistemic community, its members could have different disciplinary 
backgrounds but must have, what Haas calls, “a shared set of normative and 
principled beliefs”, “shared causal beliefs”, “shared notions of validity” and “a 
                                                      
668 Peter M. Haas, ‘Ideas, Experts and Governance’, in The Role of ‘Experts’ in International and 
European Decision-Making Processes: Advisors, Decision Makers or Irrelevant Actors?, ed. Monika 
Ambrus et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 23. 
669 For an early use of the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ see: John Gerard Ruggie, 
‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’, International Organization 29, no. 3 
(1975): 557–83. See also my discussion of the literature on international regimes in Chapter 2. 
670 See already the title of Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, ‘Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, 
World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program’, International Organization 46, no. 
1 (1992): 367–90. 
671 Mai’A K. Davis Cross, ‘Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later’, Review of 
International Studies 39, no. 1 (2013): 139. 
672 I introduced these ideas already in Chapter 2. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists 
beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998); and Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of 
International Relations (London: Routledge, 2005). 
673 Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, 
International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 3. 
674 Haas, 2. 
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common policy enterprise”.675 This means also that “expertise needs to be 
organized and self-organized in terms of epistemic communities”.676 Secondly, 
Haas delimits his account of epistemic communities in one important point from 
Mitrany’s earlier version of functionalism. As we have seen, Mitrany’s idea was to 
solve political problems through technical innovation – or in other words: for him 
expertise should trump politics. Expertise and politics are two distinct, sharply 
separated realms. In Haas’ neo-functionalist framework, however, experts are 
directly linked to political projects: “Especially in cases in which scientific evidence 
is ambiguous and the experts themselves are split into contending factions, issues 
have tended to be resolved less on their technical merits than on their political 
ones”.677 Thus, expertise and politics might intersect and experts themselves might 
operate as political actors or be instrumentalised for political purposes. 
Consequently, expertise cannot trump politics. In more empirical terms this 
hypothesis has been examined and tested first and foremost in the field of 
environmental policy and, here, in studies of contending approaches to the 
management of the stratospheric ozone layer. 678  Thirdly, the literature on 
epistemic communities engages in some kind of a division of labour with other 
agency-related approaches – all of them linked loosely to moderate constructivism. 
In order to separate epistemic communities from other approaches, Haas 
distinguishes between brute, hybrid and social facts – a distinction that goes in 
part back to John R. Searle.679 While epistemic communities and their respective 
experts mainly deal with brute and hybrid facts (hybrid facts concern, e.g., 
ecology), social facts remain the “domain of advocates and norm 
entrepreneurs”.680 This means also that lawyers and other legal experts do not 
constitute an epistemic community by their own. Nevertheless, they may be able to 
mobilise expertise from epistemic communities as they may rely on their work. In 
other words, the literature on epistemic communities treats only certain 
knowledge practices as expertise, namely those related to brute and hybrid facts 
                                                      
675 Haas, 3. 
676 Haas, ‘Ideas, Experts and Governance’, 21. 
677 Haas, ‘Introduction’, 11. 
678 Cf. Peter M. Haas, ‘Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect 
Stratospheric Ozone’, International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 187–224. 
679 Haas, ‘Ideas, Experts and Governance’, 25–29. The distinction of brute and social (or 
institutional) facts is originally Searle’s, see John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New 
York: Free Press, 1995). 
680 Haas, ‘Ideas, Experts and Governance’, 28. 
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(or the natural sciences broadly conceived), and still distinguishes to a certain 
extent between politics and expertise: experts might operate as political actors or 
their knowledge itself might be instrumentalized for political purposes, yet the 
realm where we can ‘find’ expertise remains pre-given. 
 
2.3 The ‘invisible college of international lawyers’ 
 
That lawyers constitute a distinct group of experts is, however, the core 
assumption of Oscar Schachter’s idea of an ‘invisible college of international 
lawyers’.681 The ‘invisible college’ is certainly the dominant contribution when it 
comes to conceptualise expertise in IL from a traditional (in this case: policy-
oriented) perspective. 682  Schachter starts with the observation that the 
professional group of international lawyers may appear prima facie as highly 
disintegrated because, on the hand, international lawyers work both as scholars as 
well as officials and, on the hand, they are spread all over the world. However, 
Schachter scrutinizes this observation and argues that international lawyers, as a 
“professional community”, represent “a kind of invisible college dedicated to a 
common intellectual enterprise”. 683  According to Schachter, there are four 
elements that constitute the ‘common intellectual enterprise’ of the ‘invisible 
college’. First, even though the work of international lawyers is not value-free (as it 
is, for Schachter, research in the case of the natural sciences) and even though 
international lawyers may be biased when they work as officials for governments, 
their general activity is still to be considered as objective. Consequently, it is wrong 
to insist in the “indeterminacy and relativism” of international law. This is so as 
always when lawyers act independently, i.e. free from “political interests”, and 
when they are competent, their interpretations should be unbiased, determinate 
and free of relativism.684 Second, international lawyers are “generalists”. This 
                                                      
681 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’, Northwestern University Law 
Review 72, no. 2 (1977): 217–26. 
682 For an accessible introduction to Schachter’s policy-oriented perspective, see for example his 
short piece: Oscar Schachter, ‘The Place of Policy in International Law’, Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 2, no. 2 (1972): 5–14; and the interview in Antonio Cassese, Five 
Masters of International Law: Conversations with R-J Dupuy, E Jiménez de Aréchaga, R Jennings, L 
Henkin and O Schachter (Oxford: Hart, 2011). 
683 Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’, 217. 
684 Schachter, 220. Schachter compares the possibility to produce legal objectivity by comparing the 
work of the lawyer with that of the historian. While historians might be biased by their political 
 182 
means that the field of international law has been able to “avoid 
compartmentalization” because international lawyers, even if they work in 
different fields, are still able to communicate with each other without greater 
difficulties across these fields. According to Schachter, a specialization and division 
of labour, as we have witnessed it in the natural and social sciences, is in the field 
of international law “not likely in the near future, nor is it desirable”.685Third, the 
fact that international lawyers are generalists predestines them to operate as 
orchestrators of larger projects among the different social and natural sciences 
(and their respective expertises) when it comes to solve international problems. 
This is the case in particular when not only the formulation and interpretation of 
current law (lex lata) is at stake but when international lawyers take over a 
legislative role in formulating what the law should be (de lege ferenda). If 
international lawyers fulfil such a function, their work is always political as well.  
686 However, for Schachter this does not constitute a problem as law and politics 
are always intertwined – and as an a-political international law (as it can be found 
in the work of international legal positivists) would make international law “less 
and less significant” and turn international lawyers into “a ‘mouthpiece or notary’, 
incapable of dealing with the real issues involved in developing and applying 
law”.687  
 
In this context, Schachter considers a figure such as the former UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammerskjöld as the ideal type of an international legal expert as 
Hammerskjöld was completely aware of the need to use law in a rather flexible 
way but, simultaneously, used the flexibility of international law to achieve the 
principles (or ‘policy’) of the UN Charter.688 To rely on the Charter is important for 
                                                                                                                                                            
preferences, for Schachter there are still some historical ‘facts’ that cannot be disputed. Similarly, in 
international law there are undisputable facts. See Schachter, ‘The Place of Policy in International 
Law’, 13–14. 
685 Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’, 221–223. 
686 Schachter, 223–226. 
687 Schachter, ‘The Place of Policy in International Law’, 14. 
688 As Schachter puts it: ‘Hammarskjold’s reliance on principles and legal concepts may appear to 
be at variance with the flexibility and adroitness that characterized much of his political activity; 
yet on reflection it will be seen that these apparently antithetical approaches were both essential 
aspects of a skilled technique for dealing with the specific problems which he faced. It is a 
technique that should be of special interest for the international lawyer, for it demonstrated that 
legal norms can be applied to novel situations without rigidity or blind conformity to precedent’, 
Oscar Schachter, ‘Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Politics’, American Journal of 
International Law 56, no. 1 (1962): 3. For a reconstruction of the impact of Hammersjöld on the UN, 
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Schachter as the “Charter and international law embod[y] the deeply-held values 
of the great majority of mankind and therefore constitute[e] the moral, as well as 
legal, imperative of international life”.689 Finally, and also linked to this last point, 
Schachter highlights that the invisible college is tied together by a common 
normative view, “la conscience juridique”, which manifests itself in the idea that 
social and political problems should be solved in an internationalist and 
progressive way.690 By relying on this, Schachter hopes to be able to “develop a 
truly international legal process which takes full account of the aims and common 
interests of mankind”.691 
 
To summarize this section: So far I have reconstructed the history of the notion 
of expertise in international thought and concentrated for this purpose on three 
broader discourses. Firstly, I traced back an early discourse on expertise, which 
emerged after the Great War in the domestic context (with Walter Lippmann as 
main figure). This interest in the rule and role of experts and expertise should also 
inform the literature on international organizations in the interwar years – as it 
should support claims to turn the League of Nations into a federation of various 
technical expert committees, which enables the League then to turn into an 
instrument to eliminate war. Secondly, this section reviewed two streams of 
functionalism in IR. On the one hand, David Mitrany’s early functionalist attempt to 
explain the failure of the League system by arguing that it was ‘over-politicized’. 
Consequently, in order to transform the international into a ‘working peace 
system’ it is for Mitrany necessary to organize it around an a-political system of 
technical agencies and experts. On the other hand, neo-functionalist contributions 
introduced the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ in order to link the early 
functionalists emphasis on expertise with the moderate constructivist literature of 
the 1990s. One important difference between the two functionalist accounts 
concerns the fact that the literature on ‘epistemic communities’ shifts the 
boundary between politics and expertise as it recognises that experts engage in – 
or might be instrumentalized – for political project. Nevertheless, as I pointed out, 
                                                                                                                                                            
in particular the establishment of practices of ‘international executive action’, see also Anne Orford, 
International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), chap. 2. 
689 Schachter, ‘Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Politics’, 3. 
690 Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’, 226. 
691 Schachter, ‘The Place of Policy in International Law’, 14 (emphasis in the original). 
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the assumption that there exists a pre-given space of neutral expertise (to be found 
in scientific endeavours concerned with brute and hybrid facts) remains 
unquestioned. Thirdly, I turned to the ‘invisible college of international lawyers’ of 
Oscar Schachter, which is until today the dominant traditional approach on 
expertise in IL. In Schachter’s policy-oriented approach expertise and politics are 
in general intertwined when it comes to international law. However, this is not 
problematic as the international legal profession forms an ‘invisible college’ that 
‘takes full account of the aims and common interests of mankind’. 
 
These different ways to conceptualise expertise in traditional IR and IL links 
also to my earlier discussion in Chapter 2 of the various interdisciplinary projects 
between IR and IL and their related imaginaries of the ‘international’. In a similar 
ways it is possible to link the different conceptualisations of expertise in traditional 
international thought to these conceptualisations of the ‘international’. While the 
Interbellum discourse on expertise is embedded in the same worldview as the 
work of the Chicago-based authors Schuman, Wright and Lasswell – and hence 
frames the ‘international’ in terms of ‘international organisation’ –, the (neo-
)functionalist literature as well as Schachter’s policy-driven analysis of the 
‘invisible college’ represent, in the case of Mitrany and Schachter early, 
manifestations of conceptualising the international in terms of ‘global governance’ 
– a web of expertise in, around and beyond loose institutional settings. The last 
section of this chapter will turn to approach on expertise, which can be linked to an 
image of the ‘international’ as ‘world society’. Although coming from different 
perspectives and traditions of thought, these approaches, as we will see, 
problematize the politics of expertise in international law by pointing out how 
experts are part and parcel of world-making activities and political projects on a 
global scale. However, in order to prepare this discussion, let me first briefly 
introduce in the next section how different literatures in social theory 
conceptualise experts and expertise. 
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 3. Social Theory and Legal Expertise 
 
Although we can trace, as we have seen in the previous section, a social theoretical 
tradition on experts and expertise at least back to the 1920s (with Walter 
Lippmann being the most prominent example), it was only form the 1970s 
onwards when the interest in the role of experts further substantiated as several 
authors started to describe Western societies as late-capitalist or post-modern. 
The vantage point here were major societal transformations, which were 
addressed in terms of a diagnosis of ‘legitimation problems’ or a ‘legitimacy crisis’ 
of the project of Western modernity and its auxiliary developments of democracy 
and (‘late’) capitalism.692 In this section, I will, first, address contributions, which 
describe the ‘legitimacy crisis’ as a crisis of how knowledge and society are linked 
(3.1), and turn then to three recent efforts, which explicitly link law and expertise. 
These are the attempt to move from a sociology of professions to a sociology of 
expertise (Andrew Abbott) (3.2), Pierre Bourdieu’s work on the judicial field (3.3) 
and, finally, research in the broader context of science and technology studies 
(STS) and/or actor-network theory (ANT) (Bruno Latour, Sheila Jasanoff) (3.4). 
 
3.1 Knowledge and Society 
 
The work of the American sociologist Daniel Bell is a good starting point effort to 
reconstruct different social theoretical accounts on experts and expertise.693 Bell is 
a good starting point as he was – more than forty years ago – among the first to 
diagnose fundamental shifts within the social, political and economic structure of 
the most advanced countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In his seminal study 
The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, published originally in 1973, Bell argues 
that these countries are processing a deep transformation from industrial to post-
industrial societies. 694 While in industrial societies the majority of workers 
produces tangible goods, post-industrial societies are in turn characterized by the 
rise of knowledge-based tasks. More concretely, it is for Bell above all “theoretical 
                                                      
692  Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1973). 
693 Werner, ‘The Politics of Expertise’, 45. 
694 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Basic Books, 1999). 
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knowledge”, which has become the “matrix of innovation”.695 This transformation 
is in its extent radical and profound. Nevertheless, for Bell, this shift from 
industrial to post-industrial societies occurs within the confines of modernity –
next step of the project of modernity. Post-industrial societies are still modern as 
their transformation is a progressive one in the end. In post-industrial societies 
knowledge is not only the main societal “resource” but “universities” and “research 
institutes” become the central social institutions, “education” the central tool to 
gain societal ”access”, “scientists” and “research men” the “dominant figures” and, 
finally, a “balance of technical-political forces” the “means of power”. 696  As Bell 
puts it, as a “stratum, scientists, or more widely the technical intelligentsia, now 
have to be taken into account in the political process”.697 One result of this 
development is that in areas where politics had previously dominated the 
technical (understood as the “rational”), the relationship is now turning around 
and the “politician, and the political public, will have increasingly versed in the 
technical character of policy”.698 More generally, Bell’s diagnosis should become an 
important reference for neoconservative forces and their attempt to (re)gain 
discursive hegemony in the 1970s and 1980s, in particular because Bell saw his 
own “role as replacing ‘ideological’ discourse based on unelected political 
categories and passionate instincts with ‘responsible’ technocratic knowledge 
drawing from the social sciences”.699 Once again, technocratic knowledge and 
expertise is understood as neutral and even a de-politicising force. 
 
 Since the publication of Bell’s The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, the 
conclusion that many societies have entered a new era where knowledge 
dominates society has become a commonplace and guiding theme for many social 
theorists.700A good example in this regard is Jean-François Lyotard’s seminal essay 
The Postmodern Condition.701 The piece was originally published in 1979, six years 
                                                      
695 Bell, 344. 
696 Bell, 359. 
697 Bell, 359. 
698 Bell, 365 (emphasis in the original). 
699 Jacob Hamburger and Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, ‘Why Did Neoconservatives Join Forces with 
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forthcoming. 
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after The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, and is intended as a direct answer 
to Bell’s monograph. Lyotard agrees, on the one hand, with Bell’s main finding, 
namely that knowledge and knowledge production plays an increasingly important 
role in more ‘advanced’ societies but is, on the other hand, more sceptical about 
the consequences of this development. While Bell, as we have seen, emphasised 
the rationality and objectivity of knowledge – and was thus able to locate the post-
industrial society within the project of modernity –, Lyotard, on the other hand, 
stresses that knowledge is highly fragile. To substantiate this claim, Lyotard 
provides us with the example of the great meta-narratives of modernity, such as 
the narratives of Enlightenment, Marxism, Universality, Progress and 
Emancipation. These narratives have either seen their end already or are at least in 
an existential crisis. The proliferation of knowledge by means of new information 
and communication technologies did neither increase the homogeneity of 
knowledge nor did it solidify its foundations. Rather, the opposite seems to be the 
case as many societies are confronted now with “postmodern knowledge” 
consisting of a “heterogeneity of language games”, i.e., with small and ‘local’ 
narratives in struggle over discursive hegemony. 702 Not even science remains 
untouched of this shift and has become unable to stabilize knowledge and 
meaning. Thus, paradoxically, more knowledge increases the uncertainty of 
knowledge. As Lyotard writes, 
 
“[p]ostmodern science – by concerning itself with such things as 
undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by 
incomplete information, ‘fracta’, catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes  
- is theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, 
nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the word 
                                                      
702 Lyotard, xxv. The idea of describing the world in terms of ‘language games’ goes, of course, back 
to Wittgenstein. Lyotard was influenced by Wittgenstein - or as he put it he was writing ‘after’ 
Wittgenstein. Reflecting on the notion of ‘language games’, Lyotard states: ‘The examination of 
language games, just like the critique of the faculties, identifies and reinforces the separation of 
language from itself. There is no unity to language; there are islands of language, each of them ruled 
by a different regime, untranslatable into the others’. He substantiates the claim of the 
‘untranslatability’ of language games as follows: ‘Games do not have many common traits among 
them; a move made in bridge cannot be “translated” into a move made in tennis. The same goes for 
phrases, which are moves in language games: one does not “translate” a mathematical proof into a 
narration. Translation is itself a language game’, Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Wittgenstein “After”’, in 
Political Writings, ed. Jean-François Lyotard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 20, 
21. Put differently, to speak of the postmodern condition means to acknowledge the 
‘untranslatability’ of different ‘language games’ into each other. 
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knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is 
producing not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model of 
legitimation that has nothing to do with maximized performance, but 
has as its basis difference understood as paralogy”.703 
 
For Lyotard, scientists should thus not attempt to reach agreements (homology) 
but do the opposite and emphasise the instability of knowledge or, for example, 
point to the problematic assumption of a ‘normal science’ (paralogy).704 As science 
and technology – and this is the main difference between Bell and Lyotard – is not 
able to coordinate our fragmented knowledge anymore and, hence, to guarantee 
progress, the project of modernity has come to an end: the post-modern condition 
has become the dominant condition. 
 
As a consequence, Lyotard challenges another aspect of the progressive 
narrative of modernity, namely that those who have more knowledge have more 
authority. As Lyotard points out, 
 
“[p]ostmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it 
refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to 
tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the experts homology, 
but the inventor’s paralogy”.705 
 
More generally, Lyotard’s main contribution – and this will be a recurrent topos in 
the remainder of this chapter – was to point out that knowledge – the anchor of the 
project of modernity – has become highly fragmented: a turn from knowledge to 
knowledges. Now, different societal forces can instrumentalise different 
knowledges and expertises in their attempts to dominate society by monopolising 
the power to interpret. These forces are the more successful the better they ‘link 
phrases’. In political terms, Lyotard’s analysis points in the exact opposed direction 
as Bell’s, as Lyotard in (post-)Marxist terms concludes that it is “capital, which is a 
                                                      
703 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 60. 
704 For philsophy this means: ‘Philosophy is a discourse that has as its rule the search for its rule 
(and that of other discourses), a discourse in which phrases thus try themselves out without rules 
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regime of linking phrases, far more supple and far more ‘inhuman’ (oppressive, if 
you will) than any political or social regime. Wages, profits, funds for payment and 
credit, investment, growth and recession, the money market: it would indeed be 
interesting to analyze these objects as moves or rules proceeding from various 
language games. And what if capital were a multiform way of dominating time, of 
linking?”706 
 
3.2 From a Sociology of Professions to a Sociology of Expertise (Abbott) 
 
If we turn now to more recent literatures – literatures that explicitly link expertise 
and law –, at least three developments in social theory that stand out. First, the 
traditional sociology of professions is transforming increasingly into a sociology of 
expertise.707 The main reference in this context is the sociology of Andrew Abbott, 
which stands in the tradition of symbolic interactionism.708 The shift from 
professions to expertise is already visible in the title and subtitle of Abbott’s 
central study on the subject matter, the monograph The System of Professions: An 
Essay on the Division of Expert Labor.709 For Abbott, the link between expertise and 
professionalism is established when expertise resides in people;710 something 
which resonates also with David Kennedy’s suggestion to conceptualise experts as 
‘people with projects’.711 Moreover, while traditional accounts in the sociology of 
professions were either looking at one profession at a time or explained the rise 
(and fall) of professions through internal processes of professionalization (or 
deprofessionalization), Abbott suggests to study professions instead by focussing 
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on interprofessional competition.712  In other words, Abbott rejects ‘internal’ 
attempts, which explain the success of certain professions by analysing the 
establishment of associations, journals, licenses, schools and/or ethical codes.713 
Instead, a sociology of professions, understood in terms of a sociology of expertise, 
should investigate a certain field (or realm) of work and how different professions 
– constituting a system of professions – compete within this field over the control of 
its central working processes – its “tasks and problems”.714 The link between a 
“profession and its work” is called “jurisdiction”.715 Every profession attempts to 
expand and consolidate its “jurisdiction—that is legitimate control—over a 
problem”.716 However, professions do not only expand or consolidate their 
jurisdiction as they might dissolute as well, when loosing their jurisdiction, or 
transform, when different jurisdictions amalgamate or divide. 
 
In this context two implications are important. Firstly, looking at the work of 
professions and how professions grow, consolidate and shrink their jurisdiction 
does not mean that a respective area of work is conceptually as fixed or pre-
supposed (which would only signify a reversion of the relationship between 
profession and its working area compared to traditional approaches where the 
concept of profession was fixed and the respective working area rather loose).717 
As Abbott points out the relationship between professions and their work is 
reciprocal and co-constitutive as “professions both create their work and are 
created by it”.718 As a corollary, a “differentiation in types of work […] often leads 
to serious differentiations within the professions”.719 Secondly, as Abbott opts for a 
dynamic approach, he is capable to analyse, the “evolution and interrelations” of 
professions and refutes to think of professions in pre-established categories and 
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advocates a “very loose definition” of professions as “exclusive occupational 
groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases”.720 Thus, 
professions are successful social fabrics as they are in the possession of specific 
knowledge rather than of other gate-keeping devices. In this regard, it is a 
particular kind of knowledge – expertise in the form of “abstract knowledge”721 or 
“complex knowledge”722 –, which makes certain professions such as medicine or 
law particularly successful. This knowledge is, on the one side, not as practical as a 
“technique” of a craft but, on the other side, it is also not too abstract as, for 
instance, academic disciplines usually do not form professions. The professions of 
law and medicine were successful in the jurisdictional struggles of their respective 
working fields because they were able to balance abstract knowledge in an 
acceptable way.723 Finally, it is the success of abstract knowledge that helps Abbott 
to explain why professionalism “has been the main way of institutionalizing 
expertise in industrialized countries”.724  
 
3.3 The Juridical Field and the Force of Law(yers) (Bourdieu) 
 
As a second tradition, Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology (of law) had a major 
impact on social and legal theory – and beyond.725 As it was the case with Abbott’s 
jurisdictional account, Bourdieu is interested in how a profession like the legal 
profession – as a distinct body of expertise – managed to become as powerful as it 
is. Here, Bourdieu rejects both internal (attributed to Hans Kelsen’s formalism) as 
well as external (attributed to Louis Althusser’s instrumentalism) perspectives on 
law and argues instead that law should be conceived as a specific “field”, namely 
the “judicial field”. “The judicial field”, Bourdieu claims, “is the site of competition 
                                                      
720 Abbott, 8 (emphasis added). 
721 Abbott, 8. 
722 ‘By expertise I mean the ability to accomplish complicated tasks; I could alternatively speak of it 
as complex knowledge’, Abbott, ‘The Future of Professions’, 19. 
723 For example, Abbott reconstructs in an in-depth historical study how the legal profession in 
England (1870-1940) and the United States (1919-1950) was able to expand and consolidate its 
jurisdiction. While in England the main competitor was the state and its bureaucracy, in the United 
States it were business corporations, see Abbott, ‘Jurisdictional Conflicts’. 
724 Abbott, The System of Professions, 323. 
725 I will mainly focus on Bourdieu’s seminal article on the judicial field: Bourdieu, ‘Force of Law’; 
An excellent contextualisation of Bourdieu’s other writings on law and how this connects to the 
study of global law is presented by Yves Dezalay and Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘The Force of Law and 
Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the Reflexive Sociology of Law’, Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 8 (2012): 433–52. 
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for monopoly of the right to determine what the law is”.726 Concretely, Bourdieu is 
mainly interested in the structure, peculiarities and exclusionary forces of the 
judicial field. Above all, the “institution of the ‘judicial space’” presents a 
“borderline” or “social division” between specialists (the legal profession and its 
institutions) and non-specialists (laypeople or clients).727 The legal profession is, in 
other words, able to produce and maintain their own field and exclude laypeople. 
This is so, as Bourdieu stresses, because legal “professionals create the need for 
their own services by redefining problems expressed in ordinary language as legal 
problems, translating them into the language of the law”.728 
 
In addition, legal professionals develop solutions to these problems, which 
are in turn only accessible through legal language and hence the legal professionals 
themselves. In other words, the legal profession creates its own demand. Field and 
expertise are co-productive. For example, even though laypeople may be aware 
that they have rights (as entitlements), in particular situations they might only be 
able to claim these rights by relying on the help of legal professionals.729 This 
implies that one could be in the right but not be able to win a case before a court 
without professional legal support. Those, who are not legal professionals, are thus 
silenced to some extent. This means also that “[j]udicial institutions produce their 
own problems and their own solutions according to a hermetic logic unavailable to 
laypeople”. 730  Furthermore, the legal profession is able to maintain their 
“professional monopoly over the production and sale of […] legal services” by 
controlling specific forms of education (e.g., by requiring certificates and degrees) 
or by demanding a specific language and structure of argumentation, which 
involves rules of what can be said (and not said) and how it can be said.731 In this 
regard, Bourdieu argues that legal language produces three specific effects: firstly, 
the “appropriation effect” helps law to integrate different problems into its own 
field (as it combines “elements taken directly from the common language and 
elements foreign to its system”); secondly, the “neutralization effect” helps to make 
personal matters impersonal (by relying on “passive and impersonal 
                                                      
726 Bourdieu, ‘Force of Law’, 817. 
727 Bourdieu, 817, 828. 
728 Bourdieu, 834 (emphasis in the original). 
729 Bourdieu, 833. 
730 Bourdieu, 834. 
731 Bourdieu, 835. 
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constructions”); thirdly, the “universalization effect” works in a similar way as it 
makes singular legal cases part of a greater whole (through the invocation of 
norms).732 
 
By developing their own idiom legal professionals are able to participate in 
processes of “worldmaking” and are hence part of the “dominant forces” in 
society.733 Interestingly, however, Bourdieu does not only emphasise the struggles 
between laypeople and legal professionals, i.e. the boundary work between legality 
and non-legality, but also points to the struggles and the specific division of labour 
within the judicial field itself. In this regard, Bourdieau observes a “[s]tructural 
hostility” between “theorists”, on the one hand, and “practitioners”, on the other 
hand, which is “at the origin of a permanent symbolic struggle in which different 
definitions of legal work as the authorized interpretation of canonical texts 
confront each other”.734 This struggle is carried out mainly between the holders of 
two roles: the professor of law and the judge. Moreover, this struggle took and 
takes place differently in different countries and produces, in turn, different forms 
of law. While the Anglo-American tradition is primarily judge-based, the French 
and German tradition is mainly the “law of the professors”. Both traditions are 
different because judges and professors prefer different forms of law. While legal 
professors advocate a perfectly deductive system of “pure law”, practitioners 
emphasise its “applicability”.735 
 
3.4 Making Things Legal (Latour, Jasanoff) 
 
As a third context, the broader movement of what has become known as 
‘sociology of translation’,736 science and technology studies (STS) and/or actor-
                                                      
732 Bourdieu, 819–820. However, as Nicholas Onuf notes, universality might be a problematic 
criterion when it comes to the analysis of international law. International law operates mainly in 
horizontal dyads between states without presupposing a universal telos of international law, 
Nicholas Onuf, ‘Old Mistakes: Bourdieu, Derrida, and the “Force of Law”’, International Political 
Sociology 4, no. 3 (2010): 316. 
733 Bourdieu, ‘Force of Law’, 838, 842. 
734 Bourdieu, 821. 
735 Bourdieu, 822, 825. 
736 For a seminal contribution, see Michel Callon, ‘Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: 
Domestication of the Scallops and the Fshermen of St Brieuc Bay’, in Power, Action and Belief: A New 
Sociology of Knowledge, ed. John Law (London: Routledge, 1986), 196–223. 
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network theory (ANT) improved significantly our understanding of the nexus of 
law and expertise.737 In particular three arguments stand out here.  
 
Firstly, this research tradition provides us with a more accurate picture of 
how the law actually works as it points – by drawing on material semiotics – to the 
material dimension – the materiality – of law and legality.738 As Bruno Latour, one 
of the main figures of the ANT movement, reminds us “[j]urists always speak of 
texts, but rarely of their materiality”.739 Following this observation, it is (among 
others) Latour, who studies the materiality of law and legality. To study legality in 
this way means also to treat law as a “network of people and things”740 and to 
‘open the black box’ of law.741 In particular, Latour’s ethnographically inspired 
study of the French Conseil d’Etat (the ‘Council of the State’) stands out,742 where 
Latour traces back the “meandering trajectory”743 and circulation of legal materials 
such as files and other legal documents.744 By analysing how a collection of papers 
grows and fattens, folds and unfolds, how it collects stamps and signatures, how it 
wanders from shelves to desks and back from desks to shelves, how it is used 
during debates, sessions and meetings, helps Latour to understand the ‘alchemy’ of 
                                                      
737 Cf. Bruno Latour, ‘Networks, Societies, Spheres: Reflections of an Actor-Network Theorist’, 
International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 796–810. 
738 For a discussion of the use of semiotics in Latour’s legal analysis see Niels van Dijk, ‘The Life and 
Deaths of a Dispute: An Inquiry into Matters of Law’, in Latour and the Passage of Law, ed. Kyle 
McGee (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 161–165. 
739 Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat (Cambridge: Polity, 
2010), 71. For a recent discussion of the materiality of law, see also Andreas Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, ‘Flesh of the Law: Material Legal Metaphors’, Journal of Law and Society 43, no. 1 
(2016): 45–65. 
740 Ron Levi and Mariana Valverde, ‘Studying Law by Association: Bruno Latour Goes to the Conseil 
d’Etat’, Law & Social Inquiry 33, no. 3 (2008): 806; on the central role of the notion of network in 
Latour’s research more generally, see Latour, ‘Networks, Societies, Spheres’. 
741 On the research strategy of ‚opening the black box’ and how this could be part of a 
reconstructive mode of inquiry see my discussion in Chapter 1. 
742 Latour, The Making of Law. For an excellent discussion of this book see Levi and Valverde, 
‘Studying Law by Association’. For a recent analysis of law as a specific ‘mode of existence’, see 
Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), chap. 13; and Bruno Latour, ‘The Strange Entanglement of 
Jurimorphs’, in Latour and the Passage of Law, ed. Kyle McGee (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2015), 331–53. For a broader overview on Latour take(s) on law see the discussions in Kyle 
McGee, ed., Latour and the Passage of Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015); Marcus 
Twellmann, ed., Wissen, wie Recht ist: Bruno Latours empirische Philosophie einer Existenzweise 
(Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2016); and Filipe dos Reis and Hagen Schölzel, 
‘Artikulationen im Herzen des Staates - Bruno Latours Diskussion des Rechts und deren deutsch- 
und englischsprachige Rezeption’, Zeitschrift für Politische Theorie 8, no. 2 (2017): 291–98. 
743 Latour, ‘The Strange Entanglement of Jurimorphs’, 333. 
744 Cf., in particular, Latour, The Making of Law, chap. 2. For another fascinating study of files see 
Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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how a piece of paper of a singular case is translated into ‘the’ law as the 
“progressive articulation of the case, from the lawyer’s office up to the display of 
the final judgements, consists of making the case more and more like the law just 
by having the arguments or the grounds at every stage better arrayed and 
regrouped”.745 The ‘passage of law’ is hence a process of “fractional distillation”;746 
it consists of various processes of piling, handling, assembling, circulating, 
combining, coding, etc. – a process that was termed by Kyle McGee recently as 
‘jurimorphing’. As McGee explains further, during the passage of law “the various 
entities and agents at stake are semiotically re-configured – jurimorphised”.747 It is 
during the passage of law where, as Latour describes it, 
 
“a series of transformations, translations, transmutations, 
transubstantiations unfolds; by degrees, and by paying—sometimes 
very dearly—for an endless lineup of clerks, lawyers, judges, 
commentators, professors, and other experts, the passage of law 
gradually modifies the relation between the quantity of facts, emotions, 
passions, as it were, and the quantity of principles and texts on which it 
will be possible to rule. This proportion of relative quantities is known 
by the admirable term ‘legal qualification’”.748 
 
Studying the process of jurimorphing, “step by step”, demonstrates furthermore 
that “Law is […] procedure” and that the “power of the law, like that of a chain, is 
exactly as strong as its weakest link”.749 It demonstrates also that focussing on the 
material and procedural dimension of law at the same time undermines the 
distinction between the law of the books and the law of action – a distinction (as 
we have seen above) emphasised by Bourdieu. And it demonstrates that once a 
case has been translated into a judgment it has become ‘the law’, at least as part of 
case-law and can then, e.g., be cited in subsequent judgments or by legal 
                                                      
745 Latour, The Making of Law, 88 (references omitted). 
746 Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, 365. 
747 Kyle McGee, ‘On Devices and Logics of Legal Sense: Towards Socio-Technical Legal Analysis’, in 
Latour and the Passage of Law, ed. Kyle McGee (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 64. 
See also the discussion in Latour, ‘The Strange Entanglement of Jurimorphs’. For a careful 
reconstruction of the various steps of jurismorphing in a court case see van Dijk, ‘The Life and 
Deaths of a Dispute’, 165–179. 
748 Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, 364 (emphasis in the original). 
749 Latour, The Making of Law, 90 (emphasis in the original). 
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academics. This kind of fixation constitutes then law’s structural conservatism as 
legal experts are “not looking for novelty or for access to remote states of affairs; 
they are seeking only to stir up this fact in every direction in order to see what 
principles could actually be used to judge it; they are seeking only to stir up all 
principles until they find the one that could perhaps be applied also to this fact”.750 
 
Secondly, on the basis of treating law as a ‘network of people and things’ 
and of studying the ‘passage of law’, Latour started more recently to develop a 
specific concept of law and elaborate on the specific function of law. Thus, Latour is 
in particular interested in the question of what makes law specific (‘original’) and 
distinguishes it – what creates its “respectful difference”751 – from other ‘modes of 
existence’ such as politics or religion.752 According to Latour, law is specific 
compared to other modes as it does archive its 
 
 “successive shiftings and translations. [The] originality of law lies right 
here. To ensure continuity despite discontinuity, law links to one 
another the various levels that shifting out keeps on multiplying. […] 
Thanks to law, you can multiply the levels of enunciation without causing 
them to disperse”.753 
 
Law is able to fulfil this paradoxical task because “law is its own metalanguage”;754 
and because it is both “superficial and formal”.755 On the one hand, being superficial 
guarantees that it is so open that everything can be attached to it; being formal 
guarantees, on the other hand, the continuity of the legal enterprise. Moreover, as 
Latour substantiates, the  
                                                      
750 Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, 364 (emphasis in the original). 
751 Latour, 360. 
752 To compare different ‘modes of existence’ shows at least on a first view similarities with Niklas 
Luhmann’s theory of differentiation. However, Latour distinguishes his endeavour sharply from 
Luhmann’s. According to Latour, Luhmann differentiates in terms of domains and builds these 
domains according to professional occupations, see Latour, ‘The Strange Entanglement of 
Jurimorphs’, 339, 344. Latour follows here explicitly Graham Harman’s observation that ‘[i]f 
Luhmann tends to locate each of his “social systems” in a distinct professional place, Latour 
conceives of his modes as separate radio frequencies all occupying the same air space’, Graham 
Harman, ‘Politics and Law as Latourian Modes of Existence’, in Latour and the Passage of Law, ed. 
Kyle McGee (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 50. 
753 Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, 369 (emphasis in the original). On the idea to treat 
law as ‘regime[...] of enunciation’, see also Latour, The Making of Law, 273. 
754 Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, 334. 
755 Latour, 361 (emphasis in the original). 
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“originality of law can be identified by the very notion of procedure; the 
assignation, the signature and its quite distinct ‘tremor,’ since it leaps 
over the division of levels of enunciation; imputation; qualification, the 
link between text and case (what does it mean to be a ‘journalist in the 
sense of article 123 of the code’?); and even canonical definitions such 
as responsibility (‘so-and-so is indeed the author of this act’), authority 
(‘this person is indeed authorized to sign the acts’), property (‘this 
person indeed has to hold that piece of land’)”.756 
 
In this context, Latour continues, “characters become assigned to their acts and to 
their goods. They find themselves responsible, guilty, owners, authors, insured, 
protected. And this authorizes us to say that ‘without law,’ utterances would be 
quite simply unattributable”.757 In other words, law creates “quasi subjects”.758  
 
Thirdly and connected to the previous observations, we can find in this 
literature an emphasis of the agentic quality of non-human ‘actants’ (such as ‘quasi 
subjects’) and, hence, the focus on their performative dimension.759 As we have 
seen in Latour’s reconstruction of the trajectory of files at the Council of the State, 
it is the file, which has agentic qualities. The same holds of course true with other 
non-human devices in legal settings  (and beyond); and, in the end, the same holds 
also true with law and different forms of expertise, which are entangled to it. A 
good example in this regard is Sheila Jasanoff’s reconstruction of how non-legal 
expertise (Jasanoff’s examples are drawn mainly from the natural and life 
sciences) is used in US-American court-cases.760 In contrast to what is commonly 
assumed scientific knowledge does not just ‘enter’ the courtroom and scientific 
expert witnesses do not just present the facts before the court, but things are more 
                                                      
756 Latour, 370 (emphasis in the original). 
757 Latour, 370–371 (emphasis in the original). 
758 Latour, 372 (emphasis in the original). Latour lists in his ‘anthropology of the moderns’ two 
other modes of existence, which create quasi-subjects, namely religion and politics. For example, 
politics and law can be distinguished by the fact that politics operates in cycles while law is always 
directed towards a decision, Latour, chap. 12–13. 
759 Latour refers here explicitly to John Langshaw Austin’s notion of ‘performativity’, see Latour, 
‘The Strange Entanglement of Jurimorphs’, 336. 
760 Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995). 
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complicated as we can observe that fact finding is a complex endeavour of 
boundary negotiations between law and (natural) science.761 For instance, the 
process of fact-finding in science is, at least theoretically, open-ended as the aim is 
to get the facts ‘right’ while, on the other hand, fact-finding in front of a court is 
subject to procedural (legal) rules and “always bounded in time: inquiry has to 
stop when the evidence is exhausted”.762 This does not mean that courts do not 
attempt to get the facts right, but that getting the facts right does mean something 
different in a scientific setting compared to a legal one.763 This difference does 
however not imply that we should present scientific and legal reasoning as 
independent and de-coupled modes of reasoning. Rather, as Jasanoff puts it, “the 
cultures of law and science are in fact mutually constitutive […]”, as, for instance, 
the legal rules of a court will have a direct impact on what counts as good science 
more generally. To study their relatedness could, in the end, help us to understand 
“how these institutions jointly produce our societal knowledge, and our 
relationship with technological objects”.764  
 
 4. The Politics of Expertise in International Law 
 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, traditional mainstream accounts 
distinguish between expertise and politics, knowledge and power. And with the 
exception of Schachter’s ‘invisible college of international lawyers’ do not refer to 
the knowledge form of law as expertise. As I have shown, there are literatures in 
social theory challenging this boundary. This section turns now to the work of 
more critical scholars in the intersection of IR and IL. It starts with a general 
overview (4.1); situates then the discussion in the debate(s) on managerialism, 
fragmentation and constitutionalisation of international law (4.2); reconstructs in 
detail how critical approaches frame the politics of expertise in international law 
                                                      
761 For an at-large discussion of the similarities and differences between scientific reasoning see 
also Latour, The Making of Law, chap. 5. 
762 Jasanoff, Science at the Bar, 9. 
763 To be precise, the truth claims are different. While in law every matter that is legally decided 
counts as truth - in line with the Roman law proverb res judicata pro veritate habetur (the matter 
which has been adjudicated shall be taken as the truth) -, scientific search for truth is open ended, 
see Latour, The Making of Law, 235–243. 
764 Jasanoff, Science at the Bar, 7 (emphasis in the original). 
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(4.3); and finally argues that we should pay more attention to the technicalities 
involved in the politics of expertise in international law (4.4.). 
 
4.1 Is Expertise A-Political and Non-legal? 
 
When we turn our attention now to the work of more critical scholars in IR and IL 
and their assessment of the politics of expertise in international law, we can 
observe that the recent developments in social theory, which I introduced in the 
previous section, influenced these approaches in many ways. By mobilizing these 
literatures critical approaches are able to go beyond more traditional frameworks 
on expertise in IR and IL (see section 2 of this chapter). As noted above, the 
concept of expertise was during the interwar years linked to the idea to make 
insights from early academic IR and its neighbouring disciplines such as IL or 
diplomatic history available to politicians and other practitioners. Behind this 
image of expertise stood the assumption that the most penetrating problems of 
international affairs, such as the elimination of war, can only be solved in a 
technical and a-politicised way. Consequently, it was then the task (and function) of 
the scientific study of international affairs to find these technical solutions – 
solutions, which were usually located within a complex system encompassing 
legal, institutional, educational and ‘propagandistic’ factors. This problem solving 
(self-)image gave IR the opportunity to claim its own disciplinary jurisdiction 
among competing disciplines in order to fill up the lacuna of missing technical 
knowledge on an international scale. In turn, IR then produced a demand in 
problem-solving expertise. Expertise and jurisdiction are co-constitutive. This was 
not only restricted to the interwar years as, for example David Mitrany’s early 
functionalism pointed into the same direction.  
 
What stands out in these accounts – and it seems to be still the case for most 
of contemporary ‘mainstream’ literature on expertise in IR – is the idea that 
experts and expertise are impartial, neutral, objective and stand outside the realm 
of politics. We can find, as among others Frédéric Mégret, Anna Leander and Tanja 
Aalberts have noted, similar conceptualisations of experts and expertise in the 
field of IL and, here, most prominently articulated in Oscar Schachter’s notion of an 
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‘invisible college of international lawyers’, whose function encompasses, on the 
hand, the mediation between different sources of external (i.e. extra-legal) 
expertise and, on the other hand, their translation back into the language(s) of 
international law; a similar position can be found in contemporary scholarship 
claiming the impartiality of judges and experts before courts.765 Although these 
different approaches differ in many aspects, they nevertheless belong to a similar 
image of the ‘international’, namely the international in terms of ‘international 
organisation’ – something that links of course also to the previous discussion in 
Chapter 2 on different conceptualisations of the ‘international’ in different 
interdisciplinary projects between IR and IL. 
 
This image of the role of experts and expertise changed already significantly 
in the literature on epistemic communities, as experts and expertise are not 
framed as apolitical, impartial and neutral anymore. In the epistemic communities 
framework experts rather help to pursue certain political projects and, in 
particular, play a crucial role when decision-makers are confronted with 
uncertainty and ambiguous knowledge. Put differently, experts are here part of 
larger processes of ‘global governance’ (the prevailing image of the international in 
these approaches). Yet, more critical approaches go further and introduce two 
important corrections. First, for example, Ole Jacob Sending argues in his 
Bourdieu-inspired account on international expertise that agency related 
approaches to expertise, such as the literature on epistemic communities or 
Barnett and Finnemore’s study of the bureaucratization of world politics, are 
limited to a certain extend as each of these accounts focuses only on one specific 
type of actors at a time and reconstruct then the trajectories of these actors.766 
Sending suggests that research on expertise should focus instead on different 
groups of experts – ranging from advocacy groups to international public servants 
to diplomats – and examine particularly the ‘in-between’ of these groups in order 
to understand how expert groups compete over authority. In other words, 
                                                      
765 Cf. Anna Leander and Tanja Aalberts, ‘Introduction: The Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise and 
International Security’, Leiden Journal of International Law 26, no. 4 (2013): 783–92; and Frédéric 
Mégret, ‘International Judges and Experts’ Impartiality and the Problem of Past Declarations’, The 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 10, no. 1 (2011): 31–66. 
766 Ole Jacob Sending, The Politics of Expertise: Competing for Authority in Global Governance (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015), 4. Sending engages in his critique explicitly with Haas, 
‘Introduction’; and Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International 
Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
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authority does not originate from the ‘inside’ of expert groups but is the result of a 
successful “claim to represent the international in an impartial and neutral 
way”.767 Second, in line with this observation, some authors such as Leander and 
Aalberts challenge the “presentation of law versus expertise” and claim, instead, 
that “legal expertise is an expertise among many others”.768 This helps to leave the 
image of, for instance, the ‘epistemic communities’ approach behind, which linked 
expertise to fields that are primarily concerned with ‘hard’ and ‘hybrid’ facts. 
Consequently, the world of ‘social’ facts becomes an object of study in the analysis 
of expert work as well – or, if we push this argument even further, the distinction 
between ‘hard’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘social’ facts might even collapse in favour of ‘social’ 
facts as ‘hard’ and ‘hybrid’ facts might be considered part of the ‘social 
construction of reality’.  In a nutshell, critical scholarship break with two 
fundamental assumptions of traditional conceptualisations of expertise in IR and 
IL, namely that, expertise is apolitical, neutral, impartial and, importantly, non-
legal. 
 
4.2 Managerialism, Fragmentation, Constitutionalisation 
 
The more critical literature on international legal expertise is embedded in 
intersecting literatures, which circle around three concepts: managerialism, 
fragmentation and constitutionalisation.  
 
4.2.1 Managerialism 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, different attempts to initialise an interdisciplinary project 
between mainstream IR and IL took the notion of legitimacy as their starting point. 
This ‘turn to legitimacy’ is for some critical scholars – and, here, especially Martti 
Koskenniemi stands out – part of a number of far-reaching transformations; 
transformations that are located in a broader turn to ‘managerialism’ in 
                                                      
767 Sending, The Politics of Expertise, 5; see also Sending, chap. 1. Sending’s analysis resembles here, 
of course, also Andrew Abbott’s project to study expertise as a ‘system of professions’ in which 
different professions compete to expand and stabilize their respective ‘jurisdiction’. For more, see 
my discussion of Abbott’s approach in the previous section. 
768 Leander and Aalberts, ‘The Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise and International Security’, 785. 
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international law. As Koskenniemi depicts the far-reaching results of the 
development, where 
 
“managerialism turns into absolutism: the absolutism of this or that 
regime, this or that system of preferences. The lawyer becomes a 
counsel for the functional power-holder speaking the new natural law: 
from formal institutions to regimes, learning the idiolect of ‘regulation’, 
talking of ‘governance’ instead of government and ‘compliance’ instead 
of ‘responsibility’. The normative optic is received from a ‘legitimacy’, 
measured by international relations – the Supreme Tribunal of a 
managerial world”.769 
 
What is important to not: It is less, if I understand Koskenniemi correctly, 
‘Koskenniemi-the-lawyer’ who experiences it as a problem that international 
lawyers are loosing their hegemonic position to their academic competitors from 
IR when it comes to interpret the ‘international’, but it is rather the anxiety of 
‘Koskenniemi-the-critical-scholar’ who fears that the various transformations 
generated by the managerial project would make the possibility to utter 
fundamental critique nearly impossible. In other words, Koskenniemi fears that 
any possibility to engage in critical theory (written in small or capital letters) as 
any prospect to develop broader strategies of critique could be substituted by the 
vernaculars attached to social engineering, problem-solving, legal instrumentalism 
and ‘empirical social science’. 770  Yet, that for Koskenniemi projects these 
developments towards the academic field of IR as a whole is then, however, a 
problem of his myopic reading of IR as the discipline of ‘regimes’, ‘institutional 
design’, ‘legitimate global governance institutions’, ‘legalization’, etc. In the end, 
such an understanding of IR makes, on the one hand, fruitful conversations 
between critical scholars in both disciplines nearly impossible as it portraits, on 
the other hand, IL as ‘unproblematic’ when it comes to the spread of 
                                                      
769 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law’, 
European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 3 (2009): 411; see also Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom: Kantian Themes in Today’s International Law’, No 
Foundations 4 (2007): 11–17. 
770 The classic articulation of the distinction between critical theory and problem-solving accounts 
is of course Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory’, Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55. 
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managerialism (leaving, e.g., developments such as American legal process schools 
beside). In any case, with regard to ‘managerialism’ the following passage, taken 
from a discussion about “hegemonic regimes”, is typical for Koskenniemi’s 
concern: 
 
“Managerialism is not a solution. It is a problem. To deal with it could 
begin with the translation of its vocabularies, the language of science, 
economics, technique – and law – in political terms. […] Vocabularies 
have histories that are tied with the genealogy of particular forms of 
rule. Gazing into the future in a problem-solving mode prevents asking 
the question about how it is that we are ruled by these languages, these 
men and women. Managerialism thinks of itself as a hill from which it is 
possible to see far. In truth it is a valley in which we always look in the 
same direction – and all the interesting questions lie behind our 
back”.771 
 
Of course, the critique of ‘managerialism’ is far from new for critical legal 
scholars.772 Duncan Kennedy, for example, pointed more than twenty years ago, 
although taking a more general Marxism-plus-semiotics route, into the same 
direction. For Kennedy, the legal discourse, as it is dominated by liberal and 
conservative ideas, has turned into an “instance of managerial discourse in 
general”. The problem with ‘managerialism’ is not that there is no space for 
critique. In fact, on a first view rather the opposite seems to be the case as 
‘managerialism’ is explicitly welcomes for critique. However, a second view reveals 
the how narrow the ‘bounds of critique’ are as critique is only justified (and 
thereby utterable) in order to improve the managerial discourse from within. 
                                                      
771 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes’, in Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing 
Fragmentation, ed. Margaret A. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 324 
(emphasis in the original). 
772 Interestingly, however, as Fleur Johns notes, Koskenniemi never really substantiates the concept 
of managerialism (with the exception of the above mentioned semantic shifts of adjunct concepts). 
As Johns puts it, ‘Koskenniemi seems, for most part, ill-inclined to map this managerialist expanse 
except in the broadest stokes. This is noteworthy given the ambition and tirelessness otherwise 
characteristic of his work’, Fleur Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 15–16. For a short genealogy of managerial rule in 
international law, see Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, 199–205. For 
a more general discussion, see Samuel Knafo et al., ‘The Managerial Lineages of Neoliberalism’, New 
Political Economy, forthcoming. 
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Critique becomes then rather a project of permanent adjustment where the claims 
for fundamental transformation are silenced: ‘Managerialism’ manages it that 
there appears to be “no alternative” to ‘managerialism’ as the underlying form of 
rule. “[W]hile it is permissible to manipulate ‘at the margins’”, Kennedy notes, “it is 
important not to ‘go too far’ in trying to achieve extradiscursive political objects”. 
As a result, this makes “moderation” a “metarule” as if “you take your liberal or 
conservative views about how to handle the distributively significant leeways 
within the mission statement too far, you risk ‘politizing’ the institution, and you 
will be seen as ‘disloyal’”. 773 
 
4.2.2 Fragmentation 
 
 The relationship of ‘managerialism’ and politicization plays also an 
important role in the literature on the fragmentation of international law. The 
observation that international law is witnessing a process of fragmentation links to 
the paradoxical situation, which I have described previously in this chapter when 
discussing contributions on the emergence of ‘knowledge societies’ in more 
‘advanced’ societies. It resembles, in particular, Lyotard’s critique of Bell’s 
diagnostic utopia of the rule of technocratic elites in ‘post-industrial’ societies, 
namely that for Lyotard the proliferation of knowledge in knowledge societies 
does not increase the stability and unity of knowledge but rather produces 
uncertain and fragmented knowledge: different forms of expertise, conceptualised 
as ‘paralogical language games’, compete over discursive hegemony.774 In a similar 
vein, those who observe of a fragmentation of international law emphasise that the 
‘legalization of world politics’ is not only related to the expansion and ‘turn’ to law 
on the international level, but marks also the beginning of the end of international 
legal unity as it was presented, e.g., in Schachter’s ‘invisible college of international 
lawyers’. As we have seen in my discussion above of the ‘invisible college’, 
Schachter was convinced, when writing in the late 1970s that the international 
legal profession would be immune to processes of ‘compartmentalization’ as 
                                                      
773 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siècle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1998), 368–370. 
774 See also Werner, ‘The Politics of Expertise’; and Kessler and Werner, ‘Expertise, Uncertainty, and 
International Law’, 794–795. 
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witnessed at that time in the natural and social sciences. Yet, the fragmentation 
literature argues that Schachter’s prediction was wrong aw we are witnessing 
increasingly processes of ‘compartmentalization’, ‘differentiation’, ‘diversification’, 
‘disaggregation’ and fragmentation of the international legal order. The diagnosis 
of a possible fragmentation of international law caused in the early 2000s serious 
anxieties – “postmodern anxieties” – among many international lawyers and 
spurred an intensive debate within the profession.775 In order to understand the 
extend and nature of fragmentation, the International Law Commission, chaired by 
Koskenniemi, was authorised in 2000 by the UN General Assembly to render an 
expert opinion on the subject matter. As we can read in the final report of the 
International Law Commission, 
 
“The fragmentation of the international social world has attained legal 
significance […]. What once appeared to be governed by ‘general 
international law’ has become the field of operation for such specialist 
systems as ‘trade law’, ‘human rights law’, ‘environmental law’, ‘law of 
the sea’, ‘European law’ and even such exotic and highly specialized 
knowledges as ‘investment law’ or ‘international refugee law’ etc. – 
each possessing their own principles and institutions”.776 
 
Although coming from a perspective that speaks rather of ‘autopoietic regimes’ 
than of “hegemonic regimes”777, Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner 
arrive at a similar conclusion when they write that 
 
“[i]n contrast to the constantly reiterated claims, the appearance of 
global regimes does not entail the integration, harmonization or, at the 
very least, the convergence of legal orders; rather, it transforms the 
                                                      
775 Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties’, Leiden Journal of International Law 15, no. 3 (2002): 553–79. For an excellent exposition 
of the different accounts dealing with the fragmentation of international law, see Anne-Charlotte 
Martineau, Le débat sur la fragmentation du droit international: une analyse critique (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 2015). 
776 International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682’, 13 April 
2006, para. 8. 
777 Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes’. On the differences between ‘autopoietic regimes’ and 
‘hegemonic regimes’, see Martineau, Le débat sur la fragmentation du droit international, chap. 8–9. 
 206 
internal differentiation of law”.778 
 
According to Fischer-Lescano und Teubner “[a]ny attempts to a normative unity of 
global law are […] doomed from the outset” and rather an “intensified legal 
fragmentation” is likely to occur. 779  Being theoretically indebted to Niklas 
Luhmann’s theory of differentiation and his concept of world society, Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner stick to Luhmann’s prediction that the emergence of world 
society would not create global unity, but signifies rather that the segmentary 
differentiation into territories of the international system shifts into a functional-
differentiated world society.780 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner refine Luhmann’s 
observation when they conceptualise the legal fragmentation of world society in 
terms of different legal regimes struggling for discursive hegemony with each 
other by means of expanding their respective jurisdiction.781 The fragmentation of 
international law is then only one aspect of a larger societal, political, cultural, 
economic – and legal – transformation. As any attempt to stop or reverse this 
transformation is bound to fail, “rationality conflicts” between different “functional 
regimes” will emerge on a global scale.782 These conflicts can at best be reduced to 
some extent by legal formalization and the establishment of a ‘collision law’, which 
                                                      
778 Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’, Michigan Journal of International Law 25 (2004): 1009; 
for a more comprehensive version of the argument, see also Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther 
Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2006). 
779 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions’, 1004. 
780 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts, 37. 
For another rather Luhmannian reading see Oliver Kessler and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Functional 
Differentiation and the Oughts and Musts of International Law’, in Bringing Sociology to 
International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory, ed. Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan, 
and Michael Zürn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 159–81. For Luhmann’s original 
statement see Niklas Luhmann, ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 57, 
no. 1 (1971): 1–35. Most authors on fragmentation either follow Fischer-Lescano and Teubner’s 
Luhmannian perspective or do not deeper theorise fragmentation in social theoretical terms. They 
remain at the level of symptoms and do not inquire into the roots of fragmentation (Why is 
fragmentation happening? What are the transformations at stake?). For exceptions, see the 
Foucauldian reading in Nikolas M. Rajkovic, ‘On Fragments and Geometry: The International Legal 
Order as Metaphor and How It Matters’, Erasmus Law Review 6, no. 1 (2013): 6–16; and for a 
general ‘postmodern’ take see Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Constitutionalism and the State of the “Society of 
Networks”: The Design of a New “Control Project” for a Fragmented Legal System’, Transnational 
Legal Theory 2, no. 4 (2011): 463–75. 
781  Fischer-Lescano and Teubner’s use of regimes differs signicantly from the neoliberal 
institutionalist one in IR. For further discussion see Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, Regime-
Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts, 18–23. 
782 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions’, 1006. 
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could provide the arena to tame the underlying politico-legal disputes. 783 In the 
end international law obtains, as Fischer-Lescano and Teubner put it, then the role 
of a “gentle civilizer of social systems”.784 
 
4.2.3 Constitutionalisation 
 
As noted, the diagnosis of a possible fragmentation of international law caused 
serious ‘anxieties’ among many international lawyers and should foster, - at least 
prima facie – as a counter-narrative, scholarship on (global) constitutionalism and 
the constitutionalization of international law.785 Although these literatures seem to 
project constitutional ideas directly from the nation states to the global level, a 
closer look reveals that it was rather the literature on the constitutional dimension 
of the European Union that served as foil. In general, the term constitutionalization 
is usually used to describe the processes, which might in the end lead to a 
constitution beyond the nation state, while constitutionalism denotes rather the 
(normative) ‘mind-set’ that welcomes these processes. 786  More specifically, 
‘constitutionalization’ points to processes, which strengthen legal unity as, for 
example, procedural systematization, principles such as ius cogens and obligations 
erga omnes or institutions such as the UN Charta, international organisations (such 
as the WTO) or globally operating courts.787 Proposals of ‘defragmentation’ are 
then often articulated in the language of (global) constitutionalism.788 Although 
                                                      
783 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung Des Globalen Rechts, 
170–171. 
784 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions’, 1045. 
785 For an overview see Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, eds., The Constitutionalization 
of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Christine E. J. Schwöbel, 
‘Situating the Debate on Global Constitutionalism’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 8, no. 
3 (2010): 611–35. 
786 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about 
International Law and Globalization’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8, no. 1 (2007): 9–36. 
787 Cf. Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Human Rights, 
Constitutionalism and the World Trade Organization: Challenges for World Trade Organization 
Jurisprudence and Civil Society’, Leiden Journal of International Law 19, no. 3 (2006): 633–67; and 
Jürgen Habermas, ‘Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?’, in Der 
gespaltene Westen: Kleine politische Schriften X, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2004), 113–93. 
788 For recent discussions of the fragmentation and constitutionalization debates, see Anne Peters, 
‘Fragmentation and Constitutionalization’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International 
Law, ed. Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1011–31; 
Kessler and Kratochwil, ‘Functional Differentiation’; and Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in 
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‘constitutionalism’ might be understood as an “essentially contested concept”789 
and as this involves the possibility to identify many different notions of 
‘constitutionalism’ in recent debates,790 Jan Klabbers nevertheless asserts that in 
the end the “very idea of constitutionalism presumes that constitutionalism helps 
mankind into an a-political, a-ideological space, a realm somewhere beyond 
politics where people would no longer disagree with each other”.791  
 
Importantly, however, a number of scholars pointed out in the meantime 
that fragmentation and constitutionalization have not to be conceptualised as 
mutually exclusive but rather as “two sides of the same coin”792 or “two processes 
which imply each other”.793 This claim is substantiated by the observation that 
fragmentation and constitutionalization might actually imply each other as in 
processes of functional differentiation not only a series of new ‘functional regimes’ 
emerges but that these regimes become ‘operationally closed’ and, thereby, 
‘deepened’ and ‘densified’ in order to be successful in jurisdictional conflicts with 
other regimes.794 As a result, expressions like “constitutional fragments”795 or 
“hegemonic regimes” emerged in recent years.796  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), chap. 3. 
789 Jessica C. Lawrence, ‘Contesting Constitutionalism: Constitutional Discourse at the WTO’, Global 
Constitutionalism 2, no. 1 (2013): 65. 
790 Christine Schwöbel, for example, identifies four dimensions in the academic debate on global 
constitutionalism: Social constitutionalism which ‘views the international sphere as an order of 
coexistence’; institutional constitutionalism which seeks to control international power relations 
through institutions; normative constitutionalism which ‘Introduces the key themes of idealism and 
pays particular attention to individual rights’; and, finally, analogical constitutionalism which builds 
analogies between domestic and regional constitutions on the one hand and the international 
sphere on the other. All of these dimensions share the ‘same key themes and certain central ideas’, 
which are the institutionalization of power, social idealism, the systematization of law, and the 
recognition of individual rights, but differ in the emphasis of them. Schwöbel, ‘Situating the Debate 
on Global Constitutionalism’, 613, 617, 625, 630, 634. 
791 Jan Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’, International Organizations Law Review 1, no. 1 (2004): 
54. 
792 Peters, ‘Fragmentation and Constitutionalization’, 1030. 
793 Kessler and Kratochwil, ‘Functional Differentiation’, 166. 
794 Klabbers refers to this as ‘the paradox of constitutionalism [...]: Fighting fragmentation by 
consitutionalism will [...] only result in deeper fragmentation, as the various regimes and 
organizations will be locked firmly in constitutional place - and in battle with each other’, Klabbers, 
‘Constitutionalism Lite’, 53. See also Kessler and Kratochwil, ‘Functional Differentiation’, 171. 
795 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism in the Globalization 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
796 Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes’. 
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Finally, an interesting shift in the way critical scholars evaluate these 
processes is noteworthy: while critical voices were, at least at the early stages of 
the fragmentation debate, often very positive about the fragmentation of 
international law, as fragmentation can also be understood as (a form of) global 
legal pluralism and as an opportunity to arrive at a richer representation of a 
pluralized global political landscape – something which might turn, according to 
Leino and Koskenniemi, in the end into “a politics of tolerance and pluralism” –,797 
these voices started later to point to the ‘dark side’ of fragmentation and 
constitutionalization – and, in particular, its link to different forms of 
managerialism. The successive writings of Koskenniemi on this topic are a good 
example, as Koskenniemi moved from the initial hope in ‘tolerance and pluralism’ 
to the negative evaluation that fragmentation produces managerialism when he 
argues that “managerial ideologies” emerged “sometimes in the 1990s” in order to 
provide regimes with “economic, technical and scientific vocabularies” and related 
experts.798 According to Koskenniemi, managerialism was seen as attractive as it 
could help to bring “certainty and solidity (i.e. universal validity)” to those regimes 
– a potential that international law seemed to lack at that time. These vocabularies 
are often derived from institutional economics or rational choice – but also from 
legal formalism; they are part of, what Bourdieu had called, larger universalization 
strategy. As by “adopting a technical vocabulary, one would appear to be speaking 
not only for oneself, one would be representing that which is trues, as technical 
propositions are understood in the audiences committed to them”. 799 While these 
universalization strategies may cause a depolitization of regimes from within, 
                                                      
797 Koskenniemi and Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law?’, 579. See also: ‘Far from being a 
problem to resolve, the proliferation of autonomous or semi-autonomous normative regimes is an 
unavoidable reflection of a “postmodern” social condition and a beneficial prologue to a pluralistic 
community in which the degrees of homogeneity and fragmentation reflect shifts of political 
preference and the fluctuation success of hegemonic pursuits’, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What Is 
International Law For?’, in International Law, ed. Malcom D. Evans, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 47. 
798 Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes’, 312. For the direct link between fragmentation and 
managerialism see: ‘The turn from status to contract, or from form to function. This is what 
international lawyers today call fragmentation. It is not only about technical specialisation [...]. The 
ethos of law and republicanism are replaced by individual interests, strategic planning and 
technical networks; formal sovereignty replaced by disciplinary power; constraint received from 
cognitive instead of normative vocabularies’, Koskenniemi, ‘Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom’, 
11; see also Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics’, The Modern Law Review 70, no. 1 (2007): 1–30. 
799 Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes’, 313. 
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according to Koskenniemi we witness now, as regimes are expanding, “hegemonic 
contestation” between different regimes and their expert vocabularies.800  
 
4.3 Critical Approaches and the Politics of Expertise 
 
One result of the intersecting transformations described in the literatures on 
managerialism, fragmentation and constitutionalization is that the mode and site 
of the political in the ‘politics of international law’ seems to change gradually. This 
is so, as it seems that the ‘politics of international law’ has increasingly become a 
‘politics of expertise’, replacing hence the initial critical project of the ‘politics of 
indeterminacy’, which dominated the early writings of scholars like David 
Kennedy, Martti Koskenniemi, Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil (see my 
discussion of their respective projects in Chapter 3). For example, Koskenniemi 
describes this reorientation in an article, which takes stock after two decades of his 
initial project of the ‘politics if international law’, in the following words: 
 
“Political intervention is today often a politics of re-definition, that is to 
say, the strategic definition of a situation or a problem by reference to a 
technical idiom so as to open the door for applying the expertise related 
to that idiom, together with the attendant structural bias. […] None of 
them [the idioms] is any ‘truer’ than the others […]. If 20 years ago it 
seemed intellectually necessary and political useful to demonstrate the 
indeterminacy (and, thus, political preference) within the idiom of 
public international law, today’s critique will have to focus on the clash 
of different idioms – public international law just one competitor 
among many to global authority – and highlight the way their 
competing descriptions work to push some actors or interests while 
leaving others in the shadow”.801 
 
To turn the focus to international legal expertise and the clash of different 
expert vocabularies has important implications. As David Kennedy and Friedrich 
                                                      
800 Koskenniemi, 312. 
801 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law - 20 Years Later’, European Journal of 
International Law 20, no. 1 (2009): 11. 
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Kratochwil argue, international legal experts ‘translate’ problems into their 
vocabularies and projects; 802  they offer, then, solutions on the basis of these 
vocabularies and projects. In other words, field, expertise, problem and solution 
are co-constitutive. Obviously, these translations are never neutral and cannot 
count as mere transpositions or transplantations from one context into another. 
Rather translations serve, as I have argued in the context of the politics of 
interdisciplinarity already, as sites of open mediation, rewriting and negotiation of 
boundaries. Translations are transformative, as every translation creates 
something new. What we see, if we analyse these processes of translation, is then 
the boundary work or management of boundaries of and through law: experts 
struggle over and negotiate the boundary of the jurisdiction of their respective 
projects. 
 
In order to further specify what the politics of expertise could mean for 
critical scholars, it is helpful to link the literatures on expertise to my earlier 
discussion in Chapter 3 of the various ways the linguistic turn was taken in critical 
IR and IL. To recapitulate, following Sybille Krämer I argued that it is promising to 
distinguish between a ‘performance model’ and a ‘two worlds model’ of language. 
While the ‘two worlds model’ of language distinguishes in its various guises 
between speech and language, where language is ‘behind’ speech and speech 
becomes the actualisation of language, the ‘performance model’ of language in turn 
refrains from the idea that there is a ‘behind’ of language and shifts its focus 
instead to the ‘use’ and ‘performance’ of, e.g., ‘language games’ where ‘language 
games’ are conceptualised as lying in parallel. If we follow this kind of mapping of 
the linguistic turn, the positions of Onuf and Koskenniemi resemble rather a ‘two 
world model’ of language, while Kennedy and Kratochwil rather follow a 
‘performance model’. The different ways the linguistic turn is taken has also 
repercussions on how expertise is conceptualised. Let me illustrate this by 
                                                      
802 ‘It is the expert who stands between the foreground prince and the lay context, advising and 
informing the prince, implementing and interpreting his decisions for laymen. It is the scientists, 
the pollster, who interprets facts for the politician, and it is the lawyer, the administrator, who 
translated political decisions back into facts on the ground. Both the assertion that something is the 
context, and the interpretation of its consequences are the acts of experts’, David Kennedy, 
‘Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance’, Sydney Law Review 27 (2005): 5; see 
also David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 110–116; and Kratochwil, The Status of 
Law in World Society, 30. 
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addressing three themes of the literature on the ‘politics of expertise’ in 
international law. 
 
First, approaches, which are informed by a ‘two world model’ of language, 
are mainly interested in debunking the ‘underlying grammar’ of international legal 
expertise by for example by identifying the underlying ‘rules’ or the ‘deep 
structure’ of international legal argumentation. This is in particular the way 
Koskenniemi conceptualises international legal expertise.803 Koskenniemi explains 
the connection between his earlier analysis of the structure of international legal 
argument in From Apology to Utopia (and in the 1990 article on The Politics of Law) 
and the more recent interest in the politics of expertise as follow:  
 
“The most significant addition […] is emphasis on the structural bias 
that moves from doctrinal analysis to a discussion of institutional 
practices […]. A demonstration of the lack of coherence (‘politics’) of 
legal argument is only a preface to the more important point that 
although all the official justifications of decision-making are such that 
they may support contrary positions or outcomes, in practice nothing is 
ever that random. Competent lawyers know that the world of legal 
practice is actually quite predictable”.804 
 
As a result (and quoting Susan Marks), Koskenniemi points out that one should not 
only highlight the ‘false necessity’ in international legal argumentation, which is 
the result of the indeterminacy of international legal argumentation, but that there 
is also the danger of  focussing zoo much on ‘false contingence’ as international 
legal argumentation is more structured as some fellow critical legal scholars 
conceptualise it.805 In order to understand Koskenniemi’s point, it is important to 
recognize that he emphasises the relevance of ‘grammar’ and ‘competence’ – and 
                                                      
803 I will not discuss the position of Nicholas Onuf in detail, as he does not address the question of 
international legal expertise explicitly. Suffice is to say that if one would take the route of Onuf’s 
rule-based version of constructivism in order to study international legal expertise, one would 
probably highlight how international legal expertise is structured by the underlying rules of 
international law and how one becomes an international legal expert if competent in using these 
rules. 
804 Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law - 20 Years Later’, 9 (emphasis in the original). 
805 Koskenniemi, 9; and Susan Marks, ‘False Contingency’, Current Legal Problems 62, no. 1 (2009): 
1–21. 
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how both are intertwined. Following the structuralist route, Koskenniemi 
conceptualises ‘grammar’ as being about the ‘deep structure’ of language, i.e. what 
is behind speech.806 In the case of international legal argumentation the ‘grammar’ 
is the root distinction and constitutive paradox of normativity and concreteness. 
Now, for Koskenniemi, international legal experts are those who are ‘competent’ in 
using this ‘grammar’. As Koskenniemi writes in the newly added epilogue of the 
2005 edition of From Apology to Utopia, “[t]he politics of international law is what 
competent international lawyers do. And competence is the ability to use grammar 
in order to generate meaning by doing things in argument”.807 In other words, one 
becomes an international legal expert when one knows the ‘deep structure’ of 
international law and is able to use this in legal argumentation, i.e. to oppose a 
rather normative argument with a rather concrete one, and vice versa. In short, 
competence is in Koskenniemi’s account the main criterion for international legal 
expertise. 
 
Second, approaches that leave the ‘two worlds model’ of language behind and 
follow instead a ‘performance model’ of language do not highlight competence but 
rather performance when they study expertise.808 A good example in this regard is 
David Kennedy’s work on international legal expertise. As outlined in Chapter 3, 
Kennedy argues that we “should think about international law as a set of 
arguments and counter-arguments, rhetorical performances and counter-
performances, deployed by people pursuing projects of various kind”.809 This 
means for Kennedy, when it comes to study international legal expertise, that the 
main interest should be in “the performative dimension of expertise: expert work 
                                                      
806  Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What Is Critical Research in International Law? Celebrating 
Structuralism’, Leiden Journal of International Law 29, no. 3 (2016): 727–35. 
807 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument , 
reissue with a new epilogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 571 (emphasis in the 
original). 
808 The distinction between competence and performance goes back to Chomski. While in 
Chomski’s ‘two world model’ of language performance is a realisation of competence, ‘performance 
models’ of language do not focus on an underlying competence - as there is nothing underlying or 
behind - but on performance. For further discussion see Sybille Krämer, Sprache, Sprechakt, 
Kommunikation: Sprachtheoretische Positionen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001), 
52–54. 
809 David Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and Warfare’, in The Cambridge Companion to International Law, ed. 
James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 173; 
similarly, Kennedy, A World of Struggle, 269. 
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constituting the space of its own work”.810 To concentrate on the ‘performative 
dimension of expertise’ implies, for Kennedy, on the one hand, that experts are 
part of world-making activities.811 Experts have projects and these projects have in 
turn ‘pictures’ of how the world should be. However, different projects have 
different pictures. “In this sense”, Kennedy writes, “the world-making power of 
expertise is relational: world pictures that comprehend and shape the world and 
its problems are calibrated to the position people in struggle whish to occupy”.812 
And, related to it, it means, on the other hand, that we should focus on expert work 
and the competition between different forms of expertise.813 Kennedy further 
explains this, when he defines expertise as follows: 
 
“Expertise is special knowledge made real as authority in struggle. My 
starting point for exploring expertise is the work experts do […]. Expert 
work positions the people who do it between what is known and what 
must happen. The work is interpretive, translating the known into 
action and knitting the exercise of power back into the fabric of fact. 
One characteristic is disagreement. Experts struggle with one another 
using tools of interpretation, articulation, and persuasion that are, 
when effective, at once words and authority”.814  
 
In other words, Kennedy is mainly interested in analysing how different experts, 
conceived as ‘people with projects’, struggle. Yet, these struggles can be different in 
different fields and sites of international law. There is no common ‘grammar’ (in 
the structuralist sense) or ‘deep structure’ of international law as in Koskenniemi’s 
take. Instead, Kennedy follows his take on international law as permanently 
moving between different binaries, which are ontologically on the same level (see 
my reconstruction in Chapter 3), and proposes that in order to understand “how 
experts govern – how they develop and deploy their expertise, how they struggle 
and reason with one another, and how their knowledge comes to be taken up by 
others – we need field- and site-specific studies alongside work on patterns of 
                                                      
810 Kennedy, A World of Struggle, 4. 
811 Kennedy, chap. 3. 
812 Kennedy, 90. 
813 This resembles, of course, also Andrew Abbott’s account in: Abbott, The System of Professions. 
See also my discussion above in this chapter. 
814 Kennedy, A World of Struggle, 108 (emphasis in the original). 
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struggle among experts and expert communities”.815 The aim is consequently not 
to find the ‘deep structure’ of the international legal argument, but to map and 
thereby depict different forms of struggles among international legal experts.816 
This is of course part of the reconstructive methodology, which I outlined in 
Chapter 1. By producing different maps of international legal expertise, Kennedy is 
able to show that international legal expertise involved, for example, in struggles 
over war and peace differs from the one over human rights or the one over 
neoliberal economic development. 817  Expertise is never fixed, but always 
performed. Kennedy differs also in another aspect from the structuralist position. 
Although Kennedy distinguishes between background and foreground, where 
experts are located in the background and layman and politicians in the 
foreground, neither the foreground nor the background is ontologically prior. 
There is no hierarchy between background and foreground. Instead, background 
and foreground are ontologically on the same level and the linking between both 
becomes a translation between two different vocabularies. In order to study the 
different forms of international legal expertise, the task is now to make the 
background visible.818 This connects, of course, perfectly with Anne Orford’s 
suggestion to follow Foucault and “to make visible precisely what is visible”.819 
 
Third, authors who use a ‘performance model’ of language also point to the 
possibility to study international legal expertise by analysing it as a ‘form of life’ 
and the ‘embodiment’ it involves. We have seen in Chapter 3 that Friedrich 
Kratochwil recently started to compare legal argumentation with learning a 
language, which in turn can be connected to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘form of life’. 
As Kratochwil states: “Learning such a language and speaking about the world in 
such ways means to participate in a practice, a shared form of life, as Wittgenstein 
has called it. It involves reasoning but much of what goes on is more a ‘knowing 
how’ than just a ‘knowing what’ (namely, the rules)”. 820  In Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy the concept of ‘form of life’ is central. It points to the fact that our 
                                                      
815 Kennedy, 120. 
816 Kennedy, 75, 120–135. 
817 Kennedy, 143–147. 
818 Kennedy, 110–116. 
819 Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, Leiden Journal of International Law 25, no. 3 (2012): 618. 
See my discussion in Chapter 1. 
820 Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society, 67. 
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‘language games’ are embedded in activities. Wittgenstein writes in the 
Philosophical Investigations: “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form 
of life”.821 This means that language is not only an activity but part of an activity.822 
‘Language games’ are interlinked with nonverbal activities. Linguistic rules are 
then not self-explanatory but have to be embedded in practices – practices we are 
already familiar with; and, we are familiar, because we have been ‘trained’.  Thus 
to focus on ‘forms of life’ opens up the possibility to study nonverbal activities and 
the ‘embodiment’ involved in international legal expertise.823 Anne Orford points 
in a study, which is inspired by Foucault, to the various ‘technologies of the self’ 
involved in the making of an international lawyer, in particular when it comes to 
the ‘embodiment’ of internationalism – an understanding of internationalism that 
is also the basis for experts in the various strands of ‘humanity’s law’.824 Most 
obviously, international legal experts are educated in a certain way. As Orford 
points out, international lawyers “through disciplinary training come to embody 
and internalise the foundational narratives of their discipline”.825 The ‘embodied 
and internalised foundational narratives’ of internationalism create identities of a 
heroic ‘self’; yet, at the same time exclude certain narratives:  
 
“Rather than explore the centrality of international law to past and 
present processes of imperialism, exploitation, domination, 
recolonisation and elite identity formation, international law students 
and teachers idealise international law as a subject devoted to world 
order, humanitarianism, human dignity, peace and security. 
                                                      
821 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: 
Macmillan, 1953), para. 23. 
822 Krämer, Sprache, Sprechakt, Kommunikation, 119. 
823 For a link between ‘forms of life’ and ‘embodiment’ see Sybille Krämer, ‘Is There a Language 
“Behind” Speaking? How to Look at 20th Century Language Theory in an Alternative Way’, in 
Language and World, Part Two: Signs, Minds and Actions, ed. Volker Munz, Klaus Puhl, and Joseph 
Wang (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2013), 44–50. 
824 Anne Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism: The Making of International Lawyers’, Australian 
Yearbook of International Law 19 (1998): 1–34. Such an approach resembles, of course, also studies 
of David Kennedy. See, for instance: David Kennedy, ‘Spring Break’, in Knowledges: Historical and 
Critical Studies in Interdisciplinarity, ed. Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, and David J. 
Sylvan (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 422–61. A good example for 
international criminal law is: Immi Tallgren, ‘We Did It? The Vertigo of Law and Everyday Life at 
the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, Leiden Journal 
of International Law 12, no. 3 (1999): 683–707. 
825 Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism’, 2. 
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International law’s favourite narratives are premised upon an image of 
the international community as the heroic agent of progress, security, 
order, human rights and democracy. […] International lawyers come to 
understand themselves as the embodiment of heroic internationalism, 
and of the values and myths that underlie international law”.826 
 
As this internationalist word-view is internalised by many international lawyers, it 
is not questioned anymore. Yet, the only question is now how to manage 
internationalism. International lawyers turns then into the “managerial hero [who] 
is a pragmatic internationalist, whose effectiveness is a result of his 
professionalism and managerial culture”.827 In the end, a new role of international 
lawyers is created – “a role of international lawyers as pragmatic, apolitical, 
civilised, humane and cosmopolitan professionals, whose works is central to the 
march of human history and to achieving the goals of dignity, world peace, human 
rights, development, universal democracy and civilisation”.828 
 
4.4 Experts and the Politics of Legal Technicalities and Jurisdiction 
 
Yet, the internationalist world-view of many international legal experts is not only 
taken for granted as it is embodied and internalized. Another important aspect of 
the proliferation of international legal expertise is the increasing ‘technicality’ of 
international legal argumentation. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that in 
order to study the ‘politic of expertise’ in international law it is important to study 
the ‘politics of technicalities’. Let me outline what I mean by ‘politics of 
technicalities’ briefly. 
 
 Thinking of fragmentation and constitutionalization as ‘two sides of the 
same coin’ implies also that the different vocabularies of international legal 
expertise are often highly complex; a complexity that creates then in turn a new 
demand for experts. As David Kennedy puts it, the “power of experts and the 
                                                      
826 Orford, 16. 
827 Orford, 6. 
828 Orford, 23–24. 
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density of law are linked”.829 However, according to Fleur Johns, Kennedy is not 
able to properly grasp the density of law properly. As Johns criticizes, the “elegant, 
readable essays that Kennedy has lately produced seem, in particular, to speak at 
too great a remove from the rather dense, self-referential practices of international 
legal technique”.830 Put differently, the density of law is essentially a product of the 
technical dimension of law. This means that today often a certain task - and the 
related project – is usually framed and embedded to a large extend in highly 
technical idioms of law. One consequence of this development is that sometimes 
situations are created where not only lay people but even legal professionals 
specialised in other sub-fields of law are not able to participate successfully in legal 
communication anymore.831 The idea to study the technical side of law, i.e. how 
law itself is (becoming) a highly technical idiom that can only be mastered by a 
limited group of experts, has been popularized by Annelise Riles in her work on 
the “technicalities” of law.832 Although to study law as a technicality might seem at 
first sight, as Riles admits, “mundane and inherently uninteresting”, it facilitates 
however to uncover how the politics of (international) legal expertise actually 
work.833 It is a way of ‘opening the black box’ of law and look into the unfolding 
fabric; it helps us to find “important overlooked practices and rationalities that 
have significant effects”;834 and, by doing so, it enables us  to uncover the hidden 
politics of expert works. As Marieke de Goede and Gavin Sullivan observe in their 
study of the politics of security lists, “[t]echnicality does not so much dissolve 
                                                      
829 Kennedy, Of War and Law, 25. 
830 Johns, Non-Legality in International Law, 18. 
831 For a general overview of how in international law the ‘technical’, expertise, managerialism and 
fragmentation hang together, see Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law’, 1–2; 
Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters’, 414; and Leander and Aalberts, ‘The Co-Constitution of Legal 
Expertise and International Security’. See also the case study on constitution-making by Sara 
Kendall, ‘“Constitutional Technicity”: Displacing Politics through Expert Knowledge’, Law, Culture 
and the Humanities 11, no. 3 (2015): 363–77. 
832 Annelise Riles, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities’, 
Buffalo Law Review 53 (2005): 973–1033. For a contextualisation of this approach within the 
different strands of socio-legal studies see Annelise Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in 
the Global Financial Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 14–20. 
833 Riles, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law’, 974; see also Riles, Collateral Knowledge, 
64–70. 
834 Marie-Eve Sylvestre et al., ‘Spatial Tactics in Criminal Courts and the Politics of Legal 
Technicalities: Spatial Tactics in Criminal Courts’, Antipode 47, no. 5 (2015): 1350. On ‘blackboxing’ 
see Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 304. See also my discussion of ANT earlier in this chapter. 
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political questions […], however, it buries such questions within registers of 
expertise”.835 
 
Furthermore, in order to scrutinize the ‘technical character of law’ it is helpful 
to assemble a couple of threads of the preceding and upcoming discussions. As 
Riles argues, to study legal technicalities would shed light to “ideologies” of “legal 
instrumentalism and managerialism”; to “actors” such as “the scholars and 
practitioners who treat the law as a tool or machine and who see themselves as 
modest but expertly devoted technicians”; to a distinct “problem solving 
paradigm” understood as “the orientation toward defining concrete, practical 
problems and toward crafting solutions”; and, finally, to “the form of technical legal 
doctrine and argumentation” itself, which is then encompassed in a “technical 
aesthetics of law”.836 In other words, the “focus is on the resources, mechanisms 
and knowledge structures that legal practitioners deploy in order to make sense if 
their world”.837 For Riles the technical dimension of law should also be conceived 
as performative as we should “account for the agency of technocratic legal form”.838 
Furthermore, to present a specific issue as something technical in legal terms is 
already a political project. And finally, it is interesting to note – as it touches upon 
one of the key terms of this study – that Riles started to turn to the ‘technicalities 
of law’ vis-à-vis the literature of the ‘conflict of laws’, i.e. the field of law, which is 
also known as private international law. The conflict of laws literature is 
interesting as it is the strand of law that deals mainly with questions of jurisdiction 
by determining, which legal system and what kind of law should regulate disputes 
with multi-jurisdictional elements.839 Although I will not pay much attention to 
questions of jurisdiction in private law, the following three chapters are located in 
the intersection of jurisdiction and international legal expertise – and the different 
                                                      
835 Marieke de Goede and Gavin Sullivan, ‘The Politics of Security Lists’, Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space 34, no. 1 (2016): 82. 
836 Riles, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law’, 976. 
837 Sylvestre et al., ‘Spatial Tactics in Criminal Courts and the Politics of Legal Technicalities’, 1349. 
838 Riles, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law’, 980. 
839 Riles, 976; see also Mariana Valverde, ‘Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal `Technicalities’ as Resources 
for Theory’, Social & Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (2009): 139–57; similarly Sundhya Pahuja speaks of 
‘’technical’ practices’ in the context of ‘jurisdictional encounters’, Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Laws of 
Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law’, London Review of International Law 1, no. 
1 (2013): 65. 
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legal and non-legal technicalities (e.g., interpretative techniques; but also the use 
of lists and legal indicators) involved in it.840 
 
 5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to situate this thesis in larger recent debates on the 
‘politics of expertise’ among critical scholars in IR and IL. As we have seen at the 
outset of this chapter, international legal experts play an important role in more 
and more fields and sites of the ‘international’. Yet, as this chapter argued the 
question of expertise is hardly new for students of the ‘international’. Therefore, 
the chapter reconstructed first larger academic debates and scholarly projects in 
the history of the two disciplines – the interwar attempts to describe the League of 
Nations as a body of expertise, functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches and, 
finally, Schachter’s ‘invisble college of international lawyers’. These literatures 
pictured the ‘international’ either in terms of ‘international organization’ or ‘global 
governance’ and link thus to my earlier discussion in Chapter 2. Moreover, these 
literatures clearly separate politics and expertise and, consequently, knowledge 
and power. In order to challenge this view, I introduced recent streams of social 
theory which problematize such a separation between politics and expertise – and 
conceptualise legal knowledge as a distinct form of expertise: Abbott’s ‘system of 
professions’, Bourdieu’s ‘juridicial field’ as well as recent contributions in 
STS/ANT. Finally, I turned to critical scholarship in IR and IL and how it 
conceptualises the ‘politics of expertise’ in international law. This literature 
situates the ‘politics of expertise’ in international law within broader – and often 
intersecting – transformations of international law, which run under the labels 
‘managerialism’, ‘fragmentation’ and ‘constitutionalisation’. Although the various 
streams of critical scholarship share the observation that these transformations 
                                                      
840 Although positivist accounts treat international law usually as part of general jurisprudence it 
was, for instance, Hersch Lauterpacht, who made early (in his PhD thesis) a strong argument in 
favour of treating international law more like private law as both private law and international law 
are about governing the relations between equals - something where questions of jurisdiction 
become paramount. See Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Private Law Analogies in International Law with 
Special Reference to International Arbitration’ (The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 1926). See also my discussion of Lauterpacht in Chapter 6. For an argument regarding the 
‘remarkable overlap’ of European tort law and international responsibility in international law, see 
André Nollkaemper, ‘Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of International Responsibility’, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 16, no. 2 (2009): 543. 
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are somehow happening and that we are witnessing a turn to expertise in 
international law, they nevertheless conceptualise, problematize and theorize the 
‘politics of expertise’ in different ways. As I have argued, the differences among  
critical scholars can be attributed to the different ways they take the linguistic 
turn, which I discussed at the end of Chapter 3. While authors, who rely on a ‘two 
world model’ of language foreground ‘competence’ when it comes to evaluate 
international legal expertise, proponents of a ‘performance model’ of language 
emphasise the ‘performativity’ of expert work. Moreover, the latter highlight that 
international legal expertise is embedded in a certain ‘form of life’ and is connected 
to practices of ‘embodiment’. Last but not least, I argued that to study the ‘politics 
of expertise’ in international law by turning to ‘legal technicalities’ could be a 
promising avenue as it could help to ‘open several black boxes’, including the one 
of jurisdiction. The next three chapters will reconstruct the politics of jurisdiction 
in international law and how experts are involved in the boundary work of 
jurisdiction. While the next chapter focuses on conceptual and historical aspects of 
jurisdiction, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 turn to an analysis of the politics of 
jurisdiction in the context of an emerging ‘humanity’s law’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 222 
Chapter 5: The Concept of Jurisdiction: Between Territoriality and 
Universality 
 
“The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction – question it and all that is solid 
melts into air”841 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
On 27 May 2013, the Ethiopian Prime Minister and then-Chairman of the African 
Union (AU) Hailemariam Dessaglegn found harsh words at the closing press 
conference of the 21st AU Summit in Addis Ababa in order to criticise the 
International Criminal Court (ICC):  
 
“African countries came to a consensus that the process the ICC 
conducted in Africa has a flaw. The intention was to avoid any form of 
impunity and ill governance and crime, but now the process has 
degenerated into some kind of race hunting”.842 
 
The origin of Dessaglegn’s accusations was the circumstance that at the time of the 
statement the ICC had started – as the ICC calls it – ‘preliminary investigations’, 
‘situations under investigation’ and ‘cases’ only where African countries were 
involved. For Dessaglegn this was already sign enough to claim that the ICC was 
conducting ‘some kind of race hunting’ on the African continent. These accusations 
were backed further by an official statement, also dated on the 27 March 2013, of 
the AU Assembly of Heads and States of Government (AU Assembly). The 
statement, while more ‘diplomatically’ in its formulations, backed its Chairman’s 
position substantively as it stressed “the need for international justice to be 
conducted in a transparent and fair manner, in order to avoid any perception of 
double standard, in conformity with the principles of international law”.843 
 
                                                      
841 Richard T. Ford, ‘Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction)’, Michigan Law Review 97, no. 4 
(1999): 851. 
842 Solomon Dersso, ‘The International Criminal Court’s African Problem’, Al Jazeera, 11 June 2013. 
843 African Union, ‘Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)’, Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XXI) (2013). 
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Both statements were triggered by the attempt of the ICC to bring Uhuru 
Kenyatta and William Ruto, President and Deputy-President of the Republic of 
Kenya respectively, as well as other leading politicians of the East African country 
to trial in The Hague for the alleged conduct of crimes against humanity. They 
were accused of having committed these crimes between December 2007 and 
February 2008 in the context of post-election violence with at least 1,100 killed, 
thousands injured and 660,000 of displaced people.844 The aim of the AU was not 
to drop the indictment against Kenyatta and the other politicians accused. And in 
fact, Kenyatta himself had cooperated with the ICC so far – may it be out of 
strategic calculations to avoid an arrest warrant from the ICC and not because he 
considered the ICC as the legitimate institution to deal with his case. In any case, 
what matters was the AU’s claim to refer the ICC’s investigations and prosecutions, 
as it was put, “pursuant with the principle of complementarity enshrined in the 
Rome Statute of the ICC” back to a domestic Kenyan court 
 
“to allow for a National Mechanism to prosecute and investigate the 
case under a reformed Judiciary provided for in the new constitutional 
dispensation, in support of the on-going peace building and national 
reconciliation processes, in order to prevent the resumption of conflict 
and violence in Kenya”.845 
 
The Addis Ababa episode was only one of the most recent peaks of what one 
observer coined the “International Criminal Court’s African problem”:846 a series of 
serious attacks by leading African politicians against the court in The Hague in 
particular and international criminal law and justice more generally.847 The core of 
these accusations was not limited to the point that the ICC was too selective in its 
operations as it mostly targeted African countries and investigated African 
                                                      
844 Cf. Amnesty International, ‘Crying for Justice: Victims’ Perspectives on Justice for the Post-
Election Violence in Kenya’ (London: Amnesty International, 2014). 
845 African Union, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). 
846 Dersso, ‘The International Criminal Court’s African Problem’. 
847 Cf. African Union, ‘Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction’, Doc. Assembly/AU/14(XI) (2008); African Union, ‘Decision on the 
Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’, 
Doc. Assembly/AU/3(XII)  (2009); and African Union, ‘Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction’, Doc. Assembly/AU/11(XIII) (2009). 
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politicians, but the claims contained also that the actions of the ICC reflect the 
distribution of power in world politics and that, in the end, the ICC should be 
perceived as a political instrument of either – here the interpretations of the 
various observers varied – the United Nation’s Security Council, the European 
Union or Western countries in general.  
 
Yet, a second view reveals that these claims are everything but new. For 
example, the ICC has been called previously already the “European Court of African 
Affairs” due to the selection of cases and as the ICC reflects an European project – 
both in its intellectual as well as in its political origins.848 And, furthermore, since 
the emergence of international criminal justice and adjudication – something 
which might have occurred during the early and mid-twentieth century – several 
authors argued over and over again that international penal courts and tribunals 
are political courts realizing some kind of ‘victor’s justice’ and pursuing political 
trials – although the term ‘political’ is used here in different ways by different 
authors.849 In this context, Gerry Simpson remark that international criminal trials 
and tribunals can also be seen as “trials of the ‘political’ or, at least, indictments of 
the political” is important.850 
 
                                                      
848 Sarah Nouwen, ‘The International Criminal Court: A Peacebuilder in Africa?’, in Peacebuilding, 
Power, and Politics in Africa, ed. Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2012), 172; David Hoile, a controversial Sudan-based British scholar was even more drastic 
in his opinion of the ICC: ‘The ICC in reality is not an international court; basically, it’s a European 
court. Most of the world population is not covered in the ICC. China is not there, the US is not there, 
Russia is not there, so the ICC is in essence a European court: European funded, European jury, 
European directed’, David Hoile, ‘ICC Is a Political Arm of Europe in Africa’, The Ethiopian Reporter, 
19 October 2013. 
849 Compare, for instance, early Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘The Problem of an International Criminal 
Court’, Current Legal Problems 3 (1950): 263–96; later Otto Kirchheim, Political Justice (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961); and Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); recently Gerry Simpson, Law, War and Crime: War 
Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), chap. 1; and 
Danilo Zolo, Victors’ Justice: From Nuremberg to Baghdad (London: Verso, 2009); see also the 
exchange between Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner on the one hand and Bas Schotel on the 
other: Sarah M. H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International 
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’, European Journal of International Law 21, no. 4 (2011): 941–
65; Bas Schotel, ‘Doing Justice to the Political. The International Criminal Court in Uganda and 
Sudan: A Reply to Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner’, European Journal of International Law 22, 
no. 4 (2011): 1153–60; and S. M. H. Nouwen and W. G. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan: A Rejoinder to Bas Schotel’, European Journal of 
International Law 22, no. 4 (2011): 1161–64. 
850 Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 13. 
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But let us turn again to the conflict between the ICC and the AU: Similar 
allegations, namely of being partial and political, were rejected already earlier by 
the ICC. The Court’s self-imaginary could be paraphrased as “to stay clear of 
politics, to subordinate politics to law, and to speak law to power”.851 Law and 
politics are thus conceptualised as opposites: the biggest anxiety of the ICC, it seems, 
is to be contained with politics. With this in mind it does not surprise that the ICC’s 
first reaction after the AU summit in May was framed exactly in this vernacular. On 
29 May 2013, only two days after Dessaglegn’s statement, the presidency of the 
ICC did something rather unusual as it issued a press release, where the court 
assured that the  
 
“ICC operates strictly within the mandate and legal framework by the 
Rome Statute […] and cannot take political factors into account. 
Decisions are taken independently on the basis of the law and the 
available evidence and are not based on regional or ethical 
considerations”.852  
 
Furthermore, the Court addressed the question of complementarity by claiming 
that the 
 
“ICC does not replace national jurisdictions; it only complements them 
when necessary. The Rome Statute defines the criteria for deciding 
whether a case should be tried before the ICC or in a national judicial 
system, and this determination is made through a judicial process of 
independent judges of the ICC”.853 
 
Although the ICC’s position appears, when we read these statements, to be set in 
stone, it seems however that we are witnessing some changes on a longer run as 
the ICC has recently widened its area of operation and conducted since 2013 
preliminary examinations with regard to Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Palestine, 
                                                      
851 Nouwen and Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political’, 2011, 492; Gerry Simpson observes this 
tendency for international criminal courts and tribunals more generally: ‘Ideally, the trial is a place 
liberated from politics and the contamination politics threatens’, Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 11. 
852 International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘ICC Underlines Impartiality, Reiterates Commitment to 
Cooperation with the African Union’, ICC-CPI-20130529-PR908  (2013). 
853 International Criminal Court (ICC) (emphasis added). 
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the Philippine854, the vessel ‘Mavi Marmara’855, Cambodia, Ukraine and Venezuela 
as well as it has currently Georgia as a situation under investigation. Although the 
ten remaining situations under investigations and all 24 cases, which are currently 
adjudicated before the Court, concern African countries, one can at least concede 
that the ICC has started to widen its scope. In a similarly ambivalent fashion, the 
investigations against Kenyatta were, on the one hand, dropped in December 2014 
while, on the other hand, the investigations against Ruto and others still continue. 
At the same time, however, the AU has not disarmed its rather dismissive position 
towards the ICC as it threatened in January 2016 that African countries could 
withdraw from the Rome Statute and, consequently, leave the Court’s 
jurisdiction.856  
 
  Yet, by providing this empirical example it was not intended to open up, for 
instance, an at-large discussion of the post-colonial implications of the 
international criminal justice regime in particular857 or ‘the racial origins of 
international law’ more generally;858 it was also not intended to point in the 
opposite direction and argue that the open hostilities of (some) leading African 
politicians were less about the discrimination of Africans before the ICC as they 
rather signified an attempt of autocratic rulers like the Sudanese head of state 
                                                      
854 As a reaction on the preliminary examinations the Philippines announced on 19 March 2018 to 
leave the jurisdiction of the ICC. However, the ICC reaffirmed that it will continue its preliminary 
examinations. The ICC’s press release states: ‘Should, at the conclusion of the preliminary 
examination process, the Prosecutor decide to proceed with an investigation, authorisation from a 
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met’, International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘ICC Statement on The Philippines’ Notice of Withdrawal: 
State Participation in Rome Statute System Essential to International Rule of Law’, CC-CPI-
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856 See ‘African Union Members Back Kenyan Plan to Leave ICC’, The Guardian, 1 February 2016. 
857 For a comprehensive overview of different critical, postcolonialism being one of them, 
perspectives towards international criminal law, see Frédéric Mégret, ‘International Criminal 
Justice: A Critical Research Agenda’, in Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An 
Introduction, ed. Christine Schwöbel (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 17–53; see also Nouwen, 
‘The International Criminal Court: A Peacebuilder in Africa?’ 
858 For a recent statement with regard to IL, see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Race, Hierarchy and 
International Law: Lorimer’s Legal Science’, European Journal of International Law 27, no. 2 (2016): 
415–29; for a similar discussion in IR, see Robert Vitalis, ‘The Graceful and Generous Liberal 
Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations’, Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 
331–56. 
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Omar al-Bashir to get ‘immunity from impunity’;859 and finally, it was not intended 
to start a debate about the ‘catalysing’ effect of the ICC on national justice systems, 
i.e. whether national courts and judges change their behaviour due to the 
(indirect) pressure generated by the possibility of an adjudication of international 
crimes before international criminal courts and tribunals.860Instead, the aim of 
providing this introductory example was to take up the thread of the preceding 
chapter and to show how politics and legal technicality are intertwined. They are 
intertwined as the conflict between the AU Assembly and the ICC represents a 
conflict about a rather technical legal issue: the issue of jurisdiction.  
 
Let me just briefly elaborate on this. The conflict between the ICC and the AU 
was in nuce about the question of who (should) judge(s) (quis judicabit) Kenyatta 
and the other Kenyan politicians – whether it should be a national Kenyan court or 
the ICC. Typically this is a question of jurisdiction and in the context of the ICC a 
question of ‘complementarity’. If we take a look at the Rome Statute of the ICC, 
Article 17 on ‘Issues of admissibility’ is particularly relevant for our purpose. To 
get a better picture, it is worth to quote the whole, rather long, Article: 
 
“1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the 
Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:  
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution;  
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person 
concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or 
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;  
                                                      
859 Amnesty International, ‘Impunity vs Immunity: Africa and the ICC’, Amnesty International (blog), 
24 June 2015. 
860 For an in-depth analysis, see Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The 
Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
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(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is 
the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted 
under article 20, paragraph 3;  
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.  
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by 
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as 
applicable:  
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned 
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court referred to in article 5;  
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice;  
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently 
or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner 
which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice.  
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability 
of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused 
or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry 
out its proceedings”.861 
Article 17 addresses the issue of jurisdiction vis-à-vis the principle of 
complementarity. When we read this article, we may gain the impression that the 
                                                      
861  International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 
A/CONF.189/9 (1998), para. 17. 
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idea of complementarity is stated quite clearly and questions of jurisdiction are 
merely procedural – complementarity is as technical as possible as it works as a 
‘trigger’ or a ‘mechanism’. This line of argumentation was repeatedly emphasised 
by the ICC and provided an important source of legitimacy for the international 
criminal justice regime as a whole: it provided legitimacy through procedures.862 
As, for example, Sarah Nouwen pointed out, “[l]egally, ‘complementarity’ is a 
technical term of art for a priority rule set out in article 17 of the Rome Statute”.863 
But, according to Nouwen, this is not the full story as complementarity is also 
about the ‘belonging’ and ‘possession’ of crimes – whether certain crimes ‘belong’ 
or are ‘possessed’ by states (equated with power politics) or by international 
courts and tribunals (considered as trials of humanity).864 These are, however, 
questions, which cannot simply be resolved by imposing more legal rules as these 
questions deal with fundamental tensions and paradoxes. Nouwen suggests here 
that the ICC should not try to “find a super-guardian to guard the guardians” and 
answer the perennial question of who judges the judges (quis custodiet ipsos 
custodies).865 Instead, Nouwen suggests that the ICC should “take the political 
reality as its explicit starting point” and acknowledge that the involved tensions 
and paradoxes cannot be solved from within the law.866 Such a reading of 
complementarity points thus to the politics involved in discussions of 
complementarity and, more generally, of jurisdiction. This position goes hand in 
hand with the reading of jurisdiction, which I suggest in this chapter. It is a reading 
which advocates the idea that technical-legal issues with regard to the jurisdiction 
of, for example, the ICC involve important questions, which, although formulated in 
a formalistic-legalistic vocabulary, are rather situated in the intersection of 
international law and politics than being solely of technical-legal nature. 
 
                                                      
862 See for an in-depth discussion of the relationship of legitimacy/legitimation and procedures, 
Niklas Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1969). 
863 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 14. 
864 See Nouwen, 14–21. 
865 Nouwen, 403. 
866 Nouwen, 403. Of course, in this regard one of the characteristics of (international criminal) law 
becomes central, namely that law usually ends endless theoretical discussions by presenting a 
decision. For instance, in the case of Kenyatta Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC, consisting of three 
judges, decided (with Judge Hans-Peter Kaul presenting a Dissenting Opinion) to open up 
investigations against Kenyatta, International Criminal Court (ICC), Pre-Trail Chamber II, ‘Decision 
on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali’, ICC-01/09-02/11-1 (2011). 
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This chapter aims thus to get a better grip on the concept of jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is, as we have seen for instance in the ICC’s statement, commonly 
perceived as a highly technical-legal term – as we have seen towards the end of the 
preceding chapter it is the prime example for Annelise Riles when she speaks of 
‘legal technicalities’ – and almost conceptualised as a brute fact or independent 
object in a world out there. In contrast to this traditional view, I will however 
argue that jurisdiction should be perceived as a social and political practice, which 
has strong repercussions on how authority and power are distributed in global 
politics and how order is formed, maintained and contested. Questions of 
jurisdiction are thus highly political. And questions of jurisdiction come with 
different projects. For instance, if we look at the history of jurisdiction, questions of 
jurisdiction emerged in the transition from medieval to early modern Europe. In 
this period claims of universal jurisdiction, which were propagated by Pope and 
Emperor, were opposed by other rulers through the invocation of the notion of 
territorial jurisdiction, which became then an important criterion of the modern 
sovereign state. Subsequent to this shift, the world could be conceptualised as 
divided into different states each having exclusive jurisdiction over their ‘own’ 
territory – the ‘modern international’ was born. Classic international law (as well 
as modern world politics) is built upon the idea of territorial jurisdiction and its 
corollary of state sovereignty as it is concerned to guide (and rule) the conduct 
between sovereign states. However, the dominance of the paradigm of territorial 
jurisdiction became explicitly contested in recent times. Here, international 
criminal law as well as the other strands of an emerging ‘Humanity’s Law’ are 
among the main challenge(r)s of this logic as they seem to (re)introduce the idea(l) 
of universal jurisdiction. The invocation of  ‘Humanity’s Law’ and its consequences 
will be the subject of the last two substantial chapters of this thesis. Before I 
address this, let me problematize and theorize, first – in this chapter –, the concept 
of jurisdiction.  
 
 In order to crack open the concept of jurisdiction, this chapter will pursue 
two strategies. As a first strategy, I will introduce in the next section (2.) recent 
literatures, which – although coming from different theoretical angles – challenge 
traditional notions of jurisdiction and conceptualise jurisdiction as a social and 
political practice. Following this ‘synchronic’ reading, I will pursue a second 
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strategy – a ‘diachronic’ reading of the concept – and historicise the concept in 
section 3.867 I will start this historical inquiry of the concept of jurisdiction by 
focussing on the transition from medieval to early modern Europe and end with 
the concept’s modern enunciation in classic international legal positivism. Yet, let 
me note an important caveat, here. The historical reconstruction of the use and 
function of the concept is not intended to provide an all-encompassing history of 
jurisdiction as it rather aims to show how the uses of the concept changed over 
time and, thus, to point to the (historical) contingency of todays concept(s) of 
jurisdiction. For instance, as I focus mainly on the European context, non-European 
developments and, in particular, the jurisgenerative function of encounters 
between Europeans and non-Europeans remains certainly understudied in this 
chapter. 868  Nevertheless, and put more generally, to reflect upon both the 
synchronic and diachronic uses of the concept, i.e. to reconstruct its grammar (in a 
Wittgensteinian sense), will help me in the remaining chapters to ‘re-situate’ and 
‘free’ the concept from different traditional constrains, such as its link to exclusive  
territoriality or the idea that questions of jurisdiction are a-political as they are 
part of a neutral legal-technical domain. This will set then the tone for upcoming 
discussions regarding the politics of expertise and legal technicalities as politics of 
jurisdictional projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
867 The idea to distinguish between a synchronic and a diachronic reading is, of course, rooted in 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 
pt. 2 and 3. However, in contrast to Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistic, which equates the 
synchronic with the static and the diachronic with evolution, I argue that both - the synchronic and 
the diachronic - are dynamic (and usually intertwined). 
868 On the jurisgenerative function of encounters and how encounters actually created international 
law, see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). For a similar argument with regard to cartography, see Ricardo 
Padrón, The Spacious Word: Cartography, Literature, and Empire in Early Modern Spain (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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 2. Jurisdiction as Social and Political Practice 
 
This section will challenge traditional notions of jurisdiction, which conceptualise 
the term as neutral, technical and a-political.869 One consequence of treating the 
concept of jurisdiction as a technicality is the fact that there are only very few 
contributions, which actually theorize and problematize the concept in itself. This is 
even more surprising as jurisdiction is a central concept in all branches of law.870 
The mainstream literature on jurisdiction usually limits itself to an opening 
statement about the etymological origins of the concept – something like: the 
concept of jurisdiction derives from two Latin terms, the noun ius (sometimes also 
written jus), meaning ‘law’, and the verb dicere, meaning ‘to speak’.871 Jurisdiction 
is thus usually translated as the authority to speak the law.872 Furthermore, what is 
often included in international legal contributions is an enumeration of different 
‘categories’ (e.g., prescriptive, enforcement or judicial jurisdiction) and  ‘principles’ 
(e.g., nationality, territoriality or universality) of jurisdiction, which should help to 
delimit different jurisdictional orders. What remains missing, however, is how 
these categories and principles actually came into being or how they are linked to 
more general legal and political problematiques. In short, a genuine theoretical 
debate with regard to the concept of jurisdiction is still missing.873  
 
                                                      
869 Of course, such accounts often do not exist in a ‘pure’ form. But, in order to get a better picture of 
traditional accounts of jurisdiction, see, for example, Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International 
Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Christopher Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’, in 
International Law, ed. Malcom D. Evans, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 309–35; 
and, Bruno Simma and Andreas Th. Müller, ‘Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to International Law, ed. James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 134–57; for an overview in international criminal law, see 
Antonio Cassese et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), chap. 14–17. 
870 For a similar complaint see Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, ‘Questions of Jurisdictions’, 
in Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, ed. Shaun McVeigh (Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 2007), 3. 
871 ‘Juristouching’ and ‘Jurismorphing’, two terms, which I discussed in the previous chapter, have 
similar etymological roots and also point to the process of transforming something into a legal 
issue. It is also interesting to note that the Latin word iu-dex, which means judge, has exactly the 
same etymological roots as jurisdiction (i.e. ‘ius’ and ‘dicere’), Emile Benveniste, Indo-European 
Language and Society (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 392; cf. Dorsett and McVeigh, ‘Questions of 
Jurisdictions’, 3; and Asha Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’, The Modern Law Review 78, no. 5 
(2015): 761. 
872 It is noteworthy here that even the link to the concept of authority was not enough to treat 
jurisdiction as a concept with social and political relevance. 
873 Gregor Noll, ‘Theorizing Jurisdiction’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, 
ed. Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 602–603. 
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On the other hand, more critical approaches remained for a long time 
silence(d) with regard to the concept of jurisdiction as well. This may be due to the 
fact that the critical literature – with all its twists and turns – gave much more 
attention to jurisdiction’s adjacent concept, the concept of sovereignty. Surely, this 
is not to say that there has not been done valuable work with regard to the concept 
of sovereignty – quite the opposite is the case, as theorizing and problematizing 
sovereignty was one of the major hubs for critical thinking in both IR and IL – but it 
means that the focus on sovereignty made the concept of jurisdiction somehow 
‘invisible’ for the purpose of analysis.874 This tendency was further aggravated, as 
even in critical studies the notion of sovereignty was associated with the ‘political’ 
and theory in general while jurisdiction on the other hand with legal formalism 
and subsequently treated as a technical aspect of practicing law.875 Moreover, as 
Bradin Cormack notes, “excluding jurisdiction as a contributing term, has made 
sovereignty more stable as it is”.876 Yet, against all odds, we can observe more 
recently a “nascent field of jurisdictional studies”, which started to reconstruct, 
theorize and problematize the concept in various (legal) fields and does so from a 
variety of critical perspectives. 877 What is common to these accounts is that they 
do not treat jurisdiction as a neutral, technical and a-political term anymore but 
rather understand jurisdiction as a social and political practice. Importantly, this 
                                                      
874 The critical literature on sovereignty is extensive and cannot be captured in a sole footnote. But 
see, for example, Tanja E. Aalberts, Constructing Sovereignty between Politics and Law (London: 
Routledge, 2012); Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, eds., Sovereignty Games 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Antony Anghie, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in International 
Law’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 5, no. 1 (2009): 291–310; Richard K. Ashley, ‘Untying 
the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique’, Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies 17, no. 2 (1988): 227–62; Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jens Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as 
Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Sovereignty 
as “Dominium”: Is There a Right to Humanitarian Intervention?’, in Beyond Westphalia? National 
Sovereignty and International Intervention, ed. Michael Mastanduno and Gene Lyons (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 21–42; Nicholas Onuf, ‘Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual 
History’, Alternatives 16 (1991): 425–46; Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the 
State, and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Wouter Werner 
and Jaap de Wilde, ‘The Endurance of Sovereignty’, European Journal of International Relations 7, 
no. 3 (2001): 283–313. 
875 For a similar claim, see Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’, 763. 
876 Bradin Cormack, A Power to Do Justice: Jurisdiction, English Literature, and the Rise of Common 
Law, 1509-1625 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 9. 
877 Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’, 759. Kaushal’s article presents an excellent overview of a 
number of recent developments in critical legal contributions to jurisdiction; . The chapters of the 
following collection of essay point in the same direction: Shaun McVeigh, Jurisprudence of 
Jurisdiction (Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 2007); see also the monograph by Shaunnagh Dorsett 
and Shaun McVeigh, Jurisdiction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). For a recent reconstruction of 
jurisdiction with a focus on international law, see, for example, Noll, ‘Theorizing Jurisdiction’. 
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emphasises the dynamics and contingency (indeterminacy) of law and, thus, the 
politics of law within legal language itself.878  In what follows now, I will 
reconstruct a number of these more recent attempts: which conceptualise 
jurisdiction as a social practice (2.1); embedded questions of jurisdiction within 
discussions in legal and political theory (2.2); point to the spatio-temporal fixes of 
jurisdiction (2.3); and link it to the literature on legal pluralism and postmodern 
concepts of law (2.4) 
 
2.1 Jurisdiction as social practice: Ford 
 
A good starting point to problematize and theorize jurisdiction is Richard T. Ford’s 
now seminal article on Law’s Territory.879 Ford’s article deals with a specific form 
of jurisdiction – territorial jurisdiction – and refers in its examples mainly to the 
sub-national level of the United States. Nevertheless, the article is helpful for our 
purpose as it tackles various conceptual puzzles of jurisdiction and – I will come 
back to this issue in the next section of this chapter – provides an extensive 
reconstruction of the concept’s history as well. Coming from a CLS-plus-Foucault-
inspired background, Ford argues that we should perceive jurisdiction not “solely 
in terms of material/spatial attributes, as if it were simply an object or a built 
structure” but “also [as] a discourse, a way of speaking and understanding the 
social world”.880 In other words, jurisdiction has a material as well as a discursive 
dimension and it is important to study both in conjunction in order to understand 
their interplay. In order to bring discourse and materiality together it is, according 
to Ford, fundamental to think of “territorial jurisdiction as a set of social practices, 
a code of etiquette”. As such, it must “be learned and communicated to others”.881 
 
This process of learning and communicating works mostly through maps 
and other forms of graphic representation. In this context, Ford compares the 
                                                      
878 Cf. Cormack, A Power to Do Justice, 2. 
879 Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’; for recent discussions of Ford’s article in the intersection of IR and IL, 
see Philip Liste, ‘Transnational Human Rights Litigation and Territorialised Knowledge: Kiobel and 
the “Politics of Space”’, Transnational Legal Theory 5, no. 1 (2014): 1–19; and Anne Orford, 
‘Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility to Protect’, 
Michigan Journal of International Law 30 (2009): 981–1015. 
880 Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 855. 
881 Ford, 855. 
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practice of jurisdiction with the practice of dancing the Tango: on the one hand, we 
learn to dance the Tango by looking at graphic descriptions such as diagrams 
where the steps are mapped; on the other hand, however, these graphic 
descriptions produce material consequences as people are actually moving 
according to them. With regard to jurisdiction this works in a similar way as 
 
“jurisdiction is a function of its graphical and verbal descriptions; it is a 
set of practices that are performed by individuals and groups who learn 
to ‘dance the jurisdiction’ by reading descriptions of jurisdictions and 
by looking at maps. This does not mean that jurisdiction is ‘mere 
ideology’, that the lines between various nations, cities and districts 
‘aren’t real.’ Of course the lines are real, but they are real because they 
are constantly being made real, by county assessors levying property 
taxes, by police pounding to beat (and stopping at the city limits), by 
registrars of voters checking identification for proof of residence. 
Without these practices the lines would not ‘be real’ – the lines don’t 
pre-exist the practices”.882 
 
Consequently, jurisdiction is in itself a practice and not only a space – the 
jurisdictional space – in which practices can be performed; and, as such the 
boundaries of the jurisdictional space are open to change. If we return to the 
example of the Tango, we can further see how the practice of the Tango ascribes 
certain roles to individuals – for instance, dancing the Tango involves two 
‘subjectivities’ – a ‘man’ and a ‘woman’ – and a hierarchical relationship between 
these subjectivities – while the ‘man’ leads, the ‘women’ follows. The categories of 
‘man’ and ‘woman’, and the roles that are ascribed to these categories, do not pre-
exist its social infabrication but dancing the Tango is one of “hundreds of social 
practices [which] construct these gendered roles and encourage people to conform 
to them”. If repeated over time this kind of  “conformity will become ‘second 
nature’”.883Here again, jurisdiction works in an analogous way as it “constructs 
legal statuses” and, as Ford points out, “when we perform these jurisdictional roles 
they too become ‘second nature.’ But this type of ‘second nature’ is the product of 
                                                      
882 Ford, 856 (emphasis in the original). 
883 Ford, 857. 
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social practices that are enforced by social custom and, more importantly, by 
law”.884 
 
 Insisting on the performative and productive dimension of jurisdiction, i.e. 
how jurisdiction constructs for example legal statuses (and not only offers a 
‘neutral’ description of facts out there and a mechanism of subsumption for these 
facts), encourages Ford to study how (neo-liberal) governmentality works through 
jurisdiction. As we will see later in this section, such an understanding of 
jurisdiction has recently been further advanced by a number of other scholars in 
the Foucauldian tradition. As Ford puts it, “jurisdiction is a tool for government”.885 
And, in particular territorial jurisdiction works as a “foundational technology of 
political liberalism”.886 As tool and technology of (neo-)liberalism jurisdiction is, 
firstly, part and parcel of a wider spectrum of so-called ‘technologies of the self’ as 
it is, secondly, an important boundary drawing device. As Ford describes it: 
 
“Just as liberal institutions such as individual rights help to define the 
boundaries of the liberal citizen, so the institutions of jurisdiction 
define the body politic. These walls of liberalism do in fact define liberty, 
but they do much more than this – they create the very entity that is to 
enjoy liberty. Both individual rights and the formal rule of jurisdiction 
are ‘technologies of the self’; they are discourses and concrete acts that 
define political selfhood and provide the model for biological 
individuals to ‘perform themselves’ as (autonomous, rational, profit-
maximizing, god fearing, desiring, raced, sexed) selves”.887 
 
Closely connected to the observation that jurisdiction helps to create the ‘walls of 
liberalism’ is the claim that it is in particular territorial jurisdiction which 
“construct[s] political subjectivity”. 888  This is the case because modern 
governments “are defined by territory” and individuals move within territories. As 
such, jurisdiction “in fact defines a relationship between the government and 
                                                      
884 Ford, 858 (emphasis in the original). 
885 Ford, 898. 
886 Ford, 897. 
887 Ford, 898 (emphasis added). 
888 Ford, 899 (emphasis in the original). 
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individuals, mediated by space. Territory acts as a medium of governmental power 
as well as its primary object. Territory is, in this sense, a container that holds a 
bundle of individuals and resources, just as fee simple ownership of real property 
consists of a bundle of rights”.889 I will come back in the next section to the tight 
link between jurisdiction and territoriality when I reconstruct the history of 
jurisdiction. But, for now, one last point in Ford’s approach to jurisdiction is 
worthwhile to address with regard to our discussion. 
 
When I introduced in Chapter 3 the projects of the two critical international 
legal scholars David Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi, I emphasised that both 
share the method to reconstruct legal argumentation through ‘doubles’ or 
‘binaries’ – in the case of Kennedy these doubles were more or less contingent in 
substance while Koskenniemi linked all the variegating doubles of international 
legal argumentation to the original binary – the root binary – of normativity and 
concreteness. In a similar fashion, Ford attempts to deconstruct the discourse of 
jurisdiction by making use of the method of doubling.890 According to Ford, the 
structure of the jurisdictional argument oscillates between two opposed 
conceptions – and projects – of jurisdiction, as arguments about jurisdiction can 
either be linked to a “synthetic” or an “organic” conception of jurisdiction. This 
opposition can be employed “by various actors as arguments for or against a given 
controversial action”. 891  It is indicative to see that Ford illustrates this 
argumentative struggle between different notions of jurisdiction with the 
following example: 
 
“For instance, a jurisdiction may be described as synthetic by someone 
who wishes to change the jurisdiction against the wishes of affected 
parties, while the same jurisdiction may be described as ‘organic’ by 
those who wish to assert ‘rights’ to the jurisdiction”.892 
 
                                                      
889 Ford, 904; the container metaphor goes back to Peter J. Taylor, ‘The State as Container: 
Territoriality in the Modern World-System’, Progress in Human Geography 18, no. 2 (1994): 151–62. 
890 And, as in the case of David Kennedy, the methodological inspiration comes from Duncan 
Kennedy’s masterful deconstruction of Blackstone’s Commentaries: Duncan Kennedy, ‘The 
Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries’, Buffalo Law Review 28 (1979): 205–382. 
891 Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 861–862. 
892 Ford, 862. 
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According to Ford, conceptualising jurisdiction in an “organic” way means 
that it “corresponds with the production of the local” as it “safeguards tradition and 
legacy”. Here, jurisdiction emerges from a natural order and is as such 
conceptualized as pre-political. “Synthetic jurisdiction”, on the other hand, 
“corresponds with the regularization of the body politic” and “stands for progress 
and efficiency”.893 Treating jurisdiction as synthetic implies also that jurisdiction is 
socially imposed and, hence, the result of a foundational political process. 
Furthermore, organic jurisdiction naturalizes while its synthetic counterpart 
rationalizes. The two poles of jurisdiction resemble also the German distinction 
between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). Although both 
notions of jurisdiction seem to build a stable opposition, they are never 
hermetically closed – and, from a critical perspective, to find cases in between will 
destabilize and deconstruct the opposition.  
 
For instance, when we go back to our introductory example – the dispute 
between the AU und the ICC – we can see how this dispute oscillates between both 
notions of jurisdiction. On a first glance, it seems that the AU invokes an organic 
conception of jurisdiction as it claims that the prosecution should be referred back 
to the judiciary of Kenya as the local Kenyan jurisdiction is the natural side to 
decide the case – also in order to maintain stability and avoid violence; while on 
the other side the ICC seems more to correspond to a synthetic conception of 
jurisdiction as it points to its capacity to rationalize through process, progress and 
efficiency. However, on further scrutiny we can also see that the binary is not 
hermetically closed as the ICC often operates through the seemingly pre-political 
(natural justice-like) principle of impunity while the AU points to its capacity to 
rationalize the conflict as Kenya has, in the meantime, ‘improved’ (i.e., rationalized 
in a Western sense) its domestic judiciary system.  
  
At this point, it is useful to look at how we can refine, improve and expand 
Ford’s account of jurisdiction. With regard to our purpose three recent 
developments seem to be of particular interest. First, there is an emerging 
scholarship, which links the concept of jurisdiction to a ‘thicker’ notion of politics. 
                                                      
893 Ford, 862. 
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Introducing this research will help me to clarify what I actually mean when I speak 
of the politics of jurisdiction. Second, deepening the understanding of jurisdiction 
from a Foucauldian perspective (broadly conceived) will help me to point not only 
to the ‘territorial’ but also to broader spatial and temporal dimensions of 
jurisdiction. And finally, reconstructing the literature on jurisdiction and legal 
pluralism will provide me with important links to the debate on the fragmentation 
of international law, which I addressed below in Chapter 4. 
 
2.2 Jurisdiction and Politics: Kaushal 
 
What does it actually mean, when we speak about the politics of jurisdiction? Asha 
Kaushal, for instance, argued recently that we should understand jurisdiction as a 
genuine political concept.894 “Jurisdiction is not insulated by technical padding, it is 
necessarily political too – from the beginning and all the way along”.895 Drawing 
mainly on discussions in political and legal theory, Kaushal attempts to move 
‘beyond’ Ford’s account.896 A good starting point in this regard is her discussion of 
Ford’s binary of synthetic and organic forms of jurisdiction. As Kaushal highlights: 
 
 “Territorial jurisdictions not only produce synthetic identities of 
rationalisation and draw lines around already-existing organic 
identities, thus fomenting two corollary kinds of political subjectivity, 
they also do something more basic: they enact the very idea of political 
identity and subjectivity”.897 
 
In this context it is important to note that for Kaushal the political is about 
constituting a collectivity as community and how a community is linked to power and 
authority.898 It seems that in this account every community is necessarily based on 
a legal order – ubi societas ibi ius. And where there is law, there is jurisdiction. 
                                                      
894 Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’. 
895 Kaushal, 764. 
896 For a similar but also different attempt to link political and legal theory, see Dorsett and 
McVeigh, Jurisdiction. 
897 Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’, 769. 
898 Kaushal, 764; Kaushal draws mainly on Sheldon Wolin, who conceptualises the political as ‘the 
union of authority and community’, Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, 2nd ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 314. 
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Jurisdiction has then the function to highlight the boundaries of law, as it inhabits 
the “threshold between law and non-law”. 899 According to Kaushal jurisdiction is 
here the „labourer of law“ as it sets “the original terms of the existence of law, and 
then for its entry and exit”. 900 Jurisdiction is hence about the “modes or manner of 
coming into law [and] of belonging to law”.901 In other words, first come questions 
of jurisdiction and then only those of more ‘material’ law.902 Consequently, in 
terms of research, the study of jurisdiction provides us with “a valuable lens 
because it illuminates the legal threshold – the limits and bounds of law. This 
means that jurisdictional inquiries tell us what law is willing to let in and what it 
keeps out”.903To study the politics of jurisdiction works thus as a proxy to study – 
let’s say – the politics of international law – and due to the growing relevance of 
legal language in global politics more generally, to study jurisdiction pins down the 
processes of how global authority is contested and allocated.904 
 
 To study jurisdiction in this way, points also to the fact that the politics of 
jurisdiction is not only linked to territorial jurisdiction, as it was still the case in 
Ford’s early critical (frame)work. For sure, Ford himself emphasised that he 
examines territorial jurisdiction only because it is the prevailing form in law and 
that, in the end, “jurisdictional space is conceptually empty” and as such an “empty 
vessel for governmental power”, which in turn can be filled with “any number of 
specific things and social relationships”.905 But even the ‘empty vessel’ in Ford’s 
account is still connected to spatial scales, metaphors and devices (such as maps 
and cartography).  
 
 
 
                                                      
899 Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’, 783. 
900 Kaushal, 759. 
901 Kaushal, 759. 
902 Noll, ‘Theorizing Jurisdiction’, 601. 
903 Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’, 791 (emphasis in the original). 
904 This links certainly to the recent discussions on different forms of non-legality and a-legality. On 
this see Fleur Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); and Hans Lindahl, ‘A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal 
Boundaries’, The Modern Law Review 73, no. 1 (2010): 30–56. I addressed this also in Chapter 1. 
905 Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 504. 
 241 
2.3 Jurisdiction as Chronotope (Valverde) 
 
It was particularly Mariana Valverde who started to claim that critical scholars 
should overcome the strong tie between jurisdiction and territoriality, which has 
been foundational of modernity’s conceptions of the ‘state’ and the 
‘international’.906 By leaving the tie between jurisdiction and territoriality behind, 
Valverde attempts to understand how govenernance through jurisdiction works. She 
shares this Foucauldian-inspired interest with Ford (although Ford, as we have 
seen, still discusses it in the context of territorial jurisdiction). As Valverde puts it, 
to investigate jurisdiction will help us to better understand how law and 
governmentality are interlinked as “[l]egal governance […] is always already 
governed: and the governance of legal governance is the work of jurisdiction”.907 
 
In order to understand the ‘governance of legal governance’ properly, it is 
important to move beyond an exclusively spatial concept of jurisdiction as such a 
concept only reveals the “where” (i.e., in which territory) and the “who” (i.e., 
whose authority) of governance.908  These were the main concerns of, e.g., 
Kaushal’s discussion of jurisdiction and political community. Valverde, however, 
postulates that the critical analysis of jurisdiction should go one step further and 
concentrate as well on the “how” of governance, i.e. how governance through 
jurisdiction works.909 
 
This implies methodologically that one should focus on how different projects 
of jurisdiction are connected to different logics and practices of governance.910 Here, 
Valverde stresses the necessity of foregrounding the role, which legal technicalities 
play in these projects of jurisdiction.911 Moreover, to scrutinize projects of 
                                                      
906 Cf. Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale, and Governance (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015), 37–45, 57. Valverde repeatedly engaged with jurisdiction, see Mariana Valverde, 
‘Analyzing the Governance of Security: Jurisdiction and Scale’, Behemoth 1, no. 1 (2008): 3–15; 
Mariana Valverde, ‘Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal `Technicalities’ as Resources for Theory’, Social & 
Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (2009): 139–57; and Mariana Valverde, ‘Studying the Governance of Crime 
and Security: Space, Time and Jurisdiction’, Criminology and Criminal Justice 14, no. 4 (2014): 379–
91. 
907 Valverde, ‘Jurisdiction and Scale’, 141 (emphasis added). 
908 Valverde, 144. 
909 Valverde, 144; Valverde, ‘Studying the Governance of Crime and Security’, 388. 
910 Valverde, ‘Studying the Governance of Crime and Security’, 383–385. 
911 Cf. Valverde, ‘Jurisdiction and Scale’. 
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jurisdiction vis-à-vis different logics and practices of governance reveals that 
different jurisdictional projects do not just incorporate different ways to divide 
(territorial) space but also different ways of temporal (and other forms of) 
ordering as “each mode of jurisdiction has one or more distinct temporalities”.912 
For instance, a jurisdictional project based on criminal law (usually conceptualised 
through a ‘backward-looking’ logic) works differently than a project, which is tied 
to a logic of risk management (usually conceptualised as ‘forward-looking’). I will 
come back to this point in Chapter 7, where I reconstruct the recent use of 
international criminal law in the context of the discourse on intervention. For now 
it is, however, important to notice, that Valverde challenges also, as she calls it, the 
Newtonian idea of thinking space and time separately and objectively. Borrowing 
from Russian literary critic and semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin, Valverde introduces 
the notion of the “chronotope” and argues that we should think of different 
jurisdictional projects as chronotopes, i.e. intersections of time and space.913 These 
projects operate on different levels of scale (regarding both space and time). To 
look at jurisdiction in this way enables us to understand complex governing 
manoeuvres in the broader “legal game of jurisdiction”:914 different jurisdictional 
projects interact, intersect, overlap, clash and hybridize. 
 
2.4 Jurisdiction and (Postmodern) Legal Pluralism: Berman and de Sousa Santos 
 
To treat jurisdiction as a ‘game’ brings us also back to the debate(s) concerning the 
fragmentation and constitutionalization of international law, which I introduced in 
the preceding chapter. I mentioned in this context that critical scholars perceived – 
at least in the early 2000s – the supposedly on-going fragmentation of 
international law as a more or less favourable development. This positive 
evaluation of fragmentation was fostered by the idea that one can read 
fragmentation also as a pluralisation of the international legal order, which could 
then be connected to a broader normative project of ‘global legal and political 
pluralism’ (representing then the critical counter-project to global 
                                                      
912 Valverde, 154. 
913 See, in particular, Valverde, Chronotopes of Law, chap. 1. 
914 Valverde, ‘Jurisdiction and Scale’, 139. For a similar use of the game metaphor see Adler-Nissen 
and Gammeltoft-Hansen, Sovereignty Games. 
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constitutionalism). It is, therefore, of little surprise that critical studies of 
jurisdiction also started to incorporate insights from the literature on global legal 
pluralism. The most important contribution in this context is probably Paul Schiff 
Berman’s seminal journal article on The Globalization of Jurisdiction, in which 
Berman elaborates on the basis of the conflict-of-laws-literature a cosmopolitan 
framework of global pluralism.915 This framework is cosmopolitan (or liberal), as 
Berman claims, a “jurisdictional community”, which is based on liberal values 
broadly conceived, should emerge and serve as a space for jurisdictional debates in 
order to solve conflicts of laws and the current clash of jurisdiction.916 Such an 
image of jurisdictional community, however, replicates and projects the idea of the 
liberal modern nation state only on a global scale – it creates a functional 
equivalent.  
 
Yet, there is a more radical strand in the literature on global legal pluralism, 
which goes one step further as it does not search for functional equivalents of the 
nation state on a global level. For instance, Valverde repeatedly refers in her work 
to another pioneering piece of legal pluralism, which is Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos’ influential 1987-article on a ‘postmodern conception of law’.917 In contrast 
to Berman, de Sousa Santos advances a more radical notion of legal pluralism, ‘a 
pluralism without a centre’ so to say, which he describes as follows:  
 
“Legal pluralism is the key concept in a postmodern view of law. Not the 
legal pluralism of traditional legal anthropology in which the different 
legal orders are conceived as separate entities coexisting in the same 
political space, but rather the conception of different legal spaces 
superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds as much as in 
our actions, in occasions of qualitative leaps or sweeping crises in our 
life trajectories as well as in the dull routine of eventless everyday life. 
                                                      
915 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘The Globalization of Jurisdiction’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
151, no. 2 (2002): 311–529; see also the discussion in Kaushal, ‘The Politics of Jurisdiction’, 771–
775. 
916 See also the discussion in Alexis Galan and Dennis Patterson, ‘The Limits of Normative Legal 
Pluralism: Review of Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond 
Borders’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 11, no. 3 (2013): 783–800. 
917 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of 
Law’, Journal of Law and Society 14, no. 3 (1987): 279–302; Valverde, ‘Jurisdiction and Scale’, 140–
143; Valverde, Chronotopes of Law, 48–51. 
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We live in a time of porous legality or of legal porosity, of multiple 
networks of legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and 
trespassings. Our legal life is constituted by an intersection of different 
legal orders, that is, by interlegality. Interlegality is the 
phenomenological counterpart of legal pluralism and that is why it is 
the second key concept of a postmodern conception of law”.918 
 
From this point of view, to focus on ‘interlegality’ (a neologism advanced by de 
Sousa Santos, which obviously derives from the semiotic core concept of 
intertextuality) helps us to understand processes of fragmentation as highly 
dynamic “because the different legal spaces are non-synchronic and thus result on 
uneven and unstable mixings of legal codes (codes in a semiotic sense)”.919 On the 
one hand, jurisdiction can help to settle disputes about “who rules over a 
spatiotemporal unit” as it is a boundary-drawing device. This is the case as 
“jurisdiction also sorts competing powers and knowledges into ready-made, 
clearly separate pigeon-holes. An open-ended non-legalistic discussion […] is thus 
foreclosed”.920 On the other hand, jurisdictional boundaries are never fixed and 
stable: even when boundaries are formally established, disputes about jurisdiction 
will not end as this is only the starting point for conflicts about the ‘correct’ 
interpretation and management of these boundaries. 
 
 In short, this section challenged accounts, which only conceptualise 
jurisdiction as a technical aspect of law. By drawing on the emerging critical 
literature on jurisdiction, I rather suggested that jurisdiction should be conceived 
as a social and political practice. This helped me to highlight how governance 
through jurisdiction works and to introduce the cornerstone of a multidimensional 
account of jurisdiction, which enables us to analyse how different jurisdictional 
projects – involving different temporal and spatial logics – interact, intersect, 
overlap, clash and hybridize.  
                                                      
918 de Sousa Santos, ‘A Map of Misreading’, 297–298 (emphasis in the original); . Another classic of 
the more radical strand of legal pluralism - this time from a modern systems theory perspective - 
would be Gunther Teubner, ‘“Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’, in Global 
Law Without A State, ed. Gunther Teubner (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 3–28. 
919 de Sousa Santos, ‘A Map of Misreading’, 298. 
920 Valverde, Chronotopes of Law, 85. 
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 3. A Short History of Jurisdiction 
 
The previous section introduced recent literatures and debates, which started to 
engage with the concept of jurisdiction from a critical vantage point. As suggested 
at the outset of this chapter, I will now turn to the history of jurisdiction. This goes 
hand in hand with the suggestion of treating jurisdiction as a social and political 
practice. To treat jurisdiction as a social and political practice means that practices 
of jurisdiction change and transform over time and that we cannot operate with a 
concept of jurisdiction that operationalizes jurisdiction as an “ahistorical fixture of 
political organization”.921  
 
 The aim of this section is thus to foreground the historical contingency of 
the meaning of the concept of jurisdiction, i.e. to highlight semantic shifts, and to 
reconstruct how the (still) prevailing notion of jurisdiction, i.e. as exclusive and 
territorial, emerged and became foundational of modern statecraft and the modern 
system of states. This will help, in turn, to better understand contemporary 
attempts and dynamics, which seem to undermine the traditional notion of 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction. I will scrutinize such attempts and dynamics in 
the following chapters. Thus, my analysis of the history of jurisdiction is not 
intended to provide a complete historical chronology of jurisdiction but, rather, I 
will limit myself – as I did in Chapter 2 with regard to different interdisciplinary 
projects between IR and IL – on key developments, episodes and focal points. 922 
As such, my analysis deals with the emergence and transformation of the modern 
state system – treating both as complex, historically contingent, intertwined and 
entangled developments.923 My discussion will mainly focus on forms of rule, 
available legal vocabularies and representations of space (e.g. through maps). In 
addition, I will limit myself to three episodes, which are (3.1) the different forms of 
medieval jurisdiction, (3.2) the transition from the Middle Ages to Early Modern 
                                                      
921 Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 866. 
922 Moreover, it is important to note that my historical account is basically restricted to 
developments of the Western, particularly European, state system and its global repercussions. 
This is due to the fact that I am concerned with how this particular form of jurisdiction became so 
powerful. 
923 Or, as Saskia Sassen puts it, we can speak of variegating ‘assemblages’ - with the modern 
sovereign state assembling authorities, territories and rights differently as it was the case withe the 
political entities of the Middle Ages, see Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to 
Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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Europe and (3.3) the consolidation of exclusive territorial jurisdiction in what we 
conceive as the modern state system.924 
 
3.1 Universal Jurisdiction(s), the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire 
 
In order to understand the rise, formation and success of the notion of exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction it is important to reconstruct the way jurisdiction was 
conceptualised before the emergence of the modern nation state (read: modern, 
nation, state), in particular how it was conceptualised during the Middle Ages. 
Medieval forms of jurisdiction differ in many aspects from what is perceived as 
‘modern’ forms of jurisdiction, as jurisdiction was during the Middle Ages neither 
conceptualised as territorial nor as exclusive.925  
 
3.1.1 Overlapping jurisdictions and the Cosmology of the Middle Ages 
 
During the Middle Ages, jurisdiction was not exclusive but rather – at least from 
the moderns’ point of view – overlapping. As has been widely noted, the medieval 
period was shaped by the “existence of multiple crisscrossing”926, “crosscutting”927 
or “interwoven and overlapping”928 jurisdictions. The political system of the 
Middle Ages was composed of complex and diverse ‘assemblages’ of various 
polities and communities: there were kingdoms such as Portugal, England and 
France, vassals, feudal lordships, duchies, principalities, city-states in Italy or free 
cities such as Cologne, city-leagues such as the Hanseatic League, guilds, 
merchants, the papacy, local bishoprics, the Holy Roman Empire and so on. All of 
these different forms of political organisation claimed their own jurisdictions – 
                                                      
924 A last note: As I advance rather in broad brushes, it is sufficient for the sake of my argument to 
refer mainly to secondary sources. 
925 See, for example, Jordan Branch, The Cartographic State: Maps, Territory and the Origins of 
Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 23–29; Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign 
State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 3; and John Gerard 
Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, 
International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 149–150. 
926 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, 32. 
927 Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, 36. 
928 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 23–24. 
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often having “shaky jurisdiction” only.929 Things were even more complicated as 
both the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy claimed universal jurisdiction. 
Universal jurisdiction referred in this context however to different spheres of 
jurisdiction. While the Pope claimed universal spiritual jurisdiction, i.e. jurisdiction 
in questions of faith, the Emperor hold universal temporal jurisdiction over his 
realm in order to guarantee the implementation of the Christian community. For 
example, Hendrik Spruyt describes the relationship of Pope and Emperor as 
follows: 
 
“The church, with its clear perception of hierarchy, saw itself as a 
community of believers with no geographic limits to its authority. 
Inclusion in the membership of the church meant being part of a 
religious community. There were believers and infidels. Logically, there 
were no territorial limits to the inclusion of such faithful. But as the 
name indicates, the Holy Roman Empire claimed that very same 
constituency and legitimated its power by a semireligious status of its 
own. The emperor claimed superiority over all other rulers. Frederick II 
thus claimed to rule as dominus mundi, ‘lord of the world’”.930 
 
Importantly, these claims for universal jurisdiction were often based rather on 
rights (de jure jurisdiction) than on control (de facto jurisdiction).931  
 
Yet not only the forms of rule were diverse as one can find a similar picture if 
we turn to the legal landscape of that period. With regard to medieval law we can 
find a number of different, coexisting and overlapping bodies of law and (their 
related) institutions. Law, at this time (as we can see, e.g., in the work of Isidore of 
Seville), was considered as being part of ethics since it is concerned with human 
behaviour.932 Taken the diversity of law into consideration, for instance, the 
literature on legal pluralism sums up that we can find different versions of (usually 
                                                      
929 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics: An Inquiry into the Changing Meaning of 
Territoriality’, DIIS Working Paper 2011, no. 3 (2011): 10. 
930 Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, 35; see also Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the 
World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-c.1800 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1995), chap. 2. 
931 Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’, 988. 
932 Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 46. 
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unwritten) folk, tribal and (in particular Germanic) customary law; urban laws; the 
canon (or ecclesial) law of the church; the lex mercatoria of the merchants; and 
vernacular Roman law. Some of these forms of law were local, others such as 
canon law or the lex mercatoria applied to most parts of Europe.  
 
In addition, there existed different forms of courts applying these different 
forms of law. For instance, there were manorial courts, municipal courts, merchant 
courts, guild courts, church courts or royal courts – having different kinds of 
judges ranging from barons to kings, from guild members to burghers, from 
bishops to the pope, etc.. And finally, different versions of law were applied to 
different groups within the population, i.e. it made a difference whether one was 
Frankish, Burgundian or Alemannic; or whether one was a Jew or, on the Iberian 
Peninsula before the so-called Reconquista, a Muslim.933 
 
At least for the Christian population, however, these diverse forms and 
institutions of rule and law were not necessarily perceived as fragmented but 
rather as being part of a bigger order: the Christian commonwealth. As, for 
example, Jens Bartelson remarks,  
 
“high medieval Christian society was a universal society; it was 
universal insofar as the Church – the Ecclesia – understood itself as an 
indivisible unity covering every aspect of man’s political and social 
being, and the preservation of this essential wholeness was the prime 
purpose of earthly authority. This society was also universal in the 
sense that it remained insensitive to all ethnical, regional and linguistic 
difference; all social forms where subsumed under the Christian norm. 
Its structural unity and the universality of its content were both 
ontologically associated with the idea of an immutable hierarchical 
order connecting micro- and macrocosm together in a preordained and 
                                                      
933 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’, Sydney Law 
Review 30, no. 3 (2008): 377–379; see also Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, 61–67; and Walter 
Ullmann, ed., Law and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988). 
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harmonious relationship. […]. This societal whole was conceived as an 
earthly expression of a heavenly pattern”.934 
 
Thus, the idea that mankind is living in a universal order is not restricted to social 
activities alone as it covers the whole spectrum of human experiences with regard 
to society and nature.935 As Bartelson further explains in rather bright strokes, 
 
 “Medieval cosmology was based on a variety of sources, most of which 
distinguished between a celestial and a terrestrial region. While the 
former embraced everything from the moon to the limits of the 
universe, the latter included everything below the moon to the centre of 
the earth. According to Genesis I, 9, terrestrial region was in turn 
divided into two different zones, those of the earth and water 
respectively. These zones were mutually exclusive, so where there was 
water, there could be no earth, and conversely. From a biblical 
perspective, the ocean literally marked the end of the known and 
inhabitable world. The Latin and Greek terms most frequently used to 
describe this world was orbis terrarum or oikoumene”.936 
 
While the Latin orbis terrarum describes the known world rather in spatial 
terms, the Greek oikoumene refers more to humanity as a social whole. The term 
oikoumene () derives, inter alia, from the word koine (), which 
represented for the Ancient Greeks the common linguistic community (and – 
resulting from this – common cultural community). As Anthony Pagden points out, 
the idea of the koine was expanded by Aristotle through the notion of koinos nomos 
( ), which refers to the universal legal order of all mankind.937 It is 
important to understand that medieval law was still heavily influenced by the idea 
                                                      
934 Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, 91 (emphasis in the original). 
935 For a reconstruction of the history and a statement of the historicity of the divide between 
society (understood as culture) and nature, see Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
936 Jens Bartelson, ‘The Social Construction of Globality’, International Political Sociology 4, no. 3 
(2010): 223–224 (reference omitted, emphasis in the original); Jens Bartelson, Visions of World 
Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 61–62; see also Nikolas M. Rajkovic, 
‘On Fragments and Geometry: The International Legal Order as Metaphor and How It Matters’, 
Erasmus Law Review 6, no. 1 (2013): 11. 
937 Pagden, Lords of All the World, 19–20. 
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of the koinos nomos.938 Nevertheless, these Ancient ideas had been translated into 
the life world of medieval cosmology. For instance, Jerusalem – as the Holy City – 
represented the centre of the oikoumene and the orbis terrarum. Furthermore, the 
borders of the koinos nomos, the oikoumene and the orbis terrarum should ‘ideally’ 
coincide and, if this was not the case, it was the task of the Church and the 
Emperor, e.g. through Crusades to ensure it. 939  
 
3.1.2 Jurisdiction and Space beyond Territory 
 
This brings me to a second point. As noted already, the concept of orbis terrarum is 
rather a spatial notion. However, the space of the orbis terrarum differs 
considerable from modern imaginaries of space. This is the case, as during the 
Middle Ages space was often not perceived as genuinely territorial and, even if 
perceived as territorial, territoriality itself could mean something completely 
different.940 As a corollary of medieval non-territorial images of space, jurisdiction 
was often conceptualised as non-territorial. This explains also why during the 
medieval period overlapping jurisdictions were often not perceived as 
problematic. The best way to conceive medieval images of non-territorial space 
and jurisdiction is probably to reconstruct the way cartography worked and how 
maps were used during this period. To be sure, this does not mean that 
cartography alone can explain (transformations of) spatial imaginaries – as 
Valverde has warned us, to insist on this would produce some kind of 
“cartographic determinism”941– but, I argue, that studying cartography can 
nevertheless help us to better understand shifts in spatial orders (and vice versa). 
For example, as Jordan Branch notes, mapping “shapes the conditions of possibility 
of how actors conceive space, territory, and political authority”.942 As such “maps, 
                                                      
938 Pagden, 29. 
939 Bartelson, ‘The Social Construction of Globality’, 224. 
940 As Ruggie notes, ‘[first] system of rules need not be territorial at all; [second] systems of rule 
need not be territorially fixed; [third] even where systems of rule are territorial, and even where 
territoriality is relatively fixed, the prevailing concept of territory need not entail mutual exclusion’, 
Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, 149. 
941 Valverde, Chronotopes of Law, 50. 
942 Branch, The Cartographic State, 41; see also Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics’, 14. 
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like theories, shape our understanding of the world by highlighting – and 
obscuring – particular spatial and social features”.943  
 
 In general, medieval mapping and the related spatial imaginaries differed 
considerably from their modern counterparts. 944 During the Middle Ages different 
traditions of mapmaking existed. Probably the most common forms of maps were 
the so-called mappae mundi. Although, as the name mappae mundi already 
indicates, these maps depicted the entire world as it was known to Europeans, 
they were rather schematic and mainly for religious purpose. As religious maps, 
mappae mundi often hung in cathedrals and portrayed biblical anecdotes. They 
placed Jerusalem into their centre. In order to make this work, topographical 
details were only secondary and they depicted the three known continents of the 
orbis terrarum – Europe, Asia and Africa – as identical in size and form.945 A radical 
form of this way of mapping was the so-called T/O map, which was included in 
books. These maps were coined T/O maps because of their shape: They consisted 
of a circle, the ‘O’, representing the known world, which was divided through a line 
running from left to right and representing the rivers Don (Tanais) and Nile; the 
Mediterranean sea was located at the middle of this axis running from there to the 
bottom, thus completing the ‘T’ within the ‘O’. Again, Jerusalem was placed in the 
centre as Asia occupied the upper part of the map, Europe the bottom left and 
Africa the bottom right.946As Stuart Elden suggests these religious maps “are 
simply representations of the oikoumene, not the earth as a whole”.947 
 
A second group of maps consisted of itinerary maps, i.e. maps made for 
orientation and navigation – both on land and on sea. In contrast to mappae mundi 
and T/O maps, these maps were rather regional and local. The strip map was often 
used by pilgrims, which represented the prevailing group of medieval travellers. 
These maps depicted routes as a straight line, listing and lining up the various 
                                                      
943 Branch, The Cartographic State, 36. 
944 As I will concentrate on the European context, see for a discussion and comparison of non-
modern types of maps within and outside of Europe, see Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of 
Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1995), chap. 5. 
945 Branch, The Cartographic State, 43. 
946 Cf. Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 114–
115; and Padrón, The Spacious World, 34–35. 
947 Elden, The Birth of Territory, 115. 
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places of an itinerary like pearls on a string. As a consequence, these maps ignored 
any directional orientation. In contrast, Portolan charts, which were used for ship 
boat navigation, depicted coastlines in geographically accurate terms. 
Nevertheless, they differ from modern mapping techniques as they focused on 
distances in travel time between different coastal points and lacked a grid system 
of longitude and latitude.948As a third group cadastral maps were in use. Cadastral 
maps defined the extent of settled and cultivated land and served to collect 
taxes.949  
  
 Despite all differences, two things are common to all three groups of maps. 
Firstly, maps were scarcely used. One of the reasons was of course the lack of 
modern printing techniques and infrastructures. But, more importantly, the lack of 
maps was facilitated by the “privileging of textual description over visual 
depiction”:950 extent and structure of the oikoumene were rather represented by 
the written word of the bible, travelogues were preferred by the pilgrims951 and 
rulers trusted more in cadastral surveys than in cadastral maps. Privileging the 
written form had also the consequence that one could consistently describe 
overlapping authorities whereas modern mapping techniques render it nearly 
impossible: in textual representation overlapping authority is thinkable, in two-
dimensional maps it is not. Secondly, medieval cartographical techniques did not 
depict space with geographical accuracy. What was in general lacking here was the 
representation of space as territory. As Branch points out “the world was 
understood as a series of unique places rather than as geometric area or expanse; 
and […] space was conceived in terms of time as much as distance”.952 This was 
also due to the lack of boundaries in a modern sense, i.e. as discrete lines of 
demarcation.953 We can see this, inter alia, in medieval cartography, which was 
almost entirely lacking any representation of boundaries. If space was 
                                                      
948 See Branch, The Cartographic State, 43–46; and Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 874–875. 
949 Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 874. 
950 Branch, The Cartographic State, 46. 
951 Cf. Bartelson, Visions of World Community, 63. 
952 Branch, The Cartographic State, 48. 
953 Cf. Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the 
Formation of the State System’, World Politics 39, no. 1 (1986): 27–52; Niklas Luhmann, ‘Territorial 
Borders as Systsem Boundaries’, in Cooperation and Conflict in Border Areas, ed. Raimondo 
Strassoldo and Giovanni Delli Zotti (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1982), 238; Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: 
The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
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conceptualised as territorial, territory was conceptualised as centre-focused, i.e. 
from a centre (or multiple centres) outward, rather than boundary-focused, i.e. 
from boundaries inwards. In other words, territoriality was constructed around 
‘places’ instead of ‘spaces’.954 As a consequence of the medieval notion of 
territoriality, territory was not conceived as sole basis of authority, rule and hence 
jurisdiction. Rather, authority, rule and jurisdiction were personal and attributed 
to the status of a ruler constituting a hierarchical connection between the ruler 
(may it be a king, the pope or the emperor) and ‘his subjects’.  
 
3.2 (Re)discoveries, dominium and the territorialisation of jurisdiction 
 
The late medieval and early modern period witnessed a series of transformations 
with regard to space, rule and jurisdiction. These transformations were primarily 
facilitated by conflicts within and between the authorities of the Middle Ages, 
several rediscoveries of Ancient sources and the colonisation of the New World.  
 
From the eleventh century onwards, the complex authoritative basis of the 
oikumene began gradually to erode as religion increasingly lost its institutional 
centrality. On the one hand, Pope and Emperor engaged more and more in 
disputes regarding the jurisdiction of each other, something that should eventually 
culminate in the Investiture Controversy (c. 1075-1122).955According to Harold 
Berman, the Controversy was the root for the emergence of many Western legal 
institutions and concepts.956 Similarly Spruyt points out that it had “revolutionary 
impact” as it brought the medieval framework of two equally existing universal 
                                                      
954 See, e.g., Branch, The Cartographic State, 20–21; and Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 866–880. 
955 The Controversy was sparked by the question of investiture, i.e. whether the Emperor is allowed 
to install bishops and abbots. While this was common practice during most parts of the medieval 
period (constituting an important source of power for the Emperor), the Pope began questioning 
the procedure and claiming more autonomy from the Holy Roman Empire. The Controversy started 
in 1075 with the Dictatus Papae – a note of twenty-seven theses, where Pope Gregory VII claimed 
the supremacy of the papacy over the empire and denied the right of investiture to the emperor. 
The conflict escalated in the excommunication of Emperor Henry IV two years later and his deeply 
symbolic Walk to Canossa asking for the Pope’s absolution, which he was granted. Yet, this was only 
the starting point of a decades long conflict between Pope and Emperor, which involved, e.g., the 
invasion of Rome by Henry IV, a number of antipopes and several changing coalitions. The whole 
conflicted ended only in 1122 in the compromise of the Concordat of Worms. For an overview, see, 
for example, Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, 48–51. 
956 See, in particular, Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal 
Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), chap. 2. 
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jurisdictions to an end.957 As a result, the Emperor started to develop the idea of 
universal secular rule opposed to the Pope’s spiritual rule and, from now on, 
spiritual and secular rulers were rivals. In the end, however, the whole conflict led 
to an erosion of the authoritative position of both Pope and Emperor as it should 
strengthen the kings (and ‘their’ form of political organization, which should later 
become the territorial state). 958 On the other hand, the church itself witnessed 
various internal rivalries and struggles, which should result most notably in the 
Great Schism between Orthodox and Catholic Church in the eleventh century, the 
Great Western Schism within the Catholic Church between the late thirteenth and 
fourteenth century (with temporarily three men claiming of being Pope) and the 
Age of Reformation (starting in the sixteenth century).  
 
 What is interesting for the current purpose is the fact that these various 
struggles also produced fundamental transformation in legal argumentation. It is 
important to notice here that the controversies of this period were carried on 
mainly in the language of law and even non-jurists had to make use of this 
language. As Antony Black points out, the “reason why non-jurists […] adopted 
juristic language to such an extent was not that they found there a doctrine with 
which they agreed but that it was the obvious mode and vocabulary in which to 
discuss rights and so forth”.959 As I noted above, the sources of high medieval law 
were diverse and diffuse, involving different forms of customary and vernacular 
law. This changed, however, during the late Middle Ages as the different opposing 
ecclesial and secular parties began to improve and/or create their legal arguments 
– in particular, the “investiture controversy […] provided a stimulus to both sides 
to find legal arguments to support their case”.960 For example, it was also during 
this period that the common law system began to develop in England.961 Although 
the consolidation of the common law system took several centuries, the system 
was initially established during the regency of Henry II of England. The innovation 
of common law was the idea to impose royal jurisdiction upon civil and criminal 
                                                      
957 Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, 50. 
958 Spruyt, 50. 
959 Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 11. 
960 Stein, Roman Law in European History, 43–44. 
961 The term common law should not be confused with the jus commune, which is a hybrid of 
Roman law and canon law. 
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matters – something which was previously under local and feudal jurisdiction and, 
respectively, under local and feudal law. The emergence of the common law 
tradition had two other important effects: On the one hand, it was one of the main 
factors in the centralization of the emerging English state and, on the other hand, it 
helped the English crown to gain independence from the jurisdiction of the Holy 
See as common law operates in a different way than canon law.962 
 
Canon law, the law of the Church, worked differently as it benefited from 
the rediscovery and reinterpretation of classic Roman law. While Roman law was 
used in a vernacularized version during the whole Middle Ages, only the eleventh 
century saw a systematic revival of it. In 1077, a complete version of Justinian’s 
Digest was found in Pisa.963 The Digest was commissioned by Roman emperor 
Justinian I in the sixth century and was composed by 50 books. Its aim was to 
represent a condensed, codified and systemized version of all Roman law. The 
rediscovery of the Digest led, in part, to the foundation of Europe’s oldest 
university, the University of Bologna, in 1088, which should quickly become the 
legal capital (or “mother of laws”) of Europe.964 Bologna was not the only 
university, which was established during this time (Oxford, Paris, Salamanca and 
Cambridge should quickly follow); and, as Harold Berman suggests, it was in 
particular the study of law which would become the “prototype of Western 
science” as the university system helped, inter alia, to give law – its scholarship, 
terminology and method – a “transnational” character and to produce the 
“professional class of lawyers”.965  
 
At the University of Bologna, the first generation of scholars working on the 
Digest were the so-called Glossators. They were known as Glossators as they 
provided the original text of the Digest with glossae: short notices between the 
lines or at the margins of the text, which should help to explain passages in the text 
and to embed the different legal rules into a general scheme of knowledge. In this 
                                                      
962 Cf. Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 880–888; see also the collection of essays in Anthony Musson, ed., 
Boundaries of the Law: Geography, Gender, and Jurisdiction in Medieval and Early Modern Europe  
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). The rise of comon law was inter alia fascilitated by transformations in 
English literature. On this aspect, see Cormack, A Power to Do Justice. 
963 Elden, The Birth of Territory, 215. 
964 See Stein, Roman Law in European History, 52–54. Some even locate the beginning of the 
Renaissance at this point, Elden, The Birth of Territory, 216. 
965 Berman, Law and Revolution, 151, 160–161. 
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context, law was not treated as part of ethics anymore but as part of logics, which 
consisted in turn of grammar, dialectic and rhetoric – all three building together 
the trivium.966 The Glossators were succeeded at the University of Bologna by the 
Commentators (or Post-Glossators). Although both schools had much in common, 
the Commentators took a more distanced position from the original text hence 
they were more interested in philosophical questions with regard to law. The most 
important difference was however, as Stuart Elden notes, the relationship between 
facts/world and law. While the Glossators blamed the facts for divergences from 
the legal text, the Commentators took the opposed position and tried to adapt the 
law to the facts.967  
 
In more general terms, the rediscovery of the Digest changed the form of 
late-medieval legal argumentation as it, first, provided a role model for the 
systematization of legal theorizing and, second, popularized a number of classical 
Roman legal concepts, which were in the vernacularized versions of Roman law, 
although known, hardly used – these concepts included iurisdictio, ius, officium, 
imperium, dominium, territorum and status – the latter transforming during the 
fourteenth century into the concept of the state (and the various reflections in 
different European languages: stato, estat, Staat and state).968 
 
Yet, this kind of rediscovery does not mean that late-medieval authors used 
these terms in the same way as they were used in sixth century Ancient Rome – it 
was not a project of mere transplantation. Rather, the Roman terms needed to be 
‘translated’ into the various political debates of the late Middle Ages. This becomes 
also apparent by the fact that Roman law was used by both spiritual and feudal 
authorities as it helped the Church to develop the canonical law into the more 
coherent and sophisticated Corpus Juris Canonici – the body of ecclesial law, which 
was valid until the early-twentieth century – while it simultaneously provided the 
                                                      
966 Cf. Stein, Roman Law in European History, 46–52. 
967 Elden, The Birth of Territory, 218. 
968 Cf. Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’, 984. On the semantics of status/the state, see Quentin 
Skinner, ‘The State’, in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed. Terrence Ball, James Farr, 
and Russel L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 91. 
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vantage point for the secular Corpus Juris Civilis, which should help secular 
authorities to make their claims against the Church. 969 
 
But, on the other hand, this does also not signify that the original meaning 
was completely lost during the various processes and forms of translation. A good 
example for our purpose is the use of the concept of dominium – and how 
dominium, ius and jurisdiction were related.970 Take, for instance, the following text 
passage: 
 
“Dominium is something that inheres in the person of the owner 
[domini], but it applies to the thing owned. Similarly jurisdiction inheres 
in an office [officio] and in the person who holds the office, but it applies 
to a territorium, and [jurisdiction] is thus not a quality of the 
territorium, but rather of the person”.971 
 
These remarks are taken from the work of Bartolus of Saxoferrato (1314-1357). 
Bartolus is known today as one of the main protagonists of the school of the 
Commentators and, according to Quentin Skinner, “perhaps the most original jurist 
of the Middle Ages”.972 Bartolus was less interested in the relationship between 
Church and Emperor as between Emperor and other secular rulers, such as the 
kings of France and England or the Italian city-states. Although these political units 
might be in conflict with the Emperor as they claim their own jurisdiction, the 
Emperor still has, as Bartolus argued, universal jurisdiction because “he alone had 
dominium over the world considered as a single whole”.973 This was perceived as 
unproblematic as the “Emperor had universal jurisdiction over the world as matter 
of right, not as a question of fact”.974 On the first view, this corresponds perfectly 
                                                      
969 Cf. Berman, Law and Revolution, chap. 5. The term Corpus Juris Canonici was used only from the 
fifteenth century onwards. 
970 According to Richard Tuck, it was the debate on the relationship of ius and dominium, which 
framed late medieval and early modern political and legal thinking - and which provided us with 
the first elaborated theory of rights. See, in particular, Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their 
Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), chap. 1; see also Orford, 
‘Jurisdiction without Territory’, 984. 
971 As cited in Elden, The Birth of Territory, 220 (emphasis and brackets by Elden). 
972  Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Renaissance, vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 9. 
973 As cited in Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’, 988. 
974 Orford, 989. 
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with the classical medieval view of the oikumene and its corollary that overlapping 
jurisdictions might not cause a problem as they are not exclusive but nevertheless 
form a single whole.  
 
However, what is interesting in Bartolus’ remarks is the conceptual 
innovation that the question of jurisdiction was framed in analogy to the concept 
of dominium. In particular, it was Kratochwil, who repeatedly pointed out that the 
revival of the concept of dominium – and the subsequent shift in the semantic field 
of medieval rule and authority – was essential for the emergence of the notion of 
exclusive territoriality, the idea of state sovereignty and hence the formation of the 
modern system of states.975 Taken from classic Roman private law, the concept of 
dominium (usually translated as ‘property’ or ‘ownership’) concerns the ‘rights’ of 
a property holder over his/her property.976 In contrast to the different forms of 
medieval customary law – and here in particular Germanic customary law with its 
complex use rights (e.g., fishery, wood or pastoral rights) –, property was 
conceptualised as belonging exclusively to the property holder (dominus). The 
property holder had the right to control, use, take proceeds from and dispose 
his/her dominium as well as s/he was allowed to secure and/or recover the 
property from/after invasions.977  
 
                                                      
975 See particularly Kratochwil, ‘Sovereignty as Dominium’, 25–29; and Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, 
and Politics’, 9–15. 
976 Ben Holland coined this - particularly ‘that the modern concept of sovereignty owes its genesis 
to the rediscovery of Roman private property law’ - the ‘Roman law thesis’, Ben Holland, 
‘Sovereignty as Dominium? Reconstructing the Constructivist Roman Law Thesis’, International 
Studies Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2010): 450. According to Holland, the thesis is within IR first and 
foremost advanced by constructivist scholars - in addition to Kratochwil, in particular by Onuf and 
Ruggie (although one can certainly contest whether Ruggie fits into the constructivist camp or not). 
For Kratochwil see above. For Ruggie, see John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Continuity and Transformation in 
the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis’, World Politics 35, no. 2 (1983): 261–85; and 
Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’. For Onuf, see Onuf, ‘Sovereignty’; and Nicholas Onuf and Peter 
Onuf, Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the American Civil War (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 2006), 56–58. A recent example in IL is Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Empire 
and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution’, University of Toronto Law Journal 61, no. 1 
(2011): 1–36. The thesis seems to go back to P. E. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951). Holland is in general sympathetic with the thesis 
and provides an in-depth empirical grounding of it. However, he is to some extent also critical. For 
instance, he argues that Kratochwil relies on a ‘category mistake’ when Kratochwil speaks about 
rights (ius) in the context of dominium, Holland, ‘Sovereignty as Dominium?’, 456. Likewise, Onuf 
and Onuf have noted that dominium was a ‘power, not a right’, Onuf and Onuf, Nations, Markets, and 
War, 75. 
977 See Arash Abizadeh, ‘Sovereign Jurisdiction, Territorial Rights, and Membership in Hobbes’, in 
The Oxford Handbook on Hobbes, ed. Al P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 401. 
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Furthermore, dominium essentially referred to ‘land’.978 Consequently, land 
became, with reference to dominium, conceptualised as exclusive – involving a 
notion of exclusivity, which only makes a division of property on a horizontal axis 
possible as “Roman law said: ‘usque ad inferos usque ad coelum’, i.e., ‘everything 
down to hell and up to the heavens’ belonged exclusively to the owner and could 
only be conveyed in this fashion to somebody else.”979Although, Bartolus still links, 
in accordance with medieval status-based conceptions of authority, dominium and 
jurisdiction to the person of the property holder or ruler, the rediscovery of 
dominium in legal and political theory provided nevertheless one starting point 
(among others) of a shift of authority from status to locus, which should culminate 
in the modern state (a concept, which ironically derives its meaning from status) 
along the notion of territorial and exclusive jurisdiction.  
 
This broader shift from status to locus becomes visible in the changing 
denomination of kingdoms, too. While, for a long time, rulers were named after the 
population they ruled, the late-Middle Ages saw a shift towards the territories, 
which they ruled. In this context, the King of the Franks (rex francorum) became 
the King of France (rex franciae) or the King of the English (rex anglicorum) the 
King of England (rex angliae).980 
 
 Yet, Justinian’s Digest was not the only important rediscovery of Ancient 
sources that should strongly influence late medieval and early modern conceptions 
of jurisdiction. In a similar manner, the rediscovery of Claudius Ptolemy’s 
Geographia played an equally fundamental role in the context of cartography and 
spatial imaginaries. The originally Greek text of the Geograpia was written in the 
mid-second century and rediscovered – and translated into Latin – in northern 
Italy in the early-fifteenth century. The rediscovery of the Geographia marks the 
beginning of Renaissance cartography and it is the starting point of a “revolution in 
how maps were created, distributed, and used. This transformation of cartography, 
                                                      
978 Cf. Kratochwil, ‘Sovereignty as Dominium’, 25–26; Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics’, 10. 
979 Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics’, 10 (emphasis in the original). 
980 Walter Ullmann, ‘Personality and Territoriality in the “Defensor Pacis”: The Problem of Political 
Humanism’, in Law and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, ed. Walter Ullmann (London: Variorum 
Reprints, 1988), 403. For accounts, which highlight the importance of French Kings (the Capetian 
Dynasty) for the formation of the modern state, see Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, chap. 2; and 
Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, chap. 5. 
 260 
in turn, made possible and shaped equally drastic changes in how Europeans 
understood their world”.981 
 
The cartographic revolution occurred basically during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth century. Its key moment was a shift in the projection method. As noted 
above, medieval maps did not rely on geometric accuracy and were rather used in 
order to symbolise certain places – again: if maps were used at all, as textual 
description was privileged over visual representation.982 In contrast, Ptolemaic 
cartography introduced the idea that “the world can and should be depicted 
visually with reference to a coordinate-based grid system, thereby establishing 
geometric accuracy of scale, distance, and orientation as key cartographic goals”.983 
Simultaneously, to the invention of cartographic techniques based on a grid system 
(or planimetry or graticule), improvements in printing technologies helped to 
spread maps all over Europe.984 From the sixteenth century onwards not text but 
visual representation had become the prevailing method to depict space. And, it 
were not maps in general but the grid system of Ptolemy that should quickly 
become, as Ricardo Padrón puts it, “the universal idiom that could depict a single 
chart the sea and that could map the earth, that could depict a single city or the 
entire globe. With this development, a single type of map, the gridded map, 
becomes hegemonic in European culture: it establishes itself as the standard by 
which all other maps should be judged”.985 
 
Moreover, modern cartography was at its beginning less in use within 
Europe but in the context of the first wave of the European expansion into the New 
World of the Americas – the epoch, which is today best known as Age of Discovery. 
In other words, the emergence of many techniques of modern statecraft – 
                                                      
981 Branch, The Cartographic State, 50–51; see also Bartelson, ‘The Social Construction of Globality’, 
228–229; and, for a more, cautious interpretation of the ‘revolution’, Padrón, The Spacious World, 
65–71. 
982 Interestingly, even the rediscovery of Ptolemy’s Geographia was still influenced by this 
paradigm as its first translations focused rather on its text-related descriptions of the world and 
only later, during the early sixteenth century, the emphasis shifted to mapping techniques, cf. 
Branch, The Cartographic State, 51–52. 
983 Branch, 52 (emphasis added). 
984 This had also repercussion for the professional competition in the field of maps, as the 
cartographer increasingly replaced the mapmaker as expert on maps, Padrón, The Spacious World, 
71. 
985 Padrón, 71. 
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cartography being one of them – occurred (better, maybe: were tested) first 
outside of Europe. This stands of course against the conventional view that the 
European expansion was rather a one-way street with regard to ideas and 
practices as if these ideas and practices were simply imposed onto the New World. 
Rather, it was a process of translation, a back and forth, between the New and the 
Old World, which produced in the end a couple of central foundations of modern 
statecraft and the modern system of states. Put differently, these encounters were 
sites of knowledge production and – as we will see above – international law was 
arguably one product of these encounters. 
 
The central problem for the two leading maritime political powers of the 
Age of Discovery, Spain (or, more accurately, Castile and Leóne) and Portugal, was 
that the New World consisted of unknown territory, i.e. unknown space. In this 
context Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of the Americas (‘Indies’) in 1492 only marked the 
most important of a number of controversies between Spain and Portugal on the 
possession of – and right to trade with – the newly discovered lands.986 These 
questions emerged first in the mid-fourteenth century when Castile and Portugal 
began to sail along the West African coast and stated to claim these territories. The 
claims were usually articulated in the vocabulary of ius, iurisdictio and dominium. 
In order to solve the disputes between both countries the Holy See intervened 
through a number of Papal Bulls. 987 In 1452, the Bull Dum diversas granted the 
Portuguese “King Alfonso general and indefinite powers to search out and conquer 
all pagans, enslave them and appropriate their land and goods”;988 in 1455, the 
Bull Romanus Pontifex reassured the resolution of Dum diversas; and, in 1493, only 
one year after Columbus’ voyage and the ‘discovery’ of the Americas, Pope 
Alexander VI released the Bull Inter caetera, in which he ‘donated’ the lands of the 
Americas to the Castilian crown.989  
                                                      
986 Of course, this could also be framed in a Schmittian vocabulary as conflict over ‘spheres of 
interest’, Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, 4th ed. 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997), chap. 2; see also Wilhelm G. Grewe, Epochen der 
Völkerrechtsgeschichte, 2nd ed. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988). 
987 See Shaunnagh Dorsett, ‘Mapping Territories’, in Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, ed. Shaun McVeigh 
(Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 2007), 144–145. 
988 As cited in, Dorsett, 144. 
989 Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’, 985–986; For a general discussion of these Papal Bulls, 
see Jörg Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht: Die Auseinandersetzung um den 
Status der überseeischen Gebiete vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1984), 
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Alexander did so, as he assigned all countries 100 leagues (which is approx. 
300 miles) west of the Cape Verde Islands and the Azores, which were both 
already under Portuguese dominium, to Spain. In other words, Alexander intended 
to ‘donate’ the dominium over Africa to Portugal and over the Americas to Spain. 
Portugal and Spain finally started to settle their conflict in 1494, when both signed 
the Treaty of Tordesillas. The Treaty mostly confirmed the ‘partition’ of Inter 
caetera, although it moved the demarcation line westwards. The Treaty famously 
claimed that 
 
“a boundary or straight line [una rraya o linea derecha] be determined 
and drawn, from pole to pole, on the said ocean [the Atlantic], from the 
Arctic to the Antarctic pole, north to south. This boundary or line shall 
be drawn straight, as aforesaid, at a distance of three hundred and 
seventy leagues west of Cape Verde Islands, being calculated by 
degrees, or by any other manner as may be considered the best and 
readiest, provided the distance shall be no greater than above said”.990 
 
Portugal and Spain concluded the ‘partition’ of the world 25 years later when they 
signed the Treaty of Saragossa (1529), which divided the eastern hemisphere (in 
particular, Asia) between both countries.  
 
The history of the disputes between Portugal and Spain is important for my 
purpose for at least four reasons. First, the dispute mirrors the conflicts over 
jurisdiction of the late medieval and early modern ages, which I outlined above. 
Jurisdiction is still personalised as the Pope attributes in his Bulls dominium not to 
Portugal and Spain but in the case of Dum diversas and Romanus Pontifex to the 
Portuguese King Alfonso V while in Inter caetera to the Spanish King Ferdinand 
and Queen Isabella as well as their “heirs and successors, kings of Castile and 
                                                                                                                                                            
205–209. The monograph of Fisch, who was a student of Reinhardt Koselleck, presents a still 
valuable history of international law and the European expansion. 
990 As cited in Elden, The Birth of Territory, 242 (brackets by Elden); see also Dorsett, ‘Mapping 
Territories’, 145; and Rajkovic, ‘On Fragments and Geometry’, 12. 
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Leon”.991 In other words, the logic of status still dominates here over the logic of 
locus.  
 
Second, it is important to note that it is the Pope, who has the right to 
demarcate and to entitle the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns to discover and 
possess the newly ‘discovered’ non-European and non-Christian territories. Thus, 
the Papal Bulls are not only, as it may seem prime facie, about Portugal and Spain 
but also claims (or reassurances) of the universal jurisdiction of the Pope himself 
vis-à-vis other European rulers. The relationship was so close that, as Pagden has 
called it, particularly Spain and the Catholic Church formed some kind of a 
“Church-Sate venture” in the New World, which should last at least until the 
nineteenth century.992  
 
Third and closely related to this point, is the fact that later claims by the 
colonial competitors of the second wave of the European expansion, mainly 
England and the Netherlands, directly challenged the Papal Bulls and, hence, the 
Pope’s universal jurisdiction to distribute dominium to monarchs. 993  Put 
differently, the Reformation was not only about religious conflicts within the 
European context but also about the struggle of European powers over non-
European territories. For instance, English colonial theorists developed a distinct 
anti-Catholic position and argued that the English King or Queen could claim 
colonial territories, as s/he is also the Supreme Head of the Anglican Church.994 
However, the dispute over the Pope’s universal jurisdiction over the New World 
was not only a dispute between the Catholic Church and the various strands of 
Protestantism, its new competitor in ecclesial questions, but also a dispute within 
the Catholic Church itself. The work of the Salamanca-based sixteenth century 
                                                      
991 As cited in Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’, 985. 
992 Pagden, Lords of All the World, 33. 
993 Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’, 986–988. 
994 For an in-depth analysis, see David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 2. In the end, this turned into a conflict 
between two ‘solutions’ to ‘distribute’ the colonial territories. On the one hand, there was an 
attempt to establish a priori (before the colonial enterprise took place) monopoles between 
concurring European powers. This was the constellation of the Iberian expansion - with the 
Catholic Church as distributer of monopoles. On the other hand, there was the idea to use - ex 
posteriori - free competition (trade, shipping, acquisition of territory) to distribute the colonies. 
The second phase of the European expansion relied mainly on this system. See Fisch, Die 
europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht, 49–50. 
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philosopher, theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria is exemplary, here.995 The 
Dominican Vitoria was puzzled by the question whether the people of the 
discovered lands (the ‘Indies’) had dominium over these lands. As Anthony Anghie 
has argued, this was for Vitoria a completely new situation (as it was not 
comparable with conflicts between, e.g., Christian and Muslim rulers) and as such 
Vitoria did not believe that it is possible to merely export and stipulate already 
existing European legal ideas to the issue at stake. Rather, Vitoria tried to translate 
these ideas to the new context as his “jurisprudence relies in many respects on 
existing doctrines, he reconceptualises these doctrines, or else invents new ones, in 
order to deal with the novel problem of the Indians”.996 According to Anghie, this 
situation was the foundational moment of international law: “international law 
was created out of the unique issue generated by the encounter between the 
Spanish and the Indians”.997 This is the case, as for Vitoria the Indians live outside 
the oikumene and, thus, neither Church nor Emperor have universal jurisdiction as 
the universal jurisdiction of both institutions is restricted to the Christian world . 
By the same token, also all law that is justified on a divine basis, as it is the case 
with the koinon nomos, cannot be valid. Anghie summarizes this position as 
follows: “The Spanish and the Indians are not bound by a universal, overarching 
system; instead, they belong to two different orders, and Vitoria interprets the gap 
between them in terms of the judicial problem of jurisdiction”.998According to 
Vitoria, this is the case as the inhabitants of the New World are fully rational 
human beings and know a concept of dominium comparable to the one of the Old 
World.999 For Vitoria the solution is the invocation of universal secular natural law, 
a jus gentium, in order to be able to solve the legal disputes between the Spaniards 
and the Indians. Although, Vitoria’s approach may sound progressively as he uses 
                                                      
995 Another example would be the work of Bartolomeo de las Casas, which shared many similarities 
with Francisco de Vitoria’s line of argumentation, see Bartelson, Visions of World Community, 77–
85. An overview over the ‘Salamanca school’ in general is, e.g., provided by Koskenniemi, ‘Empire 
and International Law’. 
996 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 15 (emphasis added). For 
a discussion of the danger of anachronism in Anghie’s work, see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and 
Us: Thoughts on Critical Histories of International Law’, Rechtsgeschichte-Legal History 22 (2014): 
119–38. See also to my earlier discussion in the introduction of the of Chapter 2 on the problems of 
a presentism in writing history. 
997 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 15. 
998 Anghie, 19. 
999 Cf. Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law’, 15. 
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“the language of liberality and even equality”, this is only half of the story.1000 The 
other half is that Vitoria frames the jus gentium in such a way that the Indians are 
permanently in violation of ‘universal’ natural law, as they, e.g., deny the ‘right to 
travel’ – constituting a jus for Vitoria – to the Spanish conquistadores. This allows 
the Spaniards, in turn, to ‘sanction’ the Indians for their ‘violations’ of universal 
natural law. In other words, Vitoria’s invocation of a jus gentium has two 
consequences: on the one hand, it widens Spanish jurisdiction over the territories 
of the Indians as the Spanish can claim that they defend universal natural law; on 
the other hand, it serves also to limit Papal jurisdiction over these territories as 
they do not belong to the oikumene. 
  
This brings me to my final – and a slightly different – point. The dispute 
between Portugal and Spain regarding the partition of non-Christian territories 
was a dispute about primarily unknown areas. This means that medieval itinerary 
mapping techniques, which used prominent geographical features as orientation 
points, did not work anymore.1001 We can see this in the Treaty of Tordessilas, 
which originally intended to divide the territories of both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean to Portugal and Spain; respectively, with Portugal receiving dominium over 
Africa and Spain over the Americas. The line of the Treaty, however, was too far in 
the West and included land on the American continent: Portugal could claim 
dominium over what should become known as Brazil. In this context, modern maps 
increasingly became a valuable good as they provided hardly accessible 
knowledge. Already during the sixteenth-century maps were used by governments 
as, in the words of Branch, “‘weapons of imperialism,’ by claiming land ahead of 
actual conquest and legitimizing conquest during and after the fact”.1002 Moreover, 
they presented for European rulers important “symbols of power”.1003 
 
 The various legal and cartographic revolutions as well as the discovery of 
the New World, also point to (and went hand in hand with) a deeper 
transformation in cosmological terms and the general imagination of space. As 
pointed out previously in this chapter, medieval cosmology consisted of the 
                                                      
1000 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 28. 
1001 See Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics’, 14. 
1002 Branch, The Cartographic State, 105 (references omitted). 
1003 Padrón, The Spacious World, 8. 
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‘geographical’ formation of the orbis terrarum and the concept of the Christian 
community (the oikumene) – ideally both matching in scope and covering the 
known world as a whole. During the late-medieval and early-modern period both 
imaginaries collapsed. The idea of the orbis terrarum was finally refuted by what 
became known as the Copernican revolution and the idea of a rotunditate absoluta, 
which Nikolaus Copernicus introduced in his De revolutionibus orbium coelestium 
(1543). Bartelson summarizes this development as follows: 
 
“First, rather than being united into one landmass, there are numerous 
different land formations distributed relatively evenly across the 
spherical surface of the globe. Second, rather than existing in separate 
spheres and having different centres of gravity, the elements of earth 
and water share the same centre of gravity. Third, the planet as a whole 
is best represented as a solid geological mass whose chasms are filled 
with water, the totality being one perfectly shaped sphere, a rotunditate 
absoluta. Copernicus thus managed to refute the view that the earth 
consisted of two spheres, located in a fixed position at the centre of the 
universe. According to the view set forth in De revolutionibus, the ocean 
is no longer a limit, but rather a trans-continental waterway, connecting 
different and discontinuous land formations to each other”.1004 
 
As Bartelson also notes, Copernicus refusal was ‘only’ the result of a longer 
transformation in European cosmology, as, e.g., Portuguese navigators were 
already earlier fully aware of the fact that the concept of an orbis terrarum is 
unsustainable;1005 or, as a look (again!) at early-modern cartography reveals: 
Ptolemaic, i.e. grid-based and geometric, maps operated without a centre. As a 
consequence of the “geometricization” of space1006 and the emergence of the 
notion of globality,1007 Jerusalem and the Holy Land could not be placed in the 
                                                      
1004 Bartelson, Visions of World Community, 71. 
1005 Bartelson, 72. 
1006 Branch, The Cartographic State, 113. 
1007 This is the reason why Bartelson suggests that globality is socially constructed as it reveals that 
“globality is neither a timeless condition nor a recent invention, but rather a social fact whose  basic 
structure, genesis, dissemination, and subsequent functions can be opened to historical sociological 
inquiry", Bartelson, ‘The Social Construction of Globality’, 231. 
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centre of maps any more (as it was the case in the tradition of the mappae mundi) – 
they just became places identical to all others.  
 
 These shifts in the imagination of space had also important repercussions 
on the concept of oikumene. This was also fascilitated by the fact that the 
‘discovery’ of the New World and its inhabitants confronted early-modern thinkers 
with an image of a radical fragmentation of mankind. As I noted above, Vitoria’s 
reaction consisted in a reconceptualization of the concept of universal community. 
He replaced the medieval oikumene through a new kind of universal community, 
which he based upon the rationality of all human beings and which was pulled 
together through the universal natural law of the jus gentium. As I also noted, the 
invocation of the jus gentium was far away from effectively granting rights to the 
Indians as it rather served the Spaniards to conquer the Indians’ territories. There 
was however another, a second, response on how community should be organized 
in the context of a fragmented rotunditate absoluta. It was a response, which 
started from the opposite direction as it took fragmentation for granted, 
unavoidable and inescapable. This response, and it should become the response 
that should deeply change first the political order on the European continent (and 
later also non-European teritories), was the evolving notion of the modern state, 
i.e. the idea to territorialize and nationalize community.1008 I will turn to this 
development now. 
 
3.3 Territorial jurisdiction, the nation state and the Lotus Case 
 
While the previous discussion focussed mainly the pre-history of the modern 
European state-system, I will now reconstruct its emergence, formation and 
consolidation.  
 
3.3.1 Boundaries, jurisdiction and the production of territory 
 
The partition of the rotunditate absolute, either into the empires of the European 
expansion or into nation states on the European continent, was further accelerated 
                                                      
1008 Cf. Bartelson, Visions of World Community, 76–77. 
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by the production of boundaries. Whereas, as I pointed out earlier, medieval 
imaginaries of space conceptualised jurisdiction and authority through a recourse 
on place(s) and centre(s), we witness during the early modern period a shift – and 
it was a shift over a rather long period as it occurred gradually between the 
fifteenth century and the eighteenth century – towards conceptions of jurisdiction 
and authority, which rely mainly on images of bounded spaces and territories. 
Thus, boundaries began to play an increasingly important role. During the Middle 
Ages, boundaries were usually conceptualised as loose frontier zones, something 
which made overlapping (non-exclusive) forms of jurisdiction thinkable and 
possible.1009 Here, jurisdiction was personalistic (i.e. a direct relationship between 
ruler and those who are ruled), connected to certain places (with the ruler in the 
centre) and control was conceptualised as radiating from a centre to the periphery 
– in other words, it was conceived as operating from the centre outwards.1010  
 
However, the ‘geometricization’ of space, which took place during the early 
modern period and which saw a revival of grid-based systems of cartography, 
introduced the idea of clear and abstract boundaries. As noted above, already the 
Treaty of Tordesillas operated through a, as we can read in the original text, 
‘boundary or straight line [una rraya o linea derecha]’ in order to divide unknown 
space. This way of organizing space, i.e. to draw first a line and then explore a 
certain territory should become a common practice in the European colonies – a 
practice, which is often considered to create fundamental problems until the 
present day as, e.g., African countries are often still perceived as ‘artificial’ 
constructions with internal conflicts between different ‘ethnic’ groups.1011 
                                                      
1009 Cf. Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics’, 10; and Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and 
Territoriality’, 33. For a critical discussion of the distinction of political geographers between 
boundary (‘precise, linear division, within a restrictive, political context’) and frontiers (‘connotes 
more zonal qualities, and a broader, social context’), see Sahlins, Boundaries, 4–6. 
1010 Branch, The Cartographic State, 77. 
1011 Makau Mutua presents an in-depth discussion of the colonial legacy and, particularly, the effects 
of territorial partitions for the African continent. For him, the ‘artificial’ division of Africa by 
colonial powers, which was based either on ‘natural’ boundaries (e.g., rivers or mountains) or 
simply lines of longitude or latitude, is the origin of many conflicts in Africa. As this partition still 
exists after the end of formal colonialism, the African continent remains in the ‘straitjacket’ of 
colonialism (now exercised through the ‘postcolonial’ state). Mutua’s solution is to ‘redraw the map 
of Africa’ in order to give pre-colonial entities (and their modes of rule) the possibility of regaining 
self-determination. See Makau W. Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal 
Inquiry’, Michigan Journal of International Law 16, no. 4 (1995): 1113–76. On the other hand, it is 
important to note that many of todays ‘ethnic’ groups, which seem to be Mutua’s pre-colonial 
entities, are as well constructions of European colonialism. 
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 In the European context, the “first official boundary in the modern 
sense”1012 was determined in the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), which was 
negotiated and signed between France and Spain in order to allocate a border 
between these two countries in the Pyrenean mountains.1013 The idea of the Treaty 
was to establish a joint French and Spanish commission in order to ‘find’ the 
‘natural border’ between both countries. However, the delimitation and 
demarcation took much longer as expected at the beginning and was concluded in 
1868 only (in the Treaty of Bayonne) as the local population of the borderland 
started to offer resistance against the top-down approach to draw lines between 
villages and to force the inhabitants to either become French or Spanish.1014 
 
In this context, four interrelated observations are important. First, concepts 
such as territory or natural borders have to be located in the social realm. As 
Kratochwil puts it: 
 
 “‘[T]erritoriality’ is, despite its seemingly referential link to a physical 
nature, a ‘social’ rather than a ‘natural kind’. It means that boundaries 
are status ascriptions rather than simply descriptive designations. This 
river of that mountain range are not a boundary, but serve as a 
boundary, the ideology of ‘natural boundaries’ á la Luis XIV 
notwithstanding”.1015 
 
Second, abstract boundaries, as well as the treaties or maps on which they rely, 
contain a performative dimension. This is the case, as we can observe, that there 
was first an abstract line on a paper (may it be a demarcations between different 
European empires or the separation of Spain and France in the Pyrenees) and only 
then the line established social and political practices on the ground, which turned 
                                                      
1012 Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality’, 33. 
1013 On the negotiation and evolution of this border, see the seminal study by Sahlins, Boundaries; 
see also Branch, The Cartographic State, 128–130. 
1014 Cf. Sahlins, Boundaries, chap. 7. 
1015 Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics’, 9 (emphasis in the original). 
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the line on a paper into a ‘clear’ and ‘real’ border on the ground.1016 Third, the 
aesthetics and political economy of boundaries and maps play an important role. 
Such mundane questions as printing techniques (lines are easier to draw as 
overlapping frontier zones) or commercial aspects (clear lines have a bigger 
market as they are considered as more aesthetic) play a significant role on how 
boundaries are represented on maps. This made certain actions thinkable and 
other not. Fourth, as Luhmann notes, modern boundaries do “not only separate, 
they also link” different political entities (or systems).1017 As such, boundaries 
“have a double function for systems of sufficient complexity. They serve as a 
differentiation of the system, stemming from its environment and as means of 
production of relations to other systems in this environment”. 1018 Boundaries and 
the subsequent idea of bounded territories with exclusive jurisdiction are 
constitutive for the modern system of state. 
 
 This means, that the emergence of bounded territories also gave rise to a 
‘homogenization’ of space as it introduced the idea of undefined space within 
boundaries. Luhmann speaks in this context of the creation of an “‘Innenraum’ 
(internal space) for human behaviour”.1019 Thus, rather than conceptualising space 
as radiating from the centre outwards, space was now thinkable as being 
homogenous within a bounded area. As a consequence, the possibility of overlapping 
jurisdiction was replaced by the concept of exclusive jurisdiction. This 
transformation of spatial imaginaries was, on the theoretical and conceptual side, 
finally concluded through a shift in the grammar of geometry, which occurred from 
the seventeenth century onwards. Here, in particular, the developments, which are 
attributed to René Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, stand out. Both 
Descartes and Leibniz, simultaneously – it is still contested if independently – 
                                                      
1016 Or as Baudrillard famously put it, it is ‘the map that preceded the territory’, Jean Baudrillard, 
Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 1; see also Branch, The 
Cartographic State, 122. 
1017 Luhmann, ‘Territorial Borders as Systsem Boundaries’, 236. See also: ‘A system exists as a 
difference in relation to its environment and it reflects this difference by means of boundaries’, 
Luhmann, 236. 
1018 Luhmann, ‘Territorial Borders as Systsem Boundaries’, 237; see also Mathias Albert, ‘On 
Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity: An International Relations Perspective’, Geopolitics 3, no. 
1 (1998): 53–68; and Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality’. For a comprehensive 
discussion of this function of boundaries from a slightly different vantage point, see also R. B. J. 
Walker, Out of Line: Essays on the Politics of Boundaries and the Limits of Modern Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2016), chap. 1. 
1019 Luhmann, ‘Territorial Borders as Systsem Boundaries’, 237. 
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revolutionized the field of geometry, which had remained for a long time the 
Ancient Greek geometry of Euclid. 1020 Let me discuss briefly Descartes 
contribution. Elden points out that Descartes’ view of space as  
 
“measurable, mappable, strictly demarcated, and thereby controllable, 
is precisely that which underpins the modern notion of political rather 
than solely geographical borders, the boundaries of states. Descartes’s 
view of space is as radical a break from the geometry of Euclid (which, 
crucially, and despite the common assertion, includes no notion of 
space) as the modern state is from the Greek notion of polis”.1021 
 
Descartes developed this view of space in two steps. First, Descartes distinguished 
mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa).1022 Space is then located on the side of 
the res extensa, which encompasses the entire material world. The material world 
operates through extension (thus, the terms res extensa). Everything that is 
extended (Descartes speaks of ‘bodies’) is characterised by three dimensions, 
which in reality are inseparable: length, breadth and depth. These ‘bodies’, in turn, 
 
“exist in space, a spatium, that is similarly extended. Two different 
things in size and shape can occupy the same place, but clearly not the 
same space. And when something moves, it is its place that has changed, 
not its size or shape. This is crucially important—space, not place, 
claims exclusivity”.1023 
 
As space is part of the material world, geometry, the mode of inquiry, which is 
linked to space, does not belong to the study of mental things, the res cogitans, but 
is part of the study of the material world. Second, while Euclidian geometry kept 
arithmetic (or algebra) and geometry as two distinct modes of operations (or 
sciences) – arithmetic as deductively operating science of discrete quantities, 
                                                      
1020 Cf. Rajkovic, ‘On Fragments and Geometry’, 12. 
1021 Elden, The Birth of Territory, 291. 
1022 According to Richard Rorty, it is this division, which lies at the heart of the modern - analytic - 
tradition in philosophy. For a fundamental reconstruction of how the Cartesian Dualism shaped 
modern imagination (e.g., the separation between science and a ‘world out there’) as well as 
criticism of this world view, see Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979). 
1023 Elden, The Birth of Territory, 292 (emphasis in the original). 
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geometry as science of continuous quantity – Descartes (as well as Leibniz) started 
to integrate both and, thus, initialised the conversation of arithmetic into geometry 
(and vice versa). What is important here, is that the arithmetization of geometry 
(often referred to as analytic geometry) made space calculable and carved out the 
possibly to pursue different projects on a spatial basis.1024 Thus, following this 
view of space, political space can be conceptualised as exclusive space. It was in 
particular Leibniz who introduced in this context the idea of exclusive 
jurisdiction.1025 And as space has become conceptualised as calculable and 
connected to the material world, this craved open, what Ford has called (in a 
Foucault-inspired way), “jurisdictional space” – a space, which is “conceptually 
open” and should become the condition of possibility for different projects of 
modern governmentality.1026 
 
 Certainly, these shifts of spatial imaginaries, which should become apparent 
in the notion of territorial and exclusive jurisdiction, did not immediately change 
politics and law – and, as I will suggest towards the end of this chapter, there were 
always exceptions to this image, as for example jurisdiction was even during high 
modernity never as territorial and exclusive as most scholars in IR and IL made us 
believe. This links, of course, also to the emerging revisionist historiography of the 
emergence and transformation of the modern state system.1027 The main objective 
                                                      
1024 See, for instance, the first sentences of Descartes’ Geometry (first published in 1637): ‘Any 
problem in geometry can easily be reduced to such terms that a knowledge of the length of certain 
straight is sufficient for its construction. Just as arithmetic consists of only four or five operations, 
namely, addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and the extraction of roots, which may be 
considered a kind of division, so in geometry, to find required lines it is merely necessary to add or 
subtract other lines[...]. I shall not hesitate to introduce these arithmetical terms into geometry, for 
the sake of greater clearness’, Rene Descartes, The Geometry of René Descartes, trans. David Eugene 
Smith and Marcia L. Latham (Chicago: The Open Court Publising Company, 1925), 2, 5. 
1025 Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics’, 8. For example, Leibniz published under the 
pseudonym Caesarinus Fürstenerius a treatise in which he claimed exclusive jurisdiction for the 
political sub-units (principalities, duchies, counties, cities) of the Holy Roman Empire. 
Consequently, he rejected the universal temporal jurisdiction of the Emperor, see Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (Caesarinus Fürstenerius), De jure suprematus ac legationis principum Germaniae, 1677. 
1026 Ford, ‘Law’s Territory’, 504. This resembles, of course, also the imaginary of the state as 
container, see Taylor, ‘The State as Container’. And, see of course Michel Foucault, Security, 
Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009). 
1027 Revisionist historiography in IR recently focussed on two fields of inquiry: first, it reconstructed 
the emergence and transformation of the modern system of states and, second, it concentrated on 
the early institutional phase of the academic field of IR (on this, see my discussion in chapter 2). In 
general, this strand of research incorporates a historicist mode of research and tries to debunk 
modern ‘myths’ by uncovering that neither the history of IR nor the history of the modern state 
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of this strand of research is to debunk existing ‘myths’ of the discipline of IR with 
the “Westphalian Myth” being the most significant. Here, revisionist accounts 
question the common claim of the orthodox mainstream in IR (and IL) that the 
Peace of Westphalia, involving the treaties signed in Münster and Osnabrück in 
1648, represented a fundamental transformation and innovation of the way 
political authority was organised. For revisionist authors Westphalia was ‘only’ the 
conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War (and a re-ordering of the inner order of the 
Holy Roman Empire) and did neither mark the origin of the modern sovereign 
state nor the system of states but must rather be seen as a continuation of 
medieval notions of political order and space (as it relied rather on a dynastic than 
a territorial order).1028 In other words, “Westphalia was anything but the founding 
moment of modern international relations”.1029Consequently, revisionist accounts 
locate the foundational moment of modern statecraft later than 1648 – e.g. in the 
consolidation of the English state in the late seventeenth century1030 or even in the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna (1815).1031 
 
3.3.2 Jurisdiction and Protection: From Right to Fact 
 
Although the formation of the modern nation state should take several centuries 
and was thus not finalized in 1648, we can nevertheless observe fundamental 
shifts already in the seventeenth century in how rule through jurisdiction works. 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, medieval jurisdiction was often not only non-
territorial and non-exclusive (overlapping) but relied also rather on the right (de 
jure) than on the actual capacity (de facto) to rule a political entity – the clearest 
                                                                                                                                                            
system is correctly represented by IR’s a-historical mainstream (in particular, neorealism). This 
resembles, of course, the recent ‘turn to history’ in critical IL scholarship. 
1028 This stream of literature is rather broad. However, see, for instance, Andreas Osiander, 
‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth’, International Organization 55, no. 
2 (2001): 251–87; Benno Teschke, ‘Theorising the Westphalian System of States: International 
Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism’, European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 
(2002): 5–48; Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern 
International Relations (London: Verso, 2003); Benno Teschke, ‘Debating “the Myth of 1648”: State-
Formation, the Interstate System and the Rise of Capitalism - a Rejoinder’, International Politics 43, 
no. 5 (2006): 531–73; Branch, The Cartographic State, 125–128; see also the recent discussion on 
the role and relevance of ‘benchmark dates’, such as 1648, for IR, Barry Buzan and George Lawson, 
‘Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations’, European Journal of International 
Relations 20, no. 2 (2014): 437–62. 
1029 Branch, The Cartographic State, 128. 
1030 Teschke, ‘Debating “the Myth of 1648”’. 
1031 Branch, The Cartographic State. 
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examples were the universal jurisdictions of the Church and the Holy Roman 
Empire. What we can observe from the mid-seventeenth century onwards is a shift 
from ‘right to fact’1032 in the context of jurisdiction and rule more generally. This 
move also fostered modern statehood and made it a ‘success’ in the struggle with 
other ‘jurisdictional competitors’ – may they be on the supra-state level (Church 
and Holy Roman Empire) as well on the sub-state level (such as city states or 
smaller lordship) or in the colonial context.1033In addition, the state was now able 
to claim a monopoly of violence against non-state actors such as pirates or 
mercenaries. As a corollary, the binary between public and private sources of 
violence was established.1034  
 
The most famous articulation of this shift is certainly Thomas Hobbes’ 
(1588-1679) Leviathan (1651), which was published in the immediate aftermath 
of the English Civil War (1642-51).1035 The historical context of the publication is 
important as it reveals that the Leviathan was a direct answer to the personal 
insecurity, which the Civil War had caused for large groups of the population.1036 
As it is well known, Hobbes’ solution to the problem of insecurity is the creation of 
a centralised power (a sovereign) guaranteeing by contract physical protection to 
its subjects. Thus, the source of legitimate rule shifted and is not anymore based on 
a predetermined divine order but on the capacity of a ruler to protect its 
subjects.1037According to Hobbes, other sources of legitimacy than de facto 
jurisdiction stand on a shaky ground, as ultimate moral and theological 
foundations will always remain contested (again, the English Civil War is the 
historical context). This becomes also visible in Hobbes’ view on language, which is 
usually underestimated in interpretations of his work. Hobbes was an advocate of 
                                                      
1032 Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’. 
1033 Cf. Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. 
1034 Cf. Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial 
Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Joaquín Alcaide 
Fernández, ‘Hostes Humani Generis: Pirates, Slavers, and Other Criminals’, in The Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law, ed. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 120–44. 
1035 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2014). For a 
reconstruction of Hobbes’ ‘de facto turn’, see Kinch Hoekstra, ‘The de facto Turn in Hobbes’ Political 
Philosophy’, in Leviathan after 350 Years, ed. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 33–73. 
1036 That the Leviathan was a direct answer to the political context of the mid-seventeenth century 
England is also visible in Hobbes’ conception of the state of nature, which shares many similarities 
with the English Civil War. 
1037 Cf. Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’, 989–990. 
 275 
a nominalist view on language, i.e. he claimed that it is not possible to fix by means 
of language the meaning of words and, as a consequence, the meaning of abstract 
ideas and narratives – also involving those of the universal jurisdictions of Pope 
and Emperor.1038 In other words, the task of the state is not only to overcome the 
insecurity of the state of nature by providing a monopoly of violence but also to 
overcome the indeterminacy of the signs of language by functioning as the ‘master 
of signs’. 
 
Moreover, Hobbes’ work is also interesting for my discussion for one more 
reason, namely that it stands somehow in the transition between medieval and 
modern conceptions of jurisdiction and politics. Here, two points are important. 
First, as Skinner remarks, Hobbes’ account is based on geometry as method (more 
geometrico) and, subsequently, Hobbes introduces “a ‘geometry’ of politics”, which 
works in accordance with his mechanistic philosophy.1039 Nevertheless, Hobbes 
notion of geometry differs from the one of Descartes or Leibniz, as he does not 
follow their proposal of an arithmetization of geometry.1040Second, the social-
contract tradition, which was established by Hobbes, forms more generally a 
hybrid between personalised and territorial jurisdiction.1041 Of course, different 
authors proposed different solutions in this regard. Hobbes, for instance, directly 
linked the sovereign, as represented by the artificial person of the Leviathan, to its 
subjects. Thus, jurisdiction is rather jurisdiction over persons, as in pre-modern 
times, than over territory. Yet on the other hand, territorial jurisdiction plays a 
crucial role as the sovereign only guarantees its promise to protect within the 
territorial boundaries of the state. This means also that a state can only secure 
protection – its promise given in the social contract – if it is able to control a 
territory and making then “protection […] a necessary condition for jurisdictional 
authority over persons”.1042 In contrast to Hobbes, for example, John Locke 
                                                      
1038 See in particular his chapter ‘Of Speech’ in the first part (‘Of Man’) of the Leviathan: Hobbes, 
Leviathan, chap. 4. 
1039 Quentin Skinner, Vision of Politics: Hobbes and Civil Science, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 318. 
1040 Cf. Elden, The Birth of Territory, 294–295. 
1041 For a general discussion of this second point, see Abizadeh, ‘Sovereign Jurisdiction, Territorial 
Rights, and Membership in Hobbes’. 
1042 Abizadeh, 428. 
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emphasised a stronger territorial notion of jurisdiction.1043 Locke did so as he 
foregrounded the private law notion of dominium. Locke conceptualises the 
possibility to gain dominium as pre-political (through the famous figure of ‘mixing 
their labours’1044) and, hence, the social contract is signed on the basis of already 
pre-existing territorial property rights.1045 Yet, the social contract tradition, which 
represents one of the grand narratives of justification for modern statehood, was 
never able to dissolve the tension between jurisdiction based on locus or on status 
as it always attempted to integrate (and hide the tension thereby) both notions of 
jurisdiction. 
 
 While Hobbes was important for the evolution of the modern statehood by 
introducing the idea that a political entity can only claim jurisdictional authority if 
it can guarantee the protection of its subjects, he operated within the confines of 
the project of absolutism. This is so as Hobbes’ invocation of the ‘artificial’ person 
of the Leviathan translates, of course, into the ‘real’ person of an absolutist ruler. 
By the (tacit) act of signing the contract, the inhabitants of a territory become the 
subjects of a ruler and transfer their natural rights – except their right to life 
(Hobbes even tolerates to take flight from military service) – to the sovereign. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the ruler and those who are ruled is 
different if compared to medieval times where feudalism rather imposed a 
relationship between ruler and bond-slave. Furthermore, as Kratochwil notes, 
“’[t]he people’ are now no longer the collective name for those who are definitely 
excluded from politics and the exercise of rule, as in medieval times. They are 
[now] conceived as the legitimizing source for the public authority”.1046 In this 
context, the central conceptual innovation was the invocation of the notion of 
                                                      
1043 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988). 
1044 ‘Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath 
mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
Property’, Locke, 288. 
1045 See Abizadeh, ‘Sovereign Jurisdiction, Territorial Rights, and Membership in Hobbes’, 399. In 
this regard, if Hobbes’ Leviathan was an ‘answer’ to the situation in England after the Civil War, 
Locke’s account should be read as a direct engagement with the question of how to gain dominium 
in the New World. This corresponds also with the way Locke depicts the state of nature as it 
resembles the historical situation of the first settlers in the New World. 
1046 Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics’, 11. 
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‘representation’, which made the absolutist ruler the representative of his/her 
subjects (those who are represented).1047  
 
3.3.3 Jurisdiction and Representation 
 
It took until the turn of the nineteenth century and the so-called Age of Revolutions 
until the modern notion of the state and, with it, of jurisdiction was fully 
established. During this period – particularly in the context of the French 
Revolution – the state and jurisdiction became ‘impersonalised’ as the notion of 
the ‘sovereignty of the people’ substituted the still predominant personal rule of 
absolutism.1048 In addition, nationalism and the invocation of the ‘nation’ started to 
increase the cohesion of the people within a state. Nations became “imagined 
communities” whose members shared a common cultural, social, political and 
territorial identity.1049 For example, the invention of the first national museums 
falls in this time: these represented public spaces narrating and commemorating 
the history of a nation – a nation that is located within a certain territory – as a 
linear timeline with the creation of a certain nation as a logical and natural 
outcome of some kind of philosophy of history. Put differently, the museum 
interweaves identity, memory and territoriality. 1050  Simultaneously, modern 
administrative techniques started to develop and also helped to increase the inner 
coherence of bounded territories (in Europe as well as in the colonies). This 
development was tightly linked to the arithmetization of space as governmental 
authorities started to measure everywhere, everything and everyone. For example, 
statistics became a vital part of the way modern nation states started to govern 
their territories and establish new forms of authority and power.1051 As James C. 
                                                      
1047 As Pitkin points out, Hobbes’ Leviathan was ‘the first examination of the idea of representation 
in political theory’, Hannah Fenichel Pitkin, ‘Representation’, in Political Innovation and Conceptual 
Change, ed. Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russel L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 140. 
1048 In the context of political representation, the question is now whether a representative should 
be completetly independent and do what s/he thinks is best (advocated, e.g., by Edmund Burke) or 
what her/his constituent want (advocated, e.g., by the Federalists), see Pitkin, 142. 
1049 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism  
(London: Verso, 1991). 
1050 See Bartelson, Visions of World Community, 111–113. 
1051 Cf. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population; Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Alain Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History 
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Scott adds in this context, “[e]very act of measurement was an act marked by the 
play of power relations”.1052 But also maps played an important role in this 
context. The cadastral map, for example, which was already known in the Middle 
Ages started to develop into an important instrument of statecraft, as it facilitated, 
e.g., modern taxation regimes. Here again, the performative dimension of maps 
comes to the fore, as “a state cadastral map created to designate taxable property-
holders does not merely describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system 
through its ability to give its categories the force of law”.1053 
 
According to Henri Lefebvre, it was, however, only in the writings of Hegel 
when the concept of the modern state and with it the idea(l) of territorial and 
exclusive jurisdiction were concluded. As Lefebvre put it, for “Hegel space brought 
historical time to an end, and the master of space was the state”.1054 Thus, the state 
became for Hegel synonymous with the ‘end of history’. It was in this period, when 
the state became a ‘timeless’ and ‘unquestioned’ condition for the successful 
organization of societies and politics; and, it was in this period when states became 
finally conceptualised as “containers”1055 of societies consisting of an inside, where 
hierarchy, progress and emancipation are possible, and an outside, which is 
characterised by anarchy and the endless repetition of violence and war.1056 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
of Statistical Reasoning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).This thread is taken up again 
in Chapter 7, when I discuss the implications of risk indicators for ‘humanity’s law’. 
1052 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 27. 
1053 Scott, 3. In particular, France started early to develop modern administrative techniques, which 
relied heavily on cartography, see Branch, The Cartographic State, chap. 7. 
1054 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 279; see also John Agnew, 
‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory’, Review of 
International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 71. 
1055 Taylor, ‘The State as Container’. 
1056 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); but see already also Martin Wight, ‘Why Is There No International 
Theory?’, in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 7–34; and Ruggie, ‘Continuity and 
Transformation in the World Polity’, 274. For a similar periodization, i.e. arguing for a quite ‘late’ 
starting point of the evolution of world/global politics (late eighteenth/early nineteenth century 
and not, e.g., ‘Westphalia’), see Mathias Albert, A Theory of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), chap. 3 (coming from a world systems perspective); and Jürgen 
Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) (coming from a global history perspective). 
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3.3.4 Beyond exclusive and territorial jurisdiction: Loopholes  
 
But, as my discussion of the tension in the social contractarian tradition already 
indicated, modern state and jurisdiction were never as exclusive and territorial as 
they were conceptualised during the heydays of modern statehood. In order to 
illustrate this, let me just briefly specify three ‘loopholes’ of exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction. 1057 These loopholes are usually addressed through the concept of 
extraterritoriality.1058 
 
First, the institution of diplomacy is closely related to the concept of 
extraterritoriality. While until the fifteenth century “the alpha and omega of the 
law of diplomacy” consisted in the personal “inviolability or sacrosanctity” – the 
latter notion had been developed by Bartolus – of the diplomatic agent, the 
creation of permanent diplomatic missions during the sixteenth century fostered 
the “legal device” of extraterritoriality. The notion of extraterritoriality was 
popularized by Pierre Ayrault, a French lawyer, in the late sixteenth century.1059 
Extraterritoriality means in this context that, e.g., the physical buildings of 
permanent diplomatic missions are provided with exclusive territorial jurisdiction 
within the receiving country – constituting thus some kind of an enclave.1060 A 
second view reveals, however, that extraterritoriality is a hybrid form of personal 
and territorial jurisdiction as ambassadors (and their staff and family) as well 
escape the jurisdiction of the receiving country as they are provided with 
immunity. The hybrid form of extraterritoriality in the diplomatic context becomes 
visible, for example, in the concept of the embassy, which is widely used today to 
describe the physical building of a permanent diplomatic mission but originally 
denominated the diplomatic delegation itself.  
                                                      
1057 Yet, according to Kratochwil, these ‘loopholes’ stabilize(d) modern sovereignty as ‘background 
condition’ Kratochwil, ‘Sovereignty as Dominium’, 26. Similarly: Péter D. Szigeti, ‘The Illusion of 
Territorial Jurisdiction’, Texas International Law Journal 52, no. 3 (2017): 369–99. 
1058 This discussion will limit itself to historical examples, as I will introduce in the next two 
chapters contemporary attempts to overcome exclusive territorial jurisdiction.  
1059 Arthur Eyffinger, ‘Diplomacy’, in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, ed. 
Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 820–821. 
1060 However, already Oppenheim sharpened this observation and noted: ‘Extraterritoriality, in this 
as in every other case, is a fiction only, for diplomatic envoys are in reality not without, but within, 
the territories of the receiving States. The term “Extraterritoriality” is nevertheless valuable, 
because it demonstrates clearly the fact that envoys must in most ponts be treated as though they 
were not within the territory of the receiving state’, Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A 
Treatise, vol. I: Peace (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905), 441. 
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Second, certain crimes became considered as falling under extraterritorial 
(sometimes also named ‘universal’) jurisdiction, meaning that every state is 
allowed or even has the obligation to prosecute these crimes. The idea that there 
are certain crimes, which fall under extraterritorial jurisdiction, is by far older than 
the modern state and was alaready articulated in antiquity – best-known in this 
regard is Cicero’s claim that pirates are enemies of all mankind (hostes humani 
generis).1061 In general – although there might be overlaps –, two types of crimes 
fall traditionally under extraterritorial jurisdiction: on the one hand, crimes that 
seem to undermine states’ monopoly of violence like mercenarism, piracy 
(privateering) and, later, terrorism;1062 on the other hand, crimes that seem to be 
so grave that they constitute a threat to humanity as a whole like, e.g., 
slavery.1063In the next two chapters I will continue this discussion when I address 
recent attempts to extend jurisdictional projects in the context of ‘Humanity’s Law’ 
and here particularly through the international criminal legal discourse.  
 
Third, although extraterritorial jurisdiction is usually presented as an 
exception of the rule in international law, this might only be true for the European 
context (and later the ‘Global North’).1064 It means that extraterritoriality has been 
– and to some extent still is – an important instrument to govern colonial and post-
colonial settings. Here, extraterritoriality was used, on the one hand, in the context 
of the nineteenth-century discussion about ‘standards of civilizations’.1065 In 
                                                      
1061 Alcaide Fernández, ‘Hostes Humani Generis’, 120. 
1062 For a discussion of the criminalization of piracy and mercenarism in Early Modern Europe, see 
Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns. For an argument that places the origins of 
international criminal law in the prosecution of piracy, see Simpson, Law, War and Crime, chap. 7. 
On semantic dirfts of the notion of the ‘enemy of mankind’, see Wouter Werner, ‘From Justus Hostis 
to Rogue State the Concept of the Enemy in International Legal Thinking’, International Journal for 
the Semiotics of Law 17, no. 2 (2004): 155–68. 
1063 More recently, we find claims that the anti-slavery movement of the nineteenth century, which 
was most notably promoted by Britain and the United States, also presents the beginning of 
modern International Human Rights Law. Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, ‘Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of 
International Human Rights Law’, The Yale Law Journal 117, no. 4 (2008): 550–641. It is, however, 
important to note that Britain and the United States supported the anti-slavery movement not only 
for ethical considerations but used it as well as an instrument to weaken other colonial powers. 
1064 To be clear: The claim that there existed a Jus Publicum Europeaum (i.e. an epoche of a 
European public international law), as prominently presented by Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im 
Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum is quite misleading. Rather it was, as Fisch puts it, a Jus 
Publicum Europaeorum, a public international law of Europeans, in order to defend European 
interests, Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht, 499. 
1065 For a general discussion of the role and relevance of the concept of ‘standards of civilization’ in 
the discourse of international law, see Tanja E. Aalberts, ‘Rethinking the Principle of (Sovereign) 
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particular, it was used by European states to legally ‘intervene’ in formally 
independent non-European states such as Japan, Siam, the Ottoman Empire or 
China. This practice was merely created by the establishment of European courts 
and other judicially protective activities for Europeans in non-European states. 
Thus, European citizens could ‘escape’ the jurisdiction of their host country.1066 On 
the other hand, extraterritoriality was widely used to ‘bring’ the ‘standard of 
civilization’ to non-European states, particularly from the ‘Global South’, in the 
context of decolonialisation. Former colonial rulers made wide use of 
protectorates as did international organizations, particularly the League of Nations 
and the United Nations, through systems of trusteeship. Hence, colonial powers 
were able to impose, by direct or indirect means, different projects of 
governmentality within non-European territories by invoking extraterritoriality 
(either by creating courts, protectorates or systems of trusteeship) running under 
the flag of a ‘civilising mission’ and supposing that both colonisers and colonised 
would benefit.1067 
 
3.3.5 ‘Jurisdiction is Certainly Territorial’ - Legal Positivism and Jurisdiction: Lotus 
 
If we turn finally our attention to (high) modern international law, we are 
confronted with a similar picture. I will dwell on this point only briefly as I will 
discuss modern jurisdictional practices more comprehensively in the next two 
chapters.1068 In modern international law the Lotus case, which was judged before 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1927, certainly stands out 
when it comes to discuss questions of jurisdiction. 1069 As Cedric Ryngaert argues, 
                                                                                                                                                            
Equality as a Standard of Civilisation’, Millennium 42, no. 3 (2014): 767–89; see also Fisch, Die 
Europäische Expansion Und Das Völkerrecht, 284–348. 
1066 Turan Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman 
Empire, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 84–87. 
1067 For an in-depth analysis of the various practices of governmentality through the League of 
Nations’ Mandate System, see Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 
chap. 3; on the United Nations context, see Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: 
Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
1068 Yet, this discussion links of course also to the jurisdictional conflict between African states, the 
AU and the ICC, which I outlined at the outset of this chapter. 
1069 Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”’, in Publications of the 
Permanent Court of Justice: Collection of Judgments, Series A, No. 10, 1927; for a discussion see 
Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, 30–34. 
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Lotus “still constitutes the basic framework for questions of jurisdiction under 
international law” as since “Lotus, the PCIJ and the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) have not directly addressed the doctrine of (extraterritorial) jurisdiction”.1070  
 
The Lotus case presents a jurisdictional case par excellence as it deals with an 
accident of two vessels on the high seas (i.e. beyond the territorial jurisdiction of 
any state): the mail streamer S.S. Lotus, sailing under French flag, and the Turkish 
collier Boz-Kourt collided on 2 August 1926, “just before midnight”.1071 The Boz-
Kourt sank and eight Turkish nationals died. The Lotus arrived in Constantinople 
on the next day and its French officer of the watch was first arrested by Turkish 
authorities and later convicted by a Turkish criminal court. France protested 
against the decision and agreed with Turkey to bring the case to the PCIJ in order 
to decide whether the Turkish criminal court had jurisdiction over the case or 
not.1072 In a close judgement, decided by president Max Huber’s casting vote only – 
the votes had been equally divided –, the PCIJ rejected in September 1927 France’s 
position. The PCIJ argued that there was no rule under international law 
prohibiting the installation of a criminal trail by the Turkish authority. Thus, 
according to the PCIJ sovereign states are allowed to act as they wish as long as 
their behaviour is not explicitly prohibited by international law. This means that 
international law represents a horizontal legal order between independent states, 
which is based on the ‘free will’ of states (voluntarism).1073 In this context, the PCIJ 
stated in its judgement that 
 
                                                      
1070 Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, 30. 
1071 Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘Lotus’, 10. 
1072 For more details, see Permanent Court of International Justice, 10–12. 
1073 On a side note: Lotus could thus be understood as one enunciation of an important 
transformation, that occurred from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards and that was 
summarized by Duncan Kennedy as follows: ‘The “subjects” of municipal law include “persons”, but 
the “subjects” of international law […] only “sovereigns”. Citizens as citizens had no right at all 
under international law. If they had no rights under international law, then sovereigns, and in 
particular powerful sovereigns, had no legal basis for interfering with the way independent states 
treated their citizens. This was the globalization of a legal consciousness with which a basic 
structural trait was that jurisdiction must not be global. The people doing the receiving were legal 
elites scattered around the world. They were closely integrated with, but not everywhere identical 
with, the political and economic elites of their respective countries. Receiving [Classical Legal 
Though] permitted a gesture of striking cosmopolitanism, without any sacrifice of local autonomy’ 
Duncan Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000’, in The New Law and 
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal, ed. David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 31. 
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“[i]nternational law governs relations between independent States. The 
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their free will 
as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a 
view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed”.  1074 
 
In the paragraph, immediately following this famous formulation, the court 
addresses the question of jurisdiction and claims that jurisdiction if territorial and 
exclusive: 
 
“Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the 
contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of 
another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial”.1075 
 
However, this opens up a paradoxical situations as a state would be bound by 
international law within its own jurisdiction while, on the other hand, 
international law accepts the exclusive jurisdiction of states within their 
territories. The sovereign equality of states stands in tension with the ‘free will’ of 
states. Thus, one paragraph later the PCIJ presents the following solution:  
 
“It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State 
from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case 
which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it 
cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view 
would only be tenable if international law contained a general 
prohibition to States to extend the application of their laws and the 
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their 
territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed 
States to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case 
                                                      
1074 Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘Lotus’, 18. 
1075 Permanent Court of International Justice, 18–19 (emphasis added). 
 284 
under international law it stands at present. Far from laying down a 
general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the 
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, 
property or acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a 
wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to 
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable”.1076  
 
In other words, the PCIJ attempts to solve the rather paradoxical situation of 
exclusive jurisdiction by distinguishing between – what should later be called – 
‘prescriptive’ and ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction. A state is not allowed to use coercive 
means outside its territory (enforcement jurisdiction) but is permitted to 
prescribe rules to ‘persons, property or acts’ extraterritorially as long as these 
rules are not explicitly prohibited by international law.1077 
 
The discussion of Lotus points also to the fact that states have traditionally 
claimed jurisdiction not only on the basis of territoriality. If we look today into 
textbook accounts of international law, we are usually confronted with a couple of 
principles which could serve as a foundation for states to claim jurisdiction (i.e., 
how jurisdiction can be ‘allocated’):1078 still most importantly, the territoriality 
principle, i.e. “a state has jurisdiction over everything materialising on its own 
territory”;1079 the active nationality principle, i.e. jurisdiction over all nationals; the 
passive nationality (or personality) principle, i.e. jurisdiction over any person who 
has somehow harmed one of its nationals; the protective principle, i.e. jurisdiction 
over states or persons who threaten a state’s core interest or national security; the 
universality principle, i.e. jurisdiction over acts of persons anywhere in the world if 
they commit international crimes;1080 and treaty-based extension of jurisdiction, i.e. 
                                                      
1076 Permanent Court of International Justice, 19. 
1077 Cf. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, 31; and Roger S. Clark, ‘Some Aspects of the 
Concept of International Criminal Law: Suppression Conventions, Jurisdiction, Submarine Cables 
and the Lotus’, Criminal Law Forum 22, no. 4 (2011): 528–530; but see also the discussion in Staker, 
‘Jurisdiction’, 313–315. 
1078 For example, Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’, 311–326; Simma and Müller, ‘Exercise and Limits of 
Jurisdiction’, 137–146; and Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law. 
1079 Simma and Müller, ‘Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction’, 137. 
1080 For example, in the Arrest Warrant case the Democratic Republic of Congo complained against 
Belgium before the ICJ. In 2000, Belgium had issued an international arrest warrant against 
Abdoulaye Yerodia, the Democratic of Congo’s Foreign Minister at this time. The Belgian judiciary 
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resulting from a voluntarist perspective on international law every special treaty 
between two or more states can modify jurisdictional issues between them. 
 
 4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to theorize and problematize the concept of jurisdiction in the 
discourse of international law and politics. To locate the concept within the wider 
discourse of international law and politics implies already challenge the 
widespread opinion (shared, e.g., by the ICC as we have seen at the outset of this 
chapter) that jurisdiction is a rather technical and non-political term – a legal 
technicality par excellence. Moreover, jurisdiction is usually conceptualised as 
exclusive and territorial – making it one of the central pillars of modern statehood. 
In order to critically engage with this understanding of jurisdiction, I followed in 
this chapter two – I think complementary – strategies.  
 
In the first part of the chapter, I introduced a number of recent critical 
scholarship, which – although coming from different disciplinary as well as 
conceptual and theoretical backgrounds – started to take the concept of 
jurisdiction as a key concept that is in need of further inquiry in order to better 
understand the politics of (international) law. As we have seen, these literature 
present jurisdiction as a social practice (Ford) and as a political category 
(Kaushal), they reflect the spatio-temporal embeddedness of jurisdiction when 
they study it as a ‘chonotope’ (Valverde) and  they show how a problematization of 
jurisdiction might link to broader discussions on ‘(global) legal pluralism’ 
(Berman) and a ‘postmodern conception of international law’ (de Sousa Santos). 
 
 In the second part of the chapter, I problematized the concept of jurisdiction 
by historicising it. Historicising jurisdiction helped me to show that jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                                            
accused Yerodia of having provoked massacres of Tutsi civilians. As Belgium is one of the few 
countries claiming universal jurisdiction for grave crimes, its judiciary issued the arrest warrant 
without Belgium having a direct link to the offences or to the offender. The ICJ decided that Belgium 
violated international law and demanded to close the arrest warrant. However, the ICJ tried to 
circumvent the question of universal jurisdiction as the decision was grounded on the Foreign 
Minister’s immunity and, thus, left the question of universal jurisdiction aside. International Court 
of Justice, ‘Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium)’, in ICJ 
Reports, 2002. 
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was not always exclusive and territorial as modern international law and politics 
make us belief. The historical reconstruction focussed on a number of contingent 
and intertwined developments particularly with regard to forms of rule, shifts in 
legal vocabularies and representations of space (e.g., through maps). Historically 
speaking, the chapter addressed three important episodes in the history of the 
concept of jurisdiction, namely the different (mostly non-territorial and non-
exclusive) forms of medieval jurisdiction, the transition from the medieval to the 
early modern period in Europe and the consolidation of exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction in the context in the project of modern statecraft. Thereby, the chapter 
showed that the ‘making’ of the modern nation state and exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction was a long – contingent and singular – process that might never been 
fully concluded as most of IR and IL make us believe; rather it is a process without 
finality, teleology and/or necessity. There is neither a clear foundational date of 
the modern state (system) nor is there a trans-historically and cross-culturally 
valid logic of it. Consequently, the chapter showed also that it might be 
problematic to think of jurisdiction in strict binaries such as territorial/non-
territorial or exclusive/non-exclusive as jurisdictional practices are located in-
between (even high modernity has its loopholes and paradoxes). Rather the 
binaries territorial/non-territorial or exclusive/non-exclusive should be conceived 
as gradual and fluent. Finally, the chapter showed that debates about jurisdiction 
were involved in many political projects with – from our point of view – the 
making of the modern territorial nation state as its most important one. It turned 
out then that the nation state itself provided the platform for several political 
projects. But what happens if the political project of the nation state is under fire, 
as it seemed recently? 
 
 In order to study these possible transformations, in particular the 
transformations associated with the emergence of ‘humanity’s law’, I will advance 
in the two remaining chapters a non-territorial, post-Cartesian, multidimensional 
and non-exclusive notion of jurisdiction. Let me briefly explain what I mean by this. 
 
(1) Non-territorial. As I have reconstructed in this chapter, the notion of 
jurisdiction is, since the transition from medieval forms of rule to modern 
ones, deeply linked to territoriality. Modernity’s main project of rule, the 
 287 
nation state, is based on the idea that jurisdiction is territorial. Similarly, the 
‘international’ – in all its different guises – is usually imagined in terms of 
territoriality. 1081  This means that the international is perceived as 
compartmentalized into its various territorial nation states. International 
law in turn is supposed to ‘govern the relations between independent 
states’. However, the concept of humanity challenges this imaginary. 
Humanity does not need territoriality – it is even a project that attempts to 
transcend it. The politics of humanity involves therefore the questioning 
and even dissolving of the ‘tight link between space and territory’, which is 
the condition of possibility for the modern notion of jurisdiction and 
statecraft. Without being necessary a prefigurement of a ‘new medievalism’, 
jurisdictional projects of ‘humanity’s law’ nevertheless resemble rather the 
jurisdiction of the medieval Pope than of the modern territorial nation 
state.1082 
(2) Post-Cartesian. Not only the ‘tight link between territoriality and space’ is 
increasingly under pressure. Even the concept of space itself seems to be 
under scrutiny. As I pointed out, modern space, and this is also the case for 
the space of modern jurisdiction, is Cartesian space. On the one hand, the 
Cartesian notion of space introduced the idea of ‘exclusivity’ into ‘exclusive’ 
jurisdiction. Yet, on the other hand, Cartesian space is always already 
extended space (res extensa). This means that the modern ‘politics of 
jurisdiction’ is about the division of an already existing, i.e. fully extended, 
space. This is of course the way modern ‘international’ politics is imagined. 
However, it is not necessary to conceptualise space in this way. For 
example, Bruno Latour recently started to problematize the Cartesian 
notion of space and argued that it was the “Nazi legal scholar” Carl Schmitt, 
the “toxic and nevertheless indispensable Carl Schmitt”, who in his “oddly 
titled” book Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum 
[The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum 
                                                      
1081 In this regard, Luhmann’s concept of ‘world society’ is, again, an important exception. According 
to Luhmann the emergence of ‘world society’ is linked to functional differentiation and substitutes 
the segmentary differentiation into territories, which is constitutive of the international system, 
Niklas Luhmann, ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 57, no. 1 (1971): 1–
35. 
1082 Cf. Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory’. 
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Europaeum]1083, most-profoundly questioned the modern imaginary of 
space.1084 According to Latour, Schmitt conceptualises space as extending, 
not as something that is already extended. Thus, space becomes „the 
provisional result of a phenomenon of expansion, of spacing, of gained 
ground, which depends on other political and technical variables. For him, 
as for more recent historians of sciences, the res extensa is not a space in 
which politics is situated – the background oft he map of every geopolitics – 
but, rather, something that is generated by political action itself aided by its 
technological instrumentation. In other words, for him […] space is the 
offspring of history“.1085 If we conceive space in this way, the politics of 
jurisdiction is not only about the allocation of jurisdiction within a pre-
given bounded space but also about the making and generating of new 
modalities of spatial (and, not only spatial) thinking. Jurisdictional projects 
expand and thereby create space (time, subjectivity, agency, causality, etc.). 
Thus, they are projects of connectivity.1086 
(3) Multidimensional. If jurisdiction is neither bound anymore to territoriality 
nor to the Cartesian notion of space, but is conceptualised instead as 
extending, other, namely non-spatial, modes of extension come to the 
fore.1087 One important mode of extension is certainly extension through 
time (meaning also: not only in time). This links, of course, to Mariana 
Valverde’s suggestion to study jurisdiction as chronotope.1088 As such, the 
shift from past-oriented logics to more future-driven logics of international 
legal argumentation (e.g., in risk-based rationalities) has jurisdictional 
effects. They are jurisdictional projects that extend by colonizing the future 
(and this has in turn also consequences for the spatial extend of 
                                                      
1083 Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum. 
1084 Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime (Cambridge: Polity, 
2017), 228, 229. 
1085 Latour, 231 (emphasis in the original). 
1086 Latour’s critique is even more radical, as he points out that not only the modern international 
but also our idea of globality rests os a Cartesian notions of space. See Bruno Latour, ‘Onus Orbis 
Terrarum: About a Possible Shift in the Definition of Sovereignty’, Millennium 44, no. 3 (2016): 305–
20. See also my discussion: Filipe dos Reis, ‘Wir sind nie global gewesen. Latour, Die 
Internationalen Beziehungen und die (Geo)Politik der Diplomatie’, in Der große Leviathan und die 
Welt der Ameisen. Zum Staatsverständnis Bruno Latours und der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie, ed. Hagen 
Schölzel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, forthcoming). 
1087 This links of course also to my earlier discussion of treating the extension of academic 
disciplines in terms of jurisdiction. 
1088 Valverde, Chronotopes of Law. 
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jurisdiction). As I will argue in Chapter 7, recent attempts to extend the 
jurisdictional project of the responsibility to protect are tied to future-
oriented forms of legal argumentation. Yet, there are even other forms of 
extension. For example, in Chapter 6 I will reconstruct how projects of 
international criminal law attempt to extend inter alia by means of material 
jurisdiction (ratione materiae), i.e. by adding crimes to the catalogue of 
international criminal law and thereby negotiating its boundary.  
(4) Non-Exclusive. Leaving a Cartesian-inspired notion of space and jurisdiction 
behind implies finally that jurisdiction can be conceptualised as non-
exclusive. Rather different jurisdictional projects (their spatialities, 
temporalities, subjectivities, etc.) interact, intersect, overlap, clash and 
hybridize. In this context, various authors pointed to the increasing 
difficulty to depict law, jurisdiction and authority by means of maps. The 
typical two-dimensional maps of modernity seem to work less and less.1089 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1089 This is, for example, observed in: de Sousa Santos, ‘A Map of Misreading’; William Twining, 
Globalisation and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000), chap. 6; Valverde, Chronotopes of 
Law, 58; and Szigeti, ‘The Illusion of Territorial Jurisdiction’, 394. 
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Chapter 6: How to Make an International Crime: Of Judges, Lawyers and 
Academics 
 
“The man who judges the criminal is really the master of society”1090 
“You go beyond the black letter law because you look at the spirit of law”1091 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter problematized, theorized and historicized the concept of 
jurisdiction in the discourse of international law and politics. By following the 
emerging critical scholarship on jurisdiction, I suggested that focusing on 
jurisdictional practices tells us much about the way politics works in today’s world 
society. This is because different projects of jurisdiction are connected to different 
projects of power and authority. Yet, in scholarship (‘critical’ as ‘mainstream’) 
these jurisdictional practices are usually underrated and understudied, although, 
as Orford stresses, the “process of claiming jurisdiction is a form of alchemy. A 
successful claim of jurisdiction transforms power into authority, or fact into 
right”.1092 This observation also links to my previous discussion (Chapter 4), which 
centred on the significance to study the work of international legal experts and 
their use of legal technicalities – with jurisdiction being one of these technicalities. 
As I pointed out in Chapter 5, historically speaking, todays prevalent notion of 
jurisdiction in international law, i.e. exclusive and territorial jurisdiction, is a 
relative newcomer as it is closely related to the emergence of the modern (system 
of) state(s). However, as I noted towards the end of Chapter 5, in practice modern 
jurisdiction was never as exclusive and territorial as imagined in theory. There 
were always and still are several loopholes – from the prosecution of hostes 
humani generis to the extraterritorial jurisdictional practices of European 
(post)colonial powers in the non-European parts of the world to the development 
                                                      
1090 Alexis de Tocquille, Democracy in America (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 2000), 260. 
1091 Antonio Cassese, Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, and Marlise Simons, ‘The Judge: Interview with 
Antonio Cassese’, in The Prosecutor and the Judge: Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese, Interviews 
and Writings, ed. Heikelina Verrijn Stuart and Marlise Simons (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2009), 53. 
1092  Anne Orford, ‘Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the 
Responsibility to Protect’, Michigan Journal of International Law 30 (2009): 1013. 
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of non-territorial principles such as the nationality principle(s) or various forms of 
treaty-based extensions of jurisdiction.  
 
Yet, more important – and this is the starting point for this chapter – is the 
observation that we witness in recent years several projects to leave the grounds 
of territorial and exclusive jurisdiction not only in exceptional circumstance (at 
least if we look at the ‘Western’ parts of the world) pushing, e.g., towards universal 
forms of jurisdiction in certain issue areas on a permanent and at-large basis. 
These projects are often embedded in and pursued through the vocabulary of the 
various streams of ‘humanity’s law’. In this chapter, I will concentrate on one field 
of international legal and political practice where such attempts have been 
particularly widespread: the wider discourse of international criminal law and 
justice.1093 Although, as I have already highlighted at the outset of the previous 
chapter, today’s main organ of international criminal law, the ICC in the Hague, is 
governed by the principle of complementary; and, although the jurisdiction of the 
ICC is limited only to its member states (and, thus, presents stricto sensu a form of 
treaty-based extension of states’ jurisdiction), it is the notion of universal 
jurisdiction attributed to an international criminal court or tribunal that always 
looms large at the horizon of international criminal justice and law as a whole. 
Seen from this perspective, international criminal law and justice is an exemplary 
case for a more general politics of universality. 1094 
 
If we go now into further detail, jurisdiction in international criminal law is 
usually discussed vis-à-vis the following four jurisdictional principles (or 
dimension):1095 jurisdiction ratione tempori, dealing with the question whether 
jurisdiction is curtailed by the passage of time (e.g., the issue of ex post facto 
jurisdiction and the retroactivity of law); jurisdiction ratione loci, dealing with the 
question of the territorial scope of jurisdiction; jurisdiction ratione personae, 
                                                      
1093 I use the terms ‘international criminal law’, ‘international criminal justice’ and ‘international 
criminal law and justice’ interchangeable in this chapter. Moreover, the next chapter moves then to 
the intersection of international criminal law and the intervention discourse. 
1094 For further discussion, see, e.g., Gerry Simpson, Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the 
Reinvention of International Law (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 36–37; I borrow the term ‘politics of 
universality’ from Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth 
and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
1095 These principles should not be confused with the principles of jurisdiction in international law 
in general (on these principles see my discussion towards the end of the previous chapter). 
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dealing with the question of which groups of persons fall under a jurisdiction; and, 
jurisdiction ratione materiae, dealing with the question which crimes are subject of 
jurisdiction.1096 What also becomes visible in this context is the flexibility of the 
concept of jurisdiction as well as the added value of studying it: by focusing on the 
different principles of jurisdiction we are able to accurately reconstruct the extent 
and extension of the scope and authority of international criminal law and justice in 
a multi-dimensional way. To look at jurisdiction on this way signifies of course to 
follow a non-territorial, post-Cartesian, multidimensional and non-exclusive 
notion of jurisdiction, as advanced in the previous chapter. In other words, we are 
on the one hand able to move beyond a solely territoriality-focused analysis of 
jurisdiction, which would encompass jurisdiction ratione loci, as we are on the 
other hand able to grasp the interplay of different principles of jurisdiction. For 
instance, we can scrutinize now the boundaries of international criminal law and 
justice by focusing on debates about whether certain groups fall under the 
jurisdiction of a court by studying, e.g., which kind of nationality principle is 
applied or whether leading politicians should enjoy immunity (all questions 
concerning jurisdiction ratione personae); or we can focus on the question of 
whether there exists a temporal threshold for the prosecution of certain crimes or 
not – something which the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals after the Second 
World War rather denied while the ICC only prosecutes crimes committed after 
the Rome Statute’s entry into force in 2002 (and in the case of the Crime of 
Aggression even only 2017). In the current chapter I will focus only on one 
dimension of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ratione materiae, i.e. the question of 
which crimes are or should be part of international criminal law.  
 
The question of what constitutes a crime under international criminal law, 
i.e. an international crime, lies at the core of international criminal law and justice. 
Already the first article of the Rome Statute of the ICC makes reference to 
international crimes. The whole article states the following: 
 
                                                      
1096 For further discussion, see the respective chapters in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R. 
W. D. Jones, eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 1 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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 “An International Criminal Court (the Court) is hereby established. It 
shall be a permanent institution and shall have to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern, as referred to in this Statute, and should be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the 
Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute”.1097 
 
Later, in Article 5, the Statute speaks of “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole” and lists four crimes: “(a) The crime of 
genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of 
aggression”.1098 These crimes are further specified in the subsequent Articles 6 to 8 
as well as in an addendum, the so-called Elements of Crimes.1099 It is important to 
note for our purpose that each of these crimes has its own (intellectual) history. 
The same holds true for the inclusion of certain crimes into the Rome Statute and 
the exclusion of others.1100 As we will see, these histories are often deeply 
intertwined with the work of leading international legal experts – in particular, 
legal academics.1101  
 
 Legal academics are an interesting and “hugely influential” group of experts 
in the context of international criminal law and justice as their field of work is not 
                                                      
1097 International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 
A/CONF.189/9 (1998), para. 1 (emphasis added). 
1098 International Criminal Court (ICC), para. 5. 
1099 International Criminal Court (ICC), 6–9; Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court, ‘Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes’, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000).  
1100 On the exclusion of certain crimes from the Rome Statute, see Patrick Robinson, ‘The Missing 
Crimes’, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, ed. Antonio 
Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R. W. D. Jones, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 497–
525. 
1101 This points also to the fact – for some it may constitute a problem – that there is no common 
understanding of what the concept of ‘international crimes’ actually means – the concept itself is 
‘indeterminate’ as it is ‘essentially contested’. As, for example, Roger O’Keefe notes, ‘[i]nternational 
crimes occupy a central place in international criminal law, yet there is no agreement as what is 
meant by an “international crime”. No common understanding, let alone common definition of the 
concept exists’. For O’Keefe, this is unproblematic as the ‘practical consequences of a lack of 
agreement as to the notion of an international crime are not great’ and as ‘[y]ou know one when 
you see it’. Roger O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 47, 
56. On the one hand, the present chapter follows this more pragmatic approach to some extend, as 
it does not offer a stipulative definition of what the notion of international crimes ‘really’ means 
(and rather reconstructs its use in different contexts); on the other hand, however this chapter 
argues that it makes a difference how the notion of ‘international crimes’ is used as this also 
determines the scope of the ‘catalogue’ of crimes and thus the scope of international criminal law’s 
jurisdiction in general. 
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only restricted to the confines of academia.1102 This group of experts often 
‘changes hats’ as it rotates between different positions inside and outside 
academia. Inside academia – at least this seems, as Christine Schwöbel observes, to 
be the case in international criminal law – they disseminate and advertise their 
respective legal project(s) through teaching (e.g., creating new LL.M. programs) 
and research (e.g., establishing new academic journals).1103 Outside academia they 
work as legal advisers for foreign ministries, in international organizations and 
commissions, for non-governmental organisations and in advocacy or are 
appointed as judges of international courts and tribunals.1104 As a consequence, 
they trespass what Bourdieu once called the “structural hostility” between 
theoreticians and practitioners and what he believed of being a constitutive 
feature of the ‘judicial field’.1105 This double function between theory and practice 
allows legal academics also to foster the extension of their field – both in the 
context of jurisdictional conflicts between different disciplines (and within their 
own discipline) in academia as in the application of law outside of the university 
sector.1106 In a nutshell, legal academics in the field of international criminal law 
                                                      
1102 Mikkel Jarle Christensen, ‘Academics for International Criminal Justice: The Role of Legal 
Scholars in Creating and Sustaining a New Legal Field’, iCourt Working Paper 14 (2014). 
1103 According to Schwöbel, this trend to advertise one’s own field of inquiry silences critical 
perspectives in scholarship on international criminal law. She describes the political economy in 
academia as follows: ‘So long as academics respond to the market by supplying ICL teaching (and 
this author is no exception), they are arguably pursuing a particular self-interest. The consumers in 
this market are largely students, rather than criminals. The number of students interested in ICL 
has risen exponentially. Specialised ICL courses have been established, particularly in The 
Netherlands, on a large scale to meet this new demand. We are of course to a certain extent all 
bound up in making our disciplines appear attractive and interesting, but it appears that there is a 
real fear that a critical engagement with ICL could either undermine the entire area of international 
law, give the impression of being in favour of violence, or at the very least spoil the glow of success 
for others. It is therefore tempting to become complicit in making the discipline appear more 
relevant, to focus on the detail rather than that which informs the discipline at large’, Christine E. J. 
Schwöbel, ‘The Comfort of International Criminal Law’, Law and Critique 24, no. 2 (2013): 169–91. 
1104 Koskenniemi lists judges, advisers, activists and academics as different roles for international 
lawyers, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline of a Theory of 
International Law as Practice’, in Collection of Essays by Legal Advisers of States, Legal Advisers of 
International Organizations and Practitioners in the Field of International Law (New York: United 
Nations, 1999), 495–523. Isabel Feichtner differentiates between activists, practitioners and 
scholars, Isabel Feichtner, ‘Realizing Utopia through the Practice of International Law’, European 
Journal of International Law 23, no. 4 (2012): 1151–1152. For an analysis of self-descriptions by 
legal experts, who occupy these roles, see Anne Peters, ‘Rollen von Rechtsdenkern und Praktikern - 
Aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht’, Berichte der deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 45 (2012): 168–71. 
1105 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’, Hastings Law 
Journal 38 (1986): 821. See also my discussion on Bourdieu’s analysis of law and legal expertise in 
Chapter 4. 
1106 Cf. Christensen, ‘Academics for International Criminal Justice’. 
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are a perfect example of the way David Kennedy describes experts, namely as 
‘people with projects’ or ‘people pursuing projects’.1107 
 
International criminal law and justice is, in particular, an interesting field to 
study international legal experts as individuals, i.e. as individual ‘people with 
projects’. This is due to the structure of the international criminal legal discourse, 
which both individualises and is individualised. International criminal law and 
justice individualises, as it is this discourse (perhaps together with international 
human rights law), which brought the individual to the centre stage of the 
previously state-centred discourse of international law. As such international 
criminal law and justice attributes individual criminal responsibility to individuals 
(perpetrator) for committing (collective) crimes to individuals (victims). 
Consequently, international criminal courts and tribunals are the sites where this 
kind of individualisation takes place. For example, in the ICTY trial against former 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic such a position was clearly articulated by 
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte in her opening statement on 12 February 2002: 
 
“The accused in this case, as in all cases before the Tribunal, is charged 
as an individual. He is prosecuted on the basis of his individual criminal 
responsibility. No state or organisation is on trial here today. The 
indictments do not accuse an entire people of being collectively guilty of 
the crimes, even the crime of genocide. It may be tempting to generalise 
when dealing with the conduct of leaders at the highest level, but that is 
an error that must be avoided. Collective guilt forms no part of the 
Prosecution case”.1108 
 
Such attempts to attribute responsibility to individuals have, moreover, caused 
various controversies since the emergence of modern international criminal 
law.1109 For instance, there are debates on how to deal with joint criminal 
enterprises (JCE) – as international crimes are usually collective crimes – or 
                                                      
1107 For more detail, see my discussion of Kennedy’s own academic project in Chapter 3 and on the 
way he conceptualises expertise in Chapter 4. 
1108 As cited in Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 64. 
1109 See, for instance, the discussion in Kirsten Ainley, ‘Excesses of Responsibility: The Limits of Law 
and the Possibilities of Politics’, Ethics & International Affairs 25, no. 4 (2011): 407–31. 
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whether a regular soldier can plead superior order when charged with war crimes. 
Moreover, the discourse of international criminal law and justice is also highly 
individualised as its narratives are often told as personal projects of a few 
protagonists – almost Herculean struggles of a hand full of individuals fighting a 
‘culture of impunity’ (seemingly caused by a state-centric international law). In 
this context the work and life of early academics and activists such as Hersch 
Lauterpacht and Rafael Lemkin has been subject to quasi-biographical studies;1110 
the histories of the post-Second World War trials were reconstructed in movies 
and documentaries as the personal histories of the Prosecutors Ben Ferencz or 
Robert Jackson;1111 in a similar vein, more recently, for example, former ICTY 
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte published her memoirs1112 as there were screened 
several documentaries which prominently addresses the projects of ICC’s former 
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo and current Chief Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda.1113 
  
 This chapter takes as its vantage point this second observation, namely that 
the international criminal legal discourse is highly individualised and operates on the 
basis of personal projects of international legal experts. In particular, it focuses on 
the role of two international legal experts – of two ‘people with projects’ – in the 
making of international crimes: Hersch Lauterpacht’s (1897-1960) role in the 
making of ‘crimes against humanity’ and, to a larger extent, Antonio Cassese’s 
(1937-2011) recent – and until today basically unsuccessful – attempt to make 
                                                      
1110 See, in particular, Philippe Sands wonderful and very personal reconstruction of the role of 
Lauterpacht and Lemkin in the making of international criminal law, Philippe Sands, East West 
Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
2016); on Lemkin see also Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide 
(New York: Basic Books, 2002). 
1111 US Chief Prosecutor at the Einsatzgruppen Trial, Ben Ferencz was, for example, portrayed 
recently in the documentaries Watchers of the Sky (Propeller Films, 2014) and A Man Can Make 
Difference (W-Film, 2015); while US Chief Prosecutor at the IMT in Nuremberg, Robert Jackson 
(played by Alec Baldwin) is the main character in the two-part television docudrama Nuremberg 
(Warner Home Video, 2000) 
1112 Carla Del Ponte, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the 
Culture of Impunity: A Memoir, English language ed (New York: Other Press, 2009). 
1113 For an in-depth analysis of these documentaries see Wouter Werner, ‘“We Cannot Allow 
Ourselves to Imagine What It All Means”: Documentary Practices and the International Criminal 
Court’, Law and Contemporary Problems 76, no. 3–4 (2013): 319–39; see also Wouter Werner, 
‘Justice on Screen – A Study of Four Documentary Films on the International Criminal Court’, Leiden 
Journal of International Law 29, no. 4 (2016): 1043–60. 
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‘international terrorism’ an international crime.1114 Both Lauterpacht and Cassese 
were two of the most influential scholars in international law and both worked 
additionally as legal experts outside of academia. By treating Lauterpacht and 
Cassese as ‘people with projects’ and the above mentioned crimes as projects I do 
neither situate this study in the soft-constructivist literature on ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’1115 nor am I interested in what Lauterpacht and Cassese ‘really’ 
thought, i.e. to ‘look into their heads’ in order to grasp what their ‘intentions’ 
were.1116 In this regard, I rather follow Gunther Teubner’s discussion of ‘actors’ in 
(private) international law: 
 
“As social constructs, they are indispensable to legal communication, 
because law as a social process needs to attribute communication to 
actors (individual or collective ones) in order to continue self-
reproduction. But these ‘actors’ are only role-bundles, character-masks, 
internal products of legal communication. The densely populated world 
of legal persons, the plaintiffs and defendants, the judges and 
legislators, the parties to a contract, the corporations and the state, is an 
internal invention of the legal process”.1117 
 
                                                      
1114 Here, the history of the crime of genocide and the crime of aggression could have been included 
as well. The history of genocide is deeply linked with the legacy of Rafael Lemkin. Lemkin even 
coined the word ‘genocide’ in 1944. As a consequence of Lemkin’s activism ‘genocide’ was included 
in the indictment of the British Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trail and, later, Lemkin was involved 
in the drafting process of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, which was adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1948. For further details on the role of 
Lemkin in the making of genocide, see Power, A Problem from Hell. The early history of the crime of 
aggression was, at least to some extent, linked to the work of Quincy Wright, whose general 
approach I have introduced in Chapter 2. Wright emphasised the need to ‘outlaw war’ (i.e. to make 
aggression an international crime) both after the First World War (with regard to the German 
Kaiser) as well as after the Second World War (with regard to Germany and Japan). See the 
discussion in Hatsue Shinohara, US International Lawyers in the Interwar Years: A Forgotten Crusade 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 188–198. 
1115 For a recent analysis drawing on such a framework in the field of human rights law, see Kathryn 
Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2011). 
1116 This is at least the case as long as - as it is usually assumed - that intentions are something 
‘objective’, namely, as for example Stanley Fish puts it, when ‘intention anchors interpretation in 
the sense that it stands outside and guides the process’. Rather Fish suggests a different (in my view 
more convincing) avenue when he points out that ‘intention is an interpretive fact, that is, it must 
be constructed; it is just that is impossible not to construe it and therefore impossible to oppose 
either to the production or the determination of meaning’, see Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes 
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1989), 100. 
1117 Gunther Teubner, ‘How the Law Thinks: Towards a Constructivist Epistemology of Law’, Law & 
Society Review 23, no. 5 (1989): 741 (references omitted). 
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Or, to put it differently, I treat international legal experts and their respective 
projects similar to conceptual shifts in a semantic field. To reconstruct 
‘Lauterpacht’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ or ‘Cassese’ and ‘international 
terrorism’ works from a methodological point of view similar to reconstruct, say, 
the use of the concept ‘state’ in fifteenth century ‘Italy’.  
 
 This strategy comes with three qualifications: First, I am not interested in 
judging whether it is good or bad that scholars become judges, members of 
commissions or activists (and vice versa). Indeed, that legal experts change hats is 
quite ‘normal’ in (international) law as it is ‘normal’ for legal scholars that they do 
not situate their academic work strictly outside the field of legal practice.1118 Quite 
the opposite is the case as their scholarly work can even serve as ‘source’ of 
international law and is thus ‘officially’ part of legal practices – not to mention 
more complex “looping effects” between academia and practice, e.g., by teaching 
the next generation of lawyers or through publications, which address a general 
public.1119 In the end it is rather this permanent rotation between the inside and 
the outside of academia, which stabilizes the international legal field (i.e., ‘dynamic 
stabilisation’); and to reconstruct how experts move between different positions, 
roles and functions helps to better understand how international argumentation 
actually works. Second, this implicates also that this chapter does not address the 
question whether ‘crimes against humanity’ or – more contested – ‘international 
terrorism’ are really international crimes. In this regard, this chapter is only 
descriptive as it intends to ‘follow’ different international crimes in various 
contexts. Finally, it is also descriptive for another reason, namely I will not discuss 
in extenso possible success conditions, i.e. why a certain crime did become an 
international crime and another did not. In this last regard I will limit myself to a 
few speculations towards the end of the chapter.  
                                                      
1118 Cf. Fuad Zarbiyev, ‘Judicial Activism in International Law - A Conceptual Framework for 
Analysis’, Journal of International Dispute Settlement 3, no. 2 (2012): 271. 
1119 Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 34. For a discussion in IR, see Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in 
International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 2 (2000): 149. The 
separation between scholars (observer) and their object of studies (observed) is, of course, one of 
the main tenets of philosophical positivism. For a post-positivist discussion on ‘scholars as agents’ 
in different settings (as teachers, advisors but also as ‘guardians’ of Western culture and the society 
of states) in the context of IR, see Vendulka Kubálková, ‘Reconstructing the Discipline: Scholars as 
Agents’, in International Relations in a Constructed World, ed. Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, 
and Paul Kowert (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 193–201. 
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 In order to make good on these claims, this chapter basically consists of two 
parts. The next section (2.) reconstructs the role of Lauterpacht in the making of 
crimes against humanity and the section (3.) that follows turns to Cassese’s 
attempt to make international terrorism an international crime. The latter section 
will be considerably longer. In order to make the discussion more comprehensive, 
both section are embedded in a wider discursive environment. This helps me also 
to recast and retell (parts of) the history of international criminal law and justice 
as a history of international crimes, i.e. as a history of the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae. This chapter ends with a conclusion (4.), which addresses the 
importance and practical relevance of studying the making of international crimes. 
 
 2. The Emergence of Modern International Criminal Law, Lauterpacht and 
Crimes Against Humanity 
 
As it is the case for international law more generally, it is deeply contested where, 
when and how international criminal law actually originated. The origins of 
international criminal law are contested as different origins emphasise different 
aspects of international criminal law.1120 Writing the history of international 
criminal law is thus never an ‘innocent’ endeavour. Authors, who are interested in 
the logic of international criminal law, locate the origins usually in discourses 
about the figure of the hostis humani generis (represented by the pirate). Here, 
some authors go back as far as to Antiquity and the Roman Empire while others 
limit themselves to the nineteenth century and the role of outlawry of piracy in 
                                                      
1120 Furthermore, as Mikkel Jarle Christensen observes, the mainstream literature on the history of 
international criminal law is usually told in two ways. Either it is told as a legalistic history, which 
focuses on the internal developments of the legal discourse and how these developments create 
practical mechanisms; or it is told from a functionalist standpoint, which emphasises the role of 
states’ interests for the creation of international criminal legal institutions as these institutions are 
only the epiphenomena of international power struggles, Christensen, ‘Academics for International 
Criminal Justice’, 5–6. These two accounts resemble, of course, also the debate between legal 
positivism in IL (e.g. Oppenheim) and political realism in IR (e.g., Morgenthau). I introduced this 
debate in Chapter 2; . For an in-depth discussion of different histories of international criminal law, 
see also Immi Tallgren, ‘Searching for the Historical Origins of International Criminal Law’, in 
Historical Origins of International Criminal Law, ed. Morten Bergsmo, Yi Ping, and Cheah Wui Ling, 
vol. 1, 20 (Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014), xi – xxix. 
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British imperial debates. 1121  Others, who emphasise the gradual 
institutionalisation, locate its origins often in the interwar years.1122 And finally, 
those voices, who foreground the role of the actual implementation of trials and 
tribunals, locate its origins in the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (IMTFE) in Tokyo.1123 
 
The category of ’crimes against humanity’, to which I will turn in this section, 
originated to a certain extent in all three of these contexts. First, as Gerry Simpson 
suggests, the “extra-territorial jurisdiction over piracy is an early version of 
universal jurisdiction over ‘crimes against humanity’”.1124 This is also the case as in 
both, the ‘crimes against humanity’ as in the pirate as hostis humani genris, 
‘humanity’ (or ‘humankind’) is considered the referent object, which needs to be 
protected. Yet – as a side note –, at least in the case of piracy it is at least doubtable 
whether the extra-territorial jurisdiction was really about protecting humanity or 
whether it was rather about protecting states and empires against their 
competitors. Second, the notion of crimes against humanity was used for the first 
time in a more or less comprehensive way on 28 May 1915, when the French, 
British and Russian governments strongly condemned the Ottoman Empire’s mass 
killings of Armenians as “crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilisation”.1125 
Interestingly – and again a side note –, the original draft of this message contained 
the notion of ‘crimes against Christianity’, which was then changed on French 
initiative into ‘crimes against humanity’. A similar term to crimes against humanity 
–  “offences against the laws of humanity” – was discussed in the context of the 
Versailles Conference. In this context the idea to install an international criminal 
                                                      
1121 For an illuminating discussion see Simpson, Law, War and Crime, chap. 7. See also my 
discussion of piracy and extraterritorial jurisdiction in Chapter 5. 
1122 Cf. Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 
1919-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
1123 Cf. Kevin Jon Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
1124 Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 163. 
1125 As cited in Antonio Cassese et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 84 (emphasis by Cassese et al.); see also Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice, 
64; and the discussion in Norman Geras, Crimes against Humanity: Birth of a Concept (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2011), chap. 1. 
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tribunal to trial German Emperor Wilhelm II was also on the table.1126 Yet, while 
the idea to bring the German Emperor to trial found its way into the Treaty of 
Versailles (Art. 227-230), the notion of ‘crimes against humanity’ did not. In the 
end, however, Wilhelm II was able to avoid prosecution through his exile in the 
Netherland. The attempt to prosecute Willem II is nevertheless often considered to 
be the starting point of modern international criminal law and the criminalization 
of war, as it was the first time that a head of state – as an individual – was 
considered a war criminal. In addition, there was in the immediate aftermath of 
the Great War the idea to install a permanent international criminal court. But 
these initiatives soon lost sight through the creation of the PCIJ. If we look, for 
instance, into the Lotus judgment, on which I have already touched upon in the 
previous chapter, we see that the PCIJ considers issues of (international) criminal 
law rather to be subject of national territorial jurisdiction than, say, of a 
universalised international law: as the PCIJ stated, “in all systems of law the 
principle of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental”.1127 On the 
other side, this does not mean that the idea to create a permanent international 
criminal court as well as the notion of the ‘crimes against humanity’ was 
completely forgotten during the Interbellum as both continued to be part of 
different initiatives of academics and practitioners.1128 One example in this regard 
is the creation of the International Association of Penal Law (AIDP) in 1926. Third, 
in the aftermath of the Second World War crimes against humanity were included 
into the London Agreement, which established the IMT. I will come back to this 
later in this section. Yet, it was the decision to include crimes against humanity into 
the jurisdiction of the IMT, which should make this specific international crime 
since then one of the crimes that are normally considered to lie at the core of 
international criminal law. 
                                                      
1126 Cassese et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd Ed., 85; see also the statements by 
British, Canadian and Italian officials, all including the term ‘crimes against humanity’ in Gary 
Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 65, 74; and the discussion in Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice, 
chap. 3. 
1127 According to the PCIJ, this can however change in the future, Permanent Court of International 
Justice, ‘The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”’, in Publications of the Permanent Court of Justice: Collection of 
Judgments, Series A, No. 10, 1927, 20. 
1128 For a proposal to establish an international criminal court, which was supported by academics 
and practitioners, see Lord Phillimore, ‘An International Criminal Court and the Resolution of the 
Committee of Jurists’, British Yearbook of International Law, no. 3 (1922): 79–86; for a rejection of 
the idea to establish an international criminal court, see, for example, J.L. Brierly, ‘Do We Need an 
International Criminal Court?’, British Yearbook of International Law 8 (1927): 81–88. 
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 However, it was also the work of one of the leading international legal 
experts of this period, Hersch Lauterpacht, which should help to make ‘crimes 
against humanity’ a core concept in the discourse of international criminal law and 
justice. According to Koskenniemi, who published extentsively on Lauterpacht, 
Lauterpacht was “arguably the last century’s most influential international 
lawyer”. As such, it would have been, as Koskenniemi considers, “awkward” if 
Lauterpacht had not contributed to the development of international criminal law.  
1129But before I turn to Lauterpacht’s work in the development of international 
criminal law and here particularly to his role in making crimes against humanity 
an international crime, let me reconstruct briefly some of Lauterpacht’s more 
general tenets on international law first. This is also helpful for my discussion of 
international legal expertise as Lauterpacht repeatedly addressed topics such as 
the role of the judge in international law or the relationship between academics 
and practitioners. 
 
2.1 Lauterpacht and International Legal Theory 
 
When I introduced in Chapter 2 various interdisciplinary projects between IR and 
IL, I pointed out that the (common) history of both disciplines was for a long time 
characterized by a ‘strange symbiosis’ and ‘hidden’ interdisciplinary dialogue 
between legal positivism and political realism (starting in the interwar years and 
ending with the Cold War). While political realists such as Hans Morgenthau (and 
E. H. Carr) claimed that all international disputes are in the end political, i.e. the 
                                                      
1129 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law’, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 3 (2004): 810, 813; Koskenniemi’s further 
contribution on Lauterpacht include, for example, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Lauterpacht: The Victorian 
Tradition in International Law’, European Journal of International Law 8, no. 2 (1997): 215–63; 
which was published nearly unchanged as Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The 
Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 
5; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht (1897-1960)’, in Jurists Uprooted: German-Speaking 
Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-Century Britain, ed. Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 601–62; and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Function of Law in the 
International Community: Introduction’, in The Function of Law in the International Community, ed. 
Hersch Lauterpacht (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), xxix – xlvii; which represents a 
slightly revised version of Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Function of Law in the International 
Community: 75 Years after’, The British Year Book of International Law 79 (2009): 353–66. For 
bibliographical details see also Elihu Lauterpacht, The Life of Hersch Lauterpacht (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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outcome of power politics, legal positivists emphasised on the other hand that 
there are legal and political disputes with the latter being non-justiciable (Hans 
Kelsen’s neo-positivism notwithstanding).1130 What I did not mention, however, 
was the fact that there existed, at least during the interwar years and the first 
decades after the Second World War, a third position, which was also popular to 
some extent. This was first and foremost Lauterpacht’s position. More recently, 
this position has been characterized as the “most comprehensive treatment […] to 
date” of what the English school coined later the ‘Grotian tradition’ in international 
thought;1131 or it has been described elsewhere as seminal contribution of the neo-
natural law tradition in international legal theory (together with, for example, 
Alfred Verdross’ work).1132 This last characterization is interesting as neo-natural 
refers in these contexts to two important aspects. Firstly, neo-natural refers to the 
fact that Lauterpacht adopted the rigorous scientific method from Kelsen (of whom 
he was, like Verdross, a student);1133 but secondly, neo-natural also refers to the 
refutation of main tenets of the European legal positivist tradition of this time – 
having its foundations in formalism, state-centrism and voluntarism.  
 
                                                      
1130 For Kelsen, international law was formally complete. This means that Kelsen based the 
completeness of international law on logical grounds: a complete system of law can be deduced 
from a Grundnorm via logic. Hence, all disputes are justifiable. For an in-depth discussion on Kelsen 
as international lawyer see Jochen von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans 
Kelsen: Believing in Universal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 204–205; and 
Mónica García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). To be precise, the debate arose also on the question whether the rules of 
international law should be evaluated with regard to their facticity (realism) or their normativity 
(positivism). The former would put emphasis on the effectiveness and efficiency of legal norms 
while the latter on the logical closure of the system of norms (and, then emphasise the 
counterfactual validity of norms). Morgenthau directly engaged with Kelsen’s pure theory of law in 
his Habilitationsschrift, Hans J. Morgenthau, La Réalité des normes. En particular des norms du droit 
international. Fondement d’une théorie des normes (Paris: Alcan, 1934). 
1131 Renée Jeffery, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge and the “Grotian Tradition” in 20th-
Century International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 2 (2006): 225; 
see also Lauterpacht’s own essay on this tradition, Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition of 
International Law’, British Yearbook of International Law 23 (1946): 1–53. 
1132 For further discussion of the different streams of the natural law tradition in international legal 
theory, see Geoffrey Gordon, ‘Natural Law in International Legal Theory: Linear and Dialectic 
Presentations’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, ed. Anne Orford and 
Florian Hoffmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 279–305; on Lauterpacht, see, in 
particular, Gordon, 292–293. Or, as Iain Scobbie puts it: ‘A natural law thesis, albeit initially 
inarticulate, is the thread which runs through and unifies Lauterpacht’s work’, Iain G.M. Scobbie, 
‘The Theorist as Judge: Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the International Judicial Function’, 
European Journal of International Law 8, no. 2 (1997): 266. 
1133 Similarly: ‘Lauterpacht’s theoretical construction of international law is rooted in Kelsenite 
legal epistemology’, Scobbie, ‘Theorist as Judge’, 265. 
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Lauterpacht refutes legal positivism (and political realism) basically in three 
steps. First, Lauterpacht rejects the view that international law is strictly limited 
by the will of states – something which Lotus proclaimed as well as the rule pacta 
sunt servanda (serving in Kelsen’s version of international legal positivism as basic 
norm) seems to postulate.1134 Instead, Lauterpacht argued in his most important 
monograph The Function of Law in the International Community (published in 
1933) that international law’s voluntarism is not per se limited to obligation 
between states as states could – Lauterbacht deliberately uses the conjunctive 
form – also be bound to the will of the international community (voluntas civitatis 
maximae est servanda). As Lauterpacht stresses in an often-quoted passage: 
 
“There is no reason why the original hypothesis in international law 
should not be that the will of the international community must be 
obeyed […]. An initial hypothesis expressed in the terms of voluntas 
civitatis maximae est servanda would point, as the source of law, to the 
will of the international society expressing itself in contractual 
agreements between its constituent members, in their customs, and in 
the general principles of law which no civilized community can afford 
to ignore; it would refer to the civitas maxima as meaning that super-
State of law which States, through the recognition of the binding force 
of international law qua law, have already recognized as existing over 
and above national sovereignties”.1135 
 
In Lauterpacht’s later work, this would even further shift as the ‘will of the 
international community’ as fundamental presupposition and foundation of the 
international legal order should later be substituted by ‘the social nature of man’ 
making, finally, the individual ‘the ultimate unit of all law’.1136 
 
                                                      
1134 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 427. 
1135 Lauterpacht, 429–430 (emphasis in the original). 
1136 Scobbie, ‘Theorist as Judge’, 268; and Andreas L. Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im 
Völkerrecht: Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung des Völkerrechts im Zeitalter der Globalisierung  
(München: Beck, 2001), 167–170. This shift occurred basically in Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian 
Tradition of International Law’. 
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Second, Lauterpacht was also a central figure in the debate regarding the 
question whether international disputes are political or juridical. This question 
dominated the discourse in the intersection of international law and politics 
during the interwar years. I referred to this debate already in Chapter 2, when I 
reconstructed Morgenthau’s early work. In a nutshell, Morgenthau argued that it is 
impossible to make a distinction between legal and political disputes and that as a 
consequence for him all disputes are political. Maybe surprisingly, Lauterpacht 
agreed with Morgenthau that it is impossible to draw a line distinguishing between 
the legal and political nature of disputes on an international level. However, this 
led Lauterpacht to a completely different conclusion as Morgenthau as, according 
to Lauterpacht, “all international disputes are, despite of their gravity, disputes of 
legal character in the sense that, so long as the rule of law is recognized, they are 
capable of an answer by application of legal rules”.1137Indeed, it was this 
assumption, namely that all disputes in international relations are in the end of 
legal nature, that encouraged E.H. Carr to make Lauterpacht the main 
representative of what Carr believed to be the ‘Utopian’ tradition in international 
law (and international thought more generally). 1138 Yet, for Lauterpacht himself 
                                                      
1137 Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, 166 (emphasis added); on 
differences and similarities between Lauterpacht and Morgenthau, see also Koskenniemi, ‘The 
Function of Law in the International Community: Introduction’, xxxvi–xlii. 
1138 For example, Carr wrote in a footnote: ‘It is a pity that Professor Lauterpacht, having brilliantly 
conducted his analysis up to the point where the unwillingness of states is recognised as the 
limiting factor in the justiciabilty of international disputes, should have been content to leave it 
there, treating this as “unwillingness”, in true utopian fashion, as perverse and undeserving of the 
intention of an international lawyer’, Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 195; on the 
other hand, Lauterpacht himself attacked Carr in an for Lauterpacht unusually harsh way: first, 
Lauterpacht criticised Carr’s rhetoric of ‘utopia’ and ‘reality’ as ‘practically everyone who disagrees 
with Professor Carr is Utopian’, Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Professor Carr on International Morality’, in 
International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. Eliuh Lauterpacht, vol. 2.1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 10; second and more important, Carr’s realism is 
according to Lauterpacht not only problematic in rhetorical terms but also in ‘empirical’ as it 
presupposes the ‘immorality of nations [...] as typical and normal’ and as a ‘necessary and 
permanent quality’. Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘On Realism, Especially in International Relations’, in 
International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. Eliuh Lauterpacht, vol. 2.1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 60–61; however, realism ‘tends to exaggerate the 
extent of the immoral conduct of States’ whereas experience proves the contrary as in reality states 
do act, as Lauterpacht illustrates through various examples (‘a survey of the foreign policy of 
modern States will show that the immorality of international conduct is something in the nature of 
a myth’), on moral grounds as even war is only ‘an imperfection of international law and of 
international organization, not of international morality’. In other words, in the end Lauterpacht is 
able to claim that he is the ‘realist’, i.e. theone who depicts ‘reality’ in an accurate way, while Carr’s 
work is based on some mythical presuppositions, Lauterpacht, ‘Professor Carr’, 72–73. More 
generally, if there ever was a First Great Debate in IR, it was this exchange between Carr and 
Lauterpachts (for more details see Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 361); this is 
interesting because of two reasons. First it was basically a debate between Carr and Lauterpacht or, 
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the premise of the legal nature of all international disputes had another 
consequence as it also implied the completeness of international law. As 
Lauterpacht puts it, the “completeness of the rule of law […] is an a priori 
assumption of every system of law, not a prescription of positive law”.1139 
 
Third and linked to this last point, it is the task of the international lawyer as 
judge and arbitrator – the judicial function – to guarantee the completeness of 
international law. Koskenniemi has summarized Lauterpacht’s position in the 
following terms: 
 
“Contrary to Kelsen, Lauterpacht does not postulate formal but material 
completeness of law, constructed by the lawyer as he proceeds to solve 
the case. But this construction is neither arbitrary nor based on abstract 
principles of justice or deviations from the nature of the thing. It is 
more than an effort to ascertain community consensus or the actual 
background purpose. For Lauterpacht, legal problem-solution seeks to 
ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of international law as a 
whole. By using analogy and abstracting principles from individual 
rules the lawyer will be able to perceive the law as a coherent, 
meaningful whole which ‘is originally and ultimately not so much a 
body of legal rules as a body of legal principles’. These principles 
express the law’s autonomous, systemic ‘coherence’ which ultimately 
justifies the solution of hard cases”.1140 
 
The claim of the completeness of international law signified for Lauterpacht that 
the legal system has no gaps (lacunae) and that an international court cannot 
declare that there is no applicable law (non liquet) and that it has, consequently, no 
                                                                                                                                                            
to be more precise, between Carr’s specific form of ‘realism’ and Lauterpacht’s specific form of 
‘international law’. Other prominent voices (in particular, from legal positivism) of this time did not 
take part. Second, both legal positivism as political realism later criticised Lauterpacht’s position. 
As a consequence, Lauterpacht’s position should operate as an ‘excluded third’, which should 
stabilize in the end the ‘hidden’ dialogue between legal positivism and political realism. 
1139 Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, 72. 
1140 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument , 
reissue with a new epilogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53 (emphasis in the 
original); on Lauterpacht and the completeness of the legal system see also Koskenniemi, The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 361–369. 
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jurisdiction over a specific case.1141 It is up to the judicial function to fill gaps and 
to make every case justiciable by recourse to analogies from municipal and private 
law, general principles or the moral purpose of international law.1142 That a judge 
or arbitrator has to fulfil this function is however on the first view nothing specific 
to international law as in every legal order abstract norms need to be applied to 
concrete cases as they cannot specify and anticipate all conditions of their 
application. As Iain Scobbie notes, norms are for Lauterpacht “relatively 
indeterminate”.1143Consequently, in the process of norm application the “judicial 
activity is essentially the last link in the chain of the crystallization of the rule of 
law”.1144 This process of crystallization through the judicial function is, according 
to Lauterpacht, based on “normative objectivity”.1145 Here, ‘normative objectivity’ 
derives, in turn, from the competence and impartiality of the international judge. 
On a second view, the image of the international judges as “’Herculean’ gap-
fillers”1146 in combination with the prohibition of non liquet has however far 
reaching consequences as it extents (at least potentially) the jurisdiction of 
international courts ad infinitum. As, for instance, Koskenniemi notes: 
 
“When Hersch Lauterpacht wrote that there are no intrinsic limits to 
the jurisdiction of international tribunals and suggested that they 
should routinely pronounce on as many incidental questions as 
possible, he was undertaking a subtle (‘hegemonic’) manoeuvre to 
embolden those (judicial) institutions whose biases he shared to 
declare them as universal preferences”.1147 
                                                      
1141 See also Lauterpacht’s later publication on this topic, Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Some Observations 
on the Prohibition of “Non Liquet” and the Completeness of the Legal Order’, in Symbolae Verzijl: 
Présentées Au Professeur J.H.W. Verzijl à L’occasion de Son LXXX-Ième Anniversaire, ed. J.H.W. Verzijl 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 196–221. 
1142 That Lauterpacht highlights inter alia the role of analogies from private law is hardly surprising. 
His PhD thesis was a treatment of private law analogies in international law. In this thesis, 
Lauterpacht refutes the prevailing positivist view that international law is a ‘form of general 
jurisprudence’ and argues, instead, that it resembles more private law as both international law 
and private law are governing the relations between equals, Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Private Law 
Analogies in International Law with Special Reference to International Arbitration’ (The London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 1926), 69. 
1143 Scobbie, ‘Theorist as Judge’, 270. 
1144 Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, 110. 
1145 Scobbie, ‘Theorist as Judge’, 265. 
1146 Koskenniemi, ‘The Function of Law in the International Community: Introduction’, xliii. For a 
discussion of the similarities between Lauterpacht and Ronald Dworkin’s image of judges, see 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 53–58. 
1147 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 609. 
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In the end, Lauterpacht’s approach is also a hegemonic move with regard to the 
question of how international disputes should be solved – through politics and 
diplomacy (e.g., Morgenthau) or through law and courts (Lauterpacht) – or, to put 
it differently, who has the final say and competence when it comes to mobilize 
expertise in world politics: whether politics trumps law or law trumps politics; 
whether the international is governed by diplomats or by judges. 
 
2.2 Lauterpacht and International Criminal Law 
 
Lauterpacht himself should become later, from 1955 until his death in 1960, a 
judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – something, which made him to 
leave his official academic position as Whewell Chair of International Law at the 
University of Cambridge.1148 However, Lauterpacht started already in the 1930s to 
obtain – aside of his academic work – positions outside of the scholarly world. In 
this context, his engagement in the field of international criminal law is a good 
example of an international legal expert pursuing a project within and outside of 
academia. Although themes of international criminal law have been, as mentioned 
above, discussed in a more or less loose fashion in the aftermath of the Great War 
and during the whole interwar period, as an intellectual and professional field 
international criminal law remained, however, still in a very early stage of 
development. There were simply no international legal experts dedicated solely to 
the field of international criminal law as the international legal profession was still  
very generalist. This might be the main reason why Lauterpacht did not publish an 
entire monograph on the topic of international criminal law. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to reconstruct his role in the development of the international criminal 
law in different context. In what follows, I will focus on three of these contexts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1148 On Lauterpacht’s role as international judge see Scobbie, ‘Theorist as Judge’, 279–282. 
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2.2.1 Lauterpacht editing Oppenheim’s International Law 
 
First, Lauterpacht became the editor of Oppenheim’s International Law in 1935, the 
same year he was appointed as a Reader at the LSE.1149 At this time, Oppenheim’s 
International Law was the leading textbook of the discipline.1150 Moreover, the 
textbook was still very much influenced by its original author Lassa Oppenheim, 
who had died in 1919. In particular, Oppenheim’s state-centric positivism and, 
consequently, voluntarism stand out: international law is exclusively a law 
between states; it is not complete; and, there is no international law beyond 
international agreements and a narrowly confined customary international 
law.1151 Lauterpacht used his role as an editor to gradually but substantially 
change the textbook’s general orientation. From edition to edition Oppenheim’s 
International Law should become more and more Lauterpacht’s international law, 
i.e. what Lauterpacht understood as international law. 1152  For example, 
Lauterpacht deleted in the fifth edition, the first one he edited by his own, the 
concept of the balance of power, which had been a central category for 
Oppenheim.1153 According to Benedict Kingsbury, this moment had fundamental 
consequences as “ever since the notion that balance of power principles might be 
relevant to international law has been virtually unutterable among member of the 
‘invisible college of international lawyers’”.1154 Kingsbury’s observation mirrors, of 
course, also my discussion in Chapter 2 and the disciplinary dimensions of the 
                                                      
1149 The reconstruction of this first context is strongly influenced by the discussion in Koskenniemi, 
‘Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law’, 816–818. 
1150 The textbook was also widely used in the emerging discipline of IR, see Torbjørn L. Knutsen, A 
History of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 
302. 
1151 For further contextualisation see also my discussion of Oppenheim in Chapter 2. 
1152 According to one commentator Lauterpacht’s editorship, if not problematic, had at least ‘an 
element of paradox [as] Oppenheim was the last great master of the positivist school [...]; 
Lauterpacht was among the leading challengers of all the basic assumptions of that school. The 
result was a compromise satisfactory to no one’, C. Wilfred Jenks, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht - The Scholar 
As Prophet’, British Yearbook of International Law 36 (1960): 66–67. 
1153 Hersch Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, 5th ed., vol. I: Peace (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1937). The previous edition, which was edited by Arnold McNair, still 
argued, for example, that the "first and principal moral is that a Law of Nations can exist only if 
there be an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the member s of the Family of Nations”; or 
that ‘International Law can develop progressively only when international politics, especially 
intervention, are made on the basis of real State interests. Dynastic wars belong to the past, as do 
interventions in favour of legitimacy’, Arnold D. McNair, Oppenheim’s International Law, 4th ed., vol. 
I: Peace (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), 99, 100. 
1154 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of 
Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law’, European Journal of International Law 
13, no. 2 (2002): 420. 
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forty years’ rift between IR and IL: as from now on the notion of the balance of 
power should be associated with IR and it should be excluded from IL’s discourse. 
 
If we take a closer look at those themes, which are important for our discussion 
of international criminal law, three shifts are noteworthy.1155 Firstly, Lauterpacht 
‘inherited’ from the previous edition a longer discussion of the question whether 
for members of the armed forces pleading superior orders could constitute a valid 
defence against individual responsibility for war crimes. Earlier editions of the 
textbook as well as the first edition under the auspices of Lauterpacht (i.e. the fifth 
edition of Oppenheim’s International Law) were in favour of the position that 
superior orders could constitute a valid defence and argued, consequently, that 
only commanders had liability. Lauterpacht changed this position from the sixth 
edition onwards fundamentally when he claimed that members of the armed 
forces could not escape liability “if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts 
which both violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general 
sentiment of humanity”.1156 Secondly, Lauterpacht received from earlier editions 
also a discussion on war crimes. Earlier editions had introduced the concept of war 
crimes by distinguishing between war crimes in a moral and a legal sense. This 
distinction was put forward in order to address situations, which, while formally 
illegal, were morally understandable. Such situations included in the state-centric 
framework of the textbook’s earlier editions the prohibition of all kinds of 
participation by civilians in hostilities (e.g., resistance of partisan groups again  
foreign aggressor). Lauterpacht modified this position in the 1944-edition of 
Oppenheim’s International Law as, on the one hand, the distinction between war 
crimes in a moral and legal sense was deleted and, on the other hand, the position 
of civilians was strengthened substantially. Finally, the editions published after the 
Second World War included a longer discussion on the possibility and desirability 
(both supported by Lauterpacht) of establishing a permanent international 
criminal court in order to adjudicate international crimes.  
 
                                                      
1155 The discussion of these three points draws mainly on Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht and 
the Development of International Criminal Law’, 816–818. 
1156 Hersch Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, 6th ed., vol. II: Disputes, War and 
Neutrality (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), 454–455 (emphasis added). 
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2.2.2 Lauterpacht’s general academic publications on international criminal law 
 
Second, a similar development took place in the course of Lauterpacht’s other – 
more general (i.e. non-textbook related) – academic publications. In his early 
publications throughout the 1920s Lauterpacht did not deal with topics from 
international criminal law as, for example, he did neither mention war crimes nor 
did he address the question of individual criminal responsibility; this changed 
however since the 1930s when topics related to international criminal law were 
introduced and quickly occupied a more and more important role in his 
publications. Lauterpacht was, for instance, invited to deliver the renowned Hague 
Lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law in 1937. In this lecture, 
Lauterpacht objects the predominant state-centric image of international law and 
advocates, instead, the establishment of an “International Criminal Court”, which 
should help to guarantee the “adoption of international criminal responsibility of 
the individuals to whom liability for the criminal act can feasibly be traced”.1157 
 
A similar argument is brought forward in Lauterpacht’s seminal article “The 
Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes”.1158 The article was published 
in 1944 in the British Yearbook of International Law of which Lauterpacht had 
become the editor in the same year (due to the Second World War, the publication 
of the Yearbook had been suspended for the previous five years). It is worth to 
have a closer look at the article as it delivered something like a legitimatory 
blueprint for the post-Second World War trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo. The 
article is an important intervention for in particular three reasons.  
 
Firstly, the article provides an at-large discussion of jurisdiction of a potential 
war crimes trial. Although Lauterpacht addresses different principles of 
jurisdiction such as the protective or passive nationality principle, he argues that 
the “ordinary territorial principle of criminal law […] – the principle that a State is 
entitled to punish unlawful acts committed within its territory” is sufficient for the 
                                                      
1157 As cited in Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal 
Law’, 814. 
1158 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes’, British Yearbook 
of International Law 21 (1944): 58–95. 
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establishment of such a temporal tribunal.1159 He does not even mention the 
possibility to provide such a court with universal jurisdiction. Territorial 
jurisdiction is sufficient for Lauterpacht as he simply redefines the territorial scope 
of states: Lauterpacht includes crimes committed in or from the air – something 
which was still disputed at that time and which corresponds, of course, with the 
notion of territoriality as dominium in the Roman law tradition, namely including 
‘everything down to hell and up to the heavens’ (‘usque ad inferos usque ad 
coelum’);1160 in a similar way, Lauterpacht uses Lotus in order to extend the 
territorial jurisdiction of a country to cover every crime committed by an enemy 
ship or aircraft on the high seas; moreover, Lauterpacht extends the territorial 
jurisdiction of a state also to the territories, which had been occupied during a war. 
This last extension is fundamental as it means that the territorial jurisdiction of a 
state like Germany during the Second World War (his main example) has also 
criminal jurisdiction over all territories under German military occupation. As a 
consequence, every crime committed on these territories falls under the 
jurisdiction of Germany – regardless of the nationality of the victims and the 
perpetrators. Hence a criminal court with the territorial jurisdiction over Germany 
would cover almost all war crimes committed on behalf of Germany (being the 
perpetrators German nationals or not) during the Second World War against 
individuals (being them German nationals or not – something that would also 
attribute rights to stateless persons). The extension of the notion of ‘territory’ of 
‘territorial jurisdiction’ was a significant shift in respect to the prevalent opinion, 
which attributed jurisdiction only over war crimes that had been committed by or 
against a states’ own nationals or within the territory of a state (and, here, 
‘territory’ did not incorporate occupied territories).  
 
Secondly, Lauterpacht discusses the various forms that a tribunal dealing with 
war crimes could have.1161 He rejects, on the one hand, the idea of a tribunal 
established by the defeated state. Such a tribunal would lack impartial judges. 
Lauterpacht exemplifies this claim by reviewing the German military tribunals, 
which operated after the First World War. These tribunals were according to 
                                                      
1159 Lauterpacht, 62, 63. 
1160 See my discussion in the previous chapter. 
1161 Lauterpacht, ‘The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes’, 80–86. 
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Lauterpacht politically influenced as those who were accused were hardly 
convicted. On the other hand, he also dismisses the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court. In this context, Lauterpacht’s main objection is the 
feasibility (and explicitly not the desirability) of establishing such a court in a short 
period of time. Lauterpacht expected at the time of publishing the article that the 
end of World War II was approaching quickly (again, the article was published in 
1944) and that the creation of a permanent court would need too much time. 
Instead, Lauterpacht recommends to rely on the idea of “[q]uasi-international 
tribunals”. These tribunals are “municipal tribunals of the victorious belligerent 
enlarged by the inclusion of judges from other countries, co-belligerent and 
neutral”.1162 
 
Thirdly, Lauterpacht’s article offers a comprehensive discussion of the question 
of individual criminal responsibility. In this context, Lauterpacht addresses a 
couple of objections against individual liability, namely the plea of superior orders, 
the problem of anticipating the uncertainties of the law of war and the role of 
reprisals. Although Lauterpacht acknowledges in this discussion that these points 
might be valid to some extent and that there might be certain limitations to 
individual criminal responsibility, he nevertheless claims that such limitations 
cannot negate individual criminal responsibility to a larger extent.1163 This is the 
case, as Lauterpacht considers war crimes as a specific, namely fundamental and 
severe, class of crimes. They “are crimes against international law”, and as a 
consequence “[w]ar criminals are punished, fundamentally, for breaches of 
international law”.1164 This signifies that war criminals are individually responsible 
for their crimes and cannot escape prosecution by claiming that international law 
does not apply. As Lauterpacht summarizes: 
 
“The rules of warfare, like any other rules of law, are binding not upon 
impersonal entities, but upon human beings. The rules of war are 
binding not upon an abstract notion of Germany, but upon members of 
the German Government, upon German individuals exercising 
                                                      
1162 Lauterpacht, 82–83. 
1163 Lauterpacht, 69–80. 
1164 Lauterpacht, 58, 64. 
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governmental functions in occupied territory, upon German officers, 
upon German soldiers”1165 
 
It is this passage of Lauterpacht’s article where this line of argumentation – one of 
the mantras of international criminal law and justice – originated and it has been 
repeatedly brought forward in the context of international criminal law since then. 
For example, it resembles Carla del Ponte’s accusation against Milosevic at the 
ICTY to which I referred at the outset of this chapter; and it has been used almost 
verbatim, as Koskenniemi notes, in the judgment of the IMT: 
 
“That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals 
as well as upon States has long been recognized. […] Individuals can be 
punished for violations of international law. Crimes against 
international law are committed by man, not by abstract entities, and 
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced”.1166 
 
 What is however surprisingly missing in Lauterpacht’s 1944-article is a profound 
discussion of the nature of international crimes in general and the crimes against 
humanity in particular. As Koskenniemi puts it, “it seems odd that the article 
contains no in-depth discussion of ‘crimes against humanity’. That denomination is 
not even mentioned in the article”.1167It should be, however, the third context 
where we can see that Lauterpacht engaged in a comprehensive way with 
international crimes and here particularly with the category of crimes against 
humanity. 
 
                                                      
1165 Lauterpacht, 64. 
1166 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), ‘Judgment’, American Journal of International Law 
41, no. 1 (1947): 220–221; and Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of 
International Criminal Law’, 819; see also the discussion in Ainley, ‘Excesses of Responsibility’, 408; 
Lauterpacht included a similar statement in a draft of the opening speech of Sir Hartley Shawcross, 
the British Special Prosecutor, at the IMT: ‘The State is not an abstract entity. Its rights and duties 
are the rights and duties of men. Its actions are the actions of men’, Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Draft 
Nuremberg Speeches’, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, no. 1 (2012): 62–
63. I will come back later in this chapter to Lauterpacht’s role in the drafting of Shawcross’ 
speeches. 
1167 Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law’, 820. 
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2.2.3 Lauterpacht outside of academia 
 
The third context is provided by Lauterpacht’s role as an international legal expert 
working in various commissions and committees. For instance, the 1944-article 
was an academic elaboration of a memorandum, which Lauterpacht had drafted in 
1942 for a committee on Crimes Against International Public Order.1168 This 
committee was established in the aftermath of a conference at the University of 
Cambridge in 1941, organised by the Cambridge Commission on Penal 
Reconstruction and Development (which was created in turn by the university’s 
Department of Criminal Science). Lauterpacht, who had been appointed at the 
University of Cambridge the prestigious Whewell Chair of International Law in 
1938, was in this context a member of several sub-committees. These sub-
committees were composed by British international legal academics, on the one 
hand, and representatives from those European countries that have been occupied 
by Germany, on the other. Although the committee on Crimes Against International 
Public Order “never made any definite recommendation or produced a 
comprehensive report” it was nevertheless important in collecting information 
and, first and foremost, for the “creation in official and semi-official circles of an 
atmosphere favourable to the conception of the punishment of war crimes”.1169 
Moreover, Lauterpacht was requested by the British War Office in 1940 to 
assist in the updating process of the British Manual of Military Law. 1170 The task of 
the Manual was (and still is until today) to provide all members of the armed 
forces with reliable information on the legal limits of warfare. The updated version 
was finally published in April 1944. In his function Lauterpacht was able to change 
the previous editions’ regulations in particular with regard to the question of 
superior order. The pre-1944 version stated that  
“members of the armed forces who commit such violations of the 
recognized rules of warfare as are ordered by their Government, or by 
their commander, are not war criminals and cannot therefore be 
                                                      
1168 United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
and the Developments of the Crimes of Wars (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1948), 94–99. 
1169 United Nations War Crimes Commission, 98–99. 
1170 Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal Law’, 823. 
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punished by the enemy. He may punish the officials or commanders 
responsible for such orders if they fall into his hands, but otherwise he 
may only resort to other means of obtaining redress”.1171 
The Manual’s statement was explicitly referenced to the fifth edition of 
Oppenheim’s International Law (the first under Lauterpacht’s editorship). As 
pointed out above, Lauterpacht changed – step-by-step, i.e. from edition to edition 
– core positions of the textbook. In the fifth edition, the discussion of superior 
orders was still in the tone of the previous editions, stating that there was a broad 
base at least for ordinary soldier to make use of claiming superior orders. This 
should change however with the sixth edition where the possibility that members 
of the armed force could claim superior order became substantially limited.1172 
These changes should also be ‘imported’ into the Manual and a later report should 
positively evaluate this shift of the, as it was put, “learned editor, Professor 
Lauterpacht” and attribute to Lauterpacht the adjustment in the British Manual of 
Military Law.1173 Thus, we can read in the 1944 version when it comes to the 
question of superior orders the following paragraph: 
"The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an 
order of the belligerent Government or of an individual belligerent 
commander does not deprive the act in question of its character as a 
war crime; neither does it, in principle, confer upon the perpetrator 
immunity from punishment by the injured belligerent. Undoubtedly, a 
court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in justifica-
tion of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact that 
obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of 
every member of the armed forces and that the latter cannot, in 
conditions of war discipline, be expected to weigh scrupulously the 
legal merits of the order received. The question, however, is governed 
by the major principle that members of the armed forces are bound to 
obey lawful orders only and that they cannot therefore escape liability 
                                                      
1171 As cited in United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. 
1 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1947), 18. 
1172 See also my discussion earlier in the present chapter. 
1173 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 1:18. 
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if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts which both violate 
unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of 
humanity “.1174 
It is, in particular, this last sentence of the new regulation, which changed the 
position of the Manual vis-à-vis superior orders in a significant way as it limits the 
possibility to plea superior order and, in turn, establishes a new priority guideline: 
the command of superiors is replaced by the ‘general sentiment of humanity’ as 
general guideline. 
 
Finally, Lauterpacht was able to make important contributions in the 
preparation, implementation and realization of the IMT in Nuremberg. For 
instance, Lauterpacht became in August 1945, on request of the British Foreign 
Office, a member of the British War Crimes Executive, which was charged by the 
British Government to plan and prepare the prosecution of those who committed 
war crimes on behalf of Germany. The outcome of the work of the British War 
Crimes Executive – drafted together with similar bodies from the other Allied 
powers – was the London Charter, which set out the rules and procedures of the 
IMT. In this process, Lauterpacht worked in close cooperation with both the US 
chief prosecutor Robert H. Jackson as well as the British counterpart Sir Hartley 
(later Lord) Shawcross. Lauterpacht had met Jackson for the first time in 1940 and 
their contact remained informal. In July 1945, it was an “eminent scholar of 
international law”, which was later identified as Lauterpacht, who suggested to 
Jackson to include ‘crimes against humanity’ into the London Charter. 1175The 
notion of ‘crimes against humanity’ was hardly known and used in the 1940s and it 
was Lauterpacht’s influence, which paved its way to be part of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction ratione materiae (being discussed in Article 6). The other international 
crimes listed in the Charter were the ‘crimes against peace’, also known as crime of 
aggression, under Article 6 (a) and war crimes under Article 6(b). Paragraph (c) of 
Article 6 lists and explains 
                                                      
1174 As cited in, United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1:18 (emphasis in the original). 
1175 As cited in Lauterpacht, The Life of Hersch Lauterpacht, 272; see also Jacob Robinson, ‘The 
International Military Tribunal and the Holocaust: Some Legal Reflections’, Israel Law Review 7, no. 
1 (1972): 3; Koskenniemi, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht and the Development of International Criminal 
Law’, 811, 821; and Philippe Sands, ‘Twin Peaks: The Hersch Lauterpacht Nuremberg Speeches’, 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, no. 1 (2012): 37. 
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“Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”1176 
 
In August 1945, Lauterpacht explains in a letter to Patrick Dean, who was an legal 
adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the importance of including 
‘crimes against humanity’ into the Charter: 
 
“Paragraph (c) of Article 6 of the Agreement—Crimes against 
humanity—is clearly an innovation. It is a fundamental piece of 
international legislation affirming that international law is not only the 
law between States but also the law of mankind and that those who 
transgress against it cannot shield themselves behind the law of their 
State or procedural limitations of international law”1177 
 
In contrast to the more informal contact to Jackson, Lauterpacht maintained 
an official position in the office of the British prosecutor Sir Hartley Shawcross. 
Namely, it was Lauterpacht’s task to prepare the more legal sections of the drafts 
of the opening and closing speeches at the IMT, which Shawcross delivered in 
December 1945 and July 1946, respectively.1178 While the draft of the opening 
statements deals mainly with ‘crimes again peace’, the draft of the closing speech 
engages with all three crimes. With regard to ‘crimes of humanity’, the draft argues 
that ‘crimes against humanity’ are  
                                                      
1176 As cited in Geras, Crimes against Humanity, 13–14. As a side note: a minor but important detail 
was changed during the drafting process of Article 6(c). While the French and English versions of 
the draft contained a semi-colon after ‘war’, the Russain draft included a comma. The final version 
followed the Russian draft and included a comma. This detail is important with regard to the 
temporal jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione tempore) as including a semi-colon would have signified 
that the Nuremberg Tribunal would have had jurisdiction also over crimes against humanity 
committed before 1939 as it would not be limited to armed conflicts. See Geras, 14. 
1177 Lauterpacht, The Life of Hersch Lauterpacht, 274; see also Sands, ‘Twin Peaks’, 40. 
1178 These speeches were recently (2012) published as Lauterpacht, ‘Draft Nuremberg Speeches’; 
see also the introduction by Sands, ‘Twin Peaks’. 
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“acts which the general principle of law, of criminal law—and not 
merely morality and decency—stigmatize as crimes. They are acts 
which the courts in any civilized country would treat as criminal but for 
the fact that they have been ordered by the State or by persons acting 
on behalf of the State”.1179 
 
At least two things are interesting in these remarks. Firstly, they help to draw a 
line between civilized and non-civilized nations, with Germany being part of the 
latter. As such, “the German Nazi State is not considered by the civilized world to 
have been a State under the rule of law”.1180 This observation is closely connected 
to the second point, which is the introduction of an idiom strongly shaped by 
natural legal thinking. That is to say that Lauterpacht draws mainly on the source 
of general principles of international law and as such “the principle that with regard 
to the fundamental rights of man there exists a higher forum than the positive law of 
any single State”.1181 Here, Lauterpacht uses the example of murder and “of 
physical and spiritual persecution”, which are crimes regardless of whether they 
are forbidden or not by a certain state. This holds true for Lauterpacht as the 
ultimate subject of international law is the individual human being and not the 
state: 
 
“But at the same time international law claims that there is a limit to the 
omnipotence of the State, and the individual human being, the ultimate 
unit of all law, is entitled to the protection of the society of nations 
when the State tramples upon his rights in a manner which shocks and 
outrages the conscience of the mankind. That principle was expressed 
more than three hundred years ago by Grotius the founder of modern 
international law who described as just a war undertaken for the 
                                                      
1179 Lauterpacht, ‘Draft Nuremberg Speeches’, 95; similarly, Lauterpacht, 105. 
1180 Lauterpacht, ‘Draft Nuremberg Speeches’, 96. 
1181 Lauterpacht, 96 (emphasis added). 
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purpose of defending the subject of a foreign State from injuries 
inflicted by their ruler”.1182 
 
Such a principle, though it might have been “occasionally dormant”, was only 
(re)affirmed by including ‘crimes against humanity’ into the London Charter and, 
as it was only (re)affirmed, does not present a case of retroactive international law 
(i.e. collide with the principle of nulla poena sine legem) – according to the draft, 
there was only a lack of enforcement of this general principle.1183 Consequently, 
and this might resemble many discussion of the new interventionism after the end 
of the Cold War, states are enforced to intervene, when these interventions are 
“humanitarian intervention[s]”.1184 Lauterpacht’s main hope for the international 
law of the future lies, however, not in intervening states but in the emerging United 
Nations.1185 
 
The history of the further development of international criminal law after the 
post-Second World War trials and until the end of the Cold War is quickly told: The 
UN General Assembly asked the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1948 “to 
study the desirability and Possibility of establishing an international judicial organ 
for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which 
jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international convention”.1186 
The ILC was divided upon the question whether such a permanent international 
criminal court would be, first of all, desirable and, second, in light of world political 
transformations of the beginning Cold War even possible. As a result, the majority 
of its delegates preferred to wait for a draft statute. In order to produce such a 
draft statute, the General Assembly assigned at its fifth session a Special 
Committee, which was composed by representatives of seventeen states, to draft 
such a statute.1187 The Special Committee concluded its task in 1951, but had to 
modify it in 1953 – especially by softening its compulsory jurisdiction. At this point 
                                                      
1182 Lauterpacht, 96 (emphasis added); . As pointed out above, Lauterpacht should re-introduce 
Grotius in the same year (1946) in one of his most important articles, see Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian 
Tradition of International Law’. 
1183 Lauterpacht, ‘Draft Nuremberg Speeches’, 97. 
1184 Lauterpacht, 96. 
1185 Lauterpacht, 63, 96. 
1186 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Study by the International Law Commission of the Question 
of an International Criminal Tribunal’, A/RES/3/260 B (1948). 
1187 United Nations General Assembly, ‘International Criminal Jurisdiction’, A/RES/489(V) (1950).  
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of time, it was already foreseeable that the project had no chance to be realised as 
the major powers opposed it – the United Nations was already in paralysis due to 
the Cold War. Finally, in 1954 the draft was discarded - the official justification was 
the lack of definition of the crime of aggression – and the whole project faded 
out.1188 
 
 3. The Revival of International Criminal Law, Cassese and International 
Terrorism 
 
New efforts – and these efforts should be successful in the end – to establish an 
international criminal court and to make international criminal law a core topic of 
the international legal and political discourse should only reappear after the end of 
the Cold War. It was in 1989 when Trinidad and Tobago initiated on behalf of other 
Caribbean and Central American countries a resolution in the General Assembly to 
assign the ILC to produce a draft statute for an international criminal court.1189 The 
background of this initiative was the presumption that such a court should help to 
address international criminal liability to individuals and entities involved in illicit, 
large-scale transnational narcotic drug traffic – something that caused a serious 
problem in the region at that time. Yet, these regionally and issue-specific limited 
efforts should gain momentum and develop into a completely other direction 
because of larger world political transformations. On the one hand, internal armed 
conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia and in Ruanda caused mass atrocities among the 
civilian population. These developments attracted worldwide attention. On the 
other hand, the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States as the only 
remaining superpower ended the Cold War-paralysis of the UN Security Council.  
 
These developments created an atmosphere, which made the establishment of 
international criminal trials and tribunals not only desirable but also possible. In 
                                                      
1188 This does not mean that discussions within the United Nations but also within academic circles 
stopped at all. However, these discussions remained largely unrecognized by a larger public. For a 
reconstruction of the history of the crime of aggression as well as its legal and political context, see 
Marieke de Hoon, ‘The Law and Politics of the Crime of Aggression’ (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
2015). 
1189 United Nations General Assembly, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and 
Entities Engaged in Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs across National Frontiers and Other 
Transnational Criminal Activities’, A/RES/44/39 (1989). 
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1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was 
established by resolution 827 of the UN Security Council and one year later the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by resolution 
955 of the UN Security Council.1190 Simultaneously, the ILC’s work on a draft 
statute for an international criminal court was overshadowed and formed by all 
these developments and, in 1994, the ILC presented its draft statute.1191 The draft 
statute designed a permanent international criminal court, which should be 
complementary with national jurisdictions and which should “exercise jurisdiction 
only over the most serious crimes of concern for the international community as a 
whole” (preamble). Consequently, only ‘core international crimes’ such as 
genocide, aggression, serious violations of the law and custom applicable in armed 
conflict, and crimes against humanity were included (art. 20) whereas drug 
trafficking – the original motive to commission a draft statute for an international 
criminal court – was excluded;1192 furthermore, in the draft statute the jurisdiction 
was limited to states, which have custody of a suspect of a crime, or the territory of 
a state where a crime occurred (art. 21); several opt-in mechanisms were included 
(art. 22); and the court was intended to be dependent from the UN Security Council 
(art. 23).1193 In general, the draft statute was, as one observer considered, a rather 
“conservative model”.1194  
 
Although this claim might be exaggerated (as there was for the first time a 
complete draft statute for a permanent international criminal court and as in this 
draft statute jurisdiction over core international crimes was included), there were 
nevertheless a couple of substantial shifts between the ILC draft statute, which was 
favoured by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, and the Rome 
Statute establishing in 1998 finally the ICC. These shifts made the latter more 
‘progressive’. According to authors, who emphasise the role of the ‘global civil 
                                                      
1190 United Nations Security Council, ‘Tribunal (Former Yugoslavia)’, S/RES/827 (1993); United 
Nations Security Council, ‘Establishment of an International Tribunal and Adoption of the Statute of 
the Tribunal’, S/RES/955 (1994). 
1191 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’, UN Doc. 
A/49/10 (1994). 
1192 For a discussion of excluded (’missing’) crimes, see Robinson, ‘The Missing Crimes’. 
1193 International Law Commission, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. 
1194 Nicole Deitelhoff, ‘The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the 
ICC Case’, International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 38. 
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society’1195 and other norm entrepreneurs, these shifts were facilitated by a 
coalition of small and medium powers (so-called ‘like-minded’) together with the 
help of non-state actors such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or 
the International Commission of Jurists.1196 In a number of regional conferences, 
organised far away from the UN headquarters in New York, these non-state actors 
were able to provide valuable legal expertise to still undecided countries from the 
‘Global South’. 1197  Nicole Deitelhoff described these settings as ‘islands of 
persuasions’, where not power politics but persuasion was at work – something 
that Jürgen Habermas could have had in mind (according to Deitelhoff) when he 
introduced the idea of discursive ethics.1198 In the end, the members of this 
coalition were in favour of a more comprehensive jurisdiction. For instance, this 
was reflected at the Rome Conference in a German initiative, which proposed an 
international criminal court with universal jurisdiction. The proposal enjoyed 
strong support by small and medium powers.1199 On the other side, particularly the 
United States were still much in favour of a limited jurisdiction of such a court and 
a strong position of the UN Security Council (i.e. as designed in the ILC draft 
statute). Finally, the Rome Statute was a compromise between both positions. The 
Rome Statute relies, as pointed out at the outset of Chapter 5, on a complex system 
of complementary jurisdiction while it is independent from the UN Security 
Council.1200 Since the establishment of the ICC in 1998, international criminal law 
further expanded as a couple of so-called hybrid courts operating with regard to 
Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and the Lebanon were 
created. The proliferation of international criminal courts and tribunals produced 
                                                      
1195 For a discussion of the limits of the concept of ‘global civil society’, see, for example, Hans-
Martin Jaeger, ‘“Global Civil Society” and the Political Depoliticization of Global Governance’, 
International Political Sociology 1, no. 3 (2007): 257–77; and Jens Bartelson, ‘Is There a Global 
Society?’, International Political Sociology 3, no. 1 (2009): 112–15. 
1196 Cf. Nicole Deitelhoff, Überzeugung in der Politik: Grundzüge einer Diskurstheorie internationalen 
Regierens (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006); Deitelhoff, ‘The Discursive Process of 
Legalization’; Marlies Glasius, The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement  
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); and Marlies Glasius, ‘Expertise in the Cause of Justice: Global Civil 
Society Influence on the Statute for an International Criminal Court’, in Global Civil Society, ed. 
Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 137–68. 
1197 Glasius, ‘Expertise in the Cause of Justice’. 
1198 Deitelhoff, ‘The Discursive Process of Legalization’. For discussions about the the ‘use’ of 
Habermas in IR see the various contributions in Peter Niesen and Benjamin Herborth, eds., 
Anarchie der Kommunikativen Freiheit: Jürgen Habermas und die Theorie der internationalen Politik  
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). 
1199 Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, ‘The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: 
The Negotiating Process’, American Journal of International Law 93, no. 1 (1999): 8. 
1200 International Criminal Court (ICC), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
 324 
also a demand for international criminal legal experts – working now in the centre 
and periphery of these institutions. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on one of these international legal 
experts: the Italian jurist Antonio Cassese. Although Cassese was never employed 
at the ICC he is nevertheless considered one of the leading figures of the recent 
expansion of the field of international criminal law. In this context, Cassese 
permanently oscillated between different roles as an international (criminal) legal 
expert: Cassese was, e.g., professor of international law at the University of 
Florence and the EUI in Florence; (co-)edited various journals (inter alia, as 
founding editor of the Journal of International Criminal Justice); wrote market 
leading textbooks both on international law as, specifically, on international 
criminal law; was the author of a number of seminal articles and important books; 
was a member of various Italian delegations in the context of the United Nations; 
became the President of the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (1989-93); chaired various international commissions; became Judge 
(1993-2000) and first President (1993-1997) of the ICTY and, until shortly before 
his death in October 2011, as well Judge and first President of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL).1201 In short, as the publisher of Cassese’s textbook International 
Criminal Law puts it at the back cover of the second edition:  
 
“This market leading textbook is written by an expert in the field of 
international criminal law. The author uses his broad academic 
expertise and judicial experience to provide a unique personal 
approach to the subject, with thought-provoking analysis that also 
brings the political and human context to life”1202 
 
In his function as a leading expert of international criminal law, one of 
Cassese’s most recent and most discussed projects was the attempt to make 
international terrorism an international crime. 
 
                                                      
1201 For a longer biographical sketch, see Salvatore Zappala, ‘Personal Remarks on Antonio Cassese 
and His Vision of International Law and International Criminal Justice along the Road He Walked’, 
Leiden Journal of International Law 25, no. 2 (2012): 503–10. 
1202 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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3.1 Cassese and International Legal Theory 
 
As it was the case with Lauterpacht, it is useful, however, to start this section with 
a reconstruction of Cassese’s general take on international law and to proceed then 
to his effort to make international terrorism an international crime. What is 
important to note here, is that the context of Cassese’s writings is not only with 
regard to the status of world politics but also when it comes to the structure of the 
international legal argument a different one as Lauterpacht’s. While throughout 
Lauterpacht’s career international law was rather one generalist project, Cassese 
witnessed the increasing differentiation and compartmentalisation of the 
international legal discourse with humanity’s law – and, here, Cassese contributed 
to various projects of humanitarian international law, international human rights 
law and international criminal law – being only one among these projects.1203 This 
means, e.g., that Lauterpacht rather deduced his own position in the emerging field 
of international criminal law from his general writings on international law – 
something which is mirrored in the fact that he never dedicated an entire 
monograph to international criminal law –, while Cassese worked the other way 
around as he developed his position on general international law from the specific 
problematiques, which he faced in international criminal law – both as academic 
and as practitioner. Furthermore, Lauterpacht is, as pointed out above, usually 
described as a moderate natural lawyer (with a training in positivism) while 
Cassese attempted to stay within the confines of legal positivism and to push the 
boundaries of this prevailing strand of international legal theory. Recently 
Cassese’s approach was thus coined as “presentational positivism”1204, “ideational 
positivism”1205, “utopian positivism”1206 or (inter alia by himself) as “critical 
positivism”.1207 In the end however both Lauterpacht and Cassese have also much 
                                                      
1203 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Lawyers’, 2007. 
1204 Robert Cryer, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Sources of International Law: Antonio 
Cassese’s Contribution to the Canon’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 10, no. 5 (2012): 
1048. 
1205 Anne Peters, ‘Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour’, European Journal of International Law 
24, no. 2 (2013): 534. 
1206 Antonio Cassese, ed., The Human Dimension of International Law: Selected Papers (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), vi. 
1207 Antonio Cassese, Five Masters of International Law: Conversations with R-J Dupuy, E Jiménez de 
Aréchaga, R Jennings, L Henkin and O Schachter (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 258–260; Antonio Cassese, 
‘Introduction’, in Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, ed. Antonio Cassese (Oxford: 
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in common as on a general level their effort was to make humanity the ultimate 
referent object of international law – with Cassese being described as the “Gentle 
Humanizer of Humanitarian Law”1208 – and, on a more technical level, both 
emphasised the relevance of international courts and, here in particular, 
foregrounded the role of judges.1209   
 
3.1.1 On ‘critical positivism’ 
 
Yet, what does it mean when Cassese’s approach is described as ‘critical’, 
‘presentational’, ‘ideational’ or ‘utopian positivism’? On the one hand, it means for 
Cassese to stay within the confines of legal positivism and to recognise the 
traditional limits of international law. To stay within the confines of legal 
positivism means, firstly, that one should start any assessment of law with the 
existing law, i.e. interpret existing legal rules and base proposals for new legal 
constructs on existing law.1210 Yet, Cassese’s positivism is critical as it claims that 
the “investigation of legal rules and institutions must not be carried out without a 
proper contextualisation, both socio-politically and ideologically”.1211 A proper 
contextualisation of legal rules might show the “positivist lawyer” that there is 
“some leeway” in interpretations whenever confronted with “penumbral 
situations” (the term is H.L.A. Hart’s) – something that occurs frequently in 
international law.1212 Whenever this occurs, critical positivists could reinterpret 
the law with recourse to general principles or a progressive interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Oxford University Press, 2012), xvii; and Feichtner, ‘Realizing Utopia through the Practice of 
International Law’, 1143. 
1208 Tamás Hoffmann, ‘The Gentle Humanizer of Humanitarian Law: Antonio Cassese and the 
Creation of the Customary Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts’, in Future Perspectives of 
International Criminal Justice, ed. Carsten Stahn and Larissa Van Den Herik (The Hague: TMC Asser, 
2010), 58–80. 
1209  For a short discussion of similarities between Cassese and Lauterpacht, see Cryer, 
‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Sources of International Law’, 1061. 
1210 Cassese, Five Masters of International Law, 255. 
1211 Cassese, 258. 
1212 Cassese, 258–259; H.L.A. Hart distinguishes between a ‘core’ and a ‘penumbra’ of the meaning 
of a word. Hart’s example is a legal rule, which forbids taking one’s ‘vehicle’ to the park. While this 
clearly forbids taking an automobile into the park (core meaning constituting the ‘standard case’), it 
is not so clear whether it also bans other vehicles such as skateboards or bicycles from the park. 
The latter are part of ‘a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously 
applicable nor obviously ruled out’, see H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals’, Harvard Law Review 71, no. 4 (1958): 607. 
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customary international law.1213 As we will see below, Cassese himself should 
make use at various occasions of interpreting customary international law 
‘progressively’. To stay within the confines of legal positivism means, secondly, 
that one must recognise the traditional limits of international law. As such, Cassese 
describes international law in a Kelsian fashion as a “primitive legal system”, which 
is still in its “embryonic stage”.1214 This is due to the fact that states are still “the 
principal actors on the international scenery”1215 and, hence, international law’s 
“primary subjects”. 1216 In this setting, “individuals play a limited role […] The latter 
are as puny Davids confronted by overpowering Goliaths holding instrumental 
power”.1217  Or, to put it in a different way, states are the “backbone” of 
international community.1218 As one of the consequences of this setting the 
international legal order is (still) a primitive legal system as it is horizontal and 
decentralised when it comes to both adjudication and enforcement. States enjoy 
large freedom (voluntarism). The main sources of international law are 
consequently treaties and custom.1219 This means also that all legal rules are rules 
of pairs of states and as such an emerging jus cogens exists only as it binds all 
states through binaries (erga omnes).1220 As international law is quasi-determined 
by the will of states, only changes in the ‘reality’ of the international community1221 
might in turn facilitate transformations of international law. In the end, all this 
makes international law a “realistic legal system”.1222 But, because of the lack of an 
overarching constitutional order on the international level, Cassese describes – by 
drawing explicitly on the English School in IR – the current status of the 
                                                      
1213 Cf. Cassese, Five Masters of International Law, 259. 
1214 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6; for 
Kelsen’s original account, see, for example, Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations: 
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures 1940-41 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), chap. 2. 
1215 Cassese, International Law, 3. 
1216 Cassese, 4. 
1217 Cassese, 4; see also Antonio Cassese, ‘Gathering Up the Main Threads’, in Realizing Utopia: The 
Future of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 648–652. 
1218 Cassese, International Law, 71; for an in-depth presentation of Cassese’s view of history 
(Geschichtsbild) and the role, rise and (possible) decline of the state, see Antonio Cassese, ‘States: 
Rise and Decline of the Primary Subject of the International Community’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
the History of International Law, ed. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 49–70. 
1219 To rely mostly on treaties and custom is, of course, typical for legal positivism. 
1220 Cf. Cassese, International Law, 14–15. 
1221 It seems that Cassese uses the terms ‘international community’, ‘world community’ and ‘world 
society’ interchangeable. 
1222 Cassese, International Law, 12. 
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international community not as Kantian but rather as Grotian.1223 Finally, Cassese 
is convinced – as recent statements from major powers such as China or the United 
States indicate – that for a long time “states will remain the masters of world 
society”.1224 Hence, international lawyers have to deal on a general level with the 
reality of a state-governed international order. 
 
 But, on the other hand, Cassese’s take on positivism is also the project of 
what the late Cassese dubbed “realizing utopia”.1225At the core of this project 
stands the idea that it is possible to bridge the divides between reality and utopia, 
between stability and change as well as between concreteness and normativity. It 
is this “oxymoron” of a “realistic utopia”, which Cassese specifies as follows:  
 
“we know that the international society will never be free from 
violence, poverty, and injustice. We do not dream of a peaceful 
international society based on comity, friendship, and cooperation. We 
simply intend to suggest in utopian terms new avenues for improving 
the major deficiencies of the current society of states”.1226 
 
For Cassese there is reasonable hope that such an ‘improvement’ is possible. He 
bases this hope on some (still modest) changes in the structure of the international 
legal order transforming the “traditional” international law into a “modern” 
one:1227 here, the emergence of new actors on the international stage (and their 
continuous, yet slow, incorporation as ‘official’ subjects of international law), such 
as international organisation, liberation movements and, most importantly, 
individuals1228 as well as the growing relevance of ‘humanizing’ strands of 
                                                      
1223 Cassese, 21; for the original account of the English School, see Martin Wight, International 
Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1991); and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
1224 Cassese, ‘Gathering Up the Main Threads’, 646. 
1225 Antonio Cassese, ed., Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
1226 Cassese, ‘Introduction’, xxi. 
1227 Cassese makes repeated use of the dichotomy of ‘traditional’ vs. ‘modern’, ‘new’ vs. ‘old’, see, 
e.g., Cassese, International Law, 142–144. 
1228 Cassese, chap. 7. 
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international law such as humanitarian international law, human rights law and 
international criminal law stand out for him.1229 
 
What becomes also visible in this regard is that, for Cassese, international law 
is an instrument to tame politics and to make world society a better place – in 
other words, Cassese operates with a strong opposition between law and politics 
(the latter also being directly equated with diplomacy).1230 In this context, the 
international legal expert becomes the agent of change, or as Cassese puts it, there 
is a need for “judicious reformers”.1231 Hence, as Isabel Feichtner has recently 
observed, the “project of Realizing Utopia attests to the strong belief of 
international lawyers in the possibility of engaging in social engineering through 
law”.1232According to Cassese, international legal experts can become ‘legal 
engineers’ or ‘judicial reformers’ in various roles: as scholars, they should help 
“both to identify, for the benefit of politicians and diplomats, areas of international 
law more in need of radical change, and to suggest new ways and modalities to 
bring international legal institutions and rules up to date”;1233 as legal advisers in 
foreign ministries they should ensure that politicians and diplomats do not breach 
international law as well as they should help to expand the rule of law;1234and, 
most importantly, as judges they should find avenues (where possible) to reshape 
international law in order to make it less state-centric. To do so, Cassese suggests 
that judges should make bold use of customary international law – even if faced 
with the danger of using it too bold. It was in the context of the Tadić decision of 
the ICTY, where Cassese made use of this approach, which should later also be 
coined as the ‘Cassese approach’. Cassese himself should later describe the danger 
                                                      
1229 Cassese, chap. 20, 21; cf. Cassese, ‘Gathering Up the Main Threads’, 653. 
1230 See already Antonio Cassese, ‘The Role of Legal Advisers in Ensuring That Foreign Policy 
Conforms to International Legal Standards’, Michigan Journal of International Law 14, no. 1 (1992): 
139–70. 
1231 Cassese, ‘Introduction’, xvii (emphasis in the original). 
1232 Feichtner, ‘Realizing Utopia through the Practice of International Law’, 1156; this resembles, of 
course, Morgenthau’s description of the ‘scientific man’, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics (London: Latimer House Limited, 1947). See also my discussion of Morgenthau in 
Chapter 2. 
1233 Cassese, ‘Introduction’, xx (emphasis in the original); see also the discussion in Peters, 
‘Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour’. 
1234 As Cassese argued in 1992: ‘At present, greater respect for international law is badly needed to 
ensure the smoother conduct of international relations. One of the best ways to promote respect for 
international law lies to a large extend in enhancing the importance of LAs [Legal Advisers] in 
foreign ministries. If States were to gradually rethink the role of LAs, improve the methods of their 
appointment, upgrade their functions, and ensure their independence, the stage could be set for 
expanding the rule of law in international relations’, Cassese, ‘The Role of Legal Advisers’, 170. 
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of this approach in the following terms 
 
“I was told there was also this fear of the ‘Cassese approach’, namely 
judges overdoing it, becoming dangerous by, say, producing judgments 
that can be innovative. For example, at the ICTY, we said for the first 
time that war crimes could also be committed in internal armed 
conflicts. This was breaking new ground. You go beyond the black letter 
of the law because you look at the spirit of law”.1235 
 
3.1.2 Cassese the Judge I: Tadić 
 
In order to better understand what Cassese means by the ‘Cassese approach’ it is 
worthwhile to have a quick look at the Tadić decision of the ICTY.1236 The decision 
of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Tadić was not only the first opportunity of 
the tribunal to lay down its interpretation of international criminal law but it was 
also the first opportunity of an international tribunal to do so at all since the post-
Second World War trials and tribunals. The decision was announced on 2 October 
2005 and Cassese was the Presiding Judge of the Chamber. He drafted the 
judgement by himself.1237 As observers have pointed out, the judgement reflects 
basically Cassese’s own convictions – Cassese’s successor as President of the ICTY, 
Theodor Meron, even called the judgement (and he meant it in an appreciative and 
positive way) “Cassese’s Tadić”.1238As Tadić was the first decision of the ICTY, the 
main task of the Appeals Chamber was to decide whether the ICTY actually has, as 
an international tribunal established by the UN Security Council, jurisdiction over 
international crimes that were committed during the Yugoslav Wars. Prior to the 
judgement, for most observers and international legal experts the core question 
                                                      
1235 Cassese, Verrijn Stuart, and Simons, ‘The Judge: Interview with Antonio Cassese’, 52–53 
(emphasis added). 
1236 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, ‘Prosecutor v 
Tadić, Decision on the Defence Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction’, IT-94-1-AR72 (1995). 
1237 Cf. Jean-Marie  aerts, ‘Civil War, Custom and Cassese’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 
10, no. 5 (2012): 1100; and Hoffmann, ‘The Gentle Humanizer of Humanitarian Law’. 
1238 Theodor Meron, ‘Cassese’s Tadić and the Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts’, in Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese, ed. Lal Chand Vohrah 
et al. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 533–38; see also Hoffmann, ‘The Gentle 
Humanizer of Humanitarian Law’, 64; and Cryer, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Sources 
of International Law’, 1049–1050; and Henckaerts, ‘Civil War, Custom and Cassese’, 1100. 
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was thus whether the Yugoslav Wars constitute an international or a non-
international conflict. The simplest and less contested strategy for the Appeals 
Chamber would haven been to declare the conflict an international conflict with 
the consequence that the international crimes committed during the Yugoslav 
Wars fall under the jurisdiction of the ICTY. The Appeals Chamber, however, opted 
for another avenue: it stated, that although the Yugoslav Wars were a non-
international armed conflict, the ICTY still has jurisdiction over it. In particular, the 
Appeals Chamber argued that customary law is applicable to non-international 
conflicts, too: “it cannot be denied that customary rules have developed to govern 
internal strife”.1239 
 
In order to substantiate this point, the Appeals Chamber distinguishes 
between traditional and modern international law. The judgement describes the 
traditional approach as follows: 
 
“Whenever armed violence erupted in the international community, in 
traditional international law the legal response was based on a stark 
dichotomy: belligerency or insurgency. The former category applied to 
armed conflicts between sovereign States (unless there was recognition 
of belligerency in a civil war), while the latter applied to armed violence 
breaking out in the territory of a sovereign State. Correspondingly, 
international law treated the two classes of conflict in a markedly 
different way: interstate wars were regulated by a whole body of 
international legal rules, governing both the conduct of hostilities and 
the protection of persons not participating (or no longer participating) 
in armed violence (civilians, the wounded, the sick, shipwrecked, 
prisoners of war). By contrast, there were very few international rules 
governing civil commotion, for States preferred to regard internal strife 
as rebellion, mutiny and treason coming within the purview of national 
criminal law and, by the same token, to exclude any possible intrusion 
by other States into their own domestic jurisdiction. This dichotomy 
                                                      
1239 Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 127, see 
in general, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, para. 96–
127. 
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was clearly sovereignty-oriented and reflected the traditional 
configuration of the international community, based on the coexistence of 
sovereign States more inclined to look after their own interests than 
community concerns or humanitarian demands”.1240 
 
Yet, the Appeals Chamber observers that a new approach – a modern international 
law – emerges which is based on ‘crystalizing’ customary rules: 
 
“Since the 1930s, however, the aforementioned distinction has 
gradually become more and more blurred, and international legal rules 
have increasingly emerged or have been agreed upon to regulate 
internal armed conflict. […] A State-sovereignty-oriented approach have 
[sic] been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. 
Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus 
constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has 
gained a firm foothold in the international community as well. It follows 
that in the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate 
wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are 
concerned. Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, 
torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or 
private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary 
suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain 
from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when 
armed violence has erupted "only" within the territory of a sovereign 
State? If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the 
legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of 
human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy 
should gradually lose its weight”.1241 
 
This line of argumentation also resembles Cassese’s earlier academic work and, 
here, in particular Cassese’s seminal article on ‘The Spanish Civil War and the 
                                                      
1240 Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 96 
(emphasis added). 
1241 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, para. 97 
(emphasis added). 
 333 
Development of Customary Law Concerning Internal Armed Conflicts’, which was 
originally published in 1975.1242 Cassese argued in this article that during “the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) a general conviction took shape among States that 
some fundamental principles and rules of the laws of war would have to be 
extended to cover civil strifes as well”.1243 Cassese substantiated this claim of a 
crystalizing customary law with reference to state practice.1244 The Appeals 
Chamber in Tadić, however, took a slightly different turn, as it based in its 
interlocutory decision custom not merely on state practice but on opinio juris. With 
regard to state practice and opinio juris the chamber asserts: 
 
“When attempting to ascertain State practice with a view to 
establishing the existence of a customary rule or a general principle, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the actual behaviour of the 
troops in the field for the purpose of establishing whether they in fact 
comply with, or disregard, certain standards of behaviour. This 
examination is rendered extremely difficult by the fact that not only is 
access to the theatre of military operations normally refused to 
independent observers (often even to the ICRC) but information on the 
actual conduct of hostilities is withheld by the parties to the conflict; 
what is worse, often recourse is had to misinformation with a view to 
misleading the enemy as well as public opinion and foreign 
Governments. In appraising the formation of customary rules or general 
principles one should therefore be aware that, on account of the 
inherent nature of this subject-matter, reliance must primarily be 
placed on such elements as official pronouncements of States, military 
manuals and judicial decisions”.1245 
 
It was this rather technical legal operation, i.e. to foreground opinio juris over state 
practice, which made it possible for Cassese and the ICTY to pursue the project to 
‘humanize’ international law in Tadić – to speak of ‘hominum causa omne jus 
                                                      
1242 The paper was reprinted as Antonio Cassese, ‘The Spanish Civil War and the Development of 
Customary Law Concerning Armed Conflicts’, in The Human Dimension of International Law: 
Selected Papers, ed. Antonio Cassese (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 128–47. 
1243 Cassese, 128. 
1244 See also the discussion in Henckaerts, ‘Civil War, Custom and Cassese’, 1096–1099. 
1245 Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 99. 
 334 
constitutum est’.1246 By relying on opinio juris it is not the actual behaviour of states 
but rather the claims (in treaties and declarations) of states on how states should 
behave, which becomes the basis to determine custom – and in this regard states 
might become ‘rhetorically entrapped’.1247  Later, Cassese should justify this 
operation in his scholarly work as well as in the Kupreškić decision of ICTY with 
reference to the ‘Martens Clause’. According to Cassese the ‘Martens Clause’ makes 
international humanitarian law a special case within international law as the 
clause postulates to leave the strict confines of inter-state law in international 
humanitarian law and apply instead the ‘laws of humanity’.1248 Nevertheless, to 
                                                      
1246 para. 97; see also the later discussion in Antonio Cassese, ‘Soliloqui’, in The Prosecutor and the 
Judge: Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese, Interviews and Writings, ed. Heikelina Verrijn Stuart 
and Marlise Simons (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 154. 
1247 Cf. Cryer, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Sources of International Law’, 1049–1050; 
on the notion of ‘rhetorical entrapment’ see, e.g., Deitelhoff, ‘The Discursive Process of Legalization’; 
and Thomas Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International 
Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1–39. To foreground opinio juris over state practice is a very 
‘modern’ approach to customary international law. More traditional approaches rather emphasise 
the other element of custom, namely state practice Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Traditional and 
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’, American Journal of 
International Law 95, no. 4 (2001): 758; in general, the problem with opinio juris is that it is difficult 
to determine, as it refers to the belief of states in legal obligations (while state practice refers to the 
general and consistent practice by states). In order to determine opinio juris Anthony D’Amato 
suggests to refer to statements (declarations and treaties) of states. This approach is followed by 
Cassese. See Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1971); yet, as Koskenniemi notes, both elements - the material element of state 
practice and the psychological element of opinio juris - are always linked together and produce 
indeterminate rules as it is another expression of the play of normativity (utopia) and concreteness 
(apology). Koskenniemi describes this in the following words: ‘The function of the psychological 
element is to guarantee that custom does not conflict with the liberal theory of legislation. It counts 
for the law’s ’internal aspects‘ which distinguishes it from simple coercion. The material element 
aims to ensure that law-ascertainment can be undertaken without having to rely on what States 
subjectively accept at any moment. Neither element can be dismissed or preferred to the other 
without this engendering immediately the objection that custom is either apologist (because it 
makes no distinction between might and right) or utopian (because we cannot demonstrate its 
norms in a tangible fashion). Because both elements seek to delimit each other’s distorting impact, 
the theory of custom needs to hold them independent from each other. But this it cannot do. 
Attempting to identify the presence of the psychological element, it draws inferences 
(presumptions) on the basis of material practice. To ascertain which acts of material practice are 
relevant for custom-formation, it makes reference to the psychological element (i.e. ’Those acts 
count which express opinio juris‘). The psychological element is defined by the material and vice-
versa. This circularity prevents doctrine from developing a determinate method of custom-
ascertainment. It is led to determining custom in terms of an equity which it can itself only regard 
as arbitrary’, Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 410–411; similarly, David Kennedy, 
International Legal Structures (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987), 80–99. 
1248 The Martens Clause was established in the context of the 1899 Hague Convention. The clause 
originally states: ‘Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of 
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the 
laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience’. For the scholarly context see 
Antonio Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’, European Journal of 
International Law 11, no. 1 (2000): 187–216; and Cassese, International Law, 160–161; for the 
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interpret customary international law in this way was a rather ‘bold’ move – some 
would say ‘too bold’ as it could be interpreted as a shift of the ‘secondary rules’ of 
law.1249 
 
3.2 Terrorism, Custom, Cassese 
 
In line with the effort to ‘realize utopia’ stands also one of Cassese’s most 
important recent projects, namely the attempt to make international terrorism an 
international crime. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, Cassese’s 
strategy in this context strongly resembles the one of ‘humanizing’ international 
law, which I just outlined by introducing Tadić. In order to reconstruct Cassese’s 
attempt to make international terrorism an international crime, I will concentrate 
on three interrelating areas of engagement: first, his general scholarly writings on 
this topics; second, modifications between the different editions of his textbook on 
international criminal law (which runs now in its third edition); third, his work as 
president and judge at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).  
 
Before I start to reconstruct these three contexts, however, one final remark 
is necessary, namely the question of why it is so important for Cassese at all to 
make international terrorism an international crime. Cassese justifies this by 
arguing that international terrorism has recently become one of the major threats 
for peace and stability both on a national as well as on the international level. 
Cassese argued, for example, in an autobiographical sketch, which was published 
in 2009, that 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of a new era and since 
then terrorism has become the formative and prevailing phenomenon in 
contemporary world community. 1250  International terrorism has become 
                                                                                                                                                            
context of the ICTY see International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, 
‘Kupreškić et Al., Judgement’, IT-95-16-T (2000), para. 525. Cassese was presiding judge of the Trial 
Chamber. For further discussion see Hoffmann, ‘The Gentle Humanizer of Humanitarian Law’, 76; 
and Mary Fan, ‘Custom, General Principles and the Great Architect Cassese’, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 10, no. 5 (2012): 1071–1075. 
1249 The concept of ‘secondary rules’ goes of course back to: H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
1250 Cassese recounts the evolution of world community in three stages, which he witnessed 
throughout his lifetime: the Cold War (1950-1989) with its foregrounding of state sovereignty and 
ideological struggles; the post-Cold War decade with the achievements of international criminal 
justice and human rights on a global scale (1990-2000); and, the age of terrorism (2001-present), 
Cassese, ‘Soliloqui’, 157–160. 
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paramount as “terrorism and its philosophy have become the major divide in the 
world community”.1251 According to Cassese the world is split today into two 
camps as, on the one side, stand those states and non-state organizations, which 
are supportive of terrorism, and, on the other side, those eagerly fighting it. 
Additionally, terrorism has further deepened the divide between internal and 
international conflicts, something of which Cassese was aware of since 1990s (as 
we have seen in Tadić), and as such contemporary “mixed conflicts are becoming 
more and more frequent and, even more dramatically, more asymmetrical”.1252   
 
3.2.1 Cassese’s general academic publications on terrorism I: The 1980s 
 
It is noteworthy at this point that Cassese did not start to engage with the 
phenomenon of international terrorism only after September 2001. Cassese’s first 
engagement with this topic dates back to the early 1980s. As there are several 
similarities but also differences between Cassese’s earlier and later work on 
terrorism, it is important and useful to have a close look first at these early 
writings on terrorism.1253The belief that terrorism constitutes a serious threat to 
the international community was already present in the 1980s. As, for example, 
Cassese speaks of the “heinous and despicable phenomenon of terrorism”1254 or 
that “terrorism is haunting” the international community.1255 Cassese argues that 
terrorism is, on the one hand, problematic as it is often “tainted with racism” – 
terrorism for the sake of ‘national liberation’ is often more about nationalism than 
actually liberation – and, on the other hand, as it “has a negative impact on the 
international community because it subverts the ‘rules of the game’ accepted by all 
sovereign states”.1256 It subverts the ‘rules of the game’ as it brings non-state 
actors – terrorist organisations – to international law, which previously has been 
                                                      
1251 Cassese, 159. 
1252 Cassese, 159. 
1253 These are merely Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’, American University Law 
Review 31, no. 4 (1982): 945–58; Antonio Cassese, Terrorism, Politics, and Law: The Achille Lauro 
Affair (Cambridge: Polity, 1989); and Antonio Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” 
Response to Terrorism’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1989): 589–608. 
1254 Cassese, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’, 945. 
1255 Cassese, Terrorism, Politics, and Law, 1. 
1256 Cassese, 139, 140 (emphasis in the original). 
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only a law between states (i.e., inter-state law);1257 but it subverts also the ‘rules of 
the game’ – and this is for Cassese the more relevant point – as it leads some states 
to commit serious breaches of international law when they respond to 
terrorism.1258 
 
 To be precise, Cassese was during the 1980s mainly interested in the legal 
responses of states and the international community towards terrorism. To 
scrutinize these responses is for Cassese relevant as there is no comprehensive 
international treaty regulating international responses to terrorism and as such it 
is unclear where to locate terrorism within different legal systems – i.e., whether 
terrorism is rather located in municipal and/or international law or whether in 
human rights law or international humanitarian law. What is sure, however, is that 
international criminal law did not play a role for Cassese – as for international 
lawyers in general – during the 1980s. Indeed, Cassese did not even mention this 
body of law of which he should become later one of the most influential 
representatives.  
 
On a general level, Cassese identifies two types of legal responses by the 
international community to terrorism: peaceful and coercive responses. 
Mechanisms for peaceful responses to terrorism are usually codified: multilateral 
treaties cover specific types of terrorist acts such as the hijacking of aircrafts and 
ships, taking hostages or attacks against diplomats and heads of governments; 
international humanitarian law guarantees the protection of civilians from 
terrorism not only in interstate wars but also in wars of national liberation, civil 
wars or other forms of ‘internal’ wars; and bilateral treaties regulate and co-
ordinate issues related to extradition and co-operation between judiciaries 
(particularly, following the principle of aut judicare aut dedere).1259 These bilateral 
                                                      
1257 Cassese claims: ‘International law is no longer a tool handled exclusively by governments; it can 
also be used by individuals by private organizations and by certain categories of people’, Cassese, 
viii; furthermore, terrorism blurs the distinction between belligerents and civilians and terrorist 
attacks violate in their form the internationally agreed principle of chivalry, Cassese, ‘Terrorism 
and Human Rights’, 948. 
1258 In particular, Cassese’s 1989 monograph stands out here. The monograph offers an excellent 
overview of the incident. See, in particular, Cassese, Terrorism, Politics, and Law, chap. 3; see also 
Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism’, 601–603; Interestingly, 
this distinguishes also the pirate from the terrorist as the legal responses to piracy were conducted 
in accordance to international law, Cassese, Terrorism, Politics, and Law, 140. 
1259 Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism’, 591–592. 
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treaties are, furthermore, often embedded within regulations of human rights law 
dealing, e.g., with the question whether terrorists should benefit from basic human 
rights or whether terrorism should be used as trigger and ‘opportunity’ to curtail 
human rights (for example, by declaring a ‘state of emergency’).1260 
 
Yet, for Cassese peaceful responses have one basic flaw, as they are like all 
law based on treaties only binding to those states, which have ratified the 
respective treaty.1261 Furthermore, even a ratified treaty might not end ‘political’ 
debates as the ratification might only be the stating point for debates over the 
‘correct’ interpretation of a treaty: even if two states sign an extradition treaty, in 
which they guarantee to extradite terrorists, this treaty might be of limited use if 
they stick later to divergent notions of terrorism.1262  
 
In contrast to peaceful responses, the second category of responses – 
coercive (or military) ones – is not regulated by treaties. Cassese further specifies 
this observation, as “rules governing coercive responses are part of the law on the 
use of armed force. For the most part this is customary international law (even 
though, of course, its roots may lie in treaties, particularly the UN Charter)”.1263 
Here, we are confronted with the general problem of customary law: its ambiguity. 
For instance, it is difficult, even after the Nicaragua decision of the ICJ,1264 to 
formulate a clear legal threshold to identify the support and backing of terrorist 
groups by states: is a lack of prosecution already an act of support of a terrorist 
group? are financial and logistical assistance enough? what is about attacks on the 
high seas or the international airspace? Rules in these contexts, Cassese 
summarizes, are “far from clear and States still have plenty of room for 
manoeuvre” as it was the case, for example, in the Achille Lauro affair in 1985. 1265 
This legal ‘grey zone’, in turn, makes responses to terrorism “weak and 
                                                      
1260 Cf. Cassese, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’, 950–958. 
1261 Cassese, Terrorism, Politics, and Law, 9. 
1262 Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism’, 592–593. 
1263 Cassese, 591 (emphasis added). 
1264 International Court of Justice, ‘Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Merits)’ (1986). Cassese refers, in particular, to the dissenting opinions by 
Judges Schwebel and Jennings. 
1265 Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism’, 600; on the Achille 
Lauro affair see Cassese, Terrorism, Politics, and Law. Chapter 3 provides an excellent overview of 
the ‘facts’ of the incident. 
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ambiguous”.1266  
 
Yet, the most important insights of the discussion of the different categories 
of responses to terrorism are for Cassese other ones. First, it is the insight that 
terrorism is, on a general level, actually regulated by international law. As Cassese 
puts it: “We have reached a situation where there is a general consensus among 
the international community that terrorism is to be condemned”.1267 This is the 
case as peaceful responses are regulated though treaty law and coercive responses 
through customary law.1268 Second, Cassese claims that “we appear to be moving 
closer towards a consensus on a definition of terrorism”.1269 As we will see below 
both claims, i.e. that terrorism is regulated by international law and that there 
exists a definition of terrorism, should become recurrent patterns in Cassese’s 
work on terrorism after September 2001. Finally, Cassese assumes that the 
common legal responses serve only on a short-term (in the case of coercive 
responses) and a medium-term (in the case of peaceful responses) basis. In order 
to provide a long-term solution to terrorism, it is important to eliminate the root 
causes of terrorism and to stick to extra-legal responses. Cassese draws in this 
context in particular on Johan Galtung’s work and the distinction between 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace – and, here, on the assumption that only ‘positive’ 
peace can overcome the ‘structural violence’ (by, e.g., fighting social, economic and 
political inequalities), which generates after all the phenomenon of international 
terrorism.1270 
 
 
 
                                                      
1266 Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism’, 600. 
1267 Cassese, 605. 
1268 Although Cassese reflects with regard to treaty law merely on state practice (usus) there are 
occasional (implicit) references to opinio juris. For example: ‘All states and organizations agree on 
the condemnation of the heinous and despicable phenomenon of terrorism. Even states that pay 
only lip service to this condemnation would never admit that they support or condone terrorists’, 
Cassese, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’, 945; see also the discussion of the role of the United States 
in Cassese, Terrorism, Politics, and Law, 72. 
1269 Cassese, ‘The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism’, 605 (emphasis 
added). 
1270 Cassese, 606–608; for an introduction into Galtung’s framework see Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, 
Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–91. 
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3.2.2 Cassese’s general academic publications on terrorism II: After 9/11 
 
While Cassese did not publish on international terrorism throughout the 1990s – 
something which might also be due to his involvement in the establishment of the 
ICTY and to his more general publications on international criminal law and 
international human rights law –, he took up the thread immediately after the 
September 2001 attacks again: in this context Cassese was among the first 
international legal experts publishing on the relevance of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
for international law. Similarly to his writings in the 1980s Cassese observes that 
terrorism has not only societal and political effects but also “shattering 
consequences for international law” as it “is subverting some important legal 
categories” and “thereby imposing the need to rethink them”.1271 However, this 
process of ‘rethinking’ of legal categories does not occur for Cassese in the same 
legal frameworks and subsequent vocabularies as in the 1980s. While 
international humanitarian law, even though transformed to some extend during 
the 1990s (particularly through Tadić), remains a dominant body of law for 
Cassese, human rights law has basically been substituted by international criminal 
law. Furthermore, Cassese seems to be more optimistic vis-à-vis the 
transformative character of these bodies of law as he was back in the 1980s, when 
he conceptualised international law as being – almost exclusively – a law of states 
and between states (i.e., inter-state law). Throughout the early 2000s international 
humanitarian law and international criminal law are for Cassese the two streams 
of international law, which could facilitate to overcome international law’s state-
centric nature.1272 
   
 With regard to the project of making terrorism an international crime, 
Cassese focuses on three interrelated issues: the identification of terrorism within 
international customary law, a definition of international terrorism and the 
relationship of international terrorism vis-à-vis other international crimes (in 
                                                      
1271 Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International 
Law’, European Journal of International Law 12, no. 5 (2001): 993; Cassese discusses three major 
impacts of terrorism on international law: its impact on international criminal law, its impact on 
the law of self-defence and its impact on general principles of law (particularly, the principle of 
proportionality). As I will focus in the remainder of the section on the impact of terrorism on 
international criminal law, see for a discussion of the latter two categories, Cassese, 996–1001. 
1272 This resonates of course with Cassese’s general approach to international law. See my 
discussion above. 
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particular, crimes against humanity and war crimes). As we have seen above, some 
of these issues were already raised in the 1980s. However, after September 2001 
Cassese intensifies his discussion and starts to elaborate on them in more detail. As 
such, Cassese states already in the immediate aftermath of the attacks that 
terrorism is an international crime under international customary law: 
 
“In my opinion, it may be safely contended that […] at least trans-
national, state-sponsored or state-condoned terrorism amounts to an 
international crime, and is already contemplated and prohibited by 
international customary law as a distinct category of such crimes”.1273 
 
In order to substantiate this claim, Cassese turns to the drafting process of the 
Rome Statute, where several states endorsed the inclusion of international 
terrorism into the material jurisdiction of the court, namely as a sub-category of 
crimes against humanity. Although there might be in general, as Cassese puts it, a 
“cautious attitude” to include international terrorism into the catalogue of 
international crimes – as in the end the failure of the proposal to include 
international terrorism in the ICC Statute or several decisions by municipal courts 
show –, Cassese notes that some prominent voices such as UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson and a 
number of “[d]istinguished international lawyers” were willing to back the 
proposal and make international terrorism a sub-category of crimes against 
humanity – something that would subsequently have changed the scope of the 
notion of crimes against humanity, too.1274 
 
 In the years that followed, Cassese further intensified the project of making 
international terrorism an international crime. In this context he elaborates that 
the main doubt why many international legal experts do not consider international 
terrorism as an international crime is based on the lack of a general definition of 
international terrorism within international law. Cassese calls this view the 
                                                      
1273 Cassese, ‘Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories’, 994 (emphasis added). 
1274 Cassese, 994–995. 
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“prevailing view”.1275 As Cassese outlines it, this view argues mainly that “since 
states have never agreed upon a definition of terrorism, it would be impossible to 
criminalize this phenomenon as such”.1276 Cassese, however, opposes this view 
and claims that “one may trace how an accepted definition has gradually evolved 
in the international community”.1277 At least, in times of peace, Cassese asserts, 
such a definition exists in customary international law. Cassese acknowledges in 
this context that 
 
“treaty rules laying down a comprehensive definition have not yet been 
agreed upon. However, over the years, under the strong pressure of 
public opinion and also in order to crime to grips with the spreading of 
terrorism everywhere, in fact widespread consensus on a generally 
acceptable definition of terrorism has evolved in the world community 
so much so that the contention can be made […] that indeed a 
customary rule on the objective and subjective elements of the crime of 
international terrorism in times of peace has evolved”.1278 
 
Invoking similar legal technicalities as previously in Tadić with the question 
of whether international humanitarian law is also applicable in internal armed 
conflicts (see my discussion above), Cassese claims now that a definition had 
evolved since the late 1930s.1279 Cassese develops this position on the basis of two 
arguments. First, he reconstructs practice (usus) in various contexts ranging from 
UN General Assembly resolutions to regional treaties to national legislation and 
judiciary. Second, Cassese reverses the burden of proof by noting that there exists 
an internationally accepted definition of terrorism and that the problem of this 
definition is a lacking concretization of its exceptions. Thus, for Cassese, it is 
                                                      
1275 Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’, in Enforcing International Law Norms 
Against Terrorism, ed. Andrea Bianchi (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 213. 
1276 Cassese, 213. 
1277 Cassese, 214. 
1278 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’, Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 5 (2006): 935. 
1279 While Cassese saw the Spanish Civil War as starting point for the applicability of international 
humanitarian law in internal armed conflicts (see also my discussion above), he argued that in the 
case of terrorism it is the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which was 
established in 1937 by the League of Nations, Cassese, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’, 214; 
on the history of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism see also Ondrej 
Ditrych, ‘“International Terrorism” in the League of Nations and the Contemporary Terrorism 
dispositif’, Critical Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 2 (2013): 225–40. 
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precisely not the missing agreement on a definition of terrorism but the missing 
definitions of its exceptions that might cause problems. Here, Cassese discusses 
mainly two exceptions: on the one hand the question whether there exists a 
definition in times of armed conflict (and not only during times of peace) and, on 
the other hand, the question whether ‘freedom fighters’ are terrorists or not.1280 
What is important for Cassese in this context, however, is that the lack of a 
definition of these exceptions cannot neglect a definition of international terrorism 
in general. For him, such a line of argumentation is untenable, first, on logical 
grounds – “to say because that because there is no consensus on the exception a 
general notion has not evolved would be a misconception”; but, second, it is also 
untenable with regard to treaty law – as there actually exist enough regional 
treaties dealing with terrorism – or national laws on terrorism.1281 
 
 After refusing the position that there does not exist a general definition of 
terrorism in international law, Cassese starts to list elements, which are necessarily 
required for the crime of terrorism on a national level. He identifies three main 
elements in this regard: terrorism consists of (i) acts normally criminalized under 
most national legal systems; these acts must be (ii) intended (must be aimed) to 
spread terror; and (iii) they must be politically, religiously or otherwise 
ideologically motivated.1282 These elements need now to be “translated into a 
rigorous articulation within international law”.1283  
 
In order to obtain this international dimension, Cassese suggests that these 
acts must be connected either to an international or an internal armed conflict or 
they have to be of considerable magnitude or have a trans-national dimension.1284 
In addition, there are three possible ways to translate international terrorism into 
the framework of international criminal law and justice, which are that 
international terrorism becomes either a sub-category of war crimes, a sub-
category of crimes against humanity or a discrete crime (i.e. an international crime 
                                                      
1280 Cf. Cassese, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’, 214; and Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal 
Notion of Terrorism in International Law’, 935. 
1281 Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’, 214–216. 
1282 See Cassese, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’, 219; and Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal 
Notion of Terrorism in International Law’, 937. 
1283 Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’, 937 (emphasis  
added). 
1284 Cassese, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’, 220. 
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by its own). The subsumption of international terrorism under these categories of 
international crimes depends of “the victim to be protected by international law” 
in a concrete situation. 1285 As Cassese exposes 
 
“terrorist acts are prohibited as war crimes when directed against 
civilians and civilian objects; when they fall under the category of 
crimes against humanity, they are normally banned if they target 
civilians […]; finally, when terrorist acts may be classified as 
international crimes of terrorism, they are prohibited whatever their 
target is”.1286 
 
Moreover, it is important whether an act of terrorism is committed in times of 
peace or during an armed conflict: terrorism can only be a sub-category of war 
crimes during an armed conflict; it can be subsumed under crimes against 
humanity both in times of peace as during armed conflict; and, it can be an 
international crime in times of peace.1287 What becomes, however, increasingly 
clear in Cassese’s general academic writings over the time is the attempt to make 
international terrorism a discrete crime also in times of armed conflicts – and, 
thus, a discrete crime regardless of peace or armed conflict. Here, Cassese refers, 
for example, to the historical evolution of genocide, which was according to him 
first a sub-category of crimes against humanity and only gradually differentiated 
from its “parental crime”; furthermore, Cassese suggests that the “distinct category 
of warlike terrorist acts” might be created, which would also help to criminalize 
terrorism in times of armed conflict.1288 
 
3.2.3 Cassese’s International Criminal Law 
 
If we turn now to the second context, Cassese’s work as author of the seminal 
textbook on International Criminal Law, we can find a similar development. The 
textbook runs now in its third edition: the first two editions were published in 
                                                      
1285 Cassese, 220. 
1286 Cassese, 220. 
1287 See Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’, 938–956. 
1288 Cassese, 956 (emphasis in the original). 
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2003 and 2008 respectively, while the third edition was released posthumously 
(as Cassese’s International Criminal Law) in 2013. In this sub-sections I will 
concentrate only on the two editions (2003 and 2008), which were published 
during Cassese’s lifetime – yet, I will come back to the third edition towards the 
end of this chapter, as it presents to some extend a summary of Cassese’s project to 
make international terrorism an international crime. 
 
 In both editions – 2003 and 2008 – Cassese takes basically the same line of 
argumentation as in his general academic writings. Large parts are actually taken 
verbatim from academic articles and book chapters (and vice versa).1289 Cassese 
argues, again, that under international customary law a “definition of terrorism 
exists, and the phenomenon also amounts to a customary international law 
crime”;1290 while there is, since 1937, a definition of terrorism there might exist 
disagreement about the definition of its exception(s) – something, which does not 
affect however a general definition of terrorism;1291 and again, Cassese discusses 
the relationship of terrorism vis-à-vis other international crimes in times of war 
and peace: whether international terrorism is a sub-category of war crimes, a sub-
category of crimes against humanity or a discrete international crime.1292 In the 
2008 edition, Cassese concludes that “[i]nternational law defines and regulates 
international terrorism”.1293 Furthermore, international terrorism is now – and 
this is new also with regard to his general academic publications on international 
terrorism – a discrete crime in both times of peace and armed conflict and might 
become in an “aggravated form” a crime against humanity or war crime.1294 
 
                                                      
1289 The discussion in first edition of his textbook basically resembles: Cassese, ‘Terrorism as an 
International Crime’; see also Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 120–131; while the discussion in the second edition is largely identical 
with: Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’; see also 
Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., 162–178. 
1290 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 1st ed., 120. 
1291 Although, Cassese admits that it might produce ambiguous anti-terrorism policies, Cassese, 
121–123. 
1292 Cassese, 127–130; and Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., 166–177. 
1293 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., 177. 
1294 Cassese, 177. The criteria for subsuming international terrorism under war crimes or crimes 
against humanity remain the same as in Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in 
International Law’; see also my discussion in the previous sub-section. In this context, Cassese 
addresses also the question of ‘multiplicity of offences’, i.e. ‘whether a person might be charged for 
more than one crime, and if so, under what conditions and with what legal consequences’, Cassese, 
International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., 178–183. 
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 Yet, it is also interesting to see how Cassese subsequently foregrounds – in 
scope and emphasis – international terrorism in discussions of international 
crimes. Both editions offer an own section with several chapters on international 
crimes. In the first edition, Cassese devotes individual chapters to three 
international crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. A fourth 
chapter discusses “other international crimes” and lists aggression, torture and 
terrorism.1295 According to Cassese, these crimes are in contrast to war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide “normally not regarded as being included in 
the so-called ‘core crimes’” and, furthermore, “at least at present do not fall under 
the jurisdiction of any international criminal tribunal or court”.1296 To make 
aggression, torture and terrorism international crimes is for Cassese important as 
this would “significantly contribute, at a juridical level, to rein impunity for these 
odious crimes” as it would “ensure – more and better than any national court can 
do – full respect both for the principal of impartiality of courts and for the 
fundamental rights of the accused”.1297 In a similar vein to the first edition, the 
second edition of International Criminal Law comprises a whole section on 
international crimes and, also similarly, this section introduces war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide in separate chapters. What is different now is the 
structure of the discussion of (possible) additional international crimes: while 
torture and aggression are addressed together in one chapter, Cassese devotes to 
‘terrorism as an international crime’ a separate chapter.1298 Cassese added also a 
few more pages to the discussion of international terrorism so that it attains now 
the same status as the classic ‘core crimes’, namely war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity.1299 
 
                                                      
1295 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 1st ed., chap. 6. 
1296 Cassese, 110. In the case of aggression, this statement is at least controversial as aggression (as 
‘crimes against peace’) was included in the catalogue of crimes of the IMT and IMTFE as it is part of 
the material jurisdiction of the ICC (although not exercised in 2003 due to the lack of a definition at 
that time). On the later see International Criminal Court (ICC), Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, para. 5. 
1297 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 1st ed., 111. 
1298 Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., chap. 8. 
1299 The discussion of international terrorism encompasses in the first edition almost twelve and in 
the second edition almost seventeen pages. See Cassese, International Criminal Law, 1st Ed., 120–
131; and Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., 162–172. 
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3.2.4 Cassese the Judge II: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 
I will turn now to the third context. In March 2009, Cassese should be appointed 
again as a Judge and first President of an international tribunal – this time of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Cassese obtained both positions until October 
2011, shortly before his death. The STL was established in 2007 by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1757 and officially opened in The Hague on 1 March 2009.1300 
The Tribunal was created in order to prosecute those responsible for the killing of 
the former Lebanese Premier Minister Rafiq Harriri and 22 others on 14 February 
2005 as well as connected attacks.1301 The STL represents a hybrid court as it is, 
e.g., composed by both Lebanese and international judges; moreover, it is 
established on the basis of an agreement between the United Nations and the 
Lebanese Republic; yet, in contrast to other hybrid tribunals such as the ones for 
Cambodia and Sierra Leone, which both have also jurisdiction over domestic 
crimes, the STL’s material jurisdiction is bound to the “provisions of the Lebanese 
Criminal Court”.1302 The STL is, furthermore, the first international tribunal to have 
jurisdiction ratione materiae over the crime of terrorism. Put differently, though 
not being the ICC, the STL brought the prosecution of the crime of terrorism finally 
to The Hague.  
 
 On 16 February 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the STL handed down an 
‘Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law’ (Applicable Law).1303 As it was the 
case with the Tadić decision more then 15 years earlier, Cassese was the Presiding 
Judge of the Appeals Chamber and the decision clearly bears Cassese’s 
signature.1304 Similarly to Tadić, the Applicable Law decision was the first major 
decision of a newly established tribunal and was hence used as opportunity to 
                                                      
1300  United Nations Security Council, ‘Establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, 
S/RES/1757  (2007). On the background of the tribunal see, for example, Samer N. Abboud and 
Benjamin J. Muller, ‘Geopolitics, Insecurity and Neocolonial Exceptionalism: A Critical Appraisal of 
the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, Security Dialogue 44, no. 5–6 (2013): 469–474. 
1301 The temporal jurisdiction of the STL expands from 1 January 2004 to 12 December 2015. 
1302 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, ‘Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, S/RES/1757 (2007), 
para. 2. 
1303 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, ‘Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, 
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging’, STL-11-01/I (2011). 
1304 Although the decision was unanimously taken by the five judges of the Appeals Chamber, ‘all 
the evidence’ points to the fact that it was Cassese’s work, Cryer, ‘International Criminal Tribunals 
and the Sources of International Law’, 1047 (footnote 10). 
 348 
clear the basis of future judgements. As such, the decision was requested by the 
pre-trial judge on 17 January 2011 in order to resolve important “questions ab 
inition (from the outset) to ensure that this and any future indictments are 
confirmed – if they are confirmed on sound and well-founded grounds”1305 
Applicable Law was rendered without a concrete case,1306 guided by 15 questions 
of the pre-trail judge and accompanied by three amici curiae briefs.1307 The 
decision has been immediately described as a “landmark ruling”1308 and “an 
incredible rich decision – if you will (and appropriately enough bearing in mind 
Judge Cassese’s involvement), the STL’s Tadic”.1309 The interlocutory decision was 
‘rich’ not only due to its length (more than 150 pages) but also due to its 
comprehensive discussion of the nature of interpretation (and, here, particularly 
the role of judges) in international law, the status of terrorism under international 
law and questions regarding joint criminal enterprise (JCE) liability or multiple 
offenses (and multiple charges). In what follows, I will focus on two aspects of the 
                                                      
1305 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, 
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, para. 1. 
1306 The absence of a concrete case has important consequences for the whole dynamic of the 
tribunal. Usually, international criminal trials and tribunals work through the antagonism between 
defence and prosecution – something that ‘diminishes’ also the role of judges. The absent of a 
concrete defendant in the Applicable Law decision turned this dynamic around, as it foregrounded 
the position of judges and pushed prosecution and defence (represented by the Defence Office) to 
the background. In other words, the setting established a rather atypically powerful position to the 
judges of the Tribunal. This is also an important difference to the Tadić decision. For a similar point 
see Matthew Gillett and Matthias Schuster, ‘Fast-Track Justice: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
Defines Terrorism’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 9, no. 5 (2011): 991–997. 
1307 The briefs were filed by the Institute for Criminal Law and Justice of the Georg-August Götting 
University, see Kai Ambos, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted to the Appeals Chamber of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon on the Question of the Applicable Terrorism Offence with a Particular Focus 
on “Special” Special Intent And/or a Special Motive as Additional Subjective Requirements’, 
Criminal Law Forum 22, no. 3 (2011): 389–408; the War Crimes Research Office at American 
University Washington College of Law, Susana Sácouto and Katherine Cleary, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief 
on the Practice of Cumulative Charging Before International Criminal Bodies Submitted to the 
Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Pursuant to Rule 131 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence’, Criminal Law Forum 22, no. 3 (2011): 409–32; and by Professor Ben Saul 
from the Sydney Centre of International Law at the University of Sydney, see Ben Saul, ‘Amicus 
Curiae Brief on the Notion of Terrorist Acts Submitted to the Appeals Chamber of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon Pursuant to Rule 131 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, Criminal Law 
Forum 22, no. 3 (2011): 365–88. However, only the first two briefs, which supported the STL with 
additional information on the 15 questions of the pre-trial judge, were taken to account as the third 
brief, which was particularly critical with Cassese’s earlier argumentation on the international 
crime of international terrorism, was not taken into account as it arrived the STL one working day 
too late. For a critique of the way the STL made use of the briefs, see Ben Saul, ‘The Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon and Terrorism as an International Crime: Reflections on the Judicial Function’, in The 
Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. 
Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 93–94. 
1308 Michael P. Scharf, ‘Special Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Landmark Ruling on Definition of 
Terrorism and Modes of Participation’, ASIL Insights 15, no. 6 (4 March 2011),. 
1309 Marko Milanovic, ‘Special Tribunal for Lebanon Delivers Interlocutory Decision on Applicable 
Law’, EJIL Talk (blog), 16 February 2011. 
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decision: its remarks on interpretation (and the role of judges) in international law 
and the discussion on the crime of terrorism. 
 
 In a – at least for an international criminal tribunal – rather atypical way, 
the Applicable Law decision addresses at its beginning fundamental 
methodological questions in a comprehensive fashion. This discussion comes near 
to a obitur dictum. It addresses, in particular, questions with regard to the nature 
of custom and the role of judges in the identification of it. These discussions can be 
understood as the methodological underpinning of what Cassese has termed in his 
extra-curial writings as ‘critical positivism’.1310 What is interesting here is that the 
decision concedes a rather powerful position to the judicial function. For instance, 
the decision states that 
 
“Interpretation is an operation that always proves necessary when 
applying a legal rule. One must always start with a statute’s language. 
But that must be read within the statute’s legal and factual context. 
Indeed, the old maxim in claris non fit interpretatio (when a text is clear 
there is no need for interpretation) is in truth fallacious, as has been 
rightly emphasised by distinguished scholars”.1311 
 
In other words, interpretation is always needed – all adjudication is interpretation 
– and it is the task of a court to render these interpretations: 
 
“The process is not to construe the text initially to determine whether 
there is a gap and, if there is, to construe it a second time to deal with 
the problem created by the gap. Rather, the court performs a simple 
exercise of construction, referring to whatever is the relevant 
context”.1312 
 
At this point, the Applicable Law decision differentiates between two sorts of 
                                                      
1310 See my discussion above in this chapter under 3.1.1. 
1311 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, para. 19 (emphasis in the original). The decision lists as ‘distinguished 
scholars’ Ronald Dworkin and Pierre-Marie Dupuy. 
1312 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, para. 19. 
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context: internal and external context. The internal context is the linguistic context 
within a text (e.g., a statute). To speak of an internal context signifies that words 
should not be treated in isolation within a concrete text but rather in their relation 
to other words and sentences of the text. The external context, on the other hand, 
covers everything outside the text, which is important for its interpretation. 
According to the Appeals Chamber, context “must embrace all legitimate aids to 
interpretation”, i.e. context must be used as wide as possible – including internal 
and external context.1313 Interpretation guarantees that “a statute is presumed to 
be ‘always speaking’”, i.e. the interpretation of the context helps to adapt a text to 
changing social realities without changing the original text.1314 
 
It is now the task of judges to find and interpret the context. As the Applicable 
Law decision argues, judges should look for Hartian “penumbra situations” in 
order to find some room for interpretation.1315 As we have seen above, Cassese had 
stated this specific argument before in his general academic writings.1316 When 
such a ‘penumbral situation’ exists, 
 
“it falls to the interpreter as far as practicable to give consistency, 
homogeneity and due weighting to the different elements of a deriving 
or heterogeneous set of provisions. Judges are not permitted to resort 
                                                      
1313 para. 20. 
1314 para. 21. Although not quoted in the decision, Luhmann reaches to a similar conclusion: ‘All law, 
which is set out in written form, is therefore law to interpret. Once this is recognised, it is expected 
from texts to authorize their interpretation, for instance, by determining who is appointed to 
interpret and how the interpretation should be carried out. Through this ’who‘ and ’how‘ the law, 
even in fixed texts, adapts to evolutionary transformations of the society, and this even if legislation 
is available, which could change texts in their written form. Every currently valid text is submit to 
interpretation as it is text only in context of interpretation’ (‘Alles schriftlich fixierte Recht ist 
mithin zu interpretierendes Recht. Sobald man das erkennt, wird den Texten zugemutet, ihre 
Interpretation zu autorisieren, etwa festzulegen, wer zur Interpretation berufen ist, und wie die 
Interpretation zu erfolgen hat. Über dieses “wer” und “wie” paßt sich das Recht, auch bei fixierten 
Texten, evolutionären Veränderungen der Gesellschaft an, und dies selbst dann, wenn 
Gesetzgebung verfügbar ist, um Texte auch in ihrer Schriftform zu ändern. Jeder aktuell geltende 
Text setzt sich der Interpretation aus, ja ist Text nur im Kontext von Interpretation’), Niklas 
Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 256. 
1315 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, para. 23. 
1316 Interestingly, the STL decision uses the same edition and, within it, relies on the same pages in 
order to cite Hart as in Cassese, Five Masters of International Law, 258. See also my discussion 
earlier in this chapter. 
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to a non liquet”.1317 
 
This view on the role of interpretation, links of course to Lauterpacht’s discussion 
of the judicial function and that an international court cannot pronounce non 
liquet, i.e. that an international court cannot declare that there is no applicable law 
and that it has, consequently, no jurisdiction over a specific case.1318 And indeed, 
the decision quotes Lauterpacht directly in order to clarify the function of the 
judge: 
 
“[T]he function of the judge to pronounce in each case quid est juris 
[what is the law?] is pre-eminently a practical one. He is neither 
compelled nor permitted to resign himself to the ignorabimus [it shall 
be ignored] which besets the perennial quest of the philosopher and the 
investigator in the domain of natural science”1319 
 
However, in contrast to Lauterpacht, who argues in favour – as we have seen above 
– of analogies from municipal law, general principles or the moral purpose of 
international law in order to fill ‘gaps’ in law, the Appeals Chamber in the 
Applicable Law decision – and this is in line with Cassese’s earlier work within and 
outside academia – relies on the source of customary international law. Applicable 
Law acknowledges that in this constellation of a strong role of the judicial function 
lies always the danger that judges could take a decision, which is perceived as 
being too bold, i.e. where the interpreter “override[s]” its competency.1320Thus, 
judges should be cautious in pushing the boundaries of international law. 
 
 What does this mean with regard to the STL? According to the Applicable 
Law decision, the context of the tribunal consists first of all of three ‘lawmakers’, 
                                                      
1317 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, para. 23. 
1318 Cf. Lauterpacht, ‘Some Observations on the Prohibition of “Non Liquet”’. See also my discussion 
above in this chapter. 
1319 The quotation is from: Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, 72; it is 
cited in Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, para. 11; yet, according to Matthew Gillett and Matthias 
Schuster, this quotation was ‘taken out of context’. For more detail see Gillett and Schuster, ‘Fast-
Track Justice’, 997. 
1320 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, para. 24. 
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which are the Parliament of Lebanon (“in respect to the substantive criminal law”), 
the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon (the drafters of the STL’s 
Statute) and the judges of the tribunal (making “the adjectival rules of procedure 
and evidence”). 1321  The construction of these three ‘lawmakers’ produces 
(together with ‘penumbra situations’) some leeway for interpretation as it is 
unclear where the boundaries between these three bodies is located (in the end, it 
is the role of the STL to decide this). Applicable Law interprets this construction in 
accordance with the Statute as following: “The starting point is the criminal law of 
Lebanon”. 1322 However, the STL is “nonetheless an international tribunal in 
provenance, composition, and regulation”. 1323  As such the STL should use 
international law, as a context, in order to interpret Lebanese criminal law. The 
tribunal may refer to sources of international law “to assist in interpreting and 
applying Lebanese law”.1324 But, according to the decision, the structure of this 
context, namely the structure of international law, has changed recently:  
 
“The principle in dubio mitius [in case of doubt, the more favourable 
construction should be chosen] is emblematic of the old international 
community, which consisted only of sovereign states, where individuals 
did not play any role and there did not yet exist intergovernmental 
organisations such as the United Nations tasked to safeguard such 
universal values as peace, human rights, self-determination of peoples 
and justice. It is indeed no coincidence that, although this canon of 
interpretation was repeatedly relied upon by the Permanent Court of 
Justice in its heyday, it is no longer or only scantily invoked by modern 
international courts. Today the interests of the world community tend 
to prevail over those of individual states, universal values take pride of 
place restraining reciprocity and bilateralism in international dealings; 
and the doctrine of human rights has acquired paramountcy throughout 
                                                      
1321 22. 
1322 para. 25, see also: ‘[W]e are called upon primarily to apply national law - in particular, 
Lebanon’s - prinicipaliter (that is, in the exercise of our primary jurisdiction over particular 
allegations)’ para. 33; this is in accordance with the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
para. 2. 
1323 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, para. 16. 
1324 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, para. 62. 
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the world community”.1325 
 
What is interesting about this dichotomy between an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ international 
law as well as the analysis of the current status of the international/world 
community is that it resembles exactly the one in Cassese’s textbook on 
International Law six years earlier.1326 I have discussed this earlier in this chapter. 
While the transformation of the international legal order provided according to the 
textbook a vantage point in order to introduce a more ‘humanized’ international 
law, it opens up in the Applicable Law decision the discussion whether the crime of 
terrorism constitutes an international crime under customary international law or 
not. I will turn now to this second important point of the decision.1327 
 
 The discussion of a possible crime of terrorism under customary 
international law covers 40 paragraphs of the decision (paras. 83-123). The first of 
these paragraphs held the following: 
 
“The Defence Office and the Prosecutor both forcefully assert that there 
is currently no settled definition of terrorism under customary 
international law. However, although it is held by many scholars and 
other legal experts that no widely accepted definition of terrorism has 
evolved in the world society because of the marked difference of views 
on some issues, closer scrutiny demonstrates that in fact such a definition 
has gradually emerged”.1328 
 
The Applicable Law decision – a decision against both the Defence Office and the 
Prosecutor – substantiates this view by addressing the question of the formation of 
custom under international law as well as the elements of the crime of terrorism, 
when it held that 
 
“a number of treaties, UN resolutions, and the legislative and judicial 
                                                      
1325 29 (emphasis in the original). 
1326 Cf. Cassese, International Law, 142–144. 
1327 Or, the ‘Tribunal’s principal raison d‘être: the crime of terrorism’, Interlocutory Decision on the 
Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, para. 42. 
1328 para. 83 (emphasis added). This statement is certainly also a good example of the particularly 
week position of the Defence Office and the Prosecutor in the setting of the decision. 
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practice of States evince the formation of a general opinio juris in the 
international community, accompanied by a practice consistent with 
such opinio, to the effect that a customary rule of international law 
regarding the international crime of terrorism, at least in time of peace, 
has indeed emerged. This customary rule requires the following key 
elements: (i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, 
kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an 
act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would 
generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly 
coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to 
refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act involves a transnational 
element”.1329 
 
Put differently, the line of argumentation of both the identification (of the 
formation) of custom and of the elements of the crime of terrorism resembles the 
one in Cassese’s previous academic publications. For instance, in order to identify 
custom the decision relies, similarly to Cassese’s earlier writings, on several 
regional treaties, UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions as well as 
on national legislation and national judicial decisions. Here, the review of these 
various sources is extended in depth (mainly by reviewing the legislation and 
judicial decisions from more countries) but not in substance in comparison to 
Cassese’s earlier work. According to the decision for example the review of various 
national laws1330 reveals that these “laws, despite peripheral variations normally 
motivated by national exigencies, share a core concept: terrorism is a criminal 
action that aims at spreading terror or coercing government authorities and is a 
treat to the stability of society or the State”.1331 
 
In general, the decision concludes with regard to the existence of terrorism 
                                                      
1329 para. 85 (emphasis in the original). 
1330 The review lists, inter alia, countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, France Finland, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Pakistan, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, the United States, the Russian 
Federation and India. It includes countries from civil and common law traditions as well as 
countries from an Islamic (shari’ah) law tradition such as Saudi Arabia, para. 93–96. 
1331 para. 97, a similar finding is provided by the review of national court decisions: ‘In recent years 
courts have reached concordant conclusions about the elements of an international crime of 
terrorism’, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, para. 100; for an opposite view, see, for example, Saul, 
‘The Special Tribunal for Lebanon and Terrorism as an International Crime’. 
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under customary law that “it can be said that there is a settled practice concerning 
the punishment of acts of terrorism as commonly defined, at least when committed 
in time of peace”. 1332 Yet, the decision identifies custom not only by the action of 
states (state practice) but holds that “in addition, this practice is evidence of a 
belief of States that the punishment of terrorism responds to a social necessity 
(opinio necessitates) and is hence rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule 
requiring it (opinio juris)”.1333That terrorism is commonly punished is, however, 
not sufficient to determine whether it is also criminalized under international law. 
Interestingly, the Applicable Law decision refers in this context to the Tadić 
Interlocutory Decision by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, which Judge Cassese had 
presided himself in 1995 (see my discussion above in this chapter under 3.1.2), as 
‘seminal decision’. It is worth to quote the entire relevant paragraph (para. 103) in 
the Applicable Law decision: 
 
“The Appeals Chamber acknowledges that the existence of a customary 
rule outlawing terrorism does not automatically mean that terrorism is 
a criminal offence under international law. According to the legal 
parameters suggested by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić 
Interlocutory Decision with regard to war crimes, to give rise to 
individual criminal liability at the international level it is necessary for a 
violation of the international rule to entail the individual responsibility 
of the person breaching the rule. The criteria for determining the issue 
were again suggested by the ICTY in that seminal decision: the intention 
to criminalize the prohibition must be evidenced by statements of 
government officials and international organizations, as well as by 
punishment for such violations by national courts. Perusal of these 
elements of practice will establish whether States intend to criminalise 
breaches of the international rule”.1334 
 
Here, the Applicable Law decision argues that international criminalization of 
terrorism works analogously to the one of war crimes, namely that “the domestic 
                                                      
1332 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, para. 102. 
1333 para. 102. 
1334 para. 103 (emphasis in the original). 
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criminalisation of breaches of international humanitarian law led to the 
international criminalisation of those breaches and the formation of rules of 
customary international law authorising or even imposing their punishment”.1335 
In other words, there might exist spill-over effects transferring the criminalisation 
of a certain crime from the domestic to the international level and making it, thus, 
an international crime.1336 As a result of this, the decision finally states that 
 
“the customary rule in question has a twofold dimension: it addresses 
itself to international subjects, including rebels and other non-State 
entities (whenever they exhibit such features as to enjoy international 
legal personality), by imposing or conferring on them rights and 
obligations to be fulfilled in the international arena; at the same time, it 
addresses itself to individuals by imposing on them the strict obligation 
to refrain from engaging in terrorism, an obligation to which 
corresponds as correlative the right of any State (or competent 
international subject) to enforce such obligations at the domestic 
level”.1337 
 
As already noted the decision holds that terrorism is a crime under 
customary international law in times of peace. Now, for the Appeals Chamber the 
question arises whether international terrorism is also a crime under customary 
international law in times of armed conflict, something that might be denied 
through the contested question of the status of ‘freedom fighters’ as a possible 
exception from terrorism.1338 We have seen above that Cassese elaborated on 
these issues extensively in his general academic writings on terrorism as well as in 
the different editions of his textbook on International Criminal Law. We have also 
seen that Cassese gradually accentuated this project, as international terrorism 
became from publication to publication more and more a discrete international 
                                                      
1335 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, para. 104. 
1336 This resembles, of course, the line of argumentation in Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the 
Defence Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction. 
1337 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, para. 105. 
1338 para. 107. 
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crime.1339 The Applicable Law decision takes up this position as well. The decision 
states that “the conclusion is warranted that a customary rule is incipient (in statu 
nascendi) which also covers terrorism in time of armed conflict”.1340 The decision 
comes to this conclusion by – again – reviewing state practice through 
international treaties as well as national legislation and judicial activities.  
 
In the end – and in light of the fact that the STL should primarily apply 
Lebanese criminal law –, however, the Appeals Chamber arrives to the general 
conclusion that 
 
“despite the existence of a customary international law definition of the 
crime of terrorism in time of peace, and its binding force on Lebanon, it 
cannot be directly applied by this Tribunal to the crimes of terrorism 
perpetrated and falling under our jurisdiction”.1341 
 
3.2.5 Post-Scriptum: Cassese’s International Criminal Law 
 
The whole development of Cassese’s project to make international terrorism an 
international crime, however, was ‘concluded’ two years later, in 2013, when the 
most recent edition – the third edition – of Cassese’s textbook on international 
criminal law was published. As the textbook was published posthumously it was, 
as it is a tradition in IL, renamed into Cassese’s International Criminal Law. 
Furthermore, it was revised and edited by a group of scholars with the late Cassese 
being only one of them.1342 Most of the textbook’s chapters – fourteen out of 
twenty-one – were revised by Cassese’s co-editors. Yet, among the few chapters 
that Cassese himself had worked on was the one on terrorism. With regard to the 
list of crimes the third edition resembles the second one, meaning also that a 
                                                      
1339 Compare, e.g., Cassese, ‘Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories’; with 
Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’; and Cassese, 
International Criminal Law, 2nd Ed.; see also my reconstruction above in this chapter under 3.2.2 
and 3.2.3. 
1340 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, para. 109 (emphasis in the orginal). 
1341 123 (emphasis in the original). 
1342 Cassese et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd ed. 
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whole chapter (ch. 8) is devoted to terrorism.1343  
 
Compared to the previous edition, the chapter remained in length and 
structure mostly the same. However, Cassese changed one subsection 
fundamentally. This subsection (8.2) deals with elements, which could point to a 
generally agreed definition of terrorism in time of peace. 1344 As he had done for a 
decade, Cassese confirms that there exists an agreed definition of international 
terrorism in time of peace – the most important condition to criminalize terrorism 
as a distinct international crime. Yet, what is interesting here is that Cassese refers 
in this subsection of his textbook now extensively to the Applicable Law decision 
by the Appeals Chamber of the STL. Without making it transparent that he has 
been the presiding judge of this chamber, Cassese uses Applicable Law as the only 
source to determine the existence of terrorism as an international crime in time of 
peace under customary international law. The textbook quotes, inter alia, three 
paragraphs of the decision as a whole.1345 Among them paragraph 103 – the one 
referencing in the Applicable Law decision directly the Tadić decision of the ICTY. 
Put differently, the textbook uses Cassese’s work as a judge in order to gain 
authority and brings finally Cassese’s different projects of ‘realizing utopia’ – the 
humanization of international humanitarian law and the making of the 
international crime of international terrorism –, which he pursued within and 
outside of academia, together. 
 
4. Conclusion: From Guantanamo to The Hague – Or, who judges Humanity? 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to reconstruct the role of international legal 
experts – understood as ‘people with projects’ – in the making of international 
crimes, i.e. their boundary work with regard to an important but often neglected 
aspect of jurisdiction: the jurisdiction ratione materiae. In the course of the chapter 
I focussed on two projects of two of the most important experts in the recent 
                                                      
1343 The chapter is now entitled just ‘Terrorism’ (while it was ‘Terrorism as an International Crime 
in the previous edition). The remaining structure of the section on international crimes stayed the 
same, listing – together with terrorism – war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in 
separate chapters while torture and aggression share one chapter. 
1344 Cf. Cassese et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd ed., 148–149. 
1345 These are paras. 85, 103 and 105 of Applicable Law. I have quoted all three paragraphs above in 
this subsection. 
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history of international (criminal) law, Hersch Lauterpacht’s role in the making of 
‘crimes against humanity’ and, to a larger extent, the recent – and until today 
basically failed – attempt of Antonio Cassese to make ‘international terrorism’ an 
international crime. In order to scrutinize their jurisdictional projects, I did not 
focus on the ‘hidden intentions’ of these experts and possible success ‘conditions of 
their projects’ but on two (sometimes intertwined) dimensions or levels: on the 
one hand, I traced back how international legal experts ‘change hats’, meaning how 
Lauterpacht and Cassese rotated between their positions in academia, in the 
government or – as in the case of Cassese – as judges of international courts and 
tribunals; on the other hand, I reconstructed the different argumentative strategies 
of these experts, i.e. the rather ‘technical’ side of law. While both Lauterpacht and 
Cassese stuck to their argumentative strategies in their different roles, these 
argumentative strategies (and their consequences)  – although pursuing similar 
projects in the context of humanity’s law – differed essentially. While Lauterpacht’s 
moderate neo-natural law approach foregrounded general principles as a source, 
Cassese emphasised – in line with his theoretical stance of ‘critical positivism’ – 
customary international law and, here, particularly the subjective element of 
opinio juris in order to ‘realize utopia’. While Lauterpacht started with ‘humanity’ 
as core category of international law and pursued, somehow as a consequence, the 
criminalization of  ‘crimes against humanity’ as a project, Cassese’s vantage point 
was a more traditional notion of international law – basically understood as inter-
state law –, which made for him the categorisation of international terrorism – as 
‘disruptor of central legal categories’ – as an international crime so significant. To 
make international terrorism an international crime would, then, for Cassese, 
create an opportunity to realize a more utopian notion of international law, namely 
one, which takes individual human beings seriously. Beside these dissimilarities, 
the projects of Lauterpacht and Cassese had at least two important things in 
common: on the one hand, these were projects to redraw the boundaries of 
international law in order to bring ‘humanity’s law’ in and, on the other side, 
judges were conceptualised as central agents of such change. 
 
 Yet, in order to conclude this chapter, let me address shortly a couple of 
points, which I haven’t discussed so far. First, as I said at the outset of this chapter, 
the aim of this chapter was not to discuss possible success conditions with regard 
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to the ‘making’ of international crimes, i.e. why for instance Lauterpacht’s project 
to make crimes against humanity an international crime was more successful than 
Cassese’s of international terrorism.1346 In order to speculate, I would follow 
Koskenniemi’s claim, as discussed in chapter 3, that traditional international legal 
argumentation permanently oscillates between normativity and concreteness in 
order to ‘avoid openly political rhetoric’ and that a ‘persuasive legal argument is 
one that appears both normative and concrete’. It is not the ‘speaker’ who 
determines whether an argument is successful or not but the audience, in the case 
of international law ‘it is the consensus in the profession—the invisible college of 
international lawyers—that determines, at any moment, whether a particular 
argument is or is not persuasive’.1347 What is import to note is that the ‘consensus 
of the invisible college’ is never fixed but variegates over time. The projects 
Cassese and Lauterpacht could be considered as prime examples of international 
lawyers, which try to be both normative and concrete: both combining a firm 
technical-legal background with the idea to move beyond the confines of a state-
centric version of international legal positivism. 
 
Second, what I also haven’t touched upon in this chapter were the various 
critical remarks, uttered by other scholars and practitioners, regarding the 
projects of Lauterpacht and Cassese. In particular Cassese’s project to make 
international terrorism an international crime and, here, his role as judge was 
considered at least controversial and immediately subject to broader debates. For 
instance, Roger O’Keefe described the identification of international terrorism 
under customary international law in the Applicable Law decision in the following 
terms: 
 
“It has been held by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon that terrorism is a crime under customary international law. 
The claim is unconvincing, based as it is on an overdetermined reading 
                                                      
1346 Or, why Tadić  was more successful than Applicable Law (at least, until now). 
1347 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 68; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Methodology of International 
Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007),  
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of the evidence that takes liberties with the requirements for opinio 
juris in the formation of rules of customary international law”1348 
 
In a similar vein, the decision has been characterised by other commentator as an 
example of an obiter dictum (with regard to its discussion on interpretation and 
the judicial function)1349 or a decision going ultra vires.1350 Furthermore, it has 
been claimed that the decision is “[p]rocedurally flawed” as “it is in many parts 
more akin to a legal textbook rather than a judicial decision”.1351 This last point, 
namely to resemble a legal textbook rather than a judicial decision, was mainly 
provoked by the specific structure of the Appeals Chamber during the Applicable 
Law proceedings, as it constituted – in the lack of a concrete case – more the 
structure of an advisory opinion than an interlocutory decision (the latter having a 
contentious background constituted through the play of a strong defence and 
strong prosecutor as main protagonists).1352 This links also to a more general 
observation, namely that international courts and tribunals in their capacity as 
advisory boards “tend to take a more ‘theoretical’ and abstract, almost academic 
formulation”.1353 
 
Third, this kind of criticism is often linked to the claim of judges 
‘overstretching’ the judicial function and practicing what then is called ‘judicial 
activism’. This was also the case with Cassese’s work as a judge in the context of 
the STL. As, for example, Marko Milanovic summarizes, the decision “is a manifesto 
of judge-made law (or, more crudely, judicial activism) if ever there was one”.1354 
                                                      
1348 O’Keefe, International Criminal Law, 160. 
1349 See, for instance, Kai Ambos, ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a 
Crime of Terrorism under International Law?’, Leiden Journal of International Law 24, no. 3 (2011): 
656; and Stefan Kirsch and Anna Oehmichen, ‘Judges Gone Astray: The Fabrication of Terrorism as 
an International Crime by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, Durham Law Review Online 1, no. 1 
(2011): 6. For a different position, see Gillett and Schuster, ‘Fast-Track Justice’, 1006–1007. For an 
in-depth discussion of the figure of obitur dictur (in the context of the Barclona Traction decision - 
its first and until now most famous invocation), see Christian J. Tams and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 
‘Barcelona Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development’, Leiden Journal of International 
Law 23, no. 4 (2010): 781–800. 
1350 Gillett and Schuster, ‘Fast-Track Justice’, 1003. 
1351 Gillett and Schuster, 1020. 
1352 Cf. Gillett and Schuster, 991. 
1353 Zarbiyev, ‘Judicial Activism in International Law’, 272. 
1354 Marko Milanovic, ‘On Realistic Utopias and Other Oxymorons: An Essay on Antonio Cassese’s 
Last Book’, European Journal of International Law 23, no. 4 (2012): 1041 (emphasis added); Ben 
Saul goes even further: ‘The Decision is also startling because it is not an instance of the ordinary 
kind of incremental judicial activism that necessarily tailors the law to novel circumstances. Rather, 
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Milanovic substantiates this point when he describes how Cassese’s argumentative 
strategy (with regard to the ‘technical’ of law) and his project of ‘realizing utopia’ 
hang together with his work as judge and as academic: 
 
“Cassese’s prescriptions for achieving this utopia are of course more 
interesting – and more contestable – than the utopia itself. A wish list is 
one thing; realizing it is another. And Cassese’s methods of realizing 
utopia are telling. First, there is the fluidity of the doctrine of sources of 
international law, resulting in its increased malleability; secondly, 
activist scholarship coupled with activist judging, which exploits this 
malleability, for example with regard to the emergence of new custom 
or jus cogens. States cannot be trusted with making a better 
international law, and a better world; they must be pushed into it, 
pushed by international courts, domestic courts, other independent or 
expert institutions, and by the civil society. It is perhaps only a slight 
exaggeration to say that states are the enemy, the problem that needs 
fixing”.1355 
 
Fourth, as I said, I will not provide a detailed critique and list of objections 
against Lauterpacht or Cassese’s work – the scope of this chapter was to 
reconstruct how international legal expertise in the context of jurisdictional 
projects works and what international legal experts actually do. Yet, the different 
strands of critique and particularly the claim of ‘judicial activism’ points to an – 
also for our purpose – important point, namely the way how the relationship of 
law and politics is conceptualised. Fuad Zarbiyev, for example, notes that the claim 
of ‘judicial activism’ is usually brought up when it is perceived that a judge or 
tribunal start to do their “own ‘business’” and/or trespass the boundaries of a 
“certain implicit conception of the relationship between judicial and political 
                                                                                                                                                            
it is an example of a judiciary transforming itself into a global legislature, creating entirely new law 
and exceeding the accepted bounds of the judicial function. In a fit of disguised legislative activism, 
it invented a new and post facto international criminal liability for terrorism, resulting in the radical 
expansion of liability under Lebanese criminal law as it was understood in 2005’, Ben Saul, 
‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an 
International Crime of Transnational Terrorism’, Leiden Journal of International Law 24, no. 3 
(2011): 678; see also Saul, ‘The Special Tribunal for Lebanon and Terrorism as an International 
Crime’, 91. 
1355 Milanovic, ‘On Realistic Utopias and Other Oxymorons’, 1046. 
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branches”.1356 However, the boundary is not fixed and the boundary itself is rather 
the site of struggles of the ‘adequate’ relationship between law and non-law, 
between law and politics, between academia and non-academia, and so on. In 
other words, one man’s judicial activism is another man’s legitimate use of the 
judicial function (then positively referred to as ‘judicial creativity’).1357 
 
 Fifth, ‘to do one’s own business’ refers in this context also to the sometimes 
intimate relationship between academia and judiciary in international law. As we 
have seen in this chapter and as Zarbiyev points out “[i]nternational law scholars 
display a real complicity with international judges, supplying them the 
rationalization that glosses over the tensions, arbitrariness, contingencies, and 
contradictions though legal practice”. 1358Academics and their interpretations play 
a particularly important role in international law as this strand of law is usually 
conceptualised as horizontal. Consequently, what “makes international law 
peculiar is […] the fact that, contrary to what happens in domestic laws, those 
interpretations are not killed by virtue of judicial interpretations”. 1359This 
permanent exchange between academia and court-annexed positions is usually 
taken for granted by the ‘invisible college of international lawyers’: ”The game is so 
taken for granted and its rules so well established and unchallenged that the 
players do not need to hide it”.1360Moreover, the ‘complicity’ between scholars and 
judges is also taken for granted in international law as law in general works 
through chains of interpretations, meaning that judges permanently interpret 
other judges and scholars, vice versa. These permanent chains of interpretation 
help also to make (international) law to appear more ‘technical’ as it helps to ‘hide’ 
                                                      
1356 Zarbiyev, ‘Judicial Activism in International Law’, 250. In other words, this latter claim, i.e. to 
trespass an implicitly agreed boundary between law and politics, is the first and foremost linked 
with the accusation of judges and tribunals starting to pursue ‘political projects’ and to ‘politicise 
the law’. This resembles, of course, the conception of the relationship law and politics, i.e. the idea 
that both law and politics can be conceptualised as hermetically closed spheres, that was the 
vantage point for different critical projects within IR and IL, which I have outlined in chapter 3. 
1357 Or as Joseph Powderly puts it, ‘certain rules or boundaries must be respected if judicial 
creativity is not descend into the realm of judicial activism’. According to Powderly this was, 
however, the case in the STL decision as it ‘is a prime example of when a bench crosses the line 
separating good faith creative interpretation from naked judicial activism ’, Joseph Powderly, 
‘Distinguishing Creativity from Activism: International Criminal Law and the “Legitimacy” of 
Judicial Development of the Law’, in The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal 
Law: Critical Perspectives, ed. William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, and Niamh Hayes (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2013), 237, 239. 
1358 Zarbiyev, ‘Judicial Activism in International Law’, 271. 
1359 Zarbiyev, 271. 
1360 Zarbiyev, 271. 
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that it consists of the personal projects of judges, academics and other 
international legal experts.1361 
 
Sixth, this kind of ‘taken-for-grantedness’ and naturalization does not only 
obscure the (political) projects involved but also the performative effects of the 
expert work at stake in the context of international courts and tribunals. What do I 
mean by these performative effects? Simply put, ‘performative’ means that 
language creates its own reality.1362 This is the case if we look, for instance, at 
decisions of international trials and tribunals. As Jean-Marie Henckaerts notes with 
regard to the Tadić interlocutory decision, “regardless of whether Cassese (and his 
fellow judges) was right or wrong in 1995, the subsequent evolution proved him 
right”. 1363This is the case as the ICTY in later decisions, other ad hoc tribunals and 
legal scholars started to quote and refer to Tadić – and making it thus part of 
international criminal law’s chains of interpretation by hiding its (for some 
problematic) origins. In other words, after Tadić one could legitimately refer to 
Tadić in order to argue in favour of the criminalization of war crimes, which have 
been committed in non-international armed conflicts.1364In a similar vein, a focus 
on the performativity of the work of international legal experts reveals, e.g., also 
the self-confirmatory practices of recent ad hoc tribunals. As Christine Schwöbel 
claims that “rather than discussing the ICTY’s Tadic case as a foregone conclusion 
in which the ICTY simply had to assume jurisdiction, it is tempting to go down the 
technical and absolutist route instead. Tadic is henceforth […] a case which 
determined the jurisdiction of the ICTY through the principle of jurisdiction”. 
1365And, as Schwöbel continues, the same holds true for the recent STL decision:  
 
“Most recently, this simple self-confirmation of jurisdiction was 
repeated at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL): ‘The Trial Chamber 
                                                      
1361 For a strong argument in this regard, see Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’, Texas Law 
Review 60 (1982): 540–546; see also the important critical remarks by Stanley Fish on Dworkins 
argument, in Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, chap. 4. 
1362 Cf. John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
1363 Henckaerts, ‘Civil War, Custom and Cassese’, 1101. 
1364 The same is, of course, true with regard to international crimes. The ‘making’ of the 
international crime  of crimes against humanity was primarily enabled through its inclusion in the 
London Charter of the IMT. Whether this is also the case with international terrorism after the 
STL’s Applicable Law decision only time will tell. 
1365 Schwöbel, ‘The Comfort of International Criminal Law’, 179. 
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confirmed the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s jurisdiction to try those 
accused of committing the 14 February 2005 attack and connected 
cases…,’ a press release on the website of the STL notes. What good 
fortune for the chambers, office of the prosecutor and registry that the 
principle of jurisdiction, implemented by the trial chamber, did not 
allow for the argument of the Defence to prevail that they had been 
instituted in their respective roles on the back of a lack of jurisdiction! 
What was a foregone conclusion and justification has, by a simple use of 
legal terminology, become a general principle of jurisdiction, to be 
applied in ICL for future cases”.1366 
 
Consequently, to speak about jurisdiction is not simply an ‘innocent’ mapping 
exercise of the law but reveals the performative dimension and productive 
power of language. 
 
Last but not least, this links also to the question of why we should examine 
jurisdictional projects in order to understand authority and legitimacy in the 
current constellation of world society. On the one hand, it points (and links) to the 
growing interest and body of scholarship on the role, rule, authority and legitimacy 
of international courts and tribunals.1367 On the other hand, it connects also to the 
question of, as Frédéric Mégret put it, “[w]ho do international crimes ‘belong’ 
to?”.1368 To frame discussions about international crimes in the vocabulary of 
ownership and possession helps Mégret to illustrate how global political struggles 
over international crimes work. “Although crime is obviously something that 
societies are keen to eliminate”, Mégret explains, “it is also curiously something 
about which they feel a strong sense of ownership, especially when competing 
claims for jurisdiction arise. Many of the debates on allocation of cases can and are 
thus often conceived in the language of property: appropriation, confiscation, 
                                                      
1366 Schwöbel, 179–180. 
1367 See, for instance, the special issue introduced by Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, and Mikael 
Rask Madsen, ‘How Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts’, Law and Contemporary 
Problems 79, no. 1 (2016): 1–36; or Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In wessen Namen? 
Internationale Gerichte in Zeiten globalen Regierens (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014). 
1368 Frederic Megret, ‘In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of International 
Criminal Justice’, Cornell International Law Journal 38, no. 3 (2005): 739; see also Sarah M. H. 
Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal 
Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 16. 
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transfer (as of a title)”.1369 In light of this chapter, this means that struggles 
whether crimes against humanity or international terrorism are not only abstract 
– sometimes highly technical – struggles between different international legal 
experts and which are fought in academia or in the back rooms of some 
insignificant courts. This means that we should rather conceive them in line with 
the different invocations of a politics of humanity as struggles (and its counter-
movements). And, as this chapter has shown, this can be a struggle of whether 
certain crimes – whatever the reasons might be – ‘belong’ to sovereign states or 
courts and tribunals of ‘humanity’; whether those suspect of international 
terrorism ‘belong’ to Guantanamo or the docks of The Hague.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1369 Megret, ‘In Defence of Hybridity’, 739. 
 367 
Chapter 7: Re-Inventing Interventions: Legitimacy, International Criminal 
Law and the Politics of Imagination 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter reconstructed projects of jurisdiction in one specific field of 
‘humanity’s law’, namely in the context of the making of international crimes in the 
discourse of international criminal law and justice. In particular, it focussed on the 
projects of two international legal experts – two of the most renowned 
international lawyers of the last century: Hersch Lauterpacht’s successful project 
to make ‘crimes against humanity’ an international crime and Antonio Cassese’s 
more recent – till now basically failed – project of making ‘international terrorism’ 
an international crime on a larger scale. To focus on international crimes as modes 
of the politics of jurisdiction goes hand-in-hand with a non-territorial, post-
Cartesian, multidimensional and non-exclusive notion of jurisdiction as advanced 
in Chapter 5 as it point out that jurisdictional projects, particularly projects of 
humanity’s law (with international criminal law as one of its branches), extend by 
non-territorial logics; in the case of the previous chapter the politics of 
jurisdictional boundary drawing was situated in the question of whether a crime 
constitutes an international crime (i.e., jurisdiction ratione materiae) and therefore  
belongs to the ‘international’ – or not. The present chapter further inquires into 
such a flexible notion of jurisdiction. However, it adds the temporal dimension or 
the question of temporality to the politics of jurisdiction in the context of an 
emerging ‘humanity’s law’. 
 
 Moreover, while Chapter 6 was basically situated within the broader field of 
international criminal law and justice, this chapter reconstructs the politics of 
jurisdictions mainly in the discourse of interventions for humanitarian purposes 
(concerning thus mainly questions of international humanitarian law). I say 
‘mainly’ as (and we will see this later in this chapter) international crimes – and 
also international criminal law – play an important role in the discourse of 
intervention, in particular, in the context of the responsibility to protect. This 
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means that both international criminal law and the discourse of intervention are 
often intersecting, intertwined and overlapping. For example, in the context of the 
UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), i.e., the international court that rendered 
the Applicable Law decision under the presidency of Antonio Cassese, scholars like 
Samer N. Abboud and Benjamin N. Muller it have argued that it constituted a 
“specific form of intervention” – an “international intervention made permissible 
by the international criminal tribunal system”.1370 Moreover, it was emphasised 
that the “STL successfully sought to intervene in various ways in the domestic 
affairs of Lebanon” and by doing so “instituting a process beyond Lebanon’s 
jurisdiction”.1371 In more general terms, several authors have pointed to the link 
between intervention and international criminal justice; in particular, by 
emphasising that international criminal courts and tribunals themselves are part 
and parcel of projects of intervention – some observers have labelled this as 
‘judicial interventions’.1372  As, for instance, Andrea Birdsall notes “[j]udicial 
interventions have a comparable dynamic to humanitarian intervention; they 
expose the conflict between order and justice on a concrete level because state 
sovereignty (international order) is compromised to protect human rights 
(individual justice)”.1373 A slightly different angle is taken by Frédéric Mégret, 
when he observes that two of the core projects of the international criminal law 
and of the intervention discourses, namely the “ICC and R2P discourses”, show a 
“strong mutual complementarity and even dependency”.1374 As such, both play an 
important role in the “liberal transformation of world order”1375 and are main 
drivers of ‘humanity’s law’.  
 
                                                      
1370  Samer N. Abboud and Benjamin J. Muller, ‘Geopolitics, Insecurity and Neocolonial 
Exceptionalism: A Critical Appraisal of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, Security Dialogue 44, 
no. 5–6 (2013): 468. 
1371 Abboud and Muller, 474. 
1372 Cf. Andrea Birdsall, The International Politics of Judicial Intervention: Creating a More Just Order 
(London: Routledge, 2009); Andrea Birdsall, ‘The Responsibility to Prosecute and the ICC: A 
Problematic Relationship?’, Criminal Law Forum 26, no. 1 (2015): 51–72; and Christian M. De Vos, 
Sara Kendall, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Introduction’, in Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of 
International Criminal Court Interventions, ed. Christian M. De Vos, Sara Kendall, and Carsten Stahn 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1–20. 
1373 Birdsall, The International Politics of Judicial Intervention, 3. 
1374 Frédéric Mégret, ‘ICC, R2P, and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist Toolkit’, 
Finish Yearbook of International Law 21 (2010): 15. 
1375 Christopher Daase, ‘Legalizing Legitimacy: A Critique of the Responsibility to Protect as an 
Emerging Norm’, Telos 170 (2015): 67. 
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 Moreover, like the discourse of international criminal law, the discourse of 
intervention has a rather long (pre-)history. Recent scholarship – scholarship in 
the context of the ‘turn to history’ of international thought – has pointed out that 
practices of intervention have been deeply embedded within European great 
power politics in the nineteenth century and that these interventions were very 
often justified by ‘humanitarian’ purposes. Yet, the ‘targets’ of these interventions 
by European powers were not other European states, but ‘humanitarian’ 
interventions were rather advanced in what was considered as non-European. 
‘Humanitarian’ interventions were thus intertwined with questions of hierarchy 
and exclusionary practices in the context of the ‘Family of Nations’ by means of 
‘standards of civilization’ and ‘civilizing missions’. Main examples are the British 
interventions in the context of the abolition of slavery and the various 
interventions by European states in the Ottoman Empire.1376 Put differently, 
humanitarian interventions played an important role within colonial and imperial 
debates. Critics of more recent humanitarian intervention refer therefore often to 
the (neo-)imperial and (neo-)colonial implications of such practices.1377 
 
 Yet, this chapter, although recognizing (and even foregrounding) the fact 
that practices of interventions are deeply connected to questions of power and 
authority, does not pursues the direction of a postcolonial critique. Rather, it is 
interested in how jurisdictional projects in the context of the intervention 
discourse developed a future-oriented logic and how this logic also changes the 
temporal structure, i.e., the temporality, of international legal argumentation. In 
particular, this chapter reconstructs various translations within the intervention 
discourse and how – step-by-step – the in general past-oriented logic of 
international law, evaluating whether the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 
was legal, turns at the end of a long translation process (or ‘chain of 
                                                      
1376 For the British case see, for example Edward Keene, ‘A Case Study of the Construction of 
International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making Against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth 
Century’, International Organization 61, no. 2 (2007): 311–39. For the various interventions of 
European states in the Ottoman Empire see, for example Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: 
Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914: The Emergence of a European 
Concept and International Practice (Princeton University Press, 2011). See also, for a general 
discussion, Nicholas Onuf, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: The Early Years’, Florida Journal of 
International Law 16, no. 4 (2004): 753–87. 
1377 Cf. Abboud and Muller, ‘Geopolitics, Insecurity and Neocolonial Exceptionalism’. 
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translation’1378) in the context of the ‘implementation’ of the responsibility to 
protect into a future-oriented logic, which is interested in assessing the ‘risk’ of 
whether international crimes might happen and thereby creates a justificatory 
vocabulary for future intervention. By reconstructing this, the chapter points also 
out that every project in this processes of translation (every chain link) produces 
new forms of uncertainty and ambiguity, although, paradoxically, the original aim 
of this project might have been to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity; yet, in the 
end this new uncertainty and new ambiguity ‘help’ to pursue new projects. To 
study this, I focus on two interconnected episodes of the recent discourse of 
intervention by means of a focussed (re)reading of key documents. Firstly, I 
reconstruct how the concept of legitimacy was introduced in the context of the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and how this brought a new level and mode 
of semantic uncertainty to the discourse of intervention. Secondly, I focus on how 
the concept of the responsibility to protect was introduced in order to reduce 
uncertainty. However, I argue that we can find new forms of uncertainty – 
temporal uncertainty – in this discourse, when the traditionally past-oriented logic 
of international legal argumentation is confronted with emerging future-oriented 
logics. These forms of uncertainty do terminate the general project of 
interventions for humanitarian purposes but rather create the conditions of 
possibility for projects of intervention. The upshot of my argument is then that 
neither more law nor more knowledge (expertise) reduces uncertainty and 
ambiguity, as more fundamental issues are at stake which are connected to 
practices of power and international authority and trigger questions such as: Who 
represents the international? Who represents humanity?  
 
In order to advance my argument, the chapter is structured in the following 
way. The next section (2.) introduces the interventionist debate in the context of 
the NATO bombings in Kosovo in 1999. Yet, I do not intend to restate this 
important episode in full detail – this has been done before often enough–, but 
highlight three things: first, I argue that the Kosovo intervention must be read as a 
                                                      
1378 For a recent study of a ‘chain of translation’ in security studies see Marieke de Goede, ‘The 
Chain of Security’, Review of International Studies 44, no. 1 (2018): 24–42. For an original study in 
ANT see Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999); and Michel Callon, ‘An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic 
Externalities Revisited by Sociology’, Sociological Review 46, no. S1 (1998): 244–69. 
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fully ‘legalized’, probably the first fully ‘legalized’, international conflict, meaning 
that everything was and had to be translated into legal language (with 
international legal experts playing a crucial role); second, I address the 
international legal debate in the aftermath of this conflict about the legality of the 
NATO action and how the fact that it might have been illegal was translated into 
the by now famous speech-act ‘illegal but legitimate’; third, I show how this 
speech-act produced new uncertainty as it is possible since then to oscillate in 
debates about interventions permanently between illegal and legitimate – and how 
thereby the question of international authority remains unsolved. I turn then (3.) 
to the United Nations and how the United Nations – in particular, the Secretary-
General – ‘used’ in the aftermath of the Kosovo debate the emerging concept of the 
responsibility to protect in order to (re)gain authority and jurisdiction over issues 
concerning international interventions. After outlining the recent origins of the 
responsibility to protect concept, I concentrate here on how in the context of the 
unanimous adoption of the responsibility to protect by the UN General Assembly at 
its World Summit in 2005 the intervention discourse hybridized with international 
criminal law: protection was specified as protecting ‘populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’, i.e. from international 
crimes. The next section (4.) analyses institutional practises as projects to 
‘materialize’, ‘implement’, ‘mainstream’ and/or ‘operationalize’ the responsibility 
to protect within the UN system, particularly by the Secretary-General. In this 
context, I will explore mainly two developments: first, the idea that the protection 
of ‘populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’ was further translated into the concept of ‘atrocity crimes’, serving as an 
umbrella term for genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity; second, I demonstrate how this created the conditions of possibility for 
the production of risk assessment tools within the United Nations. These tools 
attempt to evaluate the risk that atrocity crimes might take place and thereby 
provide a justificatory template for various forms of intervention. Yet, I point out 
that these strategies are not able to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity – in this 
context with regard to the temporality of the international legal argument. The 
conclusion (4.) of this chapter discusses then how the study of the production of 
different forms of uncertainty helps to better understand how different 
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jurisdictional projects struggle over discursive hegemony with regard ‘of who 
represents the international’ and ‘who represents humanity’. 
 
 Before I start my analysis, let me briefly address two points. Firstly, I am not 
interested in the question of whether ‘legitimacy’ and/or the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ are moral, legal or political concepts – what is for sure they are somehow 
located within a semantic field of morality, law and politics.1379 Rather, I follow 
Anne Orford’s suggestion with regard to the responsibility to protect. For Orford 
the responsibility to protect has “normative significance”.1380 By emphasising this, 
Orford departs from such diverse questions as whether the responsibility to 
protect is mere political rhetoric, a tool of imperialism, insignificant or binding law. 
According to Orford, to reflect on the ‘normative significance’ means instead to 
treat the responsibility to protect as a “form of law […] that allocates 
jurisdiction”.1381 Secondly, methodologically this chapter differs from the previous 
one. While the previous chapter reconstructed how projects are attached to 
people, this chapter turns it around and reconstructs rather how people are 
attached to projects – something that shows also the methodological richness of 
reconstructing projects in the way as advanced in the Introduction of this thesis. In 
other words, I foreground less the projects of individual international legal experts 
and rather focuses on how projects translate into institutional practices. Here, for 
example, my reconstruction of implementation policies of the responsibility to 
protect within the United Nations system ‘opens the black box’ of an international 
organisation.1382 To reconstruct projects in such a way avoids also conceptualising 
                                                      
1379 Yet, what is of course interesting is how the boundary between morality, law and politics is 
negotiated (second-order observation of the politics of boundary-drawing). Take for example the 
following statement of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon: ‘The responsibility to protect 
provides a political framework based on fundamental principles of international law’, United 
Nations Secretary-General, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response’, A/66/874 – 
S/2012/578 (2012), 16. 
1380 Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 22. 
1381 Orford, 25. 
1382 For a different recent attempt ‘to open the black box’ of an international organisation see: 
Alexander E. Kentikelenis and Leonard Seabrooke, ‘The Politics of World Polity: Script-Writing in 
International Organizations’, American Sociological Review 82, no. 5 (2017): 1065–92. 
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these projects in terms of a linear, teleological story.1383 Rather, this chapter 
foregrounds struggle and contestation.1384 
 
 2. Kosovo, Legitimacy and the Production of Semantic Uncertainty 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the concept of legitimacy is a relative newcomer in 
international thought. To recapitulate, although it provided (and still provides) the 
basis for many discussions in the semantic field of politics, law and morality in the 
domestic context, the concept was nearly absent from debates within IR and IL for 
a long time. In both fields, the concept was introduced to a larger audience in the 
1990s and gained prominence, inter alia, with regard to various (explicit and 
implicit) interdisciplinary projects of and between scholars from both IR and IL.1385 
The popularity of the literature on legitimacy can also be explained by the 
concept’s capacity to link politics, law and morality in various ways, i.e. of being 
neither too political, too legalistic nor too moralistic. However, at the same time, 
‘legitimacy’ seems to provide a way out of many dilemmas, tensions, traps and 
paradoxes by providing a certain degree of compatibility to a plethora of political, 
legal and moral debates. As I outlined in Chapter 2 it was in particular the work of 
Thomas M. Franck, one of the main figures of the liberal policy-oriented Manhattan 
school of IL, who introduced the language of legitimacy at the beginning of the 
1990s to the field of IL; and it was almost ten years later Ian Hurd’s moderate 
constructivist approach that made it popular in IR. Since then, ‘legitimacy’ has 
become one of the core concepts for scholars of IL and IR alike and has been 
mobilized in the context of various academic projects. For instance, Frank and 
                                                      
1383 Put differently, where I argued in Chapter 6 that reconstructing ‘people with projects’ does not 
need to study the ‘intentions’ of ‘people’, I argue now that we do not need to study the ‘intentions’ 
of ‘projects’ . 
1384 For a similar critique in the context of the responsibility to protect see Daase, ‘Legalizing 
Legitimacy’; and Jennifer Welsh, ‘Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”: Catalyzing Debate 
and Building Capacity’, in Implementation and World Politics : How International Norms Change 
Practice, ed. Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 124–43. For 
a general critique with regard to the moderate constructivist ‘norms literature’ see Friedrich 
Kratochwil, ‘How Do Norms Matter?’, in The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in 
International Relations and International Law, ed. Michael Byers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 35–68; and Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014). 
1385 See also Filipe dos Reis and Oliver Kessler, ‘The Power of Legality, Legitimacy and the 
(im)possibility of Interdisciplinary Research’, in The Power of Legality: Practices of International 
Law and Their Politics, ed. Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja Aalberts, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 99–124. 
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Hurd were both interested in the classical compliance puzzle of ‘why do powerful 
states obey powerless rules and norms’ and here particularly the rules and norms 
of international law, which apparently (seem to) lack effective enforcement 
mechanisms if compared to the law of the domestic context. Franck and Hurd, 
although taking different avenues, argue that the belief in the legitimacy of those 
rules and norms is the solution to solve the compliance puzzle.  
 
Other scholars, such as Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, were less 
interested in the ‘empirical’ or ‘descriptive’ dimension of the compliance question 
and rather presented their work as contribution to ‘normative’ research. Buchanan 
and Keohane, for example, designed ‘a standard of legitimacy’ that should serve 
‘global governance institutions’ (with international law being one of them) in order 
to enhance their ‘democratic legitimacy’ and thereby improve their ‘rates of 
compliance’. And, more recently, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope developed an 
‘interactional account of international law’, which by introducing the notion of 
legitimacy tried to fuse the neo-natural law approach of Lon Fuller with IR’s 
practice turn.  
 
Although these literatures and debates were important for and widely spread 
in the academic context, it was only in the aftermath of the Kosovo campaign of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that the concept of legitimacy achieved 
significance within international policy circles and, hence, beyond the confines 
academia. The move out of academia produced, as I shall argue in the first part of 
this chapter, a fundamental transformation of the concept’s meaning and, 
simultaneously, also changed the structure of the international legal argument.  
Although Kosovo presents certainly an exception in international law, it 
nevertheless signifies for many observers one of the most important – if not even 
the most important – turning point(s) in the intervention debate as it was the first 
time that Western powers (openly) challenged and transgressed the norm of non-
intervention. This transformation should become, as Anne Orford notes, an 
“immediate trigger for the development of the responsibility to protect concept, 
and has since then been invoked repeatedly […] as desirable precedent for 
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international intervention”.1386 In order to better understand the significance of 
Kosovo, I will argue that Kosovo was the first fully legalized international conflict 
(2.1); then turn to the work of the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo (IICK) in the aftermath of the NATO bombing and here, in particular, 
concentrate on the evaluation that the bombing was ‘illegal but legitimate’ (2.2); 
and finally show how the speech-act ‘illegal but legitimate’ produced new 
uncertainty (2.3). 
 
2.1 The first fully legalized conflict? 
 
On 24 March 1999 NATO initiated, after months of warnings, resolutions and 
negotiations, its air campaign in Kosovo under the name ‘Operation Allied Force’. 
The bombings should last for 78 days and ended on 10 June 1999 with the 
adoption of UNSC Resolution 1244 (establishing an international interim 
administration for Kosovo). ‘Operation Allied Force’ was the first major military 
operation in the history of the Alliance and only its second ‘out of area’ campaign 
(the first was in Bosnia in 1995).1387 NATO justified the intervention as a response 
to a pending and unfolding humanitarian catastrophe that was caused by an on-
going civil war between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR) and the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) and where the possibility of systematic ethnic cleansing of 
Kosovar Albanian civilians through FYR military forces was considered as highly 
likely.1388 
 
                                                      
1386 Anne Orford, ‘The Politics of Anti-Legalism in the Intervention Debate’, Global Policy (blog), 
2014. Importantly, Hilary Charlesworth has highlighted that it is not that clear what ‘Kosovo’ (or 
‘the Kosovo crisis’) actually means as the term served first as an ‘umbrella for a range of 
phenomena’. As such ‘the “crisis” of Kosovo (meaning the NATO intervention) has become an 
international legal trope for the whole confusing history of the region. “Kosovo” is a synecdoche, a 
figure of speech in which the part stands for the whole’, Hilary Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A 
Discipline of Crisis’, The Modern Law Review 65, no. 3 (2002): 377, 386. While Charlesworth rightly 
claims that international lawyers should unpack the different layers of the conflict, most 
mainstream international lawyers, however, did not follow her suggestion and still use ‘Kosovo’ as 
rather unspecific ‘umbrella term’. 
1387 Anne Orford, ‘NATO, Regionalism, and the Responsibility to Protect’, in Charter of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation Together with Scholarly Commentaries and Essential Historical 
Documents, ed. Ian Shapiro and Adam Tooze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018). 
1388 For an argument that an actual proof of an unfolding situation was missing, see Jonathan I. 
Charney, ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’, American Journal of International 
Law 93, no. 4 (1999): 839–840. 
 376 
What is interesting for the general background of this thesis is that ‘Kosovo’ 
could be summarized as the first fully ‘legalized’ conflict and thus provided an 
extensive playground for international lawyers as the conflict, as Hilary 
Charlesworth sums up,  
 
“distilled many of the big questions of international law […]. Kosovo 
offered questions about sovereignty and self-determination, grave 
human rights abuses and expulsions, condemnation by international 
institutions, failed peace negotiations, military intervention by a 
regional alliance, international peace keeping and the role of 
international criminal tribunals. It was a contemporary Cuban missile 
crisis. Kosovo gave international lawyers a sense of relevance, of being 
exhilaratingly close to the heart of grand and important issues of our 
time”.1389  
 
‘Kosovo’ gave international lawyers this ‘sense of relevance’ as it presented the 
first case of comprehensive ‘lawfare’ on an international level. Compared to 
previous conflicts legal experts were much more involved in important decision-
making processes and, at the same time, the language of law was widely spread.1390 
For example, for the first time military lawyers were before and during the 
bombings part of the chain of decisions when it came to the selection of target 
folders. These folders were mainly compiled by computerized operations. As NATO 
relied in this war on air strikes only and as target selection was processed through 
computerized models, Michael Ignatieff coined Kosovo the first “virtual” or 
“postmodern war in history”.1391 Iganatieff describes the crucial role of military 
lawyers in this context by providing the following illustrative example: 
 
“At a base in Germany, a military lawyer from the Judge Advocate 
General’s office, sitting at his computer screen, would assess the target 
                                                      
1389 Charlesworth, ‘International Law’, 381. As such Kosovo can also be seen as a debate within the 
profession of international lawyers ‘about what sort of law we [the international lawyers] practice’, 
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘“The Lady Doth Protest Too Much”: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law’, The Modern Law Review 65, no. 2 (2002): 162. 
1390 Cf. David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 270. 
1391 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Picador, 2000), 112. 
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in terms of the Geneva Conventions governing the laws of war. He 
would rule whether it was a justifiable military object in legal terms and 
whether its value outweighed the potential costs in collateral damage. A 
military lawyer also applied ‘the reasonable person standard’ of 
judgement to the fine line separating military and civilian targets’”.1392 
 
  Apart of this strong involvement of legal experts in the selection and review 
of potential targets, ‘Kosovo’ had also serious repercussions in the practice of 
international courts and tribunals. On 22 May 1999, almost two month after the 
beginning of the NATO action, Carla Del Ponte, who served at this time as 
Prosecutor of the ICTY, presented an indictment against FYR’s President Slobodan 
Milosevic and other leaders of the country charging them with “crimes against 
humanity” and “violations of the laws or customs of war”.1393 Simultaneously, 
however, Del Ponte dismissed, in June 2000, on the basis of recommendations 
from a review committee, which had been established earlier on her behalf, the 
prosecution of NATO actors for the bombing campaign.1394 Moreover, at a different 
occasion, the FYR brought NATO member states on 29 April 1999 before the ICJ. 
The ICJ rejected however on 2 June 1999 this request by claiming non liquet: “the 
Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction in order to entertain Yugoslavia’s 
Application”.1395 And finally, Kosovo witnessed an extended rule of law mission1396 
and its declaration of independence rendered an advisory opinion by the ICJ.1397 
                                                      
1392 Ignatieff, 100–101. For a (self-)description and (self-)evaluation of an involved military lawyer, 
see James E. Baker, ‘When Lawyers Advise Presidents in Wartime: Kosovo and the Law of Armed 
Conflict’, Naval War College Review 55 (2002): 11–24. 
1393 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor, ‘Initial Indictment 
“Kosovo”’, IT-99-37 (1999). On the basis of the indictment, Milosevic was surrendered in June 2001 
to the ICTY. The trial began in February 2002 (see also my discussion at the outset of the previous 
chapter of the trial’s opening statement by Carla Del Ponte) and ended with Milosevic’s death in 
March 2006. 
1394 As the report states: ‘On the basis of the information reviewed, however, the committee is of the 
opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing campaign as a whole nor 
investigations related to specific incidents are justified. In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently 
clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate 
charges against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous offences’, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Final Report of the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’, 13 June 2000, para. 90. For a critique of the rejection as a non liquet, see Natalino 
Ronzitti, ‘Is the Non Liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Acceptable?’, International Review of 
the Red Cross 82, no. 840 (2000): 1017–27. 
1395 International Court of Justice, ‘Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia vs. United 
States)’ (1999), para. 29. 
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While the rejection of the decision of the Prosecutor of the ICTY as well as the 
non liquet of the ICJ were criticised by the FYR government, these decisions 
nevertheless resemble the opinion(s) of most international lawyers at that time. 
Here the legal justification of ‘Operation Allied Force’ and, in particular, of whether 
there existed a ‘right’ to intervene (i.e., rather the question of the jus ad bellum 
than the jus in bello) caused justificatory problems to most members of the 
‘invisible college of international lawyers’ as the campaign was conceived as a clear 
breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – and hence also of international law – as it 
was neither an act of (collective) self-defence under Article 51 nor did the Security 
Council authorize it under Chapter VII. The NATO bombings were thus simply 
considered as illegal by most commentators. Nevertheless, there was the feeling 
that there existed at the same time a strong moral duty to take military action.1398 
Prominent international lawyers considered the campaign as illegal but, at the 
same time, as morally justified and, moreover, politically necessary. However, to 
frame the issue only in terms of political necessity (like in the language of ‘national 
interest’) or morality as it has been the case in previous discussions on 
interventions, and thus leave any considerations of the legality of the action aside, 
seemed also to be an unacceptable avenue:1399 the legalization of the discourse on 
intervention was already to advanced. Moreover, international lawyers felt 
uncomfortable if international law – and particularly the international law of the 
post-Cold War era – would not be able to guarantee the protection of the Kosovar 
population against international crimes – as the fear of a new ‘Srebrenica’ or 
‘Rwanda’ was looming large on the horizon.1400  
                                                                                                                                                            
1396 For further discussion see, for example, Maj Grasten, ‘Whose Legality? Rule of Law Missions and 
the Case of Kosovo’, in The Power of Legality: Practices of International Law and Their Politics, ed. 
Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja Aalberts, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 320–42. 
1397 Arguing now that Court has jurisdiction and that the declaration of independence ‘did not 
violate international law’, International Court of Justice, ‘Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion)’ (2010), para. 123. 
1398 For a critique, see David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International 
Intervention, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2006). 
1399 For instance in 1973 it was still possible to argue that humanitarian intervention ‘belongs in the 
realm not of law but of moral choice, which nations, like individuals, must sometimes make’, 
Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force’, American Journal of International Law 67, no. 2 (1973): 304. 
1400 On both events, Rwanda and Srebrenica, the UN should publish extensive reports later that 
year: United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary General to General Assembly 
Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica’, A/54/549 (1999); and United Nations Security Council, 
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In this setting, for example, Bruno Simma highlights that the intervention has 
been a transgression of the rules of the Charter but that “only a thin red line 
separates NATO’s action on Kosovo from international legality”. 1401  Simma 
continues to write: 
 
“The lesson which can be drawn from this is that unfortunately there do 
occur ‘hard cases’ in which terrible dilemmas must be faced and 
imperative political and moral considerations may appear to leave no 
choice to act outside the law”.1402 
  
However, for Simma such breaches of international law are justified when they 
“remain singular” and “as an explicit ultima ratio” – something that was for him the 
case in respect to NATO’s action.1403 The (self-proclaimed) ‘enlightened positivist’ 
Simma seems, however, to be uncomfortable to agree completely to a position on 
‘hard cases’ a la Dworkin. 1404  Consequently, Simma insists that unilateral 
                                                                                                                                                            
‘Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda’, S/1999/1257 (1999). For a more comprehensive discussion of different positions of 
international legal commentators, see Charlesworth, ‘International Law’, 379–381, 386–387; and 
Andreas L. Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht: Eine Untersuchung zur 
Entwicklung des Völkerrechts im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (München: Beck, 2001), 319–325. Even 
critical lawyers like Koskenniemi “have taken the ambivalent position that it was both formally 
illegal and morally necessary", Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’, 162. 
1401 Bruno Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, European Journal of 
International Law 10, no. 1 (1999): 22. 
1402 Simma, 22. 
1403 Simma, 229 (emphasis in the original). 
1404 On Dworkin’s original argument on ‘hard cases’, see Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’, Harvard Law 
Review 88, no. 6 (1975): 1057–1109. In a similar vein as, for example, Antonio Cassese, Simma 
attempts to ‘stretch’ positivism by distinguishing between ‘classic’ and ‘modern’ (also ‘enlightened’) 
positivism. Simma describes classic positivism (in a piece co-authored with Andreas Paulus) as 
follows: ‘Law is regarded as a unified system of rules that, according to most variants, emanate 
from state will. This system of rules is an ’objective‘ reality and needs to be distinguished from law 
’as it should be.‘ Classic positivism demands rigorous tests for legal validity. Extralegal arguments, 
e.g., arguments that have no textual, systemic or historical basis, are deemed irrelevant to legal 
analysis; there is only hard law, no soft law. For some, the unity of the legal system will provide one 
correct answer for any legal problem;’ for others, even if law is ’open-textured,‘ it still provides 
determinate guidance for officials and individuals’. On the other side, ‘enlightened positivism is 
identical neither with formalism nor with voluntarism. Both custom and general principles cannot 
simply be reduced to instances of state will. So-called soft law is an important device for the 
attribution of meaning to rules and for the perception of legal change. Moral and political 
considerations are not alien to law but part of it. However, formal sources remain the core of 
international legal discourse. Without them, there is no ’law properly so-called.‘ Only when linked 
to formal sources recognized as binding by the international community does law serve the 
decision maker in the search for a balance between idealism and realism, common values and 
ideological neutrality, apology and utopia’, Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, ‘The Responsibility 
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interventions must remain an exception and that in the future NATO has to 
subordinate again under the system of collective security of the UN Charter.  
 
A slightly different, argument was advanced by Antonio Cassese who claimed 
that “from an ethical viewpoint resort to armed forces was justified. Nevertheless, 
as a legal scholar I cannot avoid observing in the same breath that this moral 
action is contrary to current international law.”1405 Interestingly, however, Cassese 
observes “nascent trends in world community”, which indicate that humanitarian 
interventions might become legal under customary international law in the future 
(de lege ferenda).1406 Even if objective criteria of custom might be lacking, 
subjective criteria (particularly, opinio necessitatis) might be, as Cassese notes, “at 
part materialized”.1407  As custom is only ‘at partly materialized’, Cassese considers 
humanitarian interventions as (still) illegal. Nevertheless, the contours of an 
international law of the future, which should not “be utterly contrary to any 
principle of humanity”, appear on the horizon already.1408 In other words, in 
contrast to Simma, who emphasises the role of formal sources and attempts to 
remain within the institutional setting of the post-Cold War era, Cassese locates 
the instances, which guarantee humanitarian values, in a rather vague, non-
institutionalised construct of an ‘international’ or ‘world community’.1409 To speak 
of the emergence of such a future international or world community and to 
interpret customary international law mainly by referring to subjective criteria of 
opinion juris and/or opinion necissitatis presents of course only another reflection 
                                                                                                                                                            
of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View’, American Journal of 
International Law 93, no. 2 (1999): 304, 307–308. For Simma, in particular, human rights provide a 
vocabulary to challenge the boundaries of classic positivism and to turn it into its more 
‘enlightened’ version. See also the discussion in Eric Stein, ‘Bruno Simma, The Positivist?’, in From 
Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma, ed. Ulrich Fastenrath et 
al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19–31. 
1405 Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimiation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’, European Journal of 
International Law 10, no. 1 (1999): 25 (emphasis in the original). 
1406 Cassese, 27. 
1407 Antonio Cassese, ‘A Follow-Up: Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis’, 
European Journal of International Law 10, no. 4 (1999): 797. 
1408 Cassese, 797, 799 (emphasis in the original). 
1409 On this paradigm shift from ‘collective’ to ‘unilateral humanitarian interventions’, see Anne 
Orford, ‘Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism’, European 
Journal of International Law 10, no. 4 (1999): 680. For a critical reflection of the international legal 
argument with regard to interventions in the context of the immediate post-Cold War era, i.e. 
intervention under the roof of the UN Security Council, see Anne Orford, ‘Locating the International: 
Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War’, Harvard International Law Journal 38, no. 
2 (1997): 443–85. 
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of Cassese’s general project of ‘realizing utopia’ by means of ‘critical positivism’ 
(see my discussion in Chapter 6).  
 
What unites these narratives in the end is the claim that the mantra of Western 
modern statecraft, namely that only sovereign states with exclusive jurisdiction 
can guarantee human rights or peace, is inversed: where for modernity the state 
was the guarantor of peace against the struggles of the ‘international’, it is now the 
state that becomes the problem while the ‘international’ brings the solution. In line 
with this, it is argued now that complying with traditional law may aggravate the 
problem, while breaking its formalistic rules may help to find a solution.1410 As 
Anne Orford frames this development, today the “international order, which 
represents values such as humanitarianism and justice, is threatened by states and 
leaders who have no commitment to human rights or peace. […] In the case of 
Kosovo, the international community may have been acted outside of the law, but 
such action was not taken in the name of self-interest or old-fashioned 
imperialism, but for the collective good”.1411 In short, the option not to intervene 
for reasons of positive international law was widely discarded as manifestation of 
a morally and politically blind ‘legalism’.1412 
 
2.2 ‘Illegal but Legitimate’ 
 
In this broader constellation, the notion of legitimacy brought something like a 
‘solution’ to the ‘problem(s)’ and ‘dilemma(s)’ of many commentators.1413 Here, it 
was in particular the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK), 
which introduced this ‘solution’ to a broader public. The IICK was founded in the 
                                                      
1410 This corresponds with Allen Buchanan idea of ‘illegal international legal reform’, i.e. that 
breaking the law might help to develop the law. One of the cases Buchanan had in mind was NATO’s 
Kosovo campaign. See Allen E. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 456–459; and Allen 
Buchanan, ‘From Nuremburg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal Reform’, Ethics 
111, no. 4 (2001): 673–705. See also my discussion of Buchanan’s work in Chapter 2. 
1411 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 45. 
1412 Or, more precisely: a ‘caricature of “legalism”’: ‘a pedantic and overly scholastic concern with 
rules that make sense on the paper but bear no relation to reality’, Orford, ‘The Politics of Anti-
Legalism in the Intervention Debate’. 
1413 A shorter (and to some extent different) version of the argument of this subsection can be 
found in dos Reis and Kessler, ‘Power of Legality, Legitimacy and the (im)possibility of 
Interdisciplinary Research’, 111–112. 
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aftermath of the NATO air campaign on initiative of the Swedish Prime Minister 
Göran Persson and was endorsed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The IICK 
can be described as an international expert commission par excellent. It was 
chaired by Richard Goldstone, who was a former member of the South African 
Constitutional Court and also the first chief prosecutor of both the ICTY and ICTR. 
Moreover, it was composed of members like, for example, the international lawyer 
Richard Falk, the historian and writer Michael Ignatieff, the political scientist Marie 
Kaldor as well as a number of former diplomats and human rights activists.1414 The 
task of the Commission was to, inter alia, “identify the norms of international law 
[…] brought to the fore by the Kosovo war and the adequacy of present norms and 
institutions in preventing or responding to comparable crisis in the future”.1415  
 
The major outcome of the IICK was a concluding report, published in 
2000.1416 In this report the IICK states that there “was an impeding and unfolding 
humanitarian catastrophe for the Kosovo Albanian population”.1417 The situation 
was, as the Commission states, severe as “Serb oppression included numerous 
atrocities that appeared to have the character of crimes against humanity in the 
sense it has been understood since the Nuremberg Judgement in 1945”.1418 
Moreover, the report concludes that negotiations with Milosevic were nearly 
impossible as the Serbian President was “an adversary with a track record of 
manipulation and criminality”.1419 In this context the report “raises a central 
question—are the constraints imposed by international law on the non-defensive 
                                                      
1414 For a complete list of its members, see Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The 
Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 331–335. On the Commission’s work see also the (self-)assessment by Richard J. Goldstone 
and Nicole Fritz, ‘Fair Assessment: The Independent International Commission on Kosovo’, in 
International Commissions and the Power of Ideas, ed. Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper, and John 
English (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 167–79. 
1415  Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 331 (mission 
statement). 
1416 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report. Two policy reports draw 
similar conclusion. One was on Danish initiative: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 
Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of 
International Affairs, 1999). The second on Dutch initiative: Advisory Council on International 
Affairs (AIV), ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, April 2000. 
1417 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 163. 
1418 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 164. 
1419 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 163. 
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use of force adequate for the maintenance of peace and security in the 
contemporary world?”.1420 And it continues by underlying that the 
 
“question is particularly relevant where force is used for the protection 
of a vulnerable people threatened with catastrophe. If international law 
no longer provides acceptable guidelines in such a situation, what are 
the alternatives? In responding to these challenges, the Commission 
considers the international law controversy provoked by the NATO 
campaign. It also puts forward an interpretation of the emerging 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This interpretation is situated in 
a grey zone of ambiguity between an extension of international law and 
a proposal for an international moral consensus. In essence, this grey 
zone goes beyond strict ideas of legality to incorporate more flexible 
views of legitimacy”.1421 
 
For the Commission this kind of ‘flexibility’ was provided – although on “shaky 
legal grounds”1422 – by pointing out that the status of human rights had improved 
within the United Nations since the establishment of the Charter in 1945 and has 
become, in the meantime, an important vocabulary to challenge the non-
intervention paradigm.1423 Moreover, as the report observes, the form and reality 
of conflicts has changed after the end of the Cold War. While the UN Charter stands 
in the tradition of the “international wars” of the Cold War, nowadays ‘new wars’ 
(as pointed out above, Mary Kaldor was one of its expert members) in the form of 
“intra-national crises of a wide variety” have become increasingly important.1424 
This line of argumentation brought the IICK to its famous conclusion, namely “that 
the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it 
did not receive prior approval by the United Nations Security Council. However, 
the Commission considers that the intervention had the effect of liberating the 
                                                      
1420 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 164. 
1421 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 164 (emphasis in the original). The report’s 
understanding of legitimacy was strongly influenced by Thomas Franck’s account of the notion of 
legitimacy and the way Franck links it to fairness, Goldstone and Fritz, ‘Fair Assessment’, 170–172. 
On Franck’s take on legitimacy and fairness see my discussion in Chapter 2. 
1422 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 166. 
1423 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 167–169. For a similar view, see for 
example Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force’. 
1424 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 185. 
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majority of population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian 
rule”.1425 
 
 In line with this, the IICK argues that international law should adapt to the 
reality of ‘new wars’ in a post-Cold War environment and accept that the ‘crisis’ 
and ‘exception’ of Kosovo might become the ‘new normal’.1426 Subsequently, the 
report acknowledges that there exists now the  
 
“need to close the gap between legality and legitimacy. The Commission 
believes that the time is now ripe for the presentation of a principled 
framework for humanitarian intervention which could be used to guide 
future responses to imminent humanitarian catastrophes and which 
could be used to assess claims for humanitarian intervention”.1427  
 
In particular, the UN General Assembly or regional organisations should authorize 
humanitarian interventions in the case of an UN Security Council deadlock. 
 
In 2012, more than ten years after the publication of the IICK’s Kosovo Report, 
the international lawyer Richard Falk, who was a member of the Commission, 
noted that "the Kosovo War of 1999 [was] the birthplace of reliance on the 
legality/legitimacy distinction".1428 For Falk, the notion of legitimacy promises 
“meta-legal authority” and “provides a flexible alternative to the sort of binary 
assessments that have no options other than ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’. This flexibility 
                                                      
1425  Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 4 (emphasis added). For similar 
formulations in the report, see Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 186 and 289. A 
similar conclusion was also drawn by a British governmental expert commission: ‘[W]e conclude 
that NATO’s military action, if of dubious legality in the current state of international law, was 
justified on moral grounds’ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, ‘Fourth Report’, 
23 May 2000, para. 138. 
1426 For a general argument of how exceptional measured are normalised by means of international 
legal expertise, see Filipe dos Reis, ‘Law, Politics and State(s) of Emergency’, New Perspectives. 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations  25, no. 2 
(2017): 136–41. 
1427 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 10. 
1428  Richard Falk, ‘Introduction: Legality and Legitimacy: Necessities and Problematics of 
Exceptionalism’, in Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs, ed. Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, 
and Vesselin Popovski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9. Similarly: ‘Reliance on the 
distinction between legality and legitimacy first achieved prominence in the report of the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo’ Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Vesselin 
Popovski, ‘Preface’, in Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs, ed. Richard Falk, Mark 
Juergensmeyer, and Vesselin Popovski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), viii. 
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permits arguments about the comparative claims of law, morality, and politics to 
be put forth in any setting of decision or policy formation, and yet sustains the 
relevance of international law even in circumstances where the primary norm has 
been justifiably set aside”.1429  
 
Put differently, by uttering the speech act of ‘illegal but legitimate’ the concept 
of legitimacy itself reveals its reflexive and performative dimension. Thus, rather 
than evaluating whether ‘Kosovo’ was in the end legal, illegal, legitimate and/or 
illegitimate, I am more interested in excavating what ‘legitimacy’ actually ‘does’ 
‘after Kosovo’, i.e. to focus on the concepts’ productive and performative dimension. It 
seems that after Kosovo ‘legitimacy’ is not merely a descriptive (or ‘constative’) 
device with regard to something factual (e.g., how legitimate is a specific system of 
international legal rules or institutions?) or normative (e.g., how should 
international legal rules and institutions be designed in order to make global 
governance more legitimate?) anymore, but rather ‘legitimacy’ gains agentic 
capacity and the power to draw, redraw and make certain boundaries invisible. 
This constellation is, e.g., captured by Koskenniemi’s critical assessment of the 
notion. For Koskenniemi, the concept of legitimacy presents one of the central 
shifts in international law’s ‘turn to ethics’.1430 Koskenniemi complains mainly 
(and here, he should disagree with Falk) about the flexibility and elusiveness of the 
concept.1431 In other words, what has been for supporters of the new language of 
legitimacy like Falk its strength – namely its flexibility – presents for its critics the 
main problem. As Koskenniemi argues, ‘legitimacy’, used in such a way, opens a 
“normative space or field of jurisdiction” but represents within this space only a 
                                                      
1429 Falk, ‘Introduction: Legality and Legitimacy’, 25. 
1430 For a ‘focussed genealogy’ of legitimacy as the end-product of the ‘turn to ethics’ see 
Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’, 163–171; and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Legitimacy, 
Rights, and Ideology: Notes Towards a Critique of the New Moral Internationalism’, Alternatives 7, 
no. 2 (2003): 349–73. Similarly, the language of legitimacy presents for Koskenniemi also an 
important step in another turn in international law, namely the ‘turn to managerialism’. For an 
argument in this regard see, for example, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters: International 
Relations as New Natural Law’, European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 3 (2009): 409–
410. See also my discussion below in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. 
1431 In a similar vein David Kennedy argues: ‘Although modern humanitarian law need not be 
determinate to be effective - flexibility may indeed be the secret of its success - in any given 
iteration, it appeals outward, to the Charter, to law, or to a universal ethical understanding. There is 
a split, in other words, between the way the vocabulary is widely understood to function - flexibly, 
openly, interactively - and the way one expresses oneself in it ethically, self-confidently, definitely, 
judgementally. The key power in such ongoing conversation is legitimacy’, Kennedy, The Dark Sides 
of Virtue, 274 (emphasis in the original). 
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“mediate concept” that is “rhetorically successful” as it can neither be “pinned 
down” on “formal rule” nor on “some controversial theory of justice”.1432 Yet, this 
kind of criticism does certainly not lack some irony as the indeterminacy of 
concepts was the central argument of critical international legal scholars for a long 
time and was never presented as a ‘problem’. 
 
 In any case, it is for Koskenniemi mainly the permanent iteration (or 
iterability?) in the context of different political projects that gives ‘legitimacy’ such 
a central position: 
 
  “By saying ‘legitimacy’ as often as possible and in connection with as 
many and as controversial political actions as possible, actions that 
cannot be seriously discussed in terms of lawfulness or moral 
substance, receive a sense of acceptability and naturalness that is 
precisely the function of ideology to attain”.1433 
 
Legitimacy appears here to be both normative and concrete at the same time. It 
introduces a new level of uncertainty and indeterminacy to the intersection of law, 
morality and politics on a global level. What Koskenniemi fears in this regard is 
that ‘legitimacy’ opens Pandora’s box as different projects of power politics can be 
justified in the name of human rights, international community and/or global civil 
society.1434 Moreover, the rhetoric of legitimacy is so successful, as it is hard to ‘be 
against it’:  
                                                      
1432 Koskenniemi, ‘Legitimacy, Rights, and Ideology’, 372, 362. 
1433 Koskenniemi, 368. 
1434 Take for instance Anne Marie Slaughter’s justification of the 2003 US-British-led invasion of 
Iraq. Slaughter argued in an op-ed article two days before the campaign started that it could be 
justified as ‘illegal but legitimate’ and concludes from this: ‘But depending on what we find in Iraq, 
the rules may have to evolve, so that what is legitimate is also legal’, Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Good 
Reasons for Going Around the U.N.’, New York Times, 18 March 2003. However, only one year later, 
Slaughter acknowledges that the invasion was ‘Illegal and Illegitimate’ - precisely because no 
weapons of mass destruction were ‘found’. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The Use of Force in Iraq: 
Illegal and Illegitimate’, American Society of International Law Proceedings 98 (2004): 262–63. 
Another example is Michael Ignatieff, who was first very much in favour of the invasion, see Michael 
Ignatieff, ‘Why Are We In Iraq? (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)’, New York Times, 7 September 
2003; and later described this as an error, see Michael Ignatieff, ‘Getting Iraq Wrong’, New York 
Times, 5 August 2007. Yet, other commentators such as Goldstone and Fritz do not share 
Koskenniemi’s concerns and deny that the IICK’s endorsement of humanitarian intervention did 
open the door to legitimate all kinds of intervention as the report highlighted the importance of a 
‘direct protection of the victimized population’. For Goldstone and Fritz this was the case in Kosovo 
but it was not so in Iraq (or Afghanistan), Goldstone and Fritz, ‘Fair Assessment’, 175. 
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“Unlike realist fixation on states and power, or idealist moorings on 
international law and morality, ‘legitimacy’ posses an elusiveness well 
adapted to the realities of a fluid, complex and globalising world. 
Containing (unkline law) no commitment to particular institutional 
forms and (unlike morality) no implication of transcendental standards, 
as well as unburdened by the negative connotations linked to words 
such as ‘legalism’ and ‘moralism’, the notion of ‘legitimacy’ redescribes 
the international world in terms of categories whose beneficiality 
seems self-evident: lawfulness, fundamental values and human 
rights”.1435 
 
2.3 The Production of Semantic Uncertainty 
 
In this context three observations are important. Firstly, the turn to legitimacy 
language is also linked to a shift in the politics of expertise. While the language of 
legitimacy – particularly, after Kosovo – is usually associated to a broader turn to 
legal language on a global level, i.e. the ‘legalization’ of the discourse of the 
‘international’, it is not the lawyer (nor the political philosopher, nor the diplomat 
of classical realism) who determines whether an action is legitimate or not but 
increasingly the empirical social scientist and/or the policy elite who measures the 
legitimacy – in terms of a somehow operationalized legitimacy belief – among 
global civil society actors.1436  
 
Secondly, the conceptual pair legality/legitimacy constitutes a space for 
different discursive positions oscillating between ‘normativity’ and ‘concreteness’ 
                                                      
1435 Koskenniemi, ‘Legitimacy, Rights, and Ideology’, 350. 
1436 Koskenniemi, 351. Recently, Richard Falk postulated such an understanding of the relationship 
between legality and legitimacy. As Falk argues in his assessment of ‘legitimacy wars’: ‘where 
legitimacy and legality factors overlap, civil society will lend support to humanitarian intervention 
(as in Rwanda, Darfur, East Timor); where legitimacy supports a call for humanitarian intervention, 
but legality inhibits, civil society will be split (as in Kosovo); where legitimacy factors are negative 
or even ambiguous, and legality inhibits, then civil society will be overwhelmingly opposed to 
military forms of intervention (as in Iraq)’, Richard Falk, Humanitarian Intervention and Legitimacy 
Wars: Seeking Peace and Justice in the 21st Century (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 59. For a 
critical discussion of the notion of ‘global society’ see Jens Bartelson, ‘Is There a Global Society?’, 
International Political Sociology 3, no. 1 (2009): 112–15. 
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– i.e., Koskenniemi’s ‘deep structure’ of the international legal argument. For 
instance, in discussions about the legality of the intervention in Kosovo, for 
supporters 
 
“making the law/legitimacy differentiation affirmed the speaker’s legal-
technical competence while testifying to his or her moral rectitude: ‘of 
course, the intervention may not have been lawful under the UN 
Charter. But it was an acceptable response to a morally compelling need 
to act now’. […] An opponent of the intervention would immediately 
respond: ‘Well you say you are acting out of noble moral motives. But I 
know that in fact you are just making a political move so as (for 
example) to support illegality”.1437 
 
This new argumentative structure in the context of humanitarian interventions 
was recently also evaluated by Anne Orford. As Orford notes, after Kosovo it has 
become possible to frame debates about interventions by permanently oscillating 
between the two poles of ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’, where legality is understood as 
dogmatic legalism and legitimacy as the possibility to construct the better and 
more flexible law of the future. To understand this new dynamic, it is worth to 
quote the following longer paragraph by Orford: 
 
“It has become conventional to structure debates about international 
intervention in terms of an opposition between legality and legitimacy. 
In such debates, ‘legality’ is often presented as involving a blind 
adherence to restrictive rules of limited relevance to contemporary 
security challenges and doubtful moral value in the face of pressing 
humanitarian crises. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is presented as 
everything that law ought to be – it results from decision-making that is 
principled yet pragmatic, taken by actors who are representatives of 
conscience yet guarantors of protection, concerned with means yet 
never at the expense of ends, and leads to interventions undertaken by 
politically effective operators who are nevertheless committed to 
                                                      
1437 Koskenniemi, ‘Legitimacy, Rights, and Ideology’, 360–361. 
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humane values and able to balance the demands of security and justice. 
While legality is rigid, legitimacy is flexible. While legality is a 
manifestation of the suspect political machinations of powerful states, 
legitimacy is the manifestation of a meaningful commitment to ending 
human suffering and realising the rights of the individual. While legality 
involves a misplaced faith in the mechanical application of rules to 
determine whether or not intervention is justified, legitimacy involves 
the establishment of clear criteria that can guard against the political 
misuse of intervention for other than humanitarian ends. Of course, if 
this is what we understand the choice between legality and legitimacy 
to involve, then stopping to ask what actions are legally available in the 
face of humanitarian crisis or civil war can at best lead to irrelevance 
and at worst to complicity with evil”.1438 
 
Thirdly, the new flexibility of legality/legitimacy – together with the ‘new 
interventionalism’ of a regional organisation such as NATO – marks also an 
important shift on a jurisdictional level. NATO’s Kosovo campaign has to be read as 
an attack on the jurisdictional project of the modern nation state, i.e. the idea of 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction with the state designed as ‘container’, as it 
transferred the jurisdiction to intervene to an international (organisational) level. 
As Orford summarises for “states subject to intervention, this was indeed the 
nightmarish end-point of the move away from textually defined limits to external 
intervention in domestic jurisdiction of states, and the abandonment of the 
commitment to principles of sovereign equality and self-determination”.1439 
Moreover, this development presents not only a challenge to the idea of exclusive 
jurisdiction of the modern statecraft as it established also the stage for a new 
jurisdictional competition of who actually represents ‘humanity’ on an 
international level – for example, which kind of organisational form. As I will 
reconstruct in the next section, it was the UN that attempted to assemble and 
transfer the jurisdiction over interventions under its own roof. 
 
                                                      
1438 Orford, ‘The Politics of Anti-Legalism in the Intervention Debate’. 
1439 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, 177–178. 
 390 
In order to sum this section up and to weave some threads together: So far I 
have argued that the notion of legitimacy brought a new level and mode of 
indeterminacy (semantic uncertainty) to the discourse of law and politics, 
particularly in the context of interventions. In these discussions, a number of 
critical international lawyers, lead by Koskeneniemi, perceived this new ‘flexibility’ 
as a ‘problem’. As I pointed out this bears of course some irony, as it was the early 
project of critical international lawyers – as well as critical constructivist (see 
Chapter 3) – to carve out the indeterminacy of the international legal argument. 
Indeterminacy was for these early critical scholars not seen as a ‘problem’ but 
rather as a ‘quasi-natural’ element of every discourse and, subsequently, as 
something that cannot be solved but should rather be perceived as an opportunity 
to re-politicize the seemingly a-political discourse of politics.1440 Now, and this 
turns the positions of ‘critical’ scholars and ‘the mainstream’ somehow upside-
down, it was ‘the mainstream’ that applauded the new flexibility of the legal 
argument. At least scholars such as Cassese or Simma did so on a short-term basis. 
On a long time basis, however, the new flexibility of  ‘illegal but legitimacy’ caused 
also headaches to the mainstream in academia and among international legal 
practitioners as Kosovo was seen as an exceptional situation of emergency – and as 
such it was in need of ‘normalization’. Thus, for the mainstream the new task ‘after 
Kosovo’ should become the request of the IICK, namely to ‘close the gap between 
legality and legitimacy’ and to make the ‘illegal but legitimate’ ‘legal and 
legitimate’; or in Cassese’s words: ‘ex iniura ius oritur’.1441 What we see here also is 
an important shift in the temporality of the international legal argument: the 
question was not only whether Kosovo was ‘illegal but legitimate’, i.e. it was not 
only an evaluation of the past, but also to find new justifications for interventions 
in the future, i.e. how to legalize interventions in the future in order to anticipate 
‘humanitarian catastrophes’.1442 Or, as it was put, to prevent “future Kosovos and 
                                                      
1440 For an argument to politicize the discourse about legality/legitimacy, see Nico Krisch, ‘Review: 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account. By Jutta Brunnée and 
Stephen J. Toope’, American Journal of International Law 106, no. 1 (2012): 209. 
1441 Cassese, ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur’. Or, as Christopher Daase notes, there is ‘the in creasing tendency 
in international politics to demand the recognition and enforcement of liberal moral norms even at 
the expense of existing legal norms. It has been argued both explicitly and implicitly that the old 
system of international law is no longer adequate for an era of emerging threats. A new order is 
necessary, namely, one that draws on a kind of legitimacy that surmounts the legitimacy of the 
current legal order’, Daase, ‘Legalizing Legitimacy’, 68. 
1442 See already: Charney, ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’. 
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Rwandas”.1443 In other words, jurisdictional projects become future-oriented. First 
and foremost it should become, as we will see in the remainder of this chapter, a 
task within the United Nations to redefine international authority in such a way 
and thereby relocate the international jurisdiction on interventions back into its 
own fora. And it was in the context of these different developments that the 
concept of the responsibility to protect was popularized on an international 
level.1444 
 
 3. The Responsibility to Protect and the New Politics of Intervention: 
Making the legitimate legal? 
 
In order to better understand how the United Nations, as well as bodies within the 
United Nations, attempted to redefine international authority in a way that would 
relocate the international jurisdiction over interventions (back) into its own fora, 
this section reconstructs how the responsibility to protect became a project within 
and thereby of the United Nations. I will advance my argument in three steps and 
outline, first, how the concept of the responsibility to protect emerged in policy 
debates in the late 1990s (3.1); second, how the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) popularized the concept on an 
international level (3.2); and, three, how the concept ‘arrived’ at the United 
Nations and was in this process translated in a specific way, namely through a 
hybridization with categories from international criminal law (3.3). 
 
3.1 The Politics of Principles: Sovereignty and Human Rights 
 
In September 2000 Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) at the 
Millennium Summit of the United Nations. Thus, in contrast to the IICK, which 
                                                      
1443 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 
2005 World Summit’, Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2006): 143. 
1444 For a detailed reconstruction of the link between the discourse on humanitarian intervention 
and the responsibility to protect concept, see Gareth Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the 
Responsibility to Protect’, Wisconsin International Law Journal 24, no. 3 (2006): 703–22. 
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started as a Swedish initiative, the ICISS was initiated as a Canadian project.1445 
However, similarly to the IICK, the ICISS was an international expert commission 
composed of a mix of academics and practitioners. It was co-chaired by Gareth 
Evans, a former Australian Foreign Minister and president of the Brussels-based 
NGO ‘International Crisis Group’, and Mohamed Sahnoun, a former Algerian 
diplomat and Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General. Members included, for 
example, Ramesh Thakur and Michael Ignatieff. The latter was the only member 
serving in both commissions, the IICK and the ICISS.1446 As for the IICIK, the ICISS’s 
major outcome was a final report, which was published in December 2001. It was 
here where the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ was introduced to a major 
public.1447 
 
 However, this does not mean that the ICISS started from the scratch. Rather, 
the ICISS uses in its reports two already on-going discourses as its entry point. 
First, the Commission links its work directly to the Kosovo report and follows the 
IICK’s suggestion that there is a need to establish a framework for humanitarian 
interventions. In particular, it was mandated, as one can read at the outset of the 
report, to discuss a possible “right of humanitarian intervention”.1448 In addition, 
the Commission’s “mandate was generally to build a broader understanding of the 
problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and 
sovereignty; more specifically, it was to try to develop a global political consensus 
                                                      
1445 According to Jennifer Welsh, Carolin J. Thielking and S. Neil MacFarlane, the ICISS was not only 
established on initiative of the Canadian government but also its ‘thought leadership’ as ‘a great 
deal of the Commission’s language and concepts reflect the human security agenda that was so 
prominent a part of Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s’, Jennifer Welsh, Carolin J. Thielking, and 
S. Neil MacFarlane, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’, in International Commissions and the Power of 
Ideas, ed. Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper, and John English (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 2005), 199; see also Christopher Verlage, Responsibility to Protect (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2009), 56–58. 
1446 For a complete list of its members see International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 77–79. On the 
work of the Commission in general see Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to 
End Mass Atrocities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), chap. 2; as well as the evaluation of one of its 
members, Ramesh Thakur, ‘Intervention, Sovereignty, and the Responsibility to Protect’, in 
International Commissions and the Power of Ideas, ed. Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper, and John 
English (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 180–97. 
1447 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. 
See also the overview by Welsh, Thielking, and MacFarlane, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’. 
1448 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
vii. 
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on how to move from polemics – and often paralysis – towards action within the 
international system, particularly through the United Nations”.1449 Here, the report 
implicitly refers to a (rhetorical) question, which was posed by UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan earlier, namely 
 
“if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to 
gross and systemic violations of human rights that affect every precept 
of our common humanity?”.1450 
 
In this statement Annan links – and this is the second entry point of the report – 
the debate about humanitarian intervention together with a discourse on the limits 
and function of (state) sovereignty. Let me address this shortly.  
 
Although, as Luke Glanville notes, the understanding that “the notion of 
sovereignty entails some particular set of responsibilities is not new” as both 
“sovereign rights and sovereign responsibilities haven been historically 
interdependent”,1451 it was, however, only after the Cold War and here particularly 
in the work of Francis M. Deng, Roberta Cohen and their colleagues at the 
Brookings Institution, a think tank based in Washington DC, that the relationship 
of sovereignty and responsibility was explicitly problematized.1452 For instance, a 
monograph by Deng (written together with several co-authors and published in 
1996) on conflict management on the African continent attempts to present a 
“normative framework of sovereignty”, in which it is emphasised that “in order to 
be legitimate, sovereignty must demonstrate responsibility”.1453 Moreover, Deng et 
                                                      
1449 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2. 
1450 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, vii, 1. The question is 
reprinted on the first page of the report. Annan originally brought it forward in his Millennium 
Report, United Nations Secretary-General, ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 
Twenty-First Century. Report of the Secretary-General’, A/54/2000 (2000), para. 217 (emphasis in 
the original). 
1451 Luke Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2014), 9. See also Luke Glanville, ‘The Antecedents of “Sovereignty as 
Responsibility”’, European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (2011): 233–55. 
1452 Cf. Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); and Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses 
in Flight: The Global Crisis of International Displacement (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 
1998). 
1453 Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility, 1, xvii. 
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al. claim that the concept of sovereignty witnessed a fundamental transformation, 
which was initiated by the Nuremberg Trial, then further advanced by the human 
rights movement and championed finally in the 1990s by the idea of humanitarian 
intervention. This development signified a shift away from the traditional 
Westphalian notion of sovereignty, where sovereignty is understood as control, 
towards an understanding of sovereignty in terms of responsibility. 1454  The 
authors emphasise that both dimensions of sovereignty, the internal and external 
(or international), are in need of a redefinition from control to responsibility. Deng 
et al. explain that sovereignty as responsibility “means that national governments 
are duty bound to ensure minimum standards of security and social welfare for 
their citizens and be accountable both to the national body politic and the 
international community”.1455 In this new setting both state and international 
community should become the new managers of governance as “governing is 
managing conflict”.1456 In turn, the quality of governance can then been evaluated 
by measuring the effectiveness and capacity of protecting populations from harm. 
This leads Deng et al. to the conclusion that where “the sovereign state fails to 
manage conflict effectively and governance breaks down, the responsibility for 
dealing with disputes may fall for a limited time on external agents” and that those 
states, which did not meet their responsibilities, “cannot legitimately complain 
against international humanitarian intervention”.1457  
 
                                                      
1454 Deng et al., 2–19. As I focus in this paragraph mainly on policy circles and their discussion of the 
sovereignty/responsibility nexus, I do not address academic debates on sovereignty, which 
flourished at this time, too. In IR’s mainstream, for instance, Stephen Krasner tried to leave a pure 
Westphalian model of sovereignty behind by introducing four meanings of sovereignty, namely 
domestic, interdependence, international legal and Westphalian sovereignty. Although Westphalian 
sovereignty is (still) important, Krasner includes the three other forms of sovereignty as well, as it 
helps to get a more comprehensive picture of this notion, Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9. 
1455 Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility, 211. In this context in particular human rights play 
today an important role as they are of ‘transcendental importance as a legitimate are of concern for 
the international community. This is especially true when order has broken down or the state is 
incapable or unwilling to act responsibly to protect the masses of citizens. In that action 
international inaction would be quite indefensible’, Deng et al., 16; see also Cohen and Deng, Masses 
in Flight, 276–278. 
1456 Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility, 34. 
1457 Deng et al., 207, xvi. Similarly: ‘Rather than shield governments and regimes from international 
scrutiny, sovereignty as a concept of responsibility ensures that basic human rights are respected. 
When governments fail to meet their obligations [...] they are expected to request outside 
assistance to help them fulfill their responsibilities [...]. Should they refuse to accept such 
assistance, the international community can and should assert their concern and step in when the 
government has failed to discharge its responsibility’, Cohen and Deng, Masses in Flight, 276. 
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In a similar vein the discussion on the limits and function of sovereignty has 
been taken up by UN General-Secretary Kofi Annan in September 1999, i.e. more 
than three months after the end of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo.1458 
Annan observes in this context that we can find today “two concepts of 
sovereignty”, one vesting in the state and the other in individuals and in the 
peoples. This signifies for Annan that, on the one hand, “[s]tate sovereignty in its 
most basic sense, is being redefined” as “[s]tates are now widely understood to be 
instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa”, while, on the other  
hand, “individual sovereignty” (i.e., “the fundamental freedom of each individual, 
enshrined on the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties”), “has 
been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights”.1459 
The transformation of sovereignty is also manifested in the “developing 
international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale 
slaughter”.1460 Importantly, Annan claims that in the future one should not have to 
choose between UN Security Council inaction (like in Rwanda) and a solution by 
regional organisations circumventing an UN mandate (like in Kosovo) when it 
comes to the discussion and implementation of such an ‘intervention to protect’. 
Rather, the “UN should be able to find common ground in upholding the principles 
of the charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity”.1461 As Annan 
suggests in his Millennium Report presented to the UN General Assembly a few 
month later, it should be the task of the UN Security Council to find an answer 
whenever the international community is confronted with conflicting principles: 
 
“But surely no legal principle – not even sovereignty – can ever shield 
crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful 
attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a 
moral duty to act on behalf of the international community. The fact 
that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing 
nothing when we can. Armed intervention must always remain the 
                                                      
1458 Kofi Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 16 September 1999. 
1459 Annan. 
1460 Annan. 
1461 Annan. 
 396 
option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an option that 
cannot be relinquished”.1462 
 
3.2 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
 
Against this background the ICISS final report develops its understanding of the 
responsibility to protect concept. With the Kosovo debate in mind, the report 
acknowledges that there is a “critical gap” between legitimacy (“the needs and 
distress being felt, and seen to be felt, in the real world”) and legality (“the codified 
instruments and modalities for managing world order”) when it comes to “military 
intervention for human protection”.1463 However, the ICISS refutes to close this gap 
in terms of ‘humanitarian intervention’ or a ‘right to intervene’, as these 
vocabularies are, due to previous debates “outdated and unhelpful”; it departs 
therefore from its initial mandate to evaluate an eventual ‘right to humanitarian 
intervention’.1464  
 
But, why is the language of ‘humanitarian intervention’ or a ‘right to 
intervene’ according to the ICISS ‘outdated and unhelpful’? On the one hand, the 
ICISS stresses that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ has a negative connotation 
for several humanitarian actors as it involves a “militarization of the word 
‘humanitarian’: whatever the motives of those engaging in the intervention, it is 
anathema for the humanitarian relief and assistance sector to have this word 
appropriated to describe any kind of military action”.1465 Moreover, the report 
                                                      
1462 United Nations Secretary-General, We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-
first century. Report of the Secretary-General, para. 219. 
1463 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
15. 
1464 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 11, 16–18. The turning away 
from the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ is also visible in the name of the commission. 
Initially, it was planned to call it ‘commission on humanitarian intervention’, which was, however, 
by endorsing Francis Deng’s position, changed into ‘International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty’. See: Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 36. 
1465 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
9. For a view that rejects the term ‘humanitarian intervention’, see for example Anne Ryniker, ‘The 
ICRC’s Position on “humanitarian Intervention”’, International Review of the Red Cross 83, no. 842 
(2001): 529; and Jonathan Graubart, ‘War Is Not the Answer: The Responsibility to Protect and 
Military Intervention’, in Theorising the Responsibility to Protect, ed. Ramesh Thakur and William 
Maley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 200–219. This relates, of course, also to the 
by now extensive literature on ‘democratic wars’, the ‘dark side’ of ‘democratic peace’. See, for 
example, Anna Geis, Harald Müller, and Niklas Schörning, eds., The Militant Face of Democracy: 
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states that “some political quarters” have argued that the term might “prejudge” as 
it implies that an intervention is based on a just cause even though this might not 
be the case.1466 And finally, member states from the Non-Aligned Movement were 
sceptical as it might lead to some kind of “military humanism”, which would justify 
“arbitrary exercise of power by strong states” instead of protecting vulnerable and 
weak states and their populations.1467 This scepticism was augmented by the fact 
that discussions on the ‘right to intervene’ took place mainly in the global North – 
with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French Foreign Minister Bernard 
Koucher as prominent supporters – and were thus perceived as, as co-chair Gareth 
Evans should describe it later, “inherently one-sided” without “acknowledging the 
anxieties of those in the global South who had all too often been the beneficiaries 
of missions civilisatrices in the past. That concern was compounded in the French-
speaking world, by the fact that ingérence conveyed the sense not just of 
‘intervention’ but ‘interference’”.1468 
 
On the other hand, the ICISS distances itself from the idea that there might be 
a ‘right’ to intervene as it is argued that mobilising the language of rights means in 
this context to give too much attention to the “claims, rights and prerogatives of 
the potentially intervening state” and to lose sight of “the urgent need of the 
potential beneficiaries of the action”; it would, furthermore, focus too much on the 
act of the intervention itself and underestimate its before and after; and, finally, it 
would imbalance the relationship between intervention and sovereignty as 
intervention would “trump” sovereignty as it “loads the dice in favour of 
intervention before the argument has even begun, by tending to label and 
delegitimize dissent as anti-humanitarian”.1469 This does, however, not mean that 
                                                                                                                                                            
Liberal Forces for Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Anna Geis, Lothar 
Brock, and Harald Müller, eds., Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
1466 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
9. 
1467 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 68. 
1468 Gareth J. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All  
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 33. 
1469 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
16. For the original argument that rights are ‘trumps’ see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). On the problem that ‘rights’ might ‘trump’ other legal 
and non-legal figures, but that the discourse of ‘rights’ does not eliminate politics as, first, it remains 
unclear which right ‘trumps’ in situation of competing rights and, second, nearly everything can be 
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the Commission abandoned the language of ‘rights’ at all, but rather that it shifts 
our attention from a “‘right’ of the interveners to the globally acknowledged rights 
of victims”.1470 Moreover, the language of ‘human rights’ plays a central role in the 
report and should be a building bloc for the first generation of the responsibility to 
protect.1471 As we will see towards the end of this section, the second generation of 
the responsibility to protect is rather connected to the vernacular of ‘international 
crimes’. 
 
Yet for the ICISS, not not only the notions of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and 
a ‘right to intervention’ have become ‘outdated and unhelpful’ but this is also true 
for our understanding of the concept of sovereignty itself. Indeed, a “re-
characterization” of the concept of sovereignty is the central aim of the report.1472 
For the ICISS, the “Westphalian concept” of sovereignty, which is mirrored by the 
UN Charter and guarantees “the legal identity of a state in international law” by, on 
the one hand, externally conceptualising states as “equal, regardless of 
comparative size and wealthy” (‘sovereign equality’, Article 2(1) of the Charter) 
and, on the other hand, internally empowering a state “to exercise exclusive and 
total jurisdiction within its territorial borders” (‘non-intervention’, Article 2(4) of 
the Charter), is increasingly contested.1473 It is contested because the international 
environment is in flux and successively transforming: new actors (e.g., 
international courts and tribunals as well as NGOs), new security issues (e.g., from 
inter-state to intra-state conflict) and new discourses such as the ones on human 
rights, universal jurisdiction and human security produce a demand for a “modern 
understanding of the meaning of sovereignty”.1474 
 
In order to establish this ‘modern understanding of the meaning of 
sovereignty’ the ICISS report follows basically UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 
                                                                                                                                                            
translated into the language of rights, see Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: 
Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), chap. 7. 
1470 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 60. 
1471 See Kirsten Ainley, ‘From Atrocity Crimes to Human Rights: Expanding the Focus of the 
Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to Protect 9, no. 3 (2017): 243–66. 
1472 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
13. 
1473 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 13. 
1474 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 8, 3–7, 14–16. 
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“conceptual language of two notions of sovereignty”1475 and complements it with 
Francis Deng et al.’s idea to link sovereignty with responsibility.1476 As we can read 
in the ICISS report, sovereignty implies a “dual responsibility”, namely “externally 
– to respect the sovereignty of other states and internally, to respect the dignity 
and basic rights of all people within the state”.1477 And elsewhere, echoing again 
Deng and his co-authors, the report suggests that there is “a necessary re-
characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as 
responsibility in both internal functions and external duties”.1478 Hence, this ‘re-
characterization’ attempts to shift the focus from a ‘right to intervene’, which is 
attributed to outsiders, to the protection of those suffering from violence. For the 
ICISS, states remain – at least formally – the main actors as they are entrusted with 
the primary responsibility to protect their population from serious harm and to 
the “promotion of their welfare”; yet, states are not only responsible to their 
citizens but also to “the international community represented by the UN”; and 
finally, “agents of state” in case of failing to fulfil their responsibility are personally 
“responsible for their action”.1479 Importantly, however, not only those in charge 
become accountable in case of failure, as when a state in question is “unwilling or 
unable” to fulfil its responsibility “or is itself the perpetrator”, it “becomes the 
responsibility of the international community to act in its place”.1480  
 
In other words the ICISS claims that in such a case a state’s sovereignty is 
suspended and transferred to the international community. However, “the 
suspension of sovereignty is only de facto for the period of the intervention and 
follow-up, and not de jure.”1481 It is in the context of this discussion, where a new 
notion, namely the notion of risk, enters the debate, as the “substance of the 
responsibility to protect is the provision of life-supporting protection and 
assistance to populations at risk”.1482 I will discuss towards the end of this chapter 
                                                      
1475 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 13; see Annan, ‘Two Concepts 
of Sovereignty’. 
1476 Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility. 
1477 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
8. 
1478 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 13 (emphasis in the original). 
1479 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 13, xi. 
1480 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 17, xi. 
1481 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 44. 
1482 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 17 (emphasis added). 
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what this turn to ‘risk’ could signify for the discourse of ‘humanity’s law’. But let 
me first turn to two other points of the report: the division of the responsibility to 
protect into three elements and the question of authority. 
 
In order to get a better grip on the responsibility to protect and to consider 
the concept in all its bearings, the ICISS suggests that it should unfold into three 
“elements”, “techniques” or “integral and essential components”, namely “not just 
the responsibility to react to an actual or apprehended human catastrophe, but the 
responsibility to prevent it, and the responsibility to rebuild after the event”.1483 By 
including the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild, the ICISS 
attempts to move beyond the notion of humanitarian intervention and its focus on 
the very act of intervention. In this respect the responsibility to react should 
include early warning mechanisms, which should be centralized at the UN 
headquarters, as well as a “direct prevention ‘toolbox’” including political and 
diplomatic (under the auspicies of the UN Secretary-General), economic 
(supported by the World Bank), legal (including the International Criminal Court) 
and military (with UN peace-keeping forces) prevention measures. 1484  By 
acknowledging this, the report hopes to change the international community’s 
“basic mindset from a ‘culture of reaction’ to that of a ‘culture of prevention’”.1485  
 
On the other side, the ICISS’s responsibility to protect concept draws also on 
the idea of a responsibility to rebuild. Here again, the report stresses the relevance 
of mixed measures, including military (e.g., disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of local security forces), legal (e.g., building a functioning judicial 
system) and economic (e.g., development policy) initiatives. The report admits that 
these measures might be implemented through a trusteeship system governed by 
the United Nations. Although such a system might be contested, as it represents an 
                                                      
1483 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 17 (emphasis in the original). 
1484 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 23, 19–27. Here, the report 
follows basically the recommendations of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 
see Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report 
(New York: Carnegie Cooperation of New York, 1997). 
1485 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
27. 
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inference into the internal sovereignty of a state, it is nevertheless considered as 
‘better’ solution compared to the scenario of a ‘failed state’.1486  
 
Although both the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to rebuild 
are given a prominent place in the report, it is (still) the responsibility to react, i.e. 
the focus on military intervention for humanitarian purposes, which plays the 
major role. The ICISS report focuses on two issues with regard to the responsibility 
to react. On the one hand, it tries to identify “threshold criteria” in order to identify 
the “just cause” of a military intervention. ‘Just causes’ are, firstly, as it is stated, 
“large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is 
the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a 
failed state situation” or, secondly, “large scale ‘ethic cleansing’, actual or 
apprehended”.1487 Human rights violations, which do neither include large-scale 
killings nor ‘ethnic cleansing’, as well as a lack of democracy or a rescue mission of 
own nationals from foreign territory are considered of not being ‘just causes’.1488 
On the other hand, the report lists a number of “precautionary criteria” such as 
right intention, last resort or proportional measures, which should help to 
operationalize military interventions and for instance guarantee the prevention of 
large-scale causalities among the civilian population during the act of 
intervention.1489  
 
Although the split-up of the responsibility to protect into a responsibility to 
prevent, to react and to protect might sound like a temporal continuum or 
sequence of a ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ of an intervention, Orford suggests, that 
                                                      
1486 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 39–43. 
1487 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 32 (emphasis in the original). 
However, the report does not further specify or even ‘quantify’ what it means by ‘large scale’. See 
critically: Welsh, Thielking, and MacFarlane, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, 204–205. 
1488 This is an important transformation of ‘just causes’ when compared to debates even in the mid-
1990s, where rescue missions were considered together with interventions based on a UN Security 
Council authorization as the only legal and legitimate forms of humanitarian intervention. This 
argument is advanced, e.g., by Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Sovereignty as “Dominium”: Is There a Right to 
Humanitarian Intervention?’, in Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International 
Intervention, ed. Michael Mastanduno and Gene Lyons (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1995), 36–37. 
1489 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
32, 35–37, 57–67. The notion of ‘just causes’ derives of course from the just war tradition. For a 
discussion of the relationship of the responsibility to protect concept and the just war tradition see 
Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Just War Tradition’, in Theorising the 
Responsibility to Protect, ed. Ramesh Thakur and William Maley (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 181–99. 
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the different dimensions of the responsibility to protect are “in fact better 
understood as a way of thinking about groups of techniques – techniques of 
prevention such as surveillance, techniques for reaction such as the use of force 
and techniques for rebuilding such as administration, security sector reform and 
economic development”.1490 These different techniques are in turn ‘manageable’ 
by and through the various actors and experts within and around the United 
Nations. 
 
Finally and connected to these techniques, the ICISS addresses the question 
of authority, in particular the authority to represent and act in the name of the 
international community. While, as we have seen above, debates in the immediate 
aftermath of NATO’s Kosovo action in 1999 allocated authority with the Alliance 
and the intervening states by claiming the ‘legitimacy’ of the intervention, the ICISS 
report relocates this authority with the United Nations as it states that the United 
Nations “is unquestionably the principle institution for building, consolidating and 
using the authority of the international community”.1491 By implicitly referring to 
the question of the legitimacy of the Kosovo military intervention, the report 
continues to explain that the “authority of the UN is underpinned not by coercive 
power, but by its role as the applicator of legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy acts 
as the connecting link between the exercise of authority and the recourse to power. 
[…] Collective intervention blessed by the UN is regarded as legitimate because it is 
authorized by a representative international body; unilateral intervention is seen 
as illegitimate because self-interested”.1492  
 
For the ICISS, the legitimacy and authority of the United Nations is, firstly, 
established by the fact that the United Nations can balance between realism and 
idealism as it “exists in a world of sovereign states, and its operations must be 
based in political realism. But the organization is also the repository of 
international idealism, and that sense is fundamental to its identity”.1493 It is, 
secondly, grounded in the idea that the United Nations is the “centre for 
                                                      
1490 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, 103. 
1491 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
48. 
1492 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 48 (emphasis added). 
1493 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 52. 
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harmonizing national interests and forging international interests”.1494 And, finally, 
the United Nation has the capacity to do so because of its “comparative 
advantages” as it assembles “universal membership, political legitimacy, 
administrative impartiality, technical expertise, convening and mobilizing power, 
and dedication of its stuff”.1495  
 
While the ICISS clearly recommends the United Nations as the centre of 
international authority when it comes to the responsibility to protect, it is not clear 
where exactly this authority should be located within the United Nations system. 
With regard to this question, the report suggests that the UN Security Council 
should become pivotal, having a special “role – and responsibility”, as if 
“international consensus is ever to be reached about when, where, how and by 
whom military intervention should happen, it is very clear that the central role of 
the Security Council will have to be at the heart of that consensus”.1496 Making the 
Security Council the vanguard of the responsibility to protect implies for the 
Commission, on the one hand, that an authorization by the Security Council must 
be sought prior to any military intervention but, on the other hand, also that the 
Security Council “should deal promptly” if there is a “request for authority to 
intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic 
cleansing”.1497 However, if there are situations of institutional deadlock among the 
Permanent Five the ICISS suggests that, in order to remain effective, the 
Permanent Five, should agree in advance upon a “‘code of conduct’ for the use of  
the veto with respect to actions that are needed to stop or avert a significant 
humanitarian crisis”.1498 If the Security Council would still fail to act, the report 
considers that the authority to take actions with regard to the responsibility to 
protect might fall either to the General Assembly, which “would provide a high 
degree of legitimacy for an intervention”, or – “within its defining boundaries” (i.e. 
membership and not ‘out of area’) – to regional or sub-regional organisations 
because of their expertise and embeddedness within their respective region.1499 In 
the latter case, interventions of regional organizations against non-members are 
                                                      
1494 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 52. 
1495 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 52. 
1496 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 49. 
1497 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 50. 
1498 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 51. 
1499 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 53. 
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for the ICISS at least “controversial”.1500 Thus – and in order to sum up – by 
introducing the responsibility to protect concept the ICISS attempts to transfer the 
authority and hence the jurisdiction to decide in the name of the international 
community (back) to the United Nations.  
 
3.3 The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect: The Hybridization of the 
Intervention Discourse and International Criminal Law 
 
After the publication of the ICISS report the responsibility to protect was 
increasingly discussed by and within the different bodies of the United Nations. 
Obviously, the United Nations – and particularly Secretary-General Kofi Annan – 
saw the debate about the responsibility as a welcomed opportunity to further 
(re)gain international authority and jurisdiction over questions of international 
interventions.1501 This transformed arguments about the responsibility to protect 
in an important way: where discussions about the responsibility to protect in the 
context of the ICISS were mostly characterized by moral narratives, the story after 
the ICISS report increasingly became an intergovernmental one as the main 
question was now how to gain the support of UN member states to endorse the 
responsibility to protect. 
 
As a first step in this regard Secretary-General Annan assembled in 2003 a 
group of sixteen distinguished international experts in order to form a ‘High-level 
panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’.1502  As with the ICISS commission, the 
former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans became a co-chair – an 
                                                      
1500 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 54. 
1501 From early onwards and besides the United Nations, the responsibility to protect concept 
played also an important role for the African Union (AU), which was established in 2002. While its 
predecessors the Organization of African Unity (OAU) equated sovereignty with ‘non-interference’, 
the AU started to emphasise ‘non-indifference’. See, e.g, Paul D. Williams, ‘From Non-Intervention to 
Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture’, African 
Affairs 106, no. 423 (2007): 253–79; Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 77–81; and Evans, The 
Responsibility to Protect, 45. 
1502 The idea to establish this panel goes back to Annan’s general plan to reform the UN and here, in 
particular, the second reform report, which was drafted by Ramesh Thakur, United Nations 
Secretary-General, ‘Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change’, A/57/387 
(2002). For a discussion of the work of the high-level panel, see Ramesh Thakur, The Responsibility 
to Protect: Norms, Laws, and the Use of Force in International Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 
chap. 7. 
 405 
appointment that highlights the continuity between the two expert groups.1503 The 
panel foregrounded in its final report, which was published in 2004, the relevance 
of the responsibility to protect concept. This becomes already visible in the 
report’s title A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.1504 In a nutshell, A 
More Secure World acknowledges that the “maintenance of world peace and 
security depends importantly on there being a common global understanding, and 
acceptance, of when the application of force is both legal and legitimate”.1505 In this 
regard the report follows the Kosovo Commission’s observation of a ‘gap between 
legality and legitimacy’, which needs to be addressed and closed, and connects this 
with the claim of the ICISS that the “successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have 
concentrated attention not on the immunities of Sovereign governments but on 
their responsibilities, both to their own people as to the wider international 
community”.1506 In other words, the panel follows the ICISS’s project of a ‘re-
characterization’ of sovereignty and stresses that the “principle of non-
intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other 
atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-
scale ethnic cleansing”.1507  
 
What is important for our discussion in the remainder of this chapter, is that 
A More Secure World attempts to broaden and clarify the ‘just cause’ criteria of the 
ICISS report by adding ‘serious violations of international humanitarian law’ and 
by introducing the language of ‘atrocities’ – and connected to this: of genocide, 
ethic cleansing and large-scale killing.1508 I will elaborate on the consequences of 
this shift later in this chapter. On a more general note, the panel agrees with the 
ICISS when it comes to discuss the relationship between a ‘right to intervene’ and 
the ‘responsibility to protect, when it writes, that there  
 
                                                      
1503 Verlage, Responsibility to Protect, 3. 
1504 United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations Press, 2004). 
1505 United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, para. 184 (emphasis 
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1506 United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 201 (emphasis added). 
1507 United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 200. 
1508 Cf. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 75. 
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“is a growing recognition that the issue is not the ‘right to intervene’ of 
any State, but the ‘responsibility to protect’ of every State when it comes 
to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe […]. And there is a 
growing acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the 
primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such 
catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that 
responsibility should be taken up by the wider international 
community - with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, 
response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered 
societies”.1509 
 
The high-panel report A More Secure World served Secretary-General Annan 
as important groundwork for his report ‘In larger freedom: towards development, 
security and human rights for all’, which was published in March 2005 with the 
intention, on the one hand, to evaluate the outcome of the Millennium Summit five 
years earlier and, on the other hand, to prepare the World Summit a few month 
later. In this report the vernacular of responsibility is fully internalised, as there 
seems to be a ‘responsibility for everything’. For instance, it is claimed that states 
with nuclear weapons have “a unique responsibility”; 1510  similarly each 
“developing country has primary responsibility for its own development”;1511 or 
the international community has “responsibility for mitigating climate change”1512 
as well as there is a “responsibility to respect the law”;1513 and, finally, there is a 
“responsibilities to turn good words into good deeds”.1514 When it comes to 
security issues, Secretary-General Annan basically follows the high-level panel’s 
position and writes that “I believe to embrace the responsibility to protect and, 
when necessary, we must act on it”.1515 Annan also follows the ‘High-level panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change’ by introducing ‘just cause’ criteria in the form of 
concepts from the discourse of international criminal law (namely genocide, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity) as triggers for the responsibility to 
                                                      
1509 United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World, 201. 
1510 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All’ (2005), 28. 
1511 United Nations Secretary-General, 12. 
1512 United Nations Secretary-General, 20. 
1513 United Nations Secretary-General, 31. 
1514 United Nations Secretary-General, 7. 
1515 United Nations Secretary-General, 35. 
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protect. Accordingly, Annan urges from state representatives that they should 
 
“embrace the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a basis for collective action 
against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and 
agree to act on this responsibility, recognizing that this responsibility 
lies first and foremost with each individual State, whose duty it is to 
protect its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or 
unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the 
international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods 
appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to 
take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so 
required”.1516 
 
 The work of Secretary-General Annan and the ‘High-level panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change’ has been crucial in adding the responsibility to protect to 
the agenda of the General Assembly’s World Summit in October 2005, where the 
United Nations celebrated its sixtieth anniversary and which should become the 
largest assembly of heads of states in its history.1517 Among the results of the 
World Summit was that the Head of States and Governments unanimously adopted 
the responsibility to protect.1518 The responsibility to protect takes up a rather 
lengthy passage in the Outcome Document.1519 The three paragraphs dedicated to 
the responsibility to protect state the following:  
 
“138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
                                                      
1516 United Nations Secretary-General, 59. 
1517 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 76. 
1518 For a discussion whether this was actually a ‘success’ or ‘just’ the endorsement of a ‘R2P lite’ as 
the ‘basic principle divested of almost all its substance’, see Bellamy, chap. 5. Gareth Evans, 
however, emphasises the continuity: ‘The language of the relevant paragraphs, 138 and 139, of the 
Outcome Document differs a little from all the previous formulations in the ICISS, High-Level Panel, 
and secretary-general’s reports, but it does not vary from core R2P principles in any significant way 
- despite the disposition of some commentators to argues otherwise’. This brings Evans to the 
conclusion that the ’unanimous agreement on this language at the World Summit was an enormous 
achievement’, Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 47. 
1519 United Nations General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, A/RES/60/1 (2005), para. 
138–140. For an overview of the complex and complicated negotiation process on the 
responsibility to protect during the preparation of the World Summit see Ekkehard Strauss, The 
Emperor’s New Clothes? The United Nations and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 11–18. 
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populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. 
The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and 
help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly 
to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the 
Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress 
before crises and conflicts break out. 
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the 
Secretary- General on the Prevention of genocide”.1520 
 
Furthermore, in 2006 the UN Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 in its resolution 1674 by explicitly referring to the 
                                                      
1520 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 138–139. 
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“responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity”.1521 
 
 In the context of the World Summit Outcome Document four points are 
important to emphasise for the purpose of this chapter. First, it delegates the 
authority and jurisdiction over the responsibility to protect to the United Nations 
as the United Nations presents the (previously often amorphously conceptualised) 
‘international community’. In addition, the document links the central role of the 
United Nations explicitly to the Charter and foregrounds the role of the UN 
Security Council to take up a coordinative ‘collective action’ and to authorize the 
use of force if necessary.1522 Although regional organisations should be included as 
cooperation partners, the Security Council stands clearly above these 
institutions.1523 A humanitarian intervention such as conducted for example by 
NATO in its unilateral air operation in Kosovo is not intended in this framework 
anymore. This means that the World Summit Outcome Document resembles in this 
aspect the position of the ICISS. 
 
Second, as it was the case already with the high-level panel’s report and 
Secretary-General Annan’s ‘In larger freedom’ speech, the claim of the ICISS that 
the ‘substance of the responsibility to protect is the provision of life-supporting 
protection and assistance to populations at risk’1524 is further clarified and 
broadened by the introduction of the core international crimes of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Although the issue of 
protection has been around for some time in international relations, in particular 
in the context of the United Nations, and although it is obviously central for the 
responsibility to protect concept, it was not clear what ‘protection’ actually means 
and subsequently how it can be operationalized and ‘put into practice’.1525  While 
                                                      
1521 United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1674’, S/RES/1674 (2006), para. 4. 
1522 Cf. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 132. 
1523 This stands also in a broader development that has been characterized as constitutionalisation 
under the UN Security Council. For a discussion of this constitutionalisation in the context of the 
‘war on terror’ see Jean L. Cohen, ‘A Global State of Emergency or the Further Constitutionalization 
of International Law: A Pluralist Approach’, Constellations 15, no. 4 (2008): 456–84. 
1524 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect, 17 and my discussion above in this chapter. 
1525 For a genealogy of the ‘protection of civilians’ paradigm in international relations, see Arthur 
Mühlen-Schulte, ‘Evolving Discourses of Protection’, in The Protection of Civilians in UN 
Peacekeeping: Concept, Implementation and Practice, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Ole Jacob 
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most scholars and practitioners would agree that the meaning of the concept of 
protection changed from the interstate wars of the early twentieth century, with 
rather military than civilian causalities, to the intrastate conflicts at the end of the 
same century, with mainly civilian causalities, the concept is nevertheless 
considered as ‘blurred’ or ‘unclear’ and it is pointed out moreover that it is without 
a ‘formal’ definition within the United Nations. 1526  In order to circumvent 
conceptual quagmires and competing definitions, Kofi Annan introduced the 
notion of a “culture of protection” in the early 2000s.1527 On the one hand, to speak 
of a ‘culture of protection’ might help to hold within and around the United Nations 
the “vast divergence of organizational cultures, mandates and intuitional 
trajectories among actors conducting protection activities” together and to create 
the basis for a protection project of a larger movement;1528 but, on the other hand, 
it makes it difficult to ‘turn protection into practice’ and to ‘translate it to the 
ground’. To frame the issue of protection in the context of the responsibility to 
protect in terms of the international crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity presents thus an attempt to overcome the 
indeterminacy of the ‘culture of protection’ concept.  
 
Third and connected to this, as protection is tied to genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity we can observe a hybridization of 
two central discourses of ‘humanity’s law’, namely international criminal law and 
international humanitarian law.1529 Put differently, where earlier academic and 
                                                                                                                                                            
Sending (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 25–46. Jon Harald Sande Lie and Benjamin de Carvalho find 
in the context of the United Nations two distinct discourses with the notion of protection at its 
centre: one on the ‘protection of civilians’ and the other on the ‘responsibility to protect’, Jon Harald 
Sande Lie and Benjamin de Carvalho, ‘Conceptual Unclarity and Competition: The Protection of 
Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect’, in The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping: 
Concept, Implementation and Practice, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Ole Jacob Sending (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2013), 47–61. Anne Orford in contrast does not distinguish between both and 
presents instead a genealogy of only one discourse of protection within the United Nations, see 
Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect. 
1526 Lie and de Carvalho, ‘Conceptual Unclarity and Competition’, 53. According to Lie and de 
Carvalho, conceptual unclarity was further aggravated in some literatures by merging the 
protection of civilians (PoC) and the responsibility to protect (R2P). They insist that ‘being non-
interventionist, PoC enjoys wider legitimacy than R2P. The conceptual muddle resulting from the 
use of the two concepts as synonymous can easily end up in jeopardizing the legitimacy of PoC. It is 
essential to treat R2P and PoC as two distinct but related concepts in order to avoid “R2PoC”’, Lie 
and de Carvalho, 61 (emphasis in the original). 
1527 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 
the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, S/2001/331 (2001). 
1528 Lie and de Carvalho, ‘Conceptual Unclarity and Competition’, 58. 
1529 Cf. Mégret, ‘ICC, R2P, and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist Toolkit’, 25. 
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non-academic discussions in the context of ‘humanitarian interventions’ and still 
with regard to the ICISS report framed the issue of ‘protection’ – and, thus, based the 
source of ‘humanity’ – rather in the vernacular of (international) human rights (law), 
we witness now a discursive shift towards the language of international crimes.1530 
The international crimes of the World Summit Outcome Document resemble to a 
large extense also the catalogue of crimes of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.1531 Both include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
and differ with respect to the fourth category of crimes: while the Rome Statute 
includes the crime of aggression, the World Summit Outcome Document lists 
ethnic cleansing as distinct crime. As Frédéric Mégret describes the overall 
rationale, these “crimes must be prevented as a matter of urgent moral and legal 
obligation, and both R2P and the ICC are means of towards that end. As practices of 
power one might say that their specificity lies in their being technologies of 
‘designations of victims’, by which is meant ‘legitimate’ victims”.1532 In a similar 
vein Anne Orford notes an “expanded role of international criminal law categories 
in international governance. The risk of international crimes taking place is now 
posited as the trigger to a broad range of governance and police functions. The 
jurisdiction of the international community will be triggered by the risk that 
certain specific crimes may be committed”.1533 This goes, of course, also hand in 
hand with the observation of the previous chapter that ‘humanity’s Law’ is not 
restricted to expand its jurisdiction by relying on a territorial logic of jurisdiction 
but that it is able to conceptualise space differently by, e.g., relying on an extension 
of its jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
 
 Fourth, the central questions are now of who defines, frames and decides 
over the ‘risk’ that certain crimes might happen in the (immediate) future; of who is 
                                                      
1530 For critical discussion see Ainley, ‘From Atrocity Crimes to Human Rights’. 
1531 See, for example, Tarun Chhabra and Jeremy B. Zucker, ‘Defining the Crimes’, in The 
Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time, ed. Jared Genser and 
Irwin Cotler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 37. On the politics of crimes in the wider 
context of the International Criminal Court see also my discussion in Chapter 6. It is important to 
note that the World Summit Outcome Document is not the first instance that connects international 
crimes and interventionism. In a similar vein the Constitutive Act of the African Union had defined 
international crimes as ‘triggers’ for regional interventions. Cf. Orford, International Authority and 
the Responsibility to Protect, 185. 
1532 Mégret, ‘ICC, R2P, and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist Toolkit’, 25. 
1533 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, 185. See also Mégret, ‘ICC, R2P, 
and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist Toolkit’, 26. 
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able to speak and of who is silenced; of what is known and what is unknown. This is 
of course also part of a larger ‘politics of catastrophe’ and ‘imagination’.1534 What I 
will claim in the remainder of this chapter is that we can observe a jurisdictional 
struggle over the responsibility to protect within the United Nations and here 
particularly between the UN Security Council and the position of the UN Secretary 
General itself as the UN Secretary-General – first Kofi Annan and from 2007 
onwards Ban Ki-moon – attempted to gain the epistemic authority over the 
question of whether a ‘population is at risk’ or not by locating specific expertise 
within the bureaucracy of the United Nations. Hand-in-hand with this goes also a 
transformation of the focus of the responsibility to protect discourse. While the 
narrative in the context of the World Summit was first and foremost an 
intergovernmental one, we can now observe a more technical and operational 
language about the implementation of the responsibility to protect within the 
United Nations. 
 
 4. Risky Interventions: Quantifying Humanity’s Law and the Production of 
Temporal Uncertainty  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will concentrate on a specific episode of the 
implementation of the responsibility to protect within the United Nations, namely 
the attempt to translate the responsibility to protect into an indicator of a risk 
assessment tool. By doing so, I will be able to illustrate how the Secretary-General, 
first Kofi Annan and then Ban Ki-moon, was able to gain discursive hegemony 
within the United Nations as well as outside of it by making the responsibility to 
protect a technical project conducted by different experts and through various 
kinds of expertise (4.1). In particular, I will reconstruct how legal categories, in this 
case international crimes, were translated into risk indicators (4.2). This helps me 
then to reflect about the effects of quantification, the shifting of temporality within 
the international legal discourse and changes in international authority and 
jurisdiction when it comes to questions of intervention. I will link this finally to a 
discussion about the temporality of the humanity concept itself (4.3). 
                                                      
1534 For a discussion of these terms see Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, Politics of 
Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown (London: Routledge, 2011). 
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4.1 ‘Materializing’, ‘Implementing’, ‘Mainstreaming’, ‘Operationalizing’ 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, it was under the tenure of Kofi Annan as 
Secretary-General that the responsibility to protect was introduced into the United 
Nations system and started to play an increasingly important role in particular 
after its unanimous endorsement in the context the of the 2005 World Summit.1535 
Annan’s successor as Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, should further develop the 
project of the responsibility and focus mainly on its implementation. As Ban stated 
already in his appointment speech in front of the General Assembly in October 
2006: 
 
“As Secretary-General, I will make the most of the authority invested in 
my office by the Charter and the mandate you give me. I will work 
diligently to materialize our responsibility to protect the most vulnerable 
members of humanity and for the peaceful resolution of threats to 
international security and regional stability”.1536 
 
In order to ‘materialize’ the responsibility to protect – or, as he should put it 
in his programmatic speech in Berlin in July 2008 to “turn promise into practice, 
words into deeds”1537 – Ban should rely on two interrelated instruments. These 
instruments have also to be understood as forms of ‘capacity building’ on an 
international level.1538 Firstly, Ban appointed special advisers and, secondly, he 
should issue a yearly report on the ‘implementation’ of the responsibility to 
protect. Here, the language of ‘implementation’ should indicate that the main 
                                                      
1535 Indeed, Annan himself saw the endorsement of the responsibility to protect at the World 
Summit as a major achievement of his tenure as Secretary-General. Asked at his final press 
conference as Secretary-General about his major achievements, Annan answered: ‘I would say the 
work we did on human rights and the approval of the responsibility to protect, by the Member 
States. [...] Let me say that that new principle, which is an extremely important one, will make a 
difference, I believe, in our world. But, we should not expect it to be fulfilled or implemented 
immediately or in the first year. I think, over time, you will see what difference this is going to make 
to international law’, United Nations, ‘Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary General Kofi 
Annan at United Nations Headquarters’, 19 December 2006. 
1536 United Nations, ‘Ban Ki-Moon Appointed next UN Secretary-General by Acclamation’, 13 
October 2006. 
1537 And Ban continues: ‘Today, the responsibility to protect is a concept, not yet a policy; an 
aspiration, not yet a reality’, Ban Ki-moon, ‘Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies  ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ at Berlin Event on “Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed 
World”’, 15 July 2008. 
1538 For a discussion see, for example, Welsh, ‘Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”’, 140–
143. 
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political struggle over the responsibility to protect was over and that the United 
Nations, represented by the Secretary-General, has international authority and 
jurisdiction over questions of intervention and the use of force in general. Let me 
briefly turn to both instruments. 
 
 As a first instrument, and reflecting paragraph 140 of the World Summit 
Outcome Document, two special advisers should start to occupy important 
positions. A Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was appointed in 2004 
already, with Juan Méndez serving as first in this function. The initial list of the 
main responsibilities of this special adviser included to “collect existing 
information, [...] act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, […], 
make recommendations to the Security Council [and] liaise with the United 
Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance 
the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage information relating to 
genocide or related crimes”.1539 In May 2007 Francis Deng, who had coined the 
term ‘responsibility to protect’ some ten years earlier, succeed Juan Méndez as 
Special Adviser. Institutionally, the position was also enhanced at this time by 
making it full-time and upgrading it to he level of Under-Secretary-General and, 
content-wise, the mandate was altered as the position was renamed into Special 
Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities. The idea behind 
adding ‘mass atrocities’ was to broaden the scope of the mandate “without 
determining whether a specific situation has a ‘genocidal’ character or not”.1540 In 
addition, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established, after a difficult negotiation 
process with the General Assembly, the post of another special adviser, namely the 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, which should be covered on a 
part-time basis at Assistant Secretary-General level and which was first occupied 
by Edward C. Luck, 1541 a – in the words of Ban – “distinguished international 
                                                      
1539 United Nations Security Council, ‘Outline of the Mandate for the Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide’, S/2004/567 (2004), 2. 
1540 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Letter Dated 31 August 2007 from the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council’, S/2007/721 (2007), 1. 
1541 The negotiation process was difficult as the representatives of Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran and 
Pakistan rejected the first proposal to appoint a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect as 
they feared that the General Assembly would transfer to much power to the Secretary-General. See 
Strauss, The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 43. And the position should remain contested within the 
United Nations in the years that came. Reflecting retrospectively about his role as special adviser, 
Luck writes: ‘This author [Edward C. Luck] recalls talk of or attempts by three or four larger UN 
entities to absorb the Joint Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P during the five years he served 
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scholar with extensive knowledge of the United Nations system and a superb 
reputation for academic and practical excellence”.1542 The Special Adviser on the 
Responsibility to Protect should “work on the conceptual, institutional and 
political dimension” of the responsibility to protect1543 and help “to operationalize 
the concept and to develop the doctrine of the responsibility to protect”.1544 
Moreover, both special advisers – to whom Ban should refer also as “my two 
professors” – started to share a “joint office” (‘Office on Genocide Prevention and 
the Responsibility to Protect’) in New York in order to “help […] the United Nations 
to speak and act as one” when it comes to the responsibility to protect and the 
question of international crimes.1545 The “primary function” of the Office on 
Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect encompasses mainly to 
“collect, collate, analyse, and disseminate information”.1546 
 
 As a second instrument to translate the responsibility to protect into the 
United Nations system, Secretary-General Ban started to present from 2009 
onwards yearly implementation reports on the responsibility to protect before the 
General Assembly. Although the Security Council has been added as second 
addressee of the reports in 2011, it is clearly visible in these reports that the 
General Assembly rather than the Security Council is seen as the main site for 
                                                                                                                                                            
as Special Adviser. Some couched this as a possible reform measure to be taken in the name of 
streamlining and coherence. Such a step, however, would reduce the range of views presented to 
the Secretary-General and, in some cases, to the Member States. It could also discourage the kind of 
fresh thinking and targeted approaches that are most needed in the relatively underdeveloped field 
of study of atrocity prevention as a distinct policy challenge that requires distinct policy responses’, 
Edward C. Luck, ‘Getting There, Being Better: The Dual Roles of the Special Adviser’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 298–299. In other words, the establishment of the positions of special 
advisers serves as perfect example for inner-organizational rivalries within the United Nations and 
how different groups attempt to gain jurisdiction over the working areas of the two special 
advisers. 
1542 United Nations Secretary-General, Letter dated 31 August 2007 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council; Don Hubert, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: 
Preventing and Halting Crimes Against Humanity’, in Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future 
Outrages, ed. Rotberg Robert I. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 99; see also 
Edward C. Luck, ‘Getting There, Being There: The Dual Role of the Special Adviser’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 288–314. 
1543 Ban, ‘Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies  ‘Responsibility to Protect’ at Berlin Event’. 
1544 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2008-2009’, 
A/62/512/Add.1 (2007), para. 31. 
1545 Ban, ‘Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies  ‘Responsibility to Protect’ at Berlin Event’. 
1546 Welsh, ‘Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”’, 142. 
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debates with regard to the responsibility to protect.1547 Without going into the 
details of each report, the 2009 report ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ 
was important as it presented a larger programmatic overview of Ban’s strategy to 
implement the responsibility to protect within the United Nations system.1548 Ban 
emphasised in this report that the mandate of his own work on the responsibility 
to protect would stay within the confines of the World Summit Outcome Document 
and that the “task ahead is not to reinterpret or renegotiate the conclusions of the 
World Summit but to find ways of implementing its decisions in a fully faithful and 
consistent manner”.1549 In order to do so, the report breaks and translates articles 
138-139 of the World Summit Outcome Document into three ‘pillars’. Pillar one 
addresses the responsibility of individual states (‘the protection responsibilities of 
the State’) while pillar two calls upon the responsibility of the international 
community represented through the United Nations system and its partner 
organizations (‘International assistance and capacity-building’). Finally, pillar 
three stresses the importance of ‘timely and decisive response’ in situations where 
a responsibility to protect might be invoked.1550 According to Ban, the three pillars 
should neither be understood as sequential nor as unequally important as, 
metaphorically speaking, if “the three supporting pillars were of unequal length, 
the edifice of the responsibility to protect could become unstable, leaning 
preciously in one direction. Similarly, unless all three pillars are strong the edifice 
could implode and collapse”.1551 To focus on these pillars and to limit the 
protection of populations to the “four crimes and violations” of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity would keep the scope of the 
responsibility to protect “narrow” while making response at the same time “deep” 
through the employment of a “wide array of prevention and protection 
instruments”.1552 Later reports should address and reflect upon individual topics, 
                                                      
1547 Welsh, 143. 
1548 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, A/63/66 
(2009). Some of the basic ideas were already introduced in: Ban, ‘Secretary-General Defends, 
Clarifies  ‘Responsibility to Protect’ at Berlin Event’. 
1549 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect, 4. 
1550 United Nations Secretary-General, 8–9. 
1551 United Nations Secretary-General, 9. 
1552 United Nations Secretary-General, 8. For further discussion see also Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The 
“Narrow but Deep Approach” to Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Reassessing the Focus 
on International Crimes’, in Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, ed. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, 
and Alex Zucker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 81–94. 
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such as pillar one1553, two1554 and three1555, the role of and interplay with regional 
and subregional organisations 1556 , the development of early warning and 
assessment mechanisms1557, the question of accountability;1558 or they should 
present an evaluation of the first decade since the endorsement by the General 
Assembly1559 and an outlook for the next decade.1560 
 
 Although these instruments kept discussions about the responsibility to 
protect running within the United Nations, progress on its implementation was 
however slow. As a consequence, Ban emphasised in the 2015 implementation 
report that the “case for accelerating implementation could not be stronger”.1561 As 
main barriers to implement the responsibility to protect, Ban identified one year 
later “an alarming disregard for fundamental tenets of international law” and 
missing support in the prevention of international crimes on state level as well as 
the increasing perpetration of those crimes by external actors particularly in civil 
war situations.1562 In this broader context the specific language of ‘mainstreaming’ 
has gained more and more prominence over the years. As Ban had stated in the 
2009 implementation report already:  
 
“The United Nations and its range of agencies, funds and programmes 
have in place critical resources, activities and field operations that are 
already making important contributions to the elimination of these 
man-made scourges. They could do that much more effectively if goals 
                                                      
1553  United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and 
Prevention’, A/67/929 – S/2013/399 (2013). 
1554  United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International 
Assistance and the Responsibility to Protect’, A/68/947 – S/2014/449 (2014). 
1555 United Nations Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response. 
1556 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, A/65/877 – S/2011/393 (2011). 
1557 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to 
Protect’, A/84/684 (2010). 
1558 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability 
for Prevention’, A/71/1016 – S/2017/556 (2017). This was the first report of Antonio Gutierrez, of 
Ban Ki-moons successor as Secretary-General. 
1559 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’, A/69/981 - S/2015/500 (2015). 
1560 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Mobilizing Collective Action: The next Decade of the 
Responsibility to Protect’, A/70/999 – S/2016/620 (2016). 
1561 United Nations Secretary-General, A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the 
responsibility to protect, 6. 
1562 United Nations Secretary-General, Mobilizing collective action: the next decade of the 
responsibility to protect, 8–9. 
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relating to the responsibility to protect, including the protection of 
refugees and the internally displaces, were mainstreamed among their 
priorities, whether in the areas of human rights, humanitarian affairs, 
peacekeeping, political affairs or development”.1563 
 
While back then the responsibility to protect itself was understood as a tool to 
‘mainstream’ between the different ‘agencies, funds and programmes’ within (and 
among) the United Nations, Ban noted a couple of years later, in 2016, that there is 
a need of “mainstreaming the responsibility to protect” in order to keep it running 
within the United Nations.1564  
 
In general, policy actors understand ‘mainstreaming’ as an important 
instrument to enhance contested concepts with ‘determinate’ meaning and to 
make them ready for implementation within larger bureaucracies.1565 With regard 
to the specificity of the responsibility to protect one of the main instruments to 
‘mainstream’ the responsibility to protect was the introduction of the concept of 
atrocity crimes. Although loosely appearing in earlier implementation reports, the 
concept is central since Ban’s 2013 report, where it is explicitly used as an 
umbrella term for the four crimes and violations of the 2005 General Assembly 
Outcome Document, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
ethic cleansing.1566  
 
The concept of atrocity crimes goes back to the work of David Scheffer, a 
legal scholar and former US Ambassador at-Large for War Crimes Issues under the 
Clinton administration. The necessity for conceptual innovation was for Scheffer 
                                                      
1563 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect, 29 (emphasis 
added). 
1564 See, for example, United Nations Secretary-General, Mobilizing collective action: the next 
decade of the responsibility to protect, 11. 
1565 For a critical reconstruction of the emergence and role of mainstreaming in the context human 
rights, see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Strategy for Institutional Power’, 
Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 1, no. 1 
(2010): 47–58. It was in particular the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect Edward C. 
Luck, who institutionalised mainstreaming mechanisms. For a discussion, see Alex J. Bellamy, 
‘Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in the United Nations System: Dilemmas, Challenges 
and Opportunities’, Global Responsibility to Protect 5, no. 2 (2013): 160. Luck, as pointed out above, 
is seen rather as an expert of the United Nations systems and inter-agency relations than of the 
responsibility to protect. 
1566  United Nations Secretary-General, Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and 
prevention, 1. 
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crucial in the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention as he identified a lacuna in 
existing legal vocabularies to justify timely response in situations of unfolding 
international crimes. As Scheffer argues, however, a traditional understanding of 
international crimes, in particular the crime of genocide with its demanding 
requirement of proof of discriminatory intent (mens rea), would set the bar to 
intervene too high. Introducing the notion of ‘atrocity crimes’ would help instead 
to “liberate governments and international organizations from the genocide 
factor”.1567 It would bring in, as Scheffer writes, a “terminology adaptable enough 
so that at the policy level we know how to react quickly to deal with the killing in 
an efficient and timely way and not let the law stymie the policy implementation 
on the ground”.1568 Yet, this does not mean, for Scheffer, that one should abandon 
traditional categories of international crimes at all but rather “maintain these 
important distinctions among crimes in the law, because the prosecution and 
defense need these distinctions”.1569 Nevertheless, in order to react in unfolding 
situations of international criminal acts these distinctions represent for Scheffer 
too much of a legalistic straightjacket. Scheffer connects these considerations 
directly to discussions about interventionism and the responsibility to protect 
when he writes: 
 
“Humanitarian intervention and the recent articulation of a 
responsibility to protect civilian populations at risk, both of which 
remain controversial areas of international law, might be better 
understood and more supportable politically of the object of 
intervention or action to protect were to end or prevent an atrocity 
crime, rather than having politicians, military commanders, and their 
government lawyers and spokespersons claim that such massive 
military measures are required to confront war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or violation of international humanitarian law. The crime of 
genocide can be left untethered as a powerful public rationale for 
                                                      
1567 David Scheffer, ‘Genocide and Atrocity Crimes’, Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (2006): 
229. For a similar argument, see, e.g., Scott Straus, ‘What Is Being Prevented? Genocide, Mass 
Atrocity, and Conceptual Ambiguity in the Anti-Atrocity Movement’, in Reconstructing Atrocity 
Prevention, ed. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 21–23. 
1568 David Scheffer, ‘Arresting War Criminals: Mission Creep or Mission Impossible’, Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 35, no. 2 (2003): 319. 
1569 Scheffer, 319. 
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humanitarian intervention or an action to protect. But short of literally 
calling a situation a genocide, which experience is a struggle for 
governments and international organizations, there us need for a 
powerful and accurate term that can be readily understood as justifying 
the extraordinary and legally controversial initiative of a humanitarian 
intervention or action to protect populations at risk. That term is 
‘atrocity crimes’”.1570 
 
The language of ‘atrocity crimes’ and ‘atrocity’ should rapidly influence the 
vernacular of international humanitarianism. As such it should become an 
important cornerstone of, in particular, US-American initiatives culminating in the 
creation of an Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) under the Obama 
administration,1571 it should be echoed in various scholarly discussions and 
publications,1572 it should be adopted by and translated into program proposals of 
nongovernmental organisations1573 and, as mentioned, it should be a central 
concept for Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his attempt of ‘materializing’, 
‘implementing’, ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘operationalizing’ the responsibility to protect 
within the United Nations system.1574 As we will see below, the notion of atrocity 
crimes builds a perfect ‘black box’ in order to travel within organisations and to 
advance new jurisdictional projects. 
 
                                                      
1570 Scheffer, ‘Genocide and Atrocity Crimes’, 247. 
1571 The APB attempts to institutionalise the assessment of atrocity crimes and to develop strategies 
of how to reduce them. For further discussion see Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, ‘Arresting 
Atrocity: Obama’s Agenda to Prevent Genocide’, Foreign Affairs, 11 September 2015; Serena K. 
Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Introduction’, in The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the 
Challenges of Atrocity Prevention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 3; and Welsh, 
‘Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”’, 138–139. 
1572 From the expanding scholarly literature on atrocity crimes, see, for example, Ainley, ‘From 
Atrocity Crimes to Human Rights’; Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tiberiu Galis, and Alex Zucker, eds., 
Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, 2016; Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing 
Future Outrages (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). Gareth Evans explicitly adopts 
Scheffer’s approach. As noted above, Evans was co-chair of both the ICISS and the ’High-level panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change’. See Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, chap. 1. 
1573 For instance, ‘AtrocityWatch’ was founded. The organisation describes its mission statement as 
follows: ‘Provide an early warning of precursors to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity through crowd sourcing, big data and the impartial presentation of 
analytic results’, AtrocityWatch, ‘Mission Statement’, 2014. 
1574 As Ban stated, for example, in the first implementation report: ‘Eliminating mass atrocity 
crimes will continue to be one of the cardinal objectives of my tenure as Secretary-General’, United 
Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect, para. 69. 
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4.2 A Framework of Analysis: The Making of an Indicator 
 
One result of these various initiatives, processes and debates was the creation of 
indicators – in particular indicators evaluating the risk of emerging responsibility 
to protect situations – within the United Nations system and beyond. These 
indicators are important instruments in jurisdictional competitions with regard to 
the responsibility to protect – and ‘humanity’s law’ more generally. In this context 
indicators help to translate projects like and related to the responsibility to protect 
and ‘humanity’s law’ into numbers and other equivalences. By doing so these 
projects are made comparable and implementable across new areas. To illustrate 
what it means to translate the responsibility to protect and ‘humanity’s law’ into 
the specific setting and form of an indicator, I will introduce in this sub-section one 
specific indicator, namely the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A tool for 
prevention.1575 Importantly, the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes is an 
indicator in the form of a qualitative risk indicator. To have an in-depth look at this 
indicator helps me to establish the basis for the more general discussion on global 
legal indicators, risk and humanity in the next sub-section.  
 
 The Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes was published in 2014 and is 
part of the larger prevention strategy, which was set out in the Secretary-General’s 
2010 implementation report aiming to enhance early warning mechanisms and to 
build up capacities to help populations at risk.1576 Moreover, the Framework is, as 
Ban Ki-moon notes in the 2016 implementation report, “essential” in 
mainstreaming the responsibility to protect as it is “integrated into existing human 
rights and conflict analysis methodologies used by the United Nations system”.1577 
As Ban further reports, outside the United Nations “[s]ome regional bodies […] and 
individual Member States […] have begun to incorporate the Framework into their 
                                                      
1575 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (New York, 2014). 
1576 United Nations Secretary-General, Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect. 
Prevention has become the core of the responsibility to protect. As, for example, Serena Sharma and 
Jennifer Welsh note: ‘Among the key constitutive elements of the principle of R2P, prevention has 
deemed by many as the single most important. Scholars and policy makers alike concede that it is 
both normatively and politically desirable to act to prevent atrocity crimes from being committed - 
rather than to react after they are already underway’. Sharma and Welsh, ‘Introduction’, 1. See also 
the discussion in Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 4. 
1577 United Nations Secretary-General, Mobilizing collective action: the next decade of the 
responsibility to protect, 12. 
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own analysis”.1578 The Framework was developed by both the Special Adviser on 
the Prevention for Genocide and Atrocity Crimes as well as the Special Adviser of 
the Responsibility Protect, who were at the time of the publication of the 
Framework Adama Dieng and Jennifer Welsh.1579 It presents thus a result of the 
cooperation within the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to 
Protect (or ‘joint office’). It builds directly on previous work of the Office of the UN 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and here particularly another – 
earlier – framework, namely the Analysis Framework, which was published in 2009 
and which was produced to “determine whether there may be a risk of genocide in 
a given situation”.1580 In general, this early Analysis Framework is rather simple: 
after being introduced by a legal definition of genocide, it lists eight categories of 
risk factors, which are outlined in rather broad strokes (i.e., including only a few 
bullet points for each factor) and which are not made quantifiable. The overall 
background of this indicator was to sensibilize the different bodies within the 
United Nations systems for different types of risk when it comes to the question 
whether a genocide might occur or not.1581 
 
 Compared to the initial Analysis Framework, the 2014 Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes is far more elaborated and comprehensive. As it was 
produced by the ‘joint office’ of the two Advisers its scope includes not only the 
international crime of genocide but also the other atrocity crimes of the World 
Summit Outcome Document, i.e., crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic 
cleansing.1582 In order to better grasp how the Framework works, it is important to 
                                                      
1578 United Nations Secretary-General, 12. 
1579 Adama Dieng, a Senegalese legal practitioner, succeeded Francis Deng as Special Adviser for the 
Prevention of Genocide and Atrocity Crimes in 2012; Jennifer Welsh, a Canadian International 
Relation scholar, followed Edward Luck in 2013. Both also published jointly a journal article in 
order to further explain the Framework: Adama Dieng and Jennifer Welsh, ‘Assessing the Risk of 
Atrocity Crimes’, Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 3 (2016): 4–12. 
1580 Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, ‘Analysis 
Framework’, 19 October 2009. As I will focus only on initiatives within the United Nations, I will not 
discuss other precursors, which were mainly developed by civil society initiatives. For example the 
Jacob Blaustein Insitute for the Advancement of Human Rights produced a ‘compilation’ in order to 
‘identify the major “risk factors” that could lead to the perpetration of genocide and the legal norms 
and standards that underlie these risk factors’. Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of 
Human Rights, Compilation of Risk Factors and Legal Norms for the Prevention of Genocide (New 
York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, 2011), viii. 
1581 Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, ‘Analysis 
Framework’. 
1582 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, 5. 
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understand how it assembles and connects visual elements, text and lists of 
indicators.1583 These connections are, furthermore, translations between different 
forms of representation.  
 
 
Figure 3.    Cover. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility 
     to Protect, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A tool for prevention. 
 
The cover page of the document presents a carefully composed collage of six 
photographs and states in bold letters the full title – Framework of Analysis for 
Atrocity Crimes: A tool for prevention (Figure 3). The pictures are further explained 
within the document. They depict (counter-clockwise from the top): ‘Santa Cruz 
massacre 17th anniversary march, Dili’; ‘A woman testifies in the trial of former 
                                                      
1583 For a similar strategy to analyse a document see, for example, Annelise Riles, ‘Infinity within the 
Brackets’, American Ethnologist 25, no. 3 (1998): 378–98. 
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Guatemalan military dictator’; ‘A woman mourns at the Srebrenica-Potocari 
memorial and cemetery’; ‘Darfur village abandoned after heavy clashes’; ‘Rwandan 
refugees returning from Goma’; Young children at the “Killing Fields” memorial in 
the outskirts of Phnom Penh’.1584 All pictures were taken relatively recently: 
although some link to events in a distant past; these pictures bring them to the 
present. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Ban in front of Ausschwitz-Birkenau. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and    
the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A tool for 
prevention. 
 
The Framework opens then up with a foreword authored by UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon, which is accompanied by a picture showing Ban in front of 
Auschwitz-Birkenau (Figure 4). In the foreword, Ban connects the past of the 
Holocaust and other atrocities with the risk of future atrocity crimes when he 
writes: 
 
                                                      
1584 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, i. 
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“Prevention means acting early; to do that we need to know what to 
look for. Together with a commitment to accountability, we owe this to 
the millions of victims of the horrific international crimes of the past – 
and those whose lives we may be able to save in the future”.1585 
 
Elsewhere in the foreword Ban states that “we are committed to upholding the 
promise of ‘never again’, and drawing lessons from past failures”.1586 To develop a 
framework that connects past failure with future risk has become important as 
“[a]trocity crimes take place on a large scale, and are not spontaneous or isolated 
events; they are processes, with histories, precursors and triggering factors which, 
combined, enable their commission”.1587 To translate these experiences into an 
indicator and to make them thus evaluable for future operations is the purpose of 
the Framework: “With the help of the Framework, we can better sound the alarm, 
promote action, improve monitoring or early warning by different actors, and help 
Member States to identify gaps in their atrocity prevention capacities and 
strategies”.1588 Moreover, the Framework might serve to ‘mainstream’ the United 
Nations in terms of ‘humanity’s law’ as it could support a “system-wide revision of 
the way we respond to situations of serious violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law […]. In practice, it means putting human rights, the 
protection of civilians and the prevention of atrocity crimes as the centre of our 
work”.1589 
 
 The Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes is further contextualised by a 
detailed introduction written by the ‘joint office’ of the two Advisers. The 
introduction reaffirms at its outset the importance of fighting atrocity crimes as 
they “are considered to be the most serious crimes against humankind. Their 
status as international crimes is based on the belief that the acts associated with 
them affect the core dignity of human beings, in particular the dignity of being that 
                                                      
1585 Ban, ‘Foreword’, in Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention, ed. United 
Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (United Nations, 2014), iii 
(emphasis added). 
1586 Ban, iii. 
1587 Ban, iii (emphasis added). 
1588 Ban, iii. 
1589 Ban, iii. 
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should be most protected by States”.1590 Fighting atrocity crimes is, in addition, 
important in order to guarantee peace and stability on a national, regional and 
international level. In line with other proponents of the responsibility to protect, 
the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect argues that “by 
taking measures to prevent atrocity crimes and fulfilling their primary 
responsibility States reinforce their sovereignty and reduce the need for more 
intrusive forms of response from other States or international actors”.1591 This 
position is of course an entire inversion of the traditional notion of sovereignty 
based on non-interference and exclusive territorial jurisdiction. 
 
 Importantly, the authors emphasise that there is not only a “moral and 
ethical responsibility that we all have to protect populations at risk of atrocity 
crimes, both individually and collectively” but that “there are also well-established 
legal obligations to do so”.1592 In order to substantiate this claim, the Framework 
refers to a number of treaties, customary law, decisions of international courts as 
well as the “principle of the Responsibility to Protect” of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document.1593 The Framework claims hence a “legal responsibility to 
protect atrocity crimes”.1594 To back the legal dimension the Framework includes 
also an annex of “Legal Definitions of Atrocity Crimes”.1595 In other words, by 
emphasising these various legal sources the Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect frames the responsibility to protect populations from the 
risk of atrocity crimes as a legal or at least law-like project. 
 
 Moreover, the Framework translates this project into the managerial 
language of risk assessment. The ‘joint office’ argues that it “provides an integrated 
analysis and risk assessment tool for atrocity crimes” and, more precisely, “serves 
as a working tool for the assessment of the risk of atrocity crimes in all parts of the 
world and in identifying those countries most at risk”.1596 In a different manner to 
                                                      
1590 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, 1. 
1591 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2. 
1592 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2. 
1593 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2–3. 
1594 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2 (emphasis 
added). 
1595 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 26–32. 
1596 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 5. 
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the earlier Analysis Framework of 2009, the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity 
Crimes of 2014 is explicitly a “public document” that should help to mainstream 
the assessment of atrocity crimes not only within the United Nations system but 
should also be used “by international, regional and national actors as a tool either 
for early warning mechanisms, or for other mechanisms used for monitoring, 
assessment and forecasting”.1597 
 
 In order to operationalize this, the Framework introduces 14 broader risk 
factors and subdivides each of these risk factors into several indicators. Yet, what 
exactly is the difference between risk factors and indicators? How do they hang 
together? How is the Framework supposed to be used? Firstly, risk factors are 
defined as 
 
“conditions that increase the risk of or susceptibility to negative 
outcomes. Those identified in this framework include behaviours, 
circumstances or elements that create an environment conductive to 
the commission of atrocity crimes, or indicate the potential, probability 
or risk of their occurrence”.1598 
 
The framework divides the 14 risk factors in two different ways: On the one hand, 
it groups all 14 risk factors into either structural (e.g., weak state structure) or 
dynamic (e.g., specific ‘triggers’) factors; and, on the other hand, it splits the same 
14 risk factors into factors that equally apply to all atrocity crimes and into those 
that are specific to either genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes as each 
                                                      
1597 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 5. 
1598 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 5. The 14 risk 
factors comprise: 1) Situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability; 2) record of serious 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law; 3) weakness of state structures; 4) 
motives or incentives; 5) capacity to commit atrocity crime; 6) absence of mitigating factors; 7) 
enabling circumstances or preparatory action; 8) triggering factors; 9) intergroup tensions or 
patterns of discrimination against protected groups; 10) signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in 
part a protected group; 11) signs of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population; 12) signs of a plan or policy to attack any civilian population; 13) serious threats to 
those protected under international humanitarian law; 14) serious threats to humanitarian or 
peacekeeping operations. See United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility 
to Protect, 9–24. 
 428 
of these crimes has its own features and trajectories.1599 Secondly, indicators are 
defined as  
 
“different manifestations of each risk factor, and therefore assist in 
determining the degree to which an individual risk factor is present. 
The particular indicators identified in the Framework have been drawn 
from past and current cases”.1600 
 
Moreover, it is explained how the Framework should be used in a “given situation”, 
namely “a monitor or analyst, should use the risk factors and indicators to guide 
the collection and assessment of information”.1601 If we take, for example, Risk 
Factor 1 (‘situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability’), a ‘monitor or 
analyst’ would have to check the eleven indicators. He or she would also be 
provided with a brief common statement at the beginning and a larger comment 
towards the end, reflecting on the risk factor and its specific indicators more 
broadly (see figure 5).1602 
                                                      
1599 Ethnic cleansing is subsumed under these crimes and is not listed with specific risk factors. 
1600 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, 6. 
1601 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 6. See also 
Dieng and Welsh, ‘Assessing the Risk of Atrocity Crimes’. 
1602 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, 10. 
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Figure 5.  Risk Factor 1. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and    the Responsibility to 
Protect, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A tool for prevention. 
 
The remaining risk factors and the respective indicators work in a similar 
way. However, what is important to note here, is that the Framework of Analysis for 
Atrocity Crimes, although introduced as being part of a larger strategy of a 
responsibility to prevent atrocity crimes, can turn into a trigger mechanism, when 
it comes to decide whether to intervene (in various forms) or not in a given 
situation (something that would be addressed in the context of the responsibility 
to protect in terms of the responsibility to react). As the two advisers Dieng and 
Welsh admit elsewhere, “it has also be designed to facilitate early action”.1603 In 
                                                      
1603 Dieng and Welsh, ‘Assessing the Risk of Atrocity Crimes’, 11. 
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other words, technologies such as the indicators of the Framework of Analysis for 
Atrocity Crimes create a grey zone between prevention and intervention and 
operate as “interim measures that postpone substantive resolutions into the 
future”.1604  Thus, the translation of the responsibility to protect into indicators, 
particularly indicators in the language of risk assessment tools, opens up new 
jurisdictional spaces – spaces that are then open for contestation between 
different politico-legal projects. Importantly, it is the shift from normative to 
cognitive expectations and related to it a shift in the temporality of law, which 
makes this development possible. I will reflect on this and other connected 
transformations in the following sub-section. 
 
4.3 Risk, Global Legal Indicators and the Production of Temporal Uncertainty  
 
What does it mean to translate ‘humanity’s law’ in general and the responsibility to 
protect through ‘atrocity crimes’ in particular into an indicator? What does it mean 
to do so by relying on the specific form of a risk indicator? In order to address 
these questions, this sub-section discusses two interrelated themes and connects 
them to more general developments in social theory: first, the translation effects of 
the indicartorization of the responsibility to protect, atrocity crimes and, more 
generally, ‘humanity’s law’ (4.3.1); second, shifts in the temporality of the 
international legal argument through the emergence of risk-based vocabularies 
(4.3.2).  
 
  4.3.1 Indicatorization: The Politics of Quantification 
 
Initiatives such as the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes of the United 
Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect are part of 
a larger turn to new forms of ‘measurement-driven governance’ on a global scale. 
As Jacqueline Best recently noted, “[g]lobal governance is increasingly about 
                                                      
1604 Sally Engle Merry and Susan Bibler Coutin, ‘Technologies of Truth in the Anthropology of 
Conflict’, American Ethnologist 41, no. 1 (2014): 11. 
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measuring, ranking, and scoring”.1605 Although ‘measurement driven-governance’ 
is hardly new, as the rise of various forms of measuring (particularly, statistics) is 
deeply connected to the emergence of the modern nation state and has since then 
become paramount in organizing and governing modern societies,1606 the at-large 
use of these techniques on a global scale constitutes, however, a relatively recent 
phenomenon. In this regard, ‘measurement-driven governance’ encompasses 
various – often related, sometimes overlapping – techniques such as 
benchmarks,1607 standards,1608 rankings and ratings,1609 lists1610 and indicators.1611 
These techniques are issued and/or produced by governments, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.1612 For 
example, if we focus on the proliferation of indicators, the fabrication, circulation 
and use of indicators has become ubiquitous in international relations and 
international law as we find today indicators measuring, assessing and evaluating, 
                                                      
1605 Jacqueline Best, ‘The Rise of Measurement-Driven Governance: The Case of International 
Development’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 23, 
no. 2 (2017): 163. 
1606 Cf. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); and Alain Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical 
Reasoning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). See also my short discussion towards the 
end of Chapter 5. 
1607 Cf. André Broome, Alexandra Homolar, and Matthias Kranke, ‘Bad Science: International 
Organizations and the Indirect Power of Global Benchmarking’, European Journal of International 
Relations, forthcoming; and the special issue introduced by André Broome and Joel Quirk, ‘The 
Politics of Numbers: The Normative Agendas of Global Benchmarking’, Review of International 
Studies 41, no. 5 (2015): 813–18. 
1608 Cf. Jean-Christophe Graz and Christophe Hauert, ‘Beyond the Transatlantic Divide: The Multiple 
Authorities of Standards in the Global Political Economy of Services’, Business and Politics 16, no. 1 
(2014): 113–50; and Jean-Christophe Graz and Eva Hartmann, ‘Transnational Authority in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy: Who Sets the Standards of ICT Training and Certification?’, 
International Political Sociology 6, no. 3 (2012): 294–314. 
1609 Cf. Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, eds., Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Timothy J. Sinclair, The New 
Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005). 
1610 Cf. Marieke de Goede, Anna Leander, and Gavin Sullivan, ‘Introduction: The Politics of the List’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 34, no. 1 (2016): 3–13; Gavin Sullivan, 
‘Transnational Legal Assemblages and Global Security Law: Topologies and Temporalities of the 
List’, Transnational Legal Theory 5, no. 1 (2014): 81–127; and Urs Staeheli, ‘Listing the Global: 
Dis/connectivity beyond Representation?’, Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 13, no. 
3 (2012): 233–46. 
1611 While some authors conceptualise indicators as a sub-form of measurment-driven techniques, 
others use the term indicator itself as an umbrella for benchmarks, ratings, lists, indexes, etc.. See 
Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry, ‘Indicators as a Technology of Global 
Governance’, Law & Society Review 46, no. 1 (2012): 74. 
1612 Alexander Cooley, ‘The Emerging Politics of International Rankings and Ratings: A Framework 
for Analysis’, in Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance, ed. Alexander 
Cooley and Jack Snyder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 2. 
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for example, macroeconomic variables,1613 poverty reduction,1614 international 
development, 1615  political freedom, 1616  trafficking in persons, 1617  the risk of 
environmental disasters,1618 the compliance with international human rights 
norms,1619 the rule of law1620 or such mundane practices as the impact of 
international legal scholarly work. 1621  In the context of the prevention of 
international crimes we find, apart from the Analysis Framework of 2009 and the 
Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes of 2014, several civil society initiatives 
working on and producing indicators on this topic. For instance, the non-
governmental organisation ‘Genocide Watch’ provides us with a ten-stage model to 
evaluate countries at risk of genocide; 1622 while ‘AtrocityWatch’ attempts to 
mobilize big data and, then, to transform it into an indicator in order to create an 
early warning mechanism for atrocity crimes;1623 and, the Asia-Pacific Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect actually tests countries that might be at risk of 
atrocity crimes vis-à-vis the United Nation’s Framework of Analysis for Atrocity 
Crimes.1624 Likewise, academics such as (in particular) Barbara Harff develop 
                                                      
1613 Cf. Daniel Mügge, ‘Studying Macroeconomic Indicators as Powerful Ideas’, Journal of European 
Public Policy 23, no. 3 (2016): 410–27. 
1614 Cf. Katja Freistein, ‘Effects of Indicator Use: A Comparison of Poverty Measuring Instruments at 
the World Bank’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 18, no. 4 (2016): 
366–81. 
1615 Cf. Best, ‘The Rise of Measurement-Driven Governance’; and Tor Krever, ‘Quantifying Law: Legal 
Indicator Projects and the Reproduction of Neoliberal Common Sense’, Third World Quarterly 34, 
no. 1 (2013): 131–50. 
1616 Cf. Sarah Sunn Bush, ‘The Politics of Rating Freedom: Ideological Affinity, Private Authority, and 
the Freedom in the World Ratings’, Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 3 (2017): 711–31. 
1617 Cf. Sally Engle Merry, The Seductions of Quantification: Measuring Human Rights, Gender 
Violence, and Sex Trafficking (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016); and Judith G. Kelley 
and Beth A. Simmons, ‘Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations’, 
American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 1 (2015): 55–70. 
1618 United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030 (Geneva, 2015). 
1619 Cf. Merry, The Seductions of Quantification; Sally Engle Merry, ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, 
Human Rights, and Global Governance’, Current Anthropology 52, no. S3 (2011): 83–95; and Rene 
Urueña, ‘Indicators as Political Spaces: Law, International Organizations, and the Quantitative 
Challenge in Global Governance’, International Organizations Law Review 12, no. 1 (2015): 1–18. 
1620 Cf. René Urueña, ‘Indicators and the Law: A Case Study of the Rule of Law Index’, in The Quiet 
Power of Indicators: Measuring Governance, Corruption, and the Rule of Law, ed. Sally Engle Merry, 
Kevin E. Davis, and Benedict Kingsbury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 75–102. 
1621 Cf. Geoffrey Gordon, ‘Indicators, Rankings and the Political Economy of Academic Production in 
International Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law 30, no. 2 (2017): 295–304. 
1622 Gregory H. Stanton, ‘The Ten Stages of Genocide’, 2006. 
1623 See AtrocityWatch, ‘Mission Statement’. 
1624 See, for example, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Timor-Leste’, Atrocity 
Crimes Risk Assessment Series, 2016. 
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quantitative indicators to assess the risk of atrocity crimes.1625 These latter 
initiatives are also part of a larger, as Tor Krever had put it, “project of quantifying 
international law” on a global scale.1626 
 
In more general terms, critical scholars from various disciplinary 
backgrounds, including IR and IL, have started to problematize and theorize 
indicators on a global scale.1627 As there is, according to Kevin E. Davis, Benedict 
Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry, “no agreed meaning of the term indicator”,1628 
these authors provide us with an attempt of a definition, which can connect to and 
thus provide the basis for different strands of critical literature: 
 
“An indicator is a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports 
to represent the past or projected performance of different units. The 
data are generated through a process that simplifies raw data about a 
complex social phenomenon. The data, in this simplified and processed 
form, are capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis 
(such as countries, institutions, or corporations), synchronically or over 
time, and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more 
                                                      
1625 See Barbara Harff, ‘How to Use Risk Assessment and Early Warning in the Prevention and De-
Escalation of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities’, Global Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 4 (2009): 
506–31; and Barbara Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide 
and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 57–73. 
1626 Krever, ‘Quantifying Law’, 132. This move to quantification is also mirrored in the recent 
‘empirical turn’ (i.e., large-n testing exercises of legal norms as empircical data) in North American 
international legal scholarship. See, for example, Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Empirical 
Turn in International Legal Scholarship’, The American Journal of International Law 106, no. 1 
(2012): 1–46. For a critique see Jakob V.H. Holtermann and Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘Toleration, 
Synthesis or Replacement? The “Empirical Turn” and Its Consequences for the Science of 
International Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law 29, no. 4 (2016): 1001–19. 
1627 In the intersection of international law and indicators, in particular contributions from a project 
on ‘Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance’ of the Institute for Law and Justice at New 
York University of Law stand out. Its main protagonists Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and 
Sally Engle Merry, attempt to bring global administrative law and critical social theory 
(anthropology, science and technology studies, governmentality studies) together. See, in 
particular, Kevin Davis et al., eds., Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Classification and 
Rankings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry, ‘Indicators as a 
Technology of Global Governance’; Kevin Davis and Benedict Kingsbury, Indicators as Interventions 
(New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 2012); Kevin Davis and Michael Kruse, ‘Taking the Measure of 
Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project’, Law & Social Inquiry 32, no. 4 (2007): 1095–1119; 
Sally Engle Merry, Kevin Davis, and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., The Quiet Power of Indicators: 
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and the Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2015); and Merry, The Seductions of Quantification. 
1628 Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry, ‘Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance’, 73. 
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standards”.1629 
 
As Merry further explains, indicators are a “technology of knowledge creation, one 
that depends of processes of translation and commensuration. Creating indicators 
requires translating social life into commensurable categories so that different 
events become instances of the same thing”.1630 Commensuration means to 
“transform[…] different qualities into a common metric”.1631 In other words, 
indicators “convert analogous into digital information”1632 and translate qualities 
into quantities. To translate qualities into quantities makes them then suitable and 
employable for at-large societal processes of auditing and verification. 1633 
Importantly, this is not only the case for quantitative indicators but also for 
qualitative indicators, with the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes being an 
example of the latter, as they are usually designed in a similar way to establish 
commensuration (and being thus easily translatable into more quantitative 
schemes).1634  
 
 Yet, commensuration is not a straightforward process and does not involve 
an automatism. As Sally Engle Merry and Susan Bibler Coutin emphasise, 
“[p]henomena are not intrinsically commensurate but are made so by creating 
equivalences, categories, and distinctions”.1635 This means also that “[p]ower is 
embedded in these methodologies in ways that are not always obvious”.1636 In a 
similar vein, for example, Theodore M. Porter points out that indicators and other 
forms of quantification do not describe and mirror a social and natural world out 
there, but are neither neutral, non-social nor apolitical. 1637  “Numbers”, Porter 
                                                      
1629 Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry, 73–74. 
1630 Merry, The Seductions of Quantification, 27 (emphasis added). 
1631 Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens, ‘Commensuration as a Social Process’, Annual 
Review of Sociology 24, no. 1 (1998): 314. 
1632 Urs Staeheli, ‘Indexing - The Politics of Invisibility’, Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 34, no. 1 (2016): 17. Digitalisation refers here to ‘practices that produce isolated, 
discontinuous items’, which means that ‘the digital does not restrict itself to new digital media’, 
Staeheli, 16. 
1633 Michael Power, ‘Making Things Auditable’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 21, no. 2–3 
(1996): 289–315. 
1634 Merry, ‘Measuring the World’, 86. 
1635 Merry and Coutin, ‘Technologies of Truth in the Anthropology of Conflict’, 12. 
1636 Merry and Coutin, 12. See also Espeland and Stevens, ‘Commensuration as a Social Process’, 
330–332. 
1637 Theodore M. Porter, ‘Making Things Quantitative’, Science in Context 7, no. 3 (1994): 389–407. 
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explains, “create new things and transform the meaning of old ones”.1638 In other 
words, critical scholars moved from the question of whether numbers in general or 
a specific indicator perfectly measure the world as it ‘is’, to the question of what 
numbers and indicators ‘do’. This resembles, of course, earlier discussions of 
language and law among radical constructivists in IR and critical legal scholars in 
IL – and the abandonment of the mirror image of language as well as of questions 
such as whether international law is ‘really’ law. 1639 Similarly, indicators are then 
best understood as instruments of world-making and as means that produce, e.g., 
new relations and new entities. Indicators create the world they measure. 
Speaking with Luhmann they are not only observations of the world; they are 
simultaneously operations creating, ordering and maintaining the world itself.1640 
Moreover, indicators are a form of what Latour called “immutable mobiles” and, 
hence, “allow translation without corruption”.1641 In these aspects, indicators 
resemble maps. 1642  However, where maps attempt to establish the social 
imaginary of objectivity through means of visualisation, indicators rely on 
numbers. 1643  To emphasise that indicators are political, involves different 
dimensions of the politics of indicators. It means not only that indicators are, like 
other techniques of ‘measurement-driven governance’, mobilised by different 
social forces, including political activists and social movement, to substantiate 
                                                      
1638 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 17. 
1639 Hans Krause Hansen and Tony Porter compare for IR the insight that numbers do not fulfil a 
representational function but are performative to the post-positivist critique of the (scientific) 
positivist view of language: The ‘lack [to acknowledge the performative dimension of numbers] in 
more conventional literatures is reminiscent of an earlier neglect of the role played by language, a 
neglect that has now been remedied by a variety of discursive and constructivist approaches. While 
still contested, the idea that linguistically constituted norms can in turn have material effects, or 
even constitute actors, has come to be the focus of a vast amount of research and discussion. 
However, as was previously the case with language, when attention is directed to numbers, they are 
often treated simply as convenient representations of a reality from which they are disconnected. 
For casual users of numbers, this may be due to the apparent obviousness with which numbers can 
represent objects in daily routines, while for professionals, such as accountants or scientists, trust 
in the representational capacities of numbers is central to the purpose, acceptance and success of 
their work. Yet, even in the casual use of numbers there are clues that they do more than represent 
objects—that they also make it possible for objects to be defined, ordered and controlled in 
predictable ways’, Hans Krause Hansen and Tony Porter, ‘What Do Numbers Do in Transnational 
Governance?’, International Political Sociology 6, no. 4 (2012): 410. On the critique by radical 
constructivist and critical legal scholars of mainstream conceptions of law and language see also my 
discussion in Chapter 3. 
1640 See, for example, Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 
1997), 539. 
1641 Bruno Latour, ‘Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands’, Knowledge and 
Society 6 (1986): 8. 
1642 With regard to maps see my discussion in Chapter 5. 
1643 Porter, Trust in Numbers. 
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claims and counterclaims in situations of political contestation;1644 it is also not 
restricted to the claim that indicators facilitate a fundamental societal 
transformation towards a neoliberal and managerial orthodoxy, which becomes 
visible in various forms of technocratic governance;1645 moreover, it is also not 
limited to the political economy of indicator production and here, for example, the 
enormous financial and administrative costs involved in data collection and 
analysis, which is affordable only to a limited number of actors in “rich, 
industrialized countries”; 1646  Rather, to say that indicators are political, 
foregrounds the fact that indicators themselves are, in the words of Rene Urueña, 
“political spaces”.1647 They are ‘political spaces’ as, for instance, every “indicator 
embodies a particular normative view of the world, which is reflected in the 
indicator’s design: the choice of what variables are to be included, and which are 
left out; how ‘raw’ information is gathered and by whom, et cetera”.1648 
 
 To treat indicators as ‘political spaces’ points to the need to move away 
from treating indicators as ‘black boxes’ and to study instead processes of 
“indicatorization”, a term introduced by Siobhán Airey in the context of human 
rights indicators. 1649  As Airey specifies, “by adding the suffix ‘ization’ to 
‘indicators’, the new combined term draws explicit attention to the deliberate and 
contingent nature underpinning the process by which a human right is ‘broken 
down’ […] and re-articulated and re-conceptualized through the selection and use 
of data and indicators”.1650 As we have seen in the discussion above, in order to 
                                                      
1644 See Leonard Seabrooke and Duncan Wigan, ‘How Activists Use Benchmarks: Reformist and 
Revolutionary Benchmarks for Global Economic Justice’, Review of International Studies 41, no. 5 
(2015): 887–904; and Isabelle Bruno, Emmanuel Didier, and Tommaso Vitale, ‘Statactivism: Forms 
of Action between Disclosure and Affirmation’, Partecipazione e Conflitto 7, no. 2 (2014): 198–220. 
1645 For example, Tor Krever argues with regard to law and development that legal indicators 
‘should be understood not as an objective mirror but as a prism reflecting legal phenomena through 
a neoliberal reality and reproducing a neoliberal view of the law’ Krever, ‘Quantifying Law’, 131. 
For other claims on the neoliberal nature of indicators, see Tore Fougner, ‘Neoliberal Governance of 
States: The Role of Competitiveness Indexing and Country Benchmarking’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 37, no. 2 (2008): 303–26; and Richard Rottenburg et al., eds., The World of 
Indicators: The Making of Governmental Knowledge through Quantification (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
1646 Merry, The Seductions of Quantification, 31. 
1647 Urueña, ‘Indicators as Political Spaces’. 
1648 Urueña, 2. 
1649 Siobhán Airey, ‘The Taming of the Shrill: From Indicators to Indicatorization: The Norm-
Generation and Political Effects of Indicators on Human Rights’, International Organizations Law 
Review 12, no. 1 (2015): 82. 
1650 Airey, 87. 
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create the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes the responsibility to protect 
was ‘broken down’ in a specific way: the World Summit Outcome Document 
entangled the responsibility to protect discourse with the vernacular of the 
international crimes genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic 
cleansing as threshold elements – leaving “other calamities”1651 such as terrorism, 
aggression, political repression, HIV/AIDS, climate change and natural disasters 
out;1652 later the four distinct international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing were lumped together and thereby 
made commensurable by introducing the umbrella term of ‘atrocity crimes’; 
atrocity crimes, in turn, where then split into fourteen risk factors with a number 
of respective indicators. As should be obvious from the previous discussion, each 
step in this ‘chain of translation’ presents an instance of deliberation and 
contingency.  
 
 To open the ‘black box’ of ‘indicatorization’ draws also attention to the 
similarities and differences between the forms (or logics, rationalities, modes, etc.) 
of law and indicators. With regard to similarities, Merry and Coutin note: 
 
“Both law and systems of measurement are artifacts that are 
constructed at least partially out of pre-existing material, and, in this 
sense, they participate in the citational practices that are characteristic 
of language itself […]. Crafting a statute, writing an opinion, creating a 
file, or issuing a document entails entextualization, that is, excerpting 
elements of other texts, documents, or records and redeploying them in 
a new case or context […]. These redeployments invoke texts that have 
already been deemed authoritative, make use of agreed-on language, 
ensure that a new policy applies to a previously delineated population, 
and occur as part of corrective law-making cycles […]. Each 
instantiation of law therefore builds on prior instantiations, even as 
each survey or analysis of data as well as its presentation rely on past 
templates, surveys, and data-analysis strategies. Both law and 
measurement systems are, in a sense, the residue of prior negotiations, 
                                                      
1651 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect, 8. 
1652 For further discussion of ‘omissions’ see also Chhabra and Zucker, ‘Defining the Crimes’, 58–60. 
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a residue that leads forward as well as into the past. In both cases, there 
can be considerable inertia as procedures and categories become 
naturalized.”1653 
 
By being a ‘residue that leads forward as well as into the past’, Merry and Coutin 
point to the temporal dimension of law and indicators. Merry and Coutin highlight 
in particular that attention 
 
“to such layering is critical because the documents and texts of which 
both law and measurement are composed do not remain confined to a 
single historical stratum. Rather, past models and templates are 
brought forward as techniques of resolving new problems, while legal 
artifacts produced in one forum can reshape the claims being staked in 
another”.1654 
 
In other words, law and indicators both link past, present and future in a particular 
way, something which is also emphasised by Airey in the case of indicators. For 
Airey, “[d]epending on the nature and type of data and indicators available. 
Perspectives on what happened in the past (or indeed what the past was), as well 
as shared hopes for the future, can become encapsulated through choice of 
indicators”.1655 As I discussed above, the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes 
connects past, present and future in a particular way. It connects by means of 
pictures, texts and lists the ‘horrific international crimes of the past’ in order ‘to 
save [lives] in the future’, it tells the history of these crimes in a specific way and 
tries to identify in and extrapolate from the past risk factors which can then be 
projected to current and future conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1653 Merry and Coutin, ‘Technologies of Truth in the Anthropology of Conflict’, 3. 
1654 Merry and Coutin, 3. 
1655 Airey, ‘The Taming of the Shrill’, 88 (emphasis in the original). 
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4.3.2 Temporalisation: Risk 
 
Yet, the question of temporality points also to the differences between the forms 
(or logics, rationalities, modes, etc.) of law and indicators. These differences 
become particularly visible in the context of the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity 
Crimes as this indicator is designed as a tool for risk assessment. For a while now, 
the concept of risk has played an important role in debates in the social sciences in 
general, in scholarly debates in the intersection of IR and IL in particular as well as, 
more recently, in policy circles – with the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes 
as an example of the latter.1656 Broadly speaking we can observe a similar move as 
it was the case in the above discussion of law, language, numbers and indicators 
among critical scholars away from treating risk as constative utterance, i.e. an 
assessment of what risk ‘is’, to the concept’s performative consequences, i.e. what 
risk ‘does’ and how “risk creates its own reality”.1657 Tied to this is also a shift away 
from treating risk as a mere probabilistic concept and a device of making an 
otherwise uncertain future measurable and thus perfectly controllable and 
governable – and where failure in risk assessment is reduced to a problem of 
wrong, missing or asymmetric information. Without going too much into detail, 
critical scholars argue that the recent emergence of ‘risk’ in international law 
points to a fundamental transformation in the structure of the international legal 
argument, in particular its temporality. As we have seen in Chapter 3, for example 
Friedrich Kratochwil highlights that law “is always more than simply an 
instrument of regulating present interferences and the inevitable conflicts among 
self-interested actors; it is also always part of a political project that connects the 
present via the past to a future ‘utopia’”.1658 So does risk as well. It connects past, 
present and future. But risk and law connect past, present and future in different 
                                                      
1656 These different literatures cannot be captured in a footnote. However, for contributions in the 
intersection of IR and IL see, for example, the fora introduced by Fleur Johns and Wouter Werner, 
‘The Risks of International Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law 21, no. 4 (2008): 783–86; and 
Tanja E. Aalberts and Erna Rijsdijk, ‘Mobilising Uncertainty and Responsibility in International 
Politics and Law: Guest Editors’ Introduction’, Review of International Studies 37, no. 5 (2011): 
2157–61. For a discussion, which focuses more on policy initiatives in different (sub)fields of 
international law, see, for example, Mónika Ambrus, Rosemary Rayfuse, and Wouter Werner, eds., 
Risk and the Regulation of Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
1657 Oliver Kessler, ‘Is Risk Changing the Politics of Legal Argumentation?’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 21, no. 4 (2008): 867, 868. 
1658  Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Legal Theory and International Law’, in Routledge Handbook of 
International Law, ed. David Armstrong (London: Routledge, 2009), 56. 
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ways as they rely on different temporalities. In order to illustrate this, let me 
advance my argument in three interrelated steps. 
 
Firstly, legal argumentation is rather past-oriented. Here, my discussion in 
Chapter 3 of how Kratochwil conceptualises legal argumentation is indicative 
again, as Kratochwil emphasises the importance of analogies in legal 
argumentation. Analogies, Kratochwil writes, “establish similarities among 
different cases or objects in face of (striking) dissimilarities. The similarity 
established thereby concerns a (partial) equality among the compared objects or 
phenomena in regard to a relevant aspect”.1659 Importantly, similarities are 
‘established’ and not ‘found’ and ‘pre-given’. What counts as similarity is always 
linked to a specific context. This point is further explained, for instance, by Stanley 
Fish in his attempt of scrutinizing the ‘chain gang of law’. As Fish notes 
 
“similarity is not something one finds, but something one must 
establish, and when one establishes it one establishes the 
configurations of the cited cases as well as of the case that is to be 
decided. Similarity, in short, is not a property of texts (similarities do 
not announce themselves), but a property conferred by a relational 
argument in which the statement A is like B is a characterization (one 
open to challenge) of both A and B. To see a present-day case as similar 
to a chain of earlier ones is to reconceive that chain by finding it in an 
applicability that has not always been apparent”.1660 
 
To establish similarities in legal argumentation is a past-oriented endeavour; an 
endeavour where legal history plays an important role. Lawyers refer back to past 
decisions, judgements and dissenting opinions or even the travaux préparatoires of 
treaties.1661 This referring back is, of course, always a selective reading of the past 
(as a ‘history of the present’). As Fish continues to argue: 
                                                      
1659 Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 223. 
1660 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 94 (emphasis in the original). 
1661 See Filipe dos Reis and Oliver Kessler, ‘Constructivism and the Politics of International Law’, in 
The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, ed. Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 362–363. 
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“Paradoxically, one can be faithful to legal history only by revising it, by 
redisciribing it in such a way as to accommodate and render 
manageable the issues raised by the present. This is a function of the 
law’s conservatism, which will not allow a case to remain unrelated to 
the past, and so assures that the past, in the form of the history of 
decisions, will be continually rewritten. In fact, it is the duty of a judge 
to rewrite it (which is to say no more than that it is the duty of a judge 
to decide)”. 1662  
 
Nevertheless, to establish these similarities with the past is of particular 
importance for legal argumentation as it also establishes consistency overtime, i.e. 
that similar cases are decided similarly and different ones differently. Legal history 
operates thus as law’s memory.1663  
 
Secondly, as Niklas Luhmann has pointed out, law operates through norms 
and relies mainly on a specific type of expectations, namely normative 
expectations.1664 Normative expectations ‘bind’ time, contingency and uncertainty 
in a specific way, which can be distinguished from the way risk does. Luhmann 
remarks with regard to normative expectations: 
 
“A norm stabilizes expectations, also and in particular where conduct is 
unexpected. Where norms are violated, it is not the expectation but the 
conduct that is wrong. Although one can have erred in respect of the 
facts, one has not done so on the normative side of expectation. In other 
words, the violation of the norm offers no occasion for amending it, no 
occasion for learning; it condenses and confirms expectation in 
                                                      
1662 Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 94 (emphasis in the original). 
1663  Sven Opitz, An der Grenze des Rechts: Inklusion/Exklusion im Zeichen der Sicherheit  
(Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2012), 70–71. 
1664 In general, Luhmann is one of the most interesting authors when it comes to discuss the 
temporality of law as for him the temporal dimension of law represents the basis of the function of 
law. For Luhmann, law solves temporal problems of societal communication, namely when 
communication relies on expectations. This differentiates him from approaches, which emphasise 
the social function of law (e.g., ‘social control’ or ‘social integration’), Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht 
Der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 125; see also Niklas Luhmann, ‘Die Funktion 
Des Rechts: Erwartungssicherung Oder Verhaltenssteuerung?’, in Ausdiffernzierung des Rechts: 
Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), 73. 
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providing an occasion to activate and confirm it”.1665 
 
This means, in turn, that norms are “counterfactual stabilisations of expectations of 
behaviour”.1666 When disappointed they are counterfactually retained. This helps 
that one can remain indifferent towards the contingencies of the future as one can 
refer to the validity of the norm, whatever happens.1667 This helps law to 
“defuturize the future”.1668 Consequently, for Luhmann, the touchstone for the 
validity of norms is not compliance with a norm and the question of how norms 
determine behaviour.1669 Behaviour based on normative expectations is not 
disposed toward learning and does not adapt in case of deviance from a norm – 
“the norm is valid as long it is valid”.1670 This distinguishes normative expectation 
from cognitive ones. Cognitive expectations are based on the willingness to learn 
and are adapted if they are not satisfied, i.e. if reality is different than previously 
expected.1671 Although normative and cognitive expectations might often overlap, 
Luhmann argues that the emerging world society is linked to an at-large shift from 
normative to cognitive expectations.1672 
 
Thirdly and related to this, compared to the concept of norms, the concept 
of risk is more future-oriented.1673 Drawing on the work of Reinhart Koselleck, 
Luhmann argues that the transition to modernity, in particular the second half of 
                                                      
1665 Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993), 54. 
1666 ‘kontrafaktisch stablisiert[e] Verhaltenserwartung’, Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, 134. 
This mirrors, of course, in IR the early constructivist statement of Kratochwil and Ruggie: ‘Norms 
are counterfactually valid’, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International 
Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, International Organization 40, no. 4 (1986): 
767. 
1667 See also Sven Opitz, ‘Widerstreitende Temporalitäten: Recht in Zeiten Des Risikos’, Behemoth 4, 
no. 2 (2011): 73. 
1668 Sven Opitz and Ute Tellmann, ‘Future Emergencies: Temporal Politics in Law and Economy’, 
Theory, Culture & Society 32, no. 2 (2015): 118. 
1669 In fact, as Luhmann further explains one might comply or not comply with a norm because it is 
unknown. Or, might comply or not comply with a norm because it provides certain information; 
and then does not comply with the norm, because one has more confidence in one’s own 
information. Or one does not comply with a norm because one does not perceive it as legitimate or 
fair. Or, one behaves in a certain way because of coercion and not because of a norm. In short, as 
Luhmann shows, to test the validity of a norm by relying on rates of compliance does not work. 
Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, 134. 
1670 Luhmann, Risk, 54. 
1671 Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1984), 437; and Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, 133–134. 
1672 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’, Archiv Für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 57, no. 1 
(1971): 10–13; and Luhmann, ‘Die Funktion Des Rechts’, 90–91. 
1673  Niklas Luhmann, ‘Risiko und Gefahr’, in Soziologische Aufklärung 5: Konstruktivistische 
Perspektiven, ed. Niklas Luhmann (Wiesbaden: VS, 2005), 133. 
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the eighteenth century, marked a shift in the temporal structure, in which societies 
describe themselves, towards more future-oriented semantics1674 - “the future 
gained primacy over the past”.1675 As a consequence, the difference between past 
and future expands. Simultaneously, the present is increasingly important as a 
‘switch’ between past and future as now “[a|ll temporal structures relate to the 
present”.1676 In other words, modernity is “linked to an intensive futurization of the 
future”.1677 Moreover, Luhmann observes,  
 
“[t]he more a society makes its future dependent on its own future, the 
more intransparent this future becomes, because one can not know but 
must decide what the future will bring. At the same time, time begins to 
flow faster; or at least accelerations are noted. Expectations can no 
longer be based on experience as before”. 1678 
 
Societies are confronted with the difference of ‘future presents’ and ‘present 
futures’: the future becomes an “open future”.1679 At this point, the semantics of 
risk emerges in order to deal with this increasing complexity.1680 However, as 
Luhmann writes, it is for the analysis of the semantics of risk important to note 
that 
 
“the unlikely is likely to the extent that in any case everything (or 
almost everything) will change in the foreseeable future. One is then 
forced to distinguish between still unknown, neither observable future 
presents and the present future. This means: time itself seems different 
                                                      
1674 Luhmann, Risk, 37–38; Niklas Luhmann, Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik: Studien zur 
Wissenssoziologie der modernen Gesellschaft, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), chap. 4; 
Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern Society’, Social 
Research 43, no. 1 (1976): 130–131; and Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of 
Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
1675 Luhmann, Risk, 48. 
1676 Luhmann, ‘The Future Cannot Begin’, 137. 
1677 Opitz and Tellmann, ‘Future Emergencies’, 111 (emphasis in the original). 
1678 ‘Je stärker eine Gesellschaft ihre Zukunft von ihrer eigenen Zukunft abhängig macht, desto 
intransparenter wird diese Zukunft, weil man ja [...] nicht wissen kann, sondern entscheiden muß, 
was die Zukunft bringen wird. Zugleich beginnt die Zeit rascher zu fließen; oder zumindestens 
werden Beschleunigungen notiert. Erwartungen können nicht mehr, wie zuvor, auf Erfahrung 
stützen’, Luhmann, ‘Risiko und Gefahr’, 148. 
1679 ‘If we accept this distinction of the present future and future presents, we can define an open 
future as present future which has room for several mutually exclusive future presents’, Luhmann, 
‘The Future Cannot Begin’, 140. 
1680 Luhmann, Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik, 1:280. 
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in every present, it moves in time, and this makes it impossible to find 
objective criteria for risk assessment and the readiness to assume risk. 
One may calculate such criteria and try to justify their consensus - but 
at the same time, one knows that tomorrow they will be of 
yesterday”.1681 
 
In other words, for Luhmann risk is an attempt to deal with the contingency of the 
future. Like norms, risk connects past, present and future in a specific way. As 
Oliver Kessler reframes it in Luhmannian terms, risk 
 
“connects the present and the contingent and yet unknown future in so 
far as the imagination of the future feeds back on actual decisions. Via 
the contingency of the future, the present itself becomes contingent, 
which requires that more alternatives are available than can be 
materialized. Risk, in other words, signifies a highly arrangement of 
contingencies and thereby also regulates the relationship between the 
past, the present, and the future”.1682 
 
However, calculations of risk, and the various connected tools of risk management 
such as the risk factors and indicators of the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity 
Crimes, are bound to fail as it becomes apparent by shifting from first to second-
order observation that there does not exist an Archimedian point from where to 
observe time and calculate the future. This is so because there is no timeless 
observer of time standing outside of time.1683 Hence, risk is an ascription and not a 
‘neutral fact’. Through the semantics of risk the contingent future turns into a 
present future and can be imagined in different ways. The future is then conceived 
                                                      
1681 ‘daß das Unwahrscheinliche wahrscheinlicher wird in dem Maße, als sich ohnehin alles (oder 
doch fast alles) in einer absehbaren Zukunft ändern wird. Man ist dann genötigt, zwischen dennoch 
unbekannten, weder beobachtbaren künftigen Gegenwarten und der gegenwärtigen Zukunft zu 
unterscheiden. Das heißt: die Zeit selbst scheint in jeder Gegenwart anders, sie selbst bewegt sich 
in der Zeit, und das macht es unmöglich, für Risikobeurteilung und Risikobereitschaft objektive 
Kriterien zu finden. Man mag solche Kriterien errechnen und ihre Konsensfähigkeit zu begründen 
suchen - aber man weiß zugleich, daß sie morgen von gestern sein werden’, Luhmann, ‘Risiko und 
Gefahr’, 148 (emphasis in the original). 
1682 Kessler, ‘Is Risk Changing the Politics of Legal Argumentation?’, 869. 
1683 Luhmann, ‘Risiko Und Gefahr’, 148. 
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as a horizon, more precisely a “temporal horizon of the present” – and therefore, as 
Luhmann puts it, the “future cannot begin”:   
 
“[T]he essential characteristic of an horizon is that we can never touch 
it, never get at it, never surpass it, but that in spite of that, it contributes 
to the definition of the situation. Any movement and any operation of 
thought only shifts the guiding horizon but never attains it”.1684 
 
The observation that norms and risk are encapsulated in different 
temporalities as well as Luhmann’s observations of a radically ‘open future’ have 
important implications for our discussion. For example, we can understand now 
the struggle between risk and norms, which is also articulated in the emergence of 
legal risk indicators, as a struggle of ‘conflicting temporalities’1685 and a ‘clash of 
different temporalities’.1686 As such the politics of international law in world 
society could increasingly be explored through the lens of temporality. For 
instance, the struggle between risk and norms can then be studied as a struggle 
between futurization and defuturization, i.e., between different degrees of an 
increase or decrease of “the openness of a present future”.1687 This resembles also 
Mariana Valverde’s problematization of ‘jurisdiction as chronotopes’, i.e., 
emphasising both the spatial and the temporal dimension of jurisdiction and their 
interplay. Not taking a Luhmannian perspective but rather relying on Foucault, 
Valverde remarks that “each mode of governance has one or more distinct 
temporalities”.1688 As such criminal law and risk, on which the Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes is build upon, constitute different modes of 
governance. Valverde nicely captures the different temporalities of criminal law 
and risk – and the clash of temporalities when both intersect: 
 
“The criminal law and other instruments for punishing wrongs try to 
ascertain past events and provide a symbolic return to the time before 
                                                      
1684 Luhmann, ‘The Future Cannot Begin’, 139–140. 
1685 Opitz, ‘Widerstreitende Temporalitäten’. 
1686 Oliver Kessler, ‘World Society, Social Differentiation and Time’, International Political Sociology 
6, no. 1 (2012): 77–94. 
1687 Luhmann, ‘The Future Cannot Begin’, 141. For further discussion see also Opitz and Tellmann, 
‘Future Emergencies’. 
1688 Mariana Valverde, ‘Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal `Technicalities’ as Resources for Theory’, Social 
& Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (2009): 154. 
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the was committed through punishment (‘justice has to be done’). Risk 
management, by contrast, […] is oriented to the future, to 
prevention”.1689 
 
Thus, the underlying struggle of conflicting temporalities produces, on the one 
hand, more uncertainty because it cannot be anticipated whether in a specific 
situation rationalities based on risk or norms will dominate in the end. Yet, on the 
other hand, it also produces uncertainty because it creates new hybrids composed 
of both rationalities, which can lead in the long run to a blurring and “deformation” 
of traditional legal categories or the emergence of new practices.1690 As, for 
example, Oliver Kessler and Wouter Werner argue, we can observe now a 
paradigm shift in the degree of uncertainty: a shift from “structured” uncertainty, 
which refers to the indeterminacy of every legal system and which is reduced to 
the stabilization of law through normative expectations, towards “unstructured” 
forms of uncertainty in the context of risk management, which “enters when the 
structure-forming capacity of legal categories or distinctions breaks down”.1691 
Finally, as for example Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster have pointed out, 
this is reinforced by the introduction of catastrophic elements, i.e. the idea that an 
event can cause grave and irreversible damages.1692 Although the literature refers 
in the context of potentially catastrophic futures mainly to terrorism or 
environmental damages, these new ‘politics of catastrophe’ certainly apply to the 
risk that atrocity crimes might occur in the future. 
This broader transformation through the simultaneous ‘indicatorization’ and 
‘riskification’ of legal and law-like categories has important repercussions on 
questions regarding the authority of experts, jurisdiction and responsibility on a 
global level. First, the nature of international legal expertise is altered, i.e. different 
forms of expertise are mobilised and different forms of expertise are silenced. As 
                                                      
1689 Valverde, 154–155. See also Marieke de Goede and Beatrice de Graaf, ‘Sentencing Risk: 
Temporality and Precaution in Terrorism Trials’, International Political Sociology 7, no. 3 (2013): 
313–31. 
1690 Luhmann, Risk, 168. 
1691 Oliver Kessler and Wouter Werner, ‘Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management’, Security Dialogue 
39, no. 2–3 (2008): 294. 
1692 Aradau and van Munster capture this new form of risk through the notion of ‘precautionary 
risk’ (which broadly resembles Kessler and Werner’s diagnosis of ‘unstructured’ uncertainty), 
Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, 
(un)knowing the Future’, European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 101; and 
Aradau and van Munster, Politics of Catastrophe. 
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noted, legal expertise was traditionally bound to past-oriented forms of 
argumentation, as the task was to translate past and present events into legal 
categories by relying on evidence and establishing analogies. With the emergence 
of risk-based rationalities, expertise becomes more future-oriented and it becomes 
the task of experts to say what will happen.1693 If lawyers are not able to adapt to 
these new requirements in forecasting and imagination, more policy-oriented 
forms of expertise might substitute them. This means, for example, that in order to 
“take advantage of these quantified vocabularies, one must speak their 
language”.1694 Moreover, this changes also the nature of evidence, as the standard 
of proof in courts is usually higher than it is risk-based assessments. While, for 
example, in the context of terrorism a move towards ‘intelligence-as-evidence’ is 
visible,1695 it becomes central for legal and non-legal experts in the context of 
intervention, the responsibility to protect and atrocity crime prevention to solve 
certain ‘epistemic problems’, namely to ‘know’ what is happening ‘on the ground’ 
in the catastrophic scenario of a possibly unfolding atrocity crime situation. The 
question is now who can predict, estimate and assess future risks in the most 
plausible way. Yet, for instance, in the recent cases of Libya or Syria photographic 
or video material might be exaggerated or may even lack credibility. Here, 
indicators such as the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes establish a certain 
connectivity between the local and the global, where “local vernacular language is 
typically less influential than more global, technical knowledge”,1696 and serve to 
‘govern the world at a distance’.1697 One consequence of the fact that expert 
knowledge becomes increasingly precarious but has to “maintain myths of control 
and manageability” is the emergence of organisational anomalies such as what 
Michael Power has labelled “secondary risk management”, namely that experts do 
not only deal with the primary risks to which they are assigned to but are 
“becoming more preoccupied with managing their own risk”.1698 As a result, Power 
                                                      
1693 dos Reis and Kessler, ‘Constructivism and the Politics of International Law’, 363. 
1694  Gordon, ‘Indicators, Rankings and the Political Economy of Academic Production in 
International Law’, 303. 
1695 See de Goede and de Graaf, ‘Sentencing Risk’; and Sullivan, ‘Transnational Legal Assemblages 
and Global Security Law’. 
1696 Merry, The Seductions of Quantification, 7. 
1697 André Broome and Joel Quirk, ‘Governing the World at a Distance: The Practice of Global 
Benchmarking’, Review of International Studies 41, no. 5 (2015): 819–41. 
1698 Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty 
(London: Demos, 2004), 10, 14. See also de Goede and de Graaf, ‘Sentencing Risk’, 327. 
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observes “a dangerous flight from judgement and a culture of defensiveness”.1699 
 
Second, it becomes visible that the politics of jurisdiction in international 
law is also a struggle between different jurisdictional projects based on different 
temporalities. In particular, future-oriented projects based on risk seem to be 
more and more successful.1700 At the same time we are dealing with an open future 
of ‘unstructured’ uncertainty. Jurisdictional projects become then part of a ‘politics 
of imagination’, i.e. of a politics of how the future could be governed. Different 
jurisdictional projects imagine and thus ‘colonize’ the future in different ways – 
and are linked to different projects of biopolitics.1701 This is captured by Anne 
Orford, when she writes that (as already quoted above) the  
 
“risk of international crimes taking place is now posited as the trigger 
to a broad range of governance and police functions. The jurisdiction of 
the international community will be triggered by the risk that certain 
specific crimes may be committed”1702 
 
In the context of the responsibility to protect the question becomes now which 
kind of jurisdictional project is seen to represent the international community and 
thus trusted be able to prevent possible catastrophic events, i.e. “future Kosovos 
and Rwandas”.1703  
 
 Finally, the meaning of the concept of responsibility itself is shifting and the 
                                                      
1699 Power, The Risk Management of Everything, 14. 
1700 Here, Luhmann is helpful. First, as noted above, Luhmann observes a shift from projects based 
on normative expectations towards those based on cognitive expectations in the context of the 
emergence of world society. Second, for Luhmann the oppositional concept of risk is not security 
but danger. Risk and danger can be distinguished through the question of attribution (and hence 
agency). Luhmann speaks of risk when a potential loss is attributed to one’s own decision. He 
speaks of danger, if a potential loss is considered to have been caused externally, i.e. it is attributed 
to the environment. Importantly, the question of whether something is a risk or danger a question 
of how it ‘really is’, but a question of (self)attribution. Historically speaking, modern societies tend 
to substitute danger through risk. Subsequently, risk-based rationalities expand. See Luhmann, 
Risk, 21–22; and Luhmann, ‘Risiko und Gefahr’, 140. This expansion is also noted by Power, The Risk 
Management of Everything. 
1701 For a further exploration of the biopolitical effects in the context of risk management and 
humanitarian interventions see, for example, Laura Zanotti, Governing Disorder: UN Peace 
Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era (University Park: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), chap. 4. 
1702 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, 185. 
1703 Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect?’, 143. 
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question becomes of who has the responsibility to protect the future. This implies 
also that in the context of the responsibility to protect not only the concept of 
sovereignty is fundamentally rediscribed, shifting from sovereignty understood as 
control towards sovereignty to protect, but that the concept of responsibility itself 
transforms as well. While traditionally the concept of responsibility is used in 
international law – and here particularly in international criminal law – to denote 
the individual responsibility for wrongful acts that one has committed in the past, 
responsibility refers now to collective wrong-doings that have not occurred yet, 
but might occur in the future.1704 In other words, we witness a twofold inversion of 
responsibility. On the one hand, the concept of responsibility shifts from individual 
to collective responsibility. This represents a break with international criminal 
law’s mantra from the trials in Nuremberg to the politics of recent international 
criminal courts and tribunals, namely that individuals and not collectives are 
responsible for international crimes. On the other hand, the temporality of the 
concept of responsibility changes. While traditionally “the logic of responsibility 
links unhappy events to past behaviour”,1705 it turns now into a responsibility to 
protect, on state level and international level, of what could happen in a possible 
future.1706 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1704 See, for example, Kessler, ‘World Society, Social Differentiation and Time’, 91; and Kessler and 
Werner, ‘Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management’, 296. See also for a conceptual analysis: Hannes 
Peltonen, ‘Modelling International Collective Responsibility: The Case of Grave Humanitarian 
Crises’, Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 (2010): 239–55. 
1705 Kessler and Werner, ‘Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management’, 296 (emphasis in the original). 
1706 A similar shift is visible in the context of anti-terrorism policies where ‘not a past or present 
event or decision is to be evaluated for which a state or person is held responsible, but a possible 
future: norms are replaced by the image of instance, of contingency and the unpredictable of future 
attacks’, Kessler, ‘World Society, Social Differentiation and Time’, 90. 
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 5. Conclusion: Who Represents Humanity? Competing legitimacies, 
competing temporalities  
 
The aim of this chapter was to reconstruct the politics of jurisdiction in the context 
of recent debates with regard to humanitarian intervention and the responsibility 
to protect, which both constitute important streams of ‘humanity’s law’. Rather 
than taking the route of many critical scholars and situating these developments 
within (neo-)colonial and (neo-)imperial politics of Western states, 1707  this 
chapter addressed how jurisdictional projects in the context of the intervention 
discourse started to develop a future-oriented logic and how this logic also started 
to change the traditionally past-oriented logic of international law’s temporality. 
Thus, this chapter further inquired into a non-territorial, post-Cartesian, 
multidimensional and non-exclusive notion of jurisdiction by pointing out that 
jurisdictional projects do not only have a spatial but also a temporal dimension.1708 
In order to study this, I reconstructed various translations within the intervention 
discourse and how these translations changed international law’s focus from an 
evaluation of the legality of past interventions towards an assessment of the risk 
that atrocity crimes might happen. Such a future-oriented international law of 
catastrophic events might then provide thereby a justificatory template for future 
interventions. In particular, I focussed on two contexts, namely, on the one hand, 
the before, during and after of NATO’s Kosovo action in 1999 and, on the other 
hand, the implementation process of the responsibility to protect within the United 
Nations. Yet, I did not intend to reconstruct both in full detail – this has been done 
numerous times already – and focussed thereby on key episodes, where important 
translations took place.  
 
In the context of the Kosovo intervention, I argued that Kosovo represented 
the first fully legalized international conflict as the whole justification and 
operationalization of the bombings had to be addressed in legal language. It is thus 
of little surprise that an international expert group, the Independent International 
                                                      
1707 Here, also Anne Orford’s point that the responsibility to protect concerns more about the 
United Nations than the power politics of Western states is important. See Anne Orford, ‘In Praise 
of Description’, Leiden Journal of International Law 25, no. 3 (2012): 612–613. 
1708 See also Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale, and Governance (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015). 
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Commission for Kosovo (IICK), was mandated to evaluate the legality of the 
intervention; yet, the IICK not only evaluated the legality of the intervention – by 
considering it illegal –, but came to the additional conclusion that the intervention 
might have been legitimate: ‘illegal but legitimate’. However, the figure of ‘illegal 
but legitimate’ brought new uncertainty and ambiguity to the international legal 
discourse as from now on argumentation could permanently oscillate between 
legality and legitimacy. With these competing legitimacies  nearly every form of 
intervention becomes justifiable. 
 
As an answer to the jurisdictional project of unilateral military action by a 
regional organisation, the United Nations started to take up the emerging debates 
about the responsibility to protect in order to (re)gain authority and jurisdiction 
over issues concerning international interventions. In this context I ‘opened the 
organizational the black box’ of the United Nations by analysing a number of key 
documents and thereby highlighting instances of translation, which led in the end 
to shifts in the temporality of the international legal argument. Here, I illustrated 
how in particular the UN Secretary-General started to integrate the responsibility 
to protect into his agenda by, e.g., establishing international expert committees 
such as the ‘High-level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ in 2003. The 
responsibility to protect was further translated in the context of the 2005 World 
Summit when protection was linked to protection from ‘genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ – which signified also a 
hybridization of the responsibility to protect with categories from international 
criminal law. After the unanimous adoption of the responsibility to protect at that 
gathering of states, the UN Secretary-General started to further ‘materialize, 
‘implement’, ‘mainstream’ and ‘operationalize’ the responsibility, mainly by, on the 
one hand, establishing the posts of two special advisers (and their ‘joint office’) 
and, on the other hand, rendering annual implementation reports. In this context 
the notion of atrocity crimes was taken up as an umbrella term for ‘genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. I pointed out that the 
notion of atrocity crimes constitutes a perfect ‘black box’ in order to travel within 
organisations, advance new jurisdictional projects and make the protection 
dimension of the responsibility to protect measurable, i.e. part of new forms of 
‘measurement-driven governance’. In order to illustrate what this means, I 
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carefully reconstructed one important indicator project in the context of the 
responsibility to protect: the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A tool for 
prevention, which was published in 2014 by the joint office of the Special Adviser 
on the Prevention for Genocide and Atrocity Crimes as well as the Special Adviser 
of the Responsibility Protect. Importantly, this indicator presents a risk 
assessment tool in order to evaluate the possibility of future atrocity crimes. My 
final discussion aimed then to conceptualise and theorize the implications of 
translating the intervention discourse and in particular categories of international 
criminal law into a risk indicator. By taking up several discussions in social theory, 
I argued that the simultaneous ‘indicatorization’ and ‘riskification’ of legal and law-
like categories has important repercussions on questions regarding the authority 
of experts, jurisdiction and responsibility on a global level as, e.g., it might change 
the authoritative basis of expertise (from traditionally past-oriented lawyers to 
more future-oriented policy analysts), might facilitate a politics of imagination of 
an ‘open future’ with different possible biopolitical projects and might blur existing 
legal categories such as ‘responsibility’ itself as these categories are usually based 
on a past-oriented logic. In other words, the ‘competing temporalities’ at work 
seem to have profound effect on the ‘politics of international law’. 
 
Most importantly, however, these competing legitimacies and competing 
temporalities are anchored in a more profound competition between different 
jurisdictional projects and the question of who speaks for humanity. Is it the state? 
A regional organisation? The United Nations in general? The Security Council, 
General Assembly or Secretary-General in particular? Someone else? 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis explored the politics of jurisdiction in international law. In order to do 
so, it reconstructed jurisdictional projects pursued by scholars and experts, in 
particular, in the context of an emerging ‘humanity’s law’. To rely on 
reconstruction as underlying logic of inquiry means that research is never fully 
guided and sees a ‘fixed’ end but that one central tasks of every research process 
lies in identifying new problems, new questions and new projects. Hence, I do not 
limit myself in this brief concluding chapter to only summarize the core findings of 
this thesis and to bring the various threads together, but I will also provide some 
pointers for future research. 
 
 The introductory chapter set the scene by embedding the thesis in recent 
discussions about a ‘legalization’ of world politics and three interrelated shifts 
within the structure of the international legal argument: the proliferation of 
international legal expertise and experts, a transformation of the temporality of 
the structure of the international legal argument by the introduction of future-
oriented logics and, most importantly for this thesis, an emerging ‘humanity’s law’. 
I argued that an approach based on critical scholarship in two disciplines IR and IL, 
also labelled as ‘politics of international law’, as well as reconstruction as logic of 
inquiry fits best to study these shifts. With regard to reconstruction as logic of 
inquiry, I specified that this thesis is mainly based on research strategies such as 
Wittgenstein’s ‘perspicuous representation’ (übersichtliche Darstellung), the 
mapping of arguments and the ‘opening of black boxes’. Moreover, I advanced that 
it might be promising to study the ‘politics of international law’ by scrutinizing 
‘projects’ – in particular, jurisdictional projects. 
 
The remaining chapters were structured into two parts. Part I (Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3) primarily focussed on the (inter-)disciplinary dimension of 
studying the ‘politics of international law’. Here, I argued that it could be more 
promising to reconstruct various interdisciplinary projects between the two 
academic fields of IR and IL – i.e., to look how interdisciplinary works –, instead of 
advancing with a stipulative definition of what interdisciplinary is or should be. My 
reconstruction of different interdisciplinary projects showed then that these 
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projects rely on different logics of interdisciplinarity and come with different ‘hero 
figures’ different conceptualisations of the ‘international’ and relate law and 
politics differently; yet, these logics come also with their specific biases, 
hierarchies, power relations and exclusionary mechanisms as they negotiate the 
jurisdiction of academic disciplines differently. I suggested that a way to move on, 
in particular for critical scholarship in both disciplines, could be in further 
exploring ‘interdisciplinarity as translation’ under the confines of a ‘culture of 
argument’. Translation, in the way I use it, does not show us a way out of niases, 
hierarchies, per relations or exclusionary mechanisms; nor does it set ex ante a 
specific research agenda or provides with specific optics. The aim is not to find a 
‘joint disciplines of critical scholars. To take ‘interdisciplinarity as translation’ 
seriously means rather to take reconstruction as logic of inquiry seriously and 
identify puzzles, problems and common interests. One of the common interests 
among critical scholars of both disciplines is the relationship of law, language and 
(social) world. In order to substantiate this, I reconstructed the scholarly projects 
of the four critical scholars Onuf, Onuf, Kratochwil, Kennedy and Koskenniemi. All 
four took the linguistic turn seriously, yet, they tuned differently. For the sake of a 
sharper analysis I made use of the idea to distinguish a ‘performance model’ from a 
‘two worlds model’ of language with Kennedy and Kratochwil rather relating to the 
former and Koskenniemi and Onuf as representatives of the latter. Thus the aim 
was not to find a new ‘joint discipline’ of critical scholars but to look at the 
similarities and differences between these projects in order to make translation 
possible and identify common problematiques.  
 
Future research with regard to scholarly projects at the intersection of IR 
and IL could further inquire into the interdisciplinary basis of both disciplines – in 
conjunction but also separately. While in IL valuable work has been done with 
regard to the interdisciplinary grounding of international legal positivism and also 
to some degree to the ethical background of natural law accounts, studies with 
regard to, for example, sociological approaches and the various policy schools are 
still rare. To understand the interdisciplinary background of IR seems even more 
important as IR itself is often seen as a purely interdisciplinary field, i.e. lacking an 
own (theoretical) core – or, maybe (the promise of) interdisciplinarity is this 
disciplinary core. In the context of IR, not only international law played an 
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important role in the history of the field but also, for example, a very specific 
adaption of systems theory after the Second World War, later the relationship with 
the field of study of international political economy or, more recently, international 
political sociology played an important role. To reconstruct how these various 
interdisciplinary projects played out would help us not only to add a better 
understanding of the respective disciplinary histories and interdisciplinarity in 
general but also helps to explain current disciplinary blind spots and the politics of 
silence involved in the context of many interdisciplinary endeavours (i.e., how 
interdisciplinarity is written in and out). 
 
Part II (Chapter 4 to Chapter 7) was rather concerned with projects of 
jurisdiction outside of academia. In order to get a better grounding of the social 
underpinnings of the politics of jurisdiction, I situated as a first step the thesis 
within literatures on the ‘politics of expertise’ in international law. While 
traditional scholarship in IR and IL separates clearly between politics and 
expertise, more recent approaches in social theory problematized this dichotomy. 
Critical scholarship in IR and IL takes up this latter thread and conceptualises 
politics and expertise as intersecting and two sides of the same coin – as ‘politics of 
expertise’. In addition, these approaches take international law – in particular in 
the context of broader transformations associated with a constitutionalisation, 
fragmentation and a turn to managerialism in and of international law – as a 
specific form of expertise by its own. However, critical scholars conceptualise 
expertise in different ways and highlight different aspects. I argued that these 
differences could also be attributed to the different understandings of the 
relationship of law, language and the (social) world – and that this resonates with 
my earlier discussion of distinguishing between a ‘performance model’ and a ‘two 
worlds model’ of language. While proponents of a ‘two worlds model’ stress 
‘competence’ in order to locate expertise, those following a ‘performance model’ 
rather stress the ‘performativity’ of expert work or that expertise is part of a ‘form 
of life’. Moreover, I argued that it might be promising to focus on ‘legal 
technicalities’ in order to better grasp the ‘politics of expertise’ in international law 
and, here, in particular study jurisdiction as ‘legal technicality’. Chapter 5 took the 
thread up to study jurisdiction as a ‘legal technicality’. It did so by pursuing two 
strategies. Firstly, I reviewed the emerging critical literature on jurisdiction. This 
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literature points out that jurisdiction is a social and political practices or that we 
should conceive the spatio-temporal fixes involved in projects of jurisdiction and 
link it to debates on legal pluralism and a postmodern conception of law. Secondly, 
I briefly reconstructed the history of jurisdiction by focussing on how a modern 
notion of jurisdiction, which is linked to exclusivity and territoriality, gradually 
emerged in the transition from medieval forms of rule to early modern ones. The 
notion of exclusive territorial jurisdiction lay then the foundation of the modern 
nation state and the modern international. However, the emerging ‘humanity’s 
law’ seems to challenge the idea that jurisdiction is exclusive and territorial. In 
order to be better equipped to study the transformations involved in the 
emergence of ‘humanity’s law’, I advanced a notion of jurisdiction, which is non-
territorial, post-Cartesian, multidimensional and non-exclusive. The final two 
substantial chapters (Chapter 6 and 7) illustrated what it could signify to explore 
jurisdictional projects in the context of ‘humanity’s law’ by taking such an 
understanding of jurisdiction seriously. As a first example, I reconstructed how 
two international legal experts, Hersch Lauterpacht and Antonio Cassese, pursued 
jurisdictional projects in the context of the making of international crimes 
(jurisdiction ratione materiae) and thereby attempted to expand the jurisdiction of 
international criminal law in general. By focussing on these two figures helped me 
also to highlight how international legal expertise actually works, as international 
legal experts often occupy different positions within and outside of academia – and 
have to ‘pursue their projects’ thus differently. While this example reconstructed 
‘people with projects’, Chapter 7 concentrated rather on ‘projects with people’. 
Concretely, focussed on the broader discourse of humanitarian interventions for 
humanitarian purposes and explored how the traditionally past-oriented 
temporality of increasingly intersects with future-oriented logics. This has 
important implications for the study of jurisdiction as it shows how jurisdictional 
projects also expand through time by, e.g., taking risk-based rationalities up. 
Furthermore, both examples highlighted the relevance of ‘opening the black box’ of 
jurisdiction in the context of an emerging ‘humanity’s law’ as they point out that 
struggles over jurisdiction are deeply linked to fundamental questions of global 
authority and, in the end, of who judges for or represents humanity.    
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 Yet, the exact effects of the politics of jurisdiction in the context of 
‘humanity’s law’ need further scrutiny. Here, three avenues for future research 
seem to be promising. Firstly, more research needs to be done on how 
jurisdictional projects expand, e.g., by means of new technology: what is the 
jurisdictional space of the digital? how do jurisdictional projects expand here? how 
is in particular spatiality, temporality and subjectivity framed (e.g., when it comes 
to algorithms)?1709 Secondly, one could look at other fields of ‘humanity’s law’ as 
well as at its boundary of ‘humanity’s law to other fields – and how thereby the 
very idea of ‘humanity’ is constructed in itself. Within ‘humanity’s law’, e.g., the 
recent expansion of international human rights law could be explored by 
scrutinizing the different uses of the concept of human rights (in particular, what 
counts as human right);1710 at the boundary of ‘humanity’s law’ one could, for 
instance, look at the boundary to the natural and life sciences (biolaw).1711 Thirdly, 
this thesis only touched upon the possible biopolitical effects and dark sides of the 
emergence and proliferation of jurisdictional projects in the context of ‘humanity’s 
law’ – in particular, as the concept of ‘humanity’ always beers the danger of a new 
politics of fundamental exclusion. 1712  But maybe, by way of conclusion, a 
reconstruction of the project(s) of ‘humanity’s law’ and the politics of humanity in 
international law can also be the vantage point for something more positive. Not 
by finding a better conceptualisation of humanity (and then failing in another 
attempt of finding a totality) but that a confrontation with the contradictions, blind 
spots and contingencies of the politics of humanity could start some interesting 
conversation about new projects of hope, aspiration and solidarity.1713 
                                                      
1709 See already Richard Thompson Ford, ‘Law and Borders’, Alabama Law Review 64 (2012): 123–
39. 
1710 This links also to a discussion of the ‘politics of rights’. See, in particular, Friedrich Kratochwil, 
The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), chap. 7–8. 
1711 See already Britta van Beers, Luigi Corrias, and Wouter Werner, eds., Humanity across 
International Law and Biolaw, 2014. 
1712 For a further exploration of the biopolitical effects of risk management in the context of 
humanitarian interventions see, for example, Laura Zanotti, Governing Disorder: UN Peace 
Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era (University Park: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), chap. 4. Taking a different angle, the most 
fundamental critique of an invocation of humanity in international politics is probably still: Carl 
Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, 4th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1997). For an attempt to ground the position of his Doktorvater in conceptual history: 
Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), 180–191. 
1713 In this regard, I always admired the writings of Richard Rorty, for whom the confrontation with 
the contingency of the human condition never gave reason for pessimism, fear and indifference. 
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See, for example, Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
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